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[1982] SLR (CA) 9Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

DZADE vs. ABOAGYE [1982-83] GLR 209

17 May 1982 · EDUSEI JA · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1982] SLR (CA) 9
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OSCOLADZADE v ABOAGYE [1982-83] GLR 209 [1982] SLR (CA) 9
APADZADE v ABOAGYE [1982-83] GLR 209, [1982] SLR (CA) 9 (Ghana).
BluebookDZADE v ABOAGYE [1982-83] GLR 209, [1982] SLR (CA) 9 (Ghana Ct. App. 1982).

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CASE REFERRED TO

Dove v. Wuta-Ofei [1966] G.L.R. 299, S.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from a decision of the Circuit Court, Accra, upholding the respondent’s claim to a piece of land on which the appellant had erected a building. The facts are set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Monica Quayson (Mrs.) for the appellant.

E. D. Kom (with him Gbeho) for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.

This is an appeal from the judgment of his Honour the Circuit Judge, Mr. Dove, as he then was, when he granted to the

[p.211] of [1982-83 ]GLR 209 plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) a declaration of title to a parcel of land at Kotobabi, together with certain ancillary reliefs. This was on 17 September 1979.

The chief complaint of the defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) as can be gleaned from his grounds of appeal, may be summarised under two heads, namely: (a) that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence, and (b) that the trial judge faulted in his failure to apply the provisions of section 2 of the Land Development (Protection of Purchasers) Act, 1960 (Act 2), in favour of the defendant.

The facts in this case are not seriously in dispute. The plaintiff based his case on a conveyance he took from Alfred Kateinor Ocansey who in turn had the land conveyed to him from Kwabla Noi Sekan in March 1972. This conveyance was registered as number 606/1972 and it is exhibit A. This land in dispute forms part of Osu stool land as declared by the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 29 November 1960; and it covers a large tract of land at Maamobi, Kotobabi, and Dzorwulu: Thus the plaintiff traces his root of title from the Osu stool. In a nutshell there was a conveyance of the land from Nii Dowuona V, Osu Mantse, to Kwabla Noi Sekan in 1967 evidencing a customary grant made in 1939 (see exhibit 1); there was then a conveyance (exhibit A) of the same parcel of land in March 1972 from Kwabla Noi Sekan to Alfred Kateinor Ocansey who in turn conveyed the land in June 1972 to Julius Aboagye, the plaintiff. This conveyance is exhibit B registered as No. 1883/1975.

The defendant’s case is that he acquired his land in 1976 from the Osu Mantse, Nii Nortei Owuo III, who executed a document for him, but this document was not put in evidence at the trial.

It is interesting to observe on the admission of the defendant himself that he never registered or stamped the document, nor did he make any search at the Lands Department to ascertain whether the land granted him in 1976 was encumbered or not. In spite of all these he proceeded to construct a building on the plot. The defendant in evidence said:

“I gave the whole thing to a surveyor to do everything for me. He is called Tetteh. He said he would go to Town Planning and if it is approved I can start building before I stamp and register the document. I accompanied Tetteh to the Town Planning Department one day for my house plan. They approved that I should carry on with the building. I had a building permit from the city engineer.”

The matter to consider here also is whether approval from the Town Planning Authority of the building permit from the city engineer

[p.212] of [1982-83 ]GLR 209 confers any title on the defendant. The answer is clearly in the negative, and it is a notorious fact that these two authorities always intimate on their documents that their approval or grant of a building permit does not confer any legal title of the land on the holder of such a document. In these circumstances can it be said that the defendant had any title to the land on which he proceeded to construct his building? I think not.

The next question that falls for determination is whether on the facts as revealed by the evidence, the trial judge fell into error in not applying the provisions of section 2 (1) of Act 2. It is provided by section 2 (1) of Act 2 that:

“2. (1) Where – (a) a person (in this section referred to as the purchaser) took a conveyance of land in a prescribed area at some time after 31st December, 1944 and before the date on which the area became a prescribed area, and (b) the purchaser, or a person claiming through him, in good faith erected a building on the land, and (c)a possession order was made in relation to the land in proceedings finally disposed of before the date on which the area became a prescribed area, and was so made by reason that the conveyance taken by the purchaser did not operate to confer on him the title to the land, the person against whom the possession order was made may, at any time within twelve months after the date on which the area became a prescribed area, apply to the High Court for an order under this section.”

It is abundantly clear that before a purchaser can claim the benefit of the section under consideration he must pass two tests, namely (i) that he must have taken a conveyance of the land on which he built, and a conveyance of course includes a customary grant, and (ii) the construction of the building on the land must have been done in good faith. I therefore pose the question: did the defendant take a conveyance of the land on which he built? There is no evidence of conveyance, either by a document or was there any customary grant made to him. It is doubted whether the defendant, a non-Osu citizen, could acquire Osu land by a customary grant. The defendant fails in this first test, and this should settle the dispute.

But assuming that he took a conveyance of the land in dispute, can it be said on the evidence that he acted in good faith? The expression “good faith” is not defined in the Act but it has been considered in the illustrious case of Dove v. Wuta-Ofei [1966] G.L.R. 299, S.C. At p. 314 of that judgment Apaloo J.S.C. (as he then was) said:

[p.213] of [1982-83 ]GLR 209

“ . . . I cannot see how a man can be said to have erected a building in good faith if he thought or had grounds for believing that his title to the land was not in order . . . [I]t seems to me only natural, that the Act should require that the purchaser, to avail himself of the statutory protection, should have acted honestly and reasonably at the date of the original acquisition of the land, and having so acted should have believed in the validity of his title.”

When the defendant went to the Osu Mantse for the execution of the so-called conveyance, did he honestly believe that he had acquired a valid title to the land? Did the defendant satisfy himself that there had been no previous grant of the land? He says that he did not make a search; he says he did not have the document given him stamped and registered. He says he acquired the land in 1976 but this action was commenced on 16 March 1978. I ask again, what precluded him from stamping and registering the document before completion of the building. The Osu Mantse, Nii Nortei Owuo III who was the defendant’s only witness, said that no records of previous grants made by the Osu stool were kept by the stool, and this in my view should have put the defendant on his guard to make a search. I share the view of the trial judge when he opined that the defendant’s conduct:

“… In starting the building even before he had obtained a building permit is suspicious. The defendant’s attitude seems to be: ‘Let’s get a building on the land first and that would take care of everything; the defendant cannot say that he believed honestly that he had title to the land.”

I would add that he did not behave reasonably in the circumstances. The construction of the building by the defendant was not done in good faith; there was mala fide on his part and he must suffer for this.

In conclusion, I think the judgment appealed from is right and it should not be disturbed. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

JUDGMENT OF JIAGGE J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.

I also agree.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

J. A. A.

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