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[1982] SLR (CA) 5Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

BERKO vs. THE REPUBLIC [1982-83] GLR 23

24 April 1982 · MENSA BOISON JA · ≈ 18 min read

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OSCOLABERKO v THE REPUBLIC [1982-83] GLR 23 [1982] SLR (CA) 5
APABERKO v THE REPUBLIC [1982-83] GLR 23, [1982] SLR (CA) 5 (Ghana).
BluebookBERKO v THE REPUBLIC [1982-83] GLR 23, [1982] SLR (CA) 5 (Ghana Ct. App. 1982).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) R. V. Matheson [1958] 1 W.L.R. 474; [1958] 2 All E.R. 87; 102 S.J. 309; 42 Cr. App.R. 145, C.C.A.

(2) R.V. Kwadwo Mensah [1959] G.L.R. 309, C.A.

(3) Kabre v. The State [1959] G.L.R. 770, C.A.

(4) Practice Note (State v. Amoh) [1961] G.L.R. 637, S.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL by the appellant against his conviction for manslaughter. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Mr. Adamafio for the appellant.

Mrs. Bamford Addo, Chief State Attorney, for the Republic.

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.

Mensa Boison J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. The appellant, Simon Adjei Berko, appeals against his conviction on 3 April 1981 for the manslaughter of Kwame Avodzivi before Amua-Sekyi J: at the High Court, Kumasi. He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment with hard labour. The point for decision is within a small compass, but it is necessary to set out the facts of the case in view of the form of learned counsel’s arguments.

The appellant was a serving soldier in the Ghana Army when on 10 July 1979 he arrived home at his village, Krofofrom near Ashanti

[p.26] of [1982-83] GLR 23 Juaben on leave. He was to lodge with his brother, K. Oppong, but the appellant had got himself settled in already before Oppong with the family returned from farm in the evening.

On the previous day an incident in which Oppong’s wife, Helen Nyarko, the first prosecution witness, was the victim of an attempted rape had been adjudged by the odikro (chief) of the village, resulting in an award of ¢40 pacification to Oppong as the husband. What had occurred was that on the day preceding the adjudication, the first prosecution witness had gone to farm, and at the end of the day’s work was digging up some yams for the house when the deceased, Kwame, turned up at the place. Seeing the first prosecution witness in some difficulty, Kwame offered and attempted to dig the yam for her; at the same time proposing love to the first prosecution witness.

Within a few minutes attempt, however, Kwame gave up the digging. So the first prosecution witness resumed the digging herself; but to her utter surprise Kwame brusquely seized her by the waist, and forcibly tried to strip her clothing off, with the obvious intent to have sexual connection with her. Despite her struggle and pleading that she was already heavy with a six-month old pregnancy by the husband, she was obliged to promise Kwame to wait till the next day, before she could free herself; Kwame warning her, on pain of his killing her, not to tell the husband.

Next day, in the evening, Kwame called at the first prosecution witness’ house, while she was in the kitchen cooking, and presented her with ¢10. The first prosecution witness promptly handed the money to a brother of the husband, Kweku Donkor, with a report of the indecent assault on her by Kwame the previous day in the bush. Thus it was that on the complaint by Oppong to the chief that evening, the deceased was adjudged “guilty” with a penalty of ¢40 as pacification.

The next day was when the appellant arrived home, and before night fall he had been told of the incident. He took exception to the odikro treating a case of attempted rape as a civil offence, and instantly went to see the odikro to inquire of the matter further. Apparently not satisfied with what was termed a “settlement” by the chief, the appellant sent for the deceased on the purported authority of the odikro. The deceased, accompanied by two relations, came at about 7 p.m. but was met outside by the appellant who led the deceased and his two relations to the appellant’s house instead. One of the men with the deceased, Kobla Agbanyo, gave evidence as the fourth prosecution witness.

At the house, the appellant, Berko, wanted to know from Kwame’s own mouth as to his attack on the first prosecution witness. But Kwame apparently denied attempting to have sexual connection

[p.27] of [1982-83] GLR 23 with the first prosecution witness; or threatening her with harm. Thereupon the appellant told the deceased that he was taking him (the deceased) to the police to lay a complaint.

What ensued was the foundation for the prosecution, and which is the subject of controversy and argument. It may best be given in the words of the two principal prosecution witnesses, Helen Nyarko, the first prosecution witness, and Kobla Agbanyo, the fourth prosecution witness. The first prosecution witness in her evidence said:

“The accused asked Kwame Avodzivi about the incident in the bush. It was then about 7 p.m. Kwame said the accused was talking nonsense, and that the matter had already been settled. He said the accused was making himself out as a cottage soldier. Kwame held the accused by his clothes on his chest. I was then sitting and so was my husband. The rest were standing. Kwame and the accused began to fight.

The two were separated. My husband held the accused, Kwame’s brother held him back. Kwame would not agree. He said he would fight the accused. When Kwame held the accused’s shirt the accused pushed Kwame and hit him. The two of them fought. It was just as the fight began that the two were separated. After the separation Kwame’s brother took him away. While at home my husband came later to report that Kwame had collapsed. It was about fifteen minutes after they had left. My husband advised the accused to go for a vehicle to convey Kwame to hospital. Later in the night I was woken up and told Kwame was dead.”

Later the first prosecution witness explained:

“As Kwame was being taken away and was trying to release himself from his brothers he slipped and fell in some water on the ground at the back of the house. Kwame died in the house of an Ewe man at Krofofrom.

He himself lived at another village.”

The account of the fourth prosecution witness is as follows:

“On the way we met Yaw Berko (the accused) and another… Berko and Darkwa followed us. Near the town Berko told us it was he, and not the chief, who wanted us. He asked us to accompany him to his house. We went with him to his house. I and Kwame Avodzivi went . . . At the house Berko questioned Kwame about the woman. It was in Berko’s brother’s house. Kwame said he knew the woman. Berko asked Kwame if there was anything between him and the woman. Kwame said even if there was anything between them the matter had already been settled . . . Berko, asked the woman if there was anything

[p.28] of [1982-83] GLR 23 between them.

She said Kwame proposed love to her and had given her money, which she had given to her husband. She explained that her husband took the money to the chief and Kwame was summoned to appear before the chief. Berko asked Kwame to remove his shirt and he said he would beat him. Kwame refused. Berko tried to remove the shirt of Kwame. Kwame pulled his shirt down. Berko left the shirt and started to beat Kwame with his fists and also a stick. The stick got broken.

When Berko went in search of another stick Kwame ran away. As he was running Darkwa trapped (tripped)

Kwame and he fell down. Berko came in and kicked Kwame with his foot in the ribs. Berko then used his foot to stamp on Kwame. He stamped him on the side of the chest. He was stamping him. Berko was wearing a “guarantee” shoes. This went on for about one minute.

Berko’s brother and Darkwa took Kwame to the house of one Kwesi Addai… At Kwasi Addai’s house the woman’s husband poured water on Kwame. Kwesi Addai asked them to leave his house. They took Kwame to the Ewe chief’s house.

He was taken there by Kwaku Pen and Darkwa. Kwame was then dead. He died in Kwesi Addai’s house.”

The appellant’s version on oath, while to some extent admitting an exchange of just one blow each in the house, completely denied the account of the fourth prosecution witness. In particular, the appellant denied chasing and beating up the deceased outside the house. Having confronted Kwame with the first prosecution witness, the appellant told kwame that he was taking him to the police. But as Kwame’s stand was that the case had been settled and so refused to go, the appellant held Kwame by the waist.

Kwame then hit him on the shoulder and in the face, in trying to free himself from the appellant’s grip. The appellant thereupon hit Kwame back with his fist; but only once, as someone then held the appellant’s hand. At the same moment, Kwame’s brothers with him pulled Kwame out of his hold and took Kwame out of the house. The appellant did not pursue the escaping group outside, but he observed that, together with Kwame, the group had fallen down at a bathing place, at the back of the house, which was always wet and slippery, before they managed to pick themselves up and went away.

It was after he had taken his bath that Oppong came later to inform him that Kwame had become unconscious. When the appellant went to the house where Kwame had been taken, he found Kwame lying down soaked in water that apparently had been poured on him. The appellant’s successful effort in securing an army vehicle from Kumasi, with a view to conveying Kwame to hospital was too late an endeavour to be of use as Kwame had died before the vehicle arrived.

[p.29] of [1982-83] GLR 23

At the trial, the pathologist’s opinion was that death was due to severe chest and abdominal injuries, as could have been caused by some one stamping on the chest, particularly on the sterum, while the victim was asleep or unconscious.

First to be argued against the conviction was the ground that the evidence of the two prosecution eye-witnesses was in conflict, and that the learned trial judge erred by non-direction thereon.

The evidence referred to is that of the first prosecution witness and the fourth prosecution witness as quoted above. It is clear that the first prosecution witness spoke only of occurrences at the scene inside the house. To that extent the fourth prosecution witness’ evidence was substantially the same. But besides that, the fourth prosecution witness testified to events that took place outside the house. Conflict as used by counsel is intended to suggest that the two prosecution witnesses gave contradictory evidence on the one and the same event, and therefore the fourth prosecution witness was untruthful. But this was a case where the two witnesses for the prosecution gave an account from their respective points of view. Both were in the house and their account of events at that stage were substantially the same.

In any case, the fight that took place in the house was of no consequence with regard to the injuries suffered by the deceased. Of the events that occurred thereafter, the first prosecution witness confessed that she was not present outside the house to witness them. It may well be that as a sister-in-law of the appellant, her conspicuous absence was the only way out of her predicament; but that was her unchallenged evidence — that she stayed back in the house and did not follow the men out of the house. It is, however, significant that the first prosecution witness did not say that the appellant also stayed back with her in the house, as Kwame and his party went out.

The prosecution evidence of events at the scene outside the house comes solely from the fourth prosecution witness. As quoted above, it was there that the deceased was tripped to the ground by Darkwa, a brother of the appellant. The deceased was lying on the ground when the appellant kicked him about, and stamped upon him on the chest with the appellant’s “guarantee” shoes on. This part of the evidence of the fourth prosecution witness was about incidents out of the view of the first prosecution witness who gave no evidence of those incidents. The omission of those events cannot be said to be in conflict with the evidence of the fourth prosecution witness at that scene.

Now the evidence of the fourth prosecution witness on the events outside the house became most relevant in view of the post-mortem findings of the injuries sustained by the deceased. The pathologist found that:

[p.30] of [1982-83] GLR 23

“There were fractures at the second to the right (sic) ribs on the right side of the chest. Also fracture of the first to eighth ribs on the left side of the chest, including the collar bone. The left pleural cavity contained about a little (sic) of blood. There was laceration in the upper lobe of the left lung. Heart was normal. In the abdomen there was about two pints of blood with associated rupture of the spleen. Brain, kidneys and all other organs were normal.”

These findings, if believed by the jury, as the jury appear to have done, amply corroborated the evidence of the fourth prosecution witness of the violent kicks and stampings inflicted on the deceased by the appellant at the scene outside the house. Indeed, when the deceased’s companions picked him up to the nearby house of Kwasi Addai, Kwame must have already been near death. That explains why Kwasi Addai asked the party to leave his house, for fear of being implicated in any police affair.

Together with the pathologist’s opinion as to the cause of death (supra) the direction as indicated by the notes of the trial judge on this aspect of the evidence though terse was, in our opinion, fair and adequate. Indeed, in one particular regard it was unduly favourable to the appellant. This is what the notes say:

“I referred to the expert evidence as to the cause of death, and said that I agreed with counsel for the accused that the jury were not bound to accept it. I told them it was for them to accept or reject that evidence. If they accepted it and also the evidence of Agbanyo, the fourth prosecution witness, as to how the injuries occurred, they would be entitled to return a verdict of guilty of manslaughter. If however, they rejected the expert evidence then the proper verdict would be one of not guilty.”

The above indicates a direction to the jury on the evidence of the pathologist as related to the evidence of the fourth prosecution witness, the only eye-witness for the prosecution as to how the injuries on the deceased were caused. There was no reason or necessity for the learned trial judge to direct on any conflicts; because the first prosecution witness did not testify on those incidents at all.

Before we finally dispose of this ground, we must make the point that to tell a jury that “they were not bound to accept the medical evidence, and that it was for the jury to accept or reject that evidence” was in our opinion putting the matter too simply. Such a direction lacks any guidance to the jury for an analytical approach to the evidence of the doctor. Put the way it was, the jury might capriciously have rejected the expert evidence, without giving it due weight. We think that the specialised knowledge of the expert should duly be

[p.31] of [1982-83] GLR 23 pointed out, and that where such evidence was unchallenged, as in the instant case, the jury of [1982-83] GLR 23-33 may only reject it upon very good reasons. We adopt with approval the principle of law as stated in R.v. Matheson (1958) 42 Cr.App.R. 145 at p. 151, by Goddard C.J., delivering the judgment of a court of five, where the issue was that of diminished responsibility:

“While it has often been emphasised, and we would repeat, that the decision in these cases, as in those in which insanity is pleaded, is for the jury and not for doctors, the verdict must be founded on evidence. If there are facts which would entitle a jury to reject or differ from the opinions of the medical men, this court would not, and indeed could not, disturb their verdict, but if the doctors’ evidence is unchallenged and there is no other on this issue, a verdict contrary to their opinion would not be ‘a true verdict in accordance with the evidence.”

The same principle of law has been applied by our courts. In R. v. Kwadwo Mensah [1959] G.L.R. 309 Granville Sharp J.A., delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, stated at pp. 311-312, C.A.:

“It is not the function of a medical witness to decide the issue of insanity. Such an issue is an issue of fact, and it is therefore for the jury to decide it after consideration of all the circumstances disclosed to them, including the nature of the evidence of experts (or an expert) in mental diseases. In our view, however, it is of extreme importance that the jury should be fully, clearly and carefully directed upon such an issue, so that they may be able to bring to its consideration analytical, clear and impartial minds.”

See also Kabre v. The State [1966] G.L.R. 770, C.A. We think the principle as illustrated in these cases of issues of mental sanity, equally applies to cases where the issue relates to cause of death arising from bodily injuries. As it happened that the direction erred in favour of the appellant, the misdirection has not affected our opinion that the ground of appeal should fail.

Next to be argued was the ground that there was substantial miscarriage of justice occasioned by the failure of the learned trial judge to define the offence of manslaughter. It was submitted that without the definition and explanation of the elements of the offence as created by section 51 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29) the jury were left to their own imagination as to whether the charge was proved or not. The relevant provision is section 277 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30) which provides that: “When in a trial before a jury, the case on both sides is closed, the Judge shall, if necessary sum up the law and evidence in the case.”

[p.32] of [1982-83] GLR 23

Although the section appears to be discretionary we think the cases would be very rare indeed, where a trial judge would think it unnecessary to sum up the law and the evidence to any jury in this country. In fact, the section has been interpreted to impose a compelling duty on a trial judge.

A Supreme Court Practice Note dated 6 November 1961 (joint judgment of Sarkodee-Addo, Adumua-Bossman and Azu Crabbe JJ.S.C.) arising out of the case of State v. Amoh [1961] G.L.R. 637 referring to section 277 (supra) points out:

“The section appears to use language which confers a discretion, but we are of the opinion that the expression ‘shall, if necessary,’ has compelling effect. The duty of the trial judge to sum up the law and the evidence is not less imperative by reference to the exercise of a discretion, and we think that the duty to sum up, especially in a trial for a capital crime, is as obligatory as it would have been if the words ‘if necessary’ had been omitted from the section.”

State v. Kwame Amoh (Supra) was a case of murder, but we think an imperative duty equally applies to all felonies heinous enough for the law to require a jury trial, as in this case of manslaughter.

The cardinal principles of law on the essential elements of the crime of manslaughter are stated in various sections of the Code. A summing-up of the law therefore should bring to the attention of the jury the definitions by way of explanation of the various sections. The “Notes of summing-up,” in the present case is very short – a page and a half of typed script. The proceeding in court records “summing-up commences at 2 p.m.; summing-up closes at 3.10 p.m.” – a span of one whole hour plus. It is conceivable, as experience shows, that the actual oral summing-up covered more ground than what appears in script. And in this we are prepared to assume that the learned judge would not have omitted the definition or explanation of the relevant provisions.

However, the omission of these from the “Notes of summing-up” puts counsel arguing the appeal in difficulty. He was ready to concede the presumption of the judge’s knowledge of the law; but for the unexpressed direction, of what might well have been in fact said by the learned judge, counsel had no means of criticising or commending his approval in advancing the appellant’s case. We think it desirable that even in cases where only “notes,” and not a full summing-up, are available sufficient indication should be given of the principles of law relating to the charge on which the jury were, in fact, directed.

On the facts of this case, the appellant would be guilty of manslaughter under section 51 of Act 29, if he caused the death of the

[p.33] of [1982-83] GLR 23 deceased by any unlawful harm. The real issue raised by the appellant’s defence was on the essential ingredient of whether the harm caused by him was unlawful. The appellant’s justification was that he was effecting the arrest of the deceased for the commission of the offence of attempted rape or threat of harm. On that issue the learned judge’s “notes” states the direction given thus:

“I pointed out that from the evidence of the accused it appeared there was no police station at Krofofrom, the nearest being at Boankra or Ejisu, and also that motor vehicles went to Krofofrom infrequently. It seemed unlikely that the accused would have believed he would have handed over the deceased to any police officer at that time of night. I explained that while the law recognised the right of all citizens to arrest any person they reasonably suspected of having committed an offence such as rape or attempted rape it did not permit lynching…”

We are of opinion that the above, in the light of the facts, sufficiently explained to the jury that the injuries caused by the appellant would have been justified, and therefore not unlawful, if the jury found the harm as having been caused in exercise of the appellant’s right to arrest a “felon.” This ground likewise fails.

Besides other grounds argued, but not of such substance as to be discussed here, we ourselves have examined with care the evidence and we are satisfied that the verdict of guilty of manslaughter was fully supported by the evidence. It is clear from the evidence that the deceased was unequally matched with the appellant, and conscious of this advantage the appellant assaulted the deceased with the callous brutality of a bully until the life was well nigh snuffed out of the deceased. We think the sentence of two years’ imprisonment with hard labour was on the low side, and we do not interfere with it.

The appeal against conviction is accordingly dismissed.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

D. R. K. S.

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