KARMAH vs. MANZA [1982-83] GLR 1159
19 March 1982 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 18 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Newcomb v. Bonham (1681) 1 Vern. 7; Freem. Ch. 67; 2 Cas. in Ch. 58; 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 313; 22 E.R 1068 on appeal sub nom. Bonham v. Newcomb (1684) 2 Vent 364; 1 Vern. 232, H.L.
(2) Santley v. Wilde [1899] 2 Ch. 474; 68 L.J.Ch. 681; 81 L.T. 393; 48 W.R. 90; 15 T.L.R. 528, C.A.
(3) Courtenay v. Wright (1860) 2 Giff. 337; 30 L.J. Ch.31; 3 L.T. 433; 6 Jur. (N.S.) 1283; 9 W.R. 153;
66 E.R. 141. (4) Howard v. Harris (1863) 1 Vern. 190; 2 Cas. in Ch. 147; 1 Eq. Cas. Asr. 312;
Freem. Ch. 86; 23 E.R. 406.
(5) Seton v. Slade; Hunter v. Seton (1802) 7 Ves. 265; 32 E.R. 108, L.C.
(6) Asare v. Brobbey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 331, C.A.
(7) Phillips v. Copping [1935] 1 K.B. 15; 104 L.J.K.B. 78; 152 L.T. 175; 50 T.L.R. 533; 78 S.J. 617, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION by originating summons for the determination of the rights of the parties under a mortgage deed. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Kobena Acquaye for the plaintiff.
Ebow Bentsi-Enchill for the defendant.
JUDGMENT OF ANSAH-TWUM J.
By an originating summons the plaintiff claims from the defendant herein, the following reliefs:
“1. Redemption of house No. 130/3, Kwesimintsim Zongo, near Takoradi.
2. Re-conveyance of house No. 130/3, Kwesimintsim Zongo, near Takoradi to the plaintiff.
3. Delivery of possession by the mortgagee defendant, to the mortgagor plaintiff.
4. An order for an account.”
By his affidavit in support of the summons filed on 16 December 1980, the plaintiff claims that he did on 1 September 1970 mortgage his house No. 130/3 Kwesimintsim to the defendant, as mortgagee to secure the sum of ¢1,080 which he owed the defendant. Apparently, the plaintiff could not redeem the property and upon an application by the defendant herein, an order for possession issued by the circuit court on 13 March 1971 was sealed in favour of the defendant. The defendant did immediately thereafter move into possession of the said house and has ever since remained in possession of the premises comprising nine rooms. The plaintiff has made attempts to redeem the property without success, even after due notice offering to pay ¢2,160
[p.1162] of [1982-83] GLR 1159 being the principal debt plus other expenses and interest, at the rate of ten per cent. The plaintiff is therefore now ready and willing to pay every pesewa due on the mortgage and redeem his said house from the defendant herein.
Paragraph 11 of the defendant’s affidavit in opposition reads as follows:
“11. That even though possession of the said house was granted to the defendant on the grounds of a mortgage, which was denied by the plaintiff, the defendant has since relied on the plaintiff’s concurrent offer of forfeiture of the security and the defendant has accepted the property in satisfaction of the debt over due, upon the plaintiff’s default in payment of the amount due and owing.
Indeed the defendant has already spent about ¢10,000 in making cement blocks alone, for the improvement of the property.”
The defendant contends further that the plaintiff had waived any rights he might have had under the mortgage deed and the plaintiff is therefore estopped from making the claim he is presently making.
The main question therefore is, was there ever a valid mortgage deed executed between the parties herein in respect of the house in question? Secondly, if there was ever any such mortgage, has the plaintiff lost his right of redemption under the mortgage deed? It seems to me that we must at this stage examine the document, exhibit 1, which the plaintiff exhibited as the mortgage deed he referred to in his affidavit in support of the summons. There is no doubt whatsoever that the document filed by the plaintiff as exhibit 1 is a mortgage deed. Some of the first words of this deed read as follows, among other things, “This mortgage is made 1 September 1970 between Kwesi Karmah… called the mortgagor . . . and Ewuah Manza trader . . . called the mortgagee . . .” Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the recital runs thus:
“2. Whereas the mortgagor is indebted to the mortgagee for advance made to him making a total sum of ¢1,080.
3. Whereas the mortgagee has agreed to forbear to press for payment of the said sum of ¢1,080 for two months from 1 September 1970 to 31 October 1970 on having the payment thereof secured in the manner hereinafter appearing:
And the operative part of the deed provided respectively:
“1. (a) In pursuance of the said agreement and in consideration of the sum of ¢1.080 owing to the mortgagee as aforesaid the mortgagor hereby covenants with the mortgagee to
[p.1163] of [1982-83] GLR 1159 pay the said sum of ¢1,080 to the mortgagee before 31 October 1970 . . .
(c) If the mortgagor shall on 31 October 1970 have paid to the mortgagee the sum of ¢1,080 as ought to be paid under the foregoing covenant, the term hereby created shall cease.
6. If default shall be made in payment of any sum or sums of money due under this security or any part thereof the mortgagee may at any time thereafter enter into and upon the mortgaged premises or any part thereof and shall thenceforth during the term hereby granted quietly possess and enjoy the same and receive the rents and profits thereof without any lawful eviction, interruption, disturbance, claim or demand from or by the mortgagor or any other person or persons whomsoever AND THAT IN SUCH EVENT the mortgagor will effectually free and discharge the mortgaged premises or indemnify and keep the mortgagee indemnified against all estates, encumbrances, claims and demands whatsoever.”
Now the term created by this mortgage as contained in paragraph 9(b) provides:
“For the consideration aforesaid the mortgagor as beneficial owner hereby demises unto the mortgagee all that property described in the schedule hereto, together with all the buildings thereon to hold the same unto the mortgagee for the remaining term of years contained in the lease from the date hereof without impeachment of waste subject to the proviso for cesser hereinafter contained.”
It is significant to note here that the lease under which the plaintiff obtained the piece of land in question was dated 2 October 1969 and it was for a period of 99 years so when the mortgage in question was executed in September 1970, the lease created on 2 October 1969 had about 98 years to run, and it was this that was therefore mortgaged.
Now what the defendant seems to be saying is that since the plaintiff failed to redeem the house in question by 31 October 1970, he automatically forfeited his right to redemption under the deed and cannot now come forward to pay the amount due for the recovery of the premises. Counsel for the defendant has therefore submitted that the court should rather go into the substance of the transaction, this being an action on mortgage. That the substance of the transaction does not disclose a mortgage property so-called, it is a sale with an action for repurchase, counsel submits. Counsel submits further that this is a case in which an early fraud by the plaintiff was detected. The plaintiff therefore gave his said house to the defendant to secure
[p.1164] of [1982-83] GLR 1159 payment of the amount involved within two months. This is therefore neither a mortgage nor lending transaction at all; it was an absolute sale with only a reserved right to repurchase within a given period.
Counsel did not state the specified period he referred to here but he submitted further that the transaction took place in September 1970 and it is now, therefore, too late in the day for the plaintiff to ask to be permitted to repurchase the house, since he could only have done so, it seems, within two months from 1 September 1970. Counsel submits further that in April 1972 there was an interpleader suit in respect of this same house by the defendant who was then in possession, to protect her interest in the property. (Judgment of the interpleader proceedings has been tendered as exhibit B.) There is further submission that when the plaintiff failed to refund the money within two months he lost the property forever.
Counsel for the plaintiff, Mr. Acquaye, has expressed surprise that Mr. Bentsi-Enchill, counsel for the defendant, who prepared exhibit 1 is now saying that exhibit 1 is not a mortgage deed. He submits it does not lie in Mr. Bentsi-Enchill’s mouth to say that exhibit 1 is not a mortgage deed. Counsel refers to paragraph 6 of the deed, exhibit 1, and submits that this estops the defendant from saying that this is not a mortgage deed. It being a mortgage the mortgagor can redeem same within twelve years from the date of execution. Counsel submits, even though the defendant has denied it, that there is credible evidence that the required notice of intention to redeem was given to the defendant by the plaintiff before the commencement of this action.
I am satisfied from the evidence before me that the plaintiff did give the defendant sufficient notice of his intention to redeem the property in question. I am also satisfied that this was purely a mortgage transaction prepared by a lawyer who knew what he was engaged to do and he did carry out his instructions by drawing up the deed, exhibit 1, as a mortgage deed. A mortgage transaction carries all the incidents of a mortgage. It is said that once a mortgage always a mortgage. The transaction between the parties herein was a legal mortgage whereby the plaintiff secured himself for the payment of the sum of ¢1.080 to the defendant with his house in question at Kwesimintsim near Takoradi. It was a legal mortgage of an estate in land and I shall, at the appropriate time in this judgment, consider the effect of the Land Registration Act, 1962 (Act 122), on the transaction before me. By a legal mortgage of this nature the mortgagee may be put in possession of the property but the mortgagor’s legal estate in the reversion of the term of years is not transferred to the mortgagee until the mortgagor loses his right of redemption by foreclosure or sale or otherwise: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 27, p. 156, para. 239, where the following appears:
[p.1165] of [1982-83] GLR 1159
“The effect of a legal mortgage by demise is to vest the legal estate in the term of years thereby created in the mortgagee, who unless the deed expressly provides for possession by the mortgagor until default, is immediately entitled upon the execution of the deed to possession of property; but the mortgagor’s legal estate in the reversion of the term of years is not transferred to the mortgagee until the right of redemption is destroyed by foreclosure or sale or otherwise.”
It seems to me that not until the right of redemption has been lost by effective foreclosure, or proper and lawful sale or otherwise, the mortgagor can redeem the property so mortgaged by paying fully the mortgage debt and other expenses actually and lawfully incurred in respect of the mortgaged property by the mortgagee. For the right of redemption is not lost merely because the mortgagor has failed to pay the mortgage debt as agreed upon in the deed: see again Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 27, p. 157, para. 243 for the following:
“Incident to every mortgage is the right of the mortgage or to redeem, a right which is called his equity of redemption, and which continues notwithstanding that the mortgagor fails to pay the debt in accordance with the proviso for redemption. This right arises from the transaction being considered as a mere loan of money secured by a pledge of the estate. Any provision inserted in the mortgage to prevent redemption on payment of the debt or performance of the obligation for which the security was given is termed a clog or fetter on the equity of redemption, and is void.
See also Newcomb v. Bonham (1681) 1 Vern. 7 at p. 8 and Santley v. Wilde [1899] 2 Ch. 474, C.A. And no agreement between mortgagor and mortgagee contained in the mortgage can make a mortgage irredeemable: see Courtenay v. Wright (1860) 2 Giff. 337 and Howard v. Harris (1863) 1 Vern. 190 where a restriction of redemption to the heirs male of the body did not prevent the mortgagor from redeeming. For what the position was at common law and in equity: see also Seton v. Slade; Hunter v. Seton (1802) 7 Ves. 265 at p. 273.
It seems to me that from the very terms of the mortgage deed, the plaintiff was to remain in possession of the house as mortgagor until 31 October 1970, when the mortgagee, the defendant, could take up possession in the event of the mortgagor’s failure to redeem by that date. The mortgagee did therefore upon the mortgagor’s default to redeem as agreed apply to the court for possession and obtained same. It is even doubtful that in view of the provision of the provision of section 24(1) of the Lands Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122), that order for possession was
[p.1166] of [1982-83] GLR 1159 effective. However, it is my view that when the mortgagee went into possession, she took it subject to the mortgagor’s right of redemption which had thereby not been destroyed. Learned counsel’s submission that failure to redeem by 31 October 1970 amounted to forfeiture of the property is not, in my view, the correct statement of the law.
Counsel again submitted that this was not a mortgage transaction but a sale with an option for repurchase where the plaintiff would not have a right of redemption. So as stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 27, p. 159, para. 245:
“If an intended arrangement is not a lending and borrowing transaction but an absolute sale, accompanied by a contemporaneous agreement for repurchase or a stipulation that the conveyance should be void upon payment of a certain sum at a fixed time, this does not entitle the vendor to such a right to redeem as is incidental to a mortgage, but creates a mere right of repurchase to be exercised in accordance with the terms of the power. The question always is – was the original transaction a bona fide sale with a contract for repurchase, or was it a mortgage under the form of a sale? In the former case the condition for repurchase is construed strictly against the vendor, and where there is time limited for the purchase it must be precisely observed.”
Here the recitals in the deed state, among other things, that the mortgagor is indebted to the mortgagee for advances made to him making a total sum of ¢1,080. This, obviously, is not meant to be purchase money, but money advanced or lent to the mortgagor which the mortgagee expects repayment to her. In fact, it was for the lender’s forbearance to press for immediate payment that the mortgage deed was executed to the effect that should the plaintiff default in making payment of the said sum of ¢1,080, being the amount advanced, then the mortgagee — defendant, could move into possession as she did. There was therefore no sale of the plaintiff’s said house to the defendant with an option for repurchases as the defendant contends. It was a pure case of a legal mortgage with all the incidents appertaining thereto, and which could be redeemed within twelve years, being the period of limitation. All that the mortgagor was in law bound in this case to do after default had been made in payment of the mortgage debt, in accordance with the proviso for redemption, was to give the mortgagee due notice of his intention to pay off the mortgage debt. I am satisfied from the evidence before me that due notice was here given by the mortgagor or the mortgagee, and therefore the plaintiff is within his right to bring this action, the defendant having refused to accept payment as tendered.
[p.1167] of [1982-83] GLR 1159
Another piece of evidence which takes the matter out of the realms of doubt is the proceedings in the case: Madam Ewuah Manza v. Kwesi Karmah (the very parties in this suit) filed here by the plaintiff mortgagor as exhibit 2. Mr. Bentsi-Enchill who there appeared for Ewuah Manza as the plaintiff, applied for an order for possession after the mortgagor, i.e. the plaintiff herein, had defaulted in paying off the mortgage debt. The matter went before the Circuit Court, Takoradi on 9 March 1971 and Ewuah Manza testifying on oath before his Honour Judge Isaac Amuah (as he then was) had the following to say:
“I am an akpeteshie seller, residing at Takoradi. I know the defendant herein. He owes me ¢1,080. The defendant invited me to buy a building which he did not sell to me. As a result I demanded the sum of ¢1.080 which I gave him. He agreed to pay to me and mortgaged his property against the debt. A document was prepared. I am asking for an order to take possession of the house [document was shown to court].”
And the court made the following order:
I have examined the document. Under clause 6 of the said document the plaintiff is empowered to take possession of the said premises in the event of a default in payment.
Having heard counsel and the plaintiff on the issue I am satisfied that the plaintiff is entitled to the order sought. I therefore grant an order for possession with immediate effect.”
It is significant to note that the defendant herein did not in that case, as the plaintiff, allege any fraud on the part of the plaintiff in this present case. Neither did she allege that there had been a sale of the plaintiff’s said house to her and that she therefore wanted transfer of same to her. There, her evidence left no room for any doubt whatsoever, that the transaction between the parties was purely a mortgage transaction. It does not therefore now lie in the defendant’s mouth to say that this was not a mortgage transaction. I am satisfied, therefore, that the plaintiff is entitled to redeem the house in question having rejected the defendant’s claim that this was a sale transaction with an option to repurchase. The plaintiff could therefore succeed on this issue alone.
But it appears there is another point of law which, though not raised by either party in this matter, adversely operates against the defendant’s interest. It appears that the mortgage deed, exhibit 1, filed by the plaintiff, was not, and has not been duly registered. It would appear that it could not effectively pass title in the property to the mortgagee. Being an instrument affecting an interest in land non-
[p.1168] of [1982-83] GLR 1159 registration of it renders it ineffective, and the purported order for possession of the premises made in favour of the defendant herein by his Honour Judge Amuah on 9 March 1971, was so made contrary to the express provisions of section 24(1) of the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122) which provides:
“24. (1) Subject to subsection (2), of this section, an instrument other than, (a) a will, or (b) a judge’s certificate, first executed after the commencement of this Act shall be of no effect until it is registered.
It seems to me that since the mortgage deed, exhibit 1, was not registered, the circuit court ought not have entertained that application for an order of possession which was being sought contrary to the provisions of section 24(1) of Act 122. The order which was therefore made upon the strength of that unregistered mortgage deed was a nullity and was of no legal effect and consequence whatsoever, even though this point of law was never raised when the circuit court was called upon to make that order. And again it has not been raised here when this court is being called upon to give effect to the order for possession made in favour of the defendant herein, based upon an unregistered mortgage deed, by holding that the mortgagor’s failure to redeem in accordance with the proviso for redemption in that instrument, destroyed the mortgagor’s equity of redemption and passed the property to the mortgagee, I think it is my duty in the interest of justice to take the point myself, and hold as I do, that the order for possession made on 9 March 1971, by the learned circuit judge, giving possession of the house in question to the defendant herein, was a nullity.
Having been made contrary to the express provision of section 24 (1) of Act 122 it was of no legal consequence and therefore conveyed no interest whatsoever in the property to the defendant herein. The true position as viewed by the law is that no such order has ever been made at all, or that even if it is deemed to have been made, it was rendered ineffectual under the Act and conferred no interest or title whatsoever: see Asare v. Brobbey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 331, C.A. In that case the appellant obtained a loan from the first respondent who was a money-lender. He mortgaged his house as security for the loan. When he defaulted in repaying the loan, the second respondent, an auctioneer, on the instructions of the first respondent, sold the house at a public auction to the third respondent. The appellant by an action in the High Court sought to set aside the sale on the ground, inter alia, that no notice as required by the terms of the mortgage deed had been given to him before the sale. Counsel for the appellant in his final
[p.1169] of [1982-83] GLR 1159 address to the court for the first time submitted that as the mortgage deed was not registered under section 24 of Act 122, the power of sale was illegally exercised. It was held (as stated in the headnote) at p. 332 that:
“(2) Since the mortgage deed was not registered at the time the power of sale was exercised, the document itself was ineffective and invalid to confer the rights and to impose the obligations stipulated in the mortgage deed. Consequently the first respondent did not have any power of sale at the time the house was sold by auction, and therefore had no title to transfer the property to the third respondent.
(3) In view of the non-registration of the mortgage deed, the sale to the third respondent was invalid…”
On the question whether or not the court suo motu can take up the point even at this stage, the Court of Appeal again had the following to say per Archer J.A. at p. 335:
“Moreover, where all the facts relating to the point are before it, the court will not hesitate to consider it.
Thus where a statute makes a particular contract invalid, the judge may refuse to entertain the action even though neither party has raised or wishes to raise the objection. See Royal Exchange Association v. Atk Sjorforsakrings Vega [1902] 2 K.B. 384, C.A. and also National Omnibus Services Authority v. Owuo, Court of Appeal, 20 August 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C. 158 . . .”
And in Phillips v. Copping [1935] 1 K.B. 15 at p. 21, C.A. Scrutton L.J. said, “. . . it is the duty of the Court when asked to give a judgment which is contrary to a statute to take the point although the litigants may not take it.”
The authorities seem clear that since the formality of registration of the mortgage deed required by statute had not been complied with at the time the mortgagor, the defendant herein, applied for an order for possession, the mortgage deed had no legal effect and all the rights and powers contained therein were of no legal consequences and were invalid. The order based thereon and giving the defendant possession was a nullity, and the defendant must be deemed never to have properly been in possession of the plaintiff’s said house.
I am satisfied on the whole therefore that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment and the reliefs he claims as follows:
1. The defendant is hereby ordered to receive the mortgage debt of ¢1,080 plus all other expenses, which the plaintiff totalled as ¢2,160 carrying an interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum.
[p.1170] of [1982-83] GLR 1159
2. The defendant is hereby ordered to surrender the mortgage deed, the lease and all other documents of title in respect of house No. 130/3, Kwesimintsim Zongo, Takoradi which have come into her possession in connection with the said mortgage transaction.
3. The defendant is further hereby ordered with immediate effect to give possession of the said house No. 130/3, Kwesimintsim Zongo near Takoradi to the plaintiff herein.
4. The defendant is again hereby ordered to go into account with the plaintiff regarding rents received from tenants in the said house, and all lawful and legitimate expenses made by the defendant concerning and touching the house in question.
The plaintiff is awarded costs assessed at ¢1,500.
DECISION Judgment for the plaintiff.
J. A. A.
