SAM vs. NOAH [1982-83] GLR 1122
11 June 1982 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 8 min read
[1982] SLR (HC) 20Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASE REFERRED TO
Kwesi Yaw v. Kwaw Atta [1961] G.L.R. (Pt.II) 513.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against the award of damages against the defendant for trespass. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Ofori for the appellant.
Ewusie-Wilson for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.
The plaintiff’s writ which he issued against the defendant was of home-made vintage and it runs as follows:
“the plaintiff sues the defendant to show cause why the defendant should instruct Kweku Amoah who is a tenant on the plaintiff’s farm land to pay ¢40 to the defendant being annual fee on the plaintiff’s farm and being cultivated by Kweku Amoah. Failure to explain reasons for that whilst the defendant does not own that land, ¢500 damages are claimed.”
At the trial at the District Court Grade I, Agona Swedru, the plaintiff testified, in support of his action as follows:
“. . . Our ancestors have land, and it is at that place that I have been farming some years ago. I took people to the land to clear it for me. The defendant went and collected some money from these people. his year too when I asked one Kweku Amoah to go and clear the land, he went after him trying to collect money from him. I therefore came to the conclusion that he wanted to take the land from me. Amoah came to tell me something. He later came to report the same story and I found that the defendant wanted to take the land from me. I therefore took this action against him.”
The evidence of Kweku Amoah, the first plaintiff witness, was also to the effect that the plaintiff took him to his land when he requested for a piece of land to cultivate and asked him not to clear beyond certain
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“Ntome” trees and stated that he formed boundary with one Akroma. After he had weeded the land and planted corn the defendant came to demand ¢40. He refused to pay that amount since the defendant had given him no land.
The plaintiff also advised him not to pay any money as the land did not belong to the defendant. The plaintiff further called one Kweku Attah as the second plaintiff witness who is the successor of Akroma. He stated that his predecessor’s land is sandwiched between the ancestral land of the plaintiff and that of the defendant. The relevance of the third plaintiff witness’ evidence to the plaintiff’s case is quite unclear. Although he had said that he shared a boundary with the plaintiff’s uncle called Kobina Akyin yet it was not disclosed what is the connection between Kobina Akyin’s land and the land the plaintiff permitted the first plaintiff witness to cultivate.
The defendant on the other hand described his ancestral land and supported his family’s title to the land by a judgment of the Land Court, Cape Coast, and a plan. He said that he saw some people working on a portion of that land and he inquired of the person who gave the land to them and he questioned them. He further said that they have not gone to the land again since then. In the course of the trial the trial magistrate, on his own motion, ordered a plan but the defendant failed to pay the initial sum necessary to put his order in execution. Thereafter he decided to visit the locus in quo but abandoned it when the defendant failed to appear on the appointed day although his counsel appeared. Without waiting to find out why the defendant failed to appear for the proposed inspection the trial magistrate gave his judgment in which he capitalised on the defendant’s failure to turn up for the visit by branding him and his witness as liars.
The following passage spelt out the reasons why the trial magistrate gave judgment for the plaintiff and I here quote it in full:
“There is no doubt about the fact the defendant went and crossed the person who was farming on the disputed land. The defendant stated that he had not collected any money from anybody, but he would not deny the fact that he demanded money from the first plaintiff witness but the first plaintiff witness refused to pay it. The first plaintiff witness’ evidence on this fact was clear. The defendant demanded ¢40 from him as annual rent and when he failed to pay it, he even informed his father and another. The defendant himself stated at the moment nobody is working on the land. In other words as a result of his conduct the first plaintiff witness has left the land.
Now the question is this: If this was the situation, does any cause of action arise at all? Is the plaintiff entitled to any damages from the defendant? In other words, if you give land to somebody and another person goes to claim the land and
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demands rent from the person and as it were caused him to leave the land, are you entitled to demand damages from the person?
In the case of Kwesi Yaw v. Kwaw Atta [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 513, the court held that by customary law a person has sufficient cause of action to sue for declaration of title of another person who by oath asserts title to his property. He does not have to wait until his possession is disturbed. In this particular case the defendant did not swear an oath but he has certainly disturbed the possession of the plaintiff by asking for money from the plaintiff’s tenant and as it were causing the tenant to leave the land.
As he himself stated, nobody is on the land now and the corn cultivated by the first plaintiff witness might have been rotten by now. I think that the plaintiff is entitled to damages from the defendant, because what he did amounts to a disturbance of the possession and quiet enjoyment of the land by the first plaintiff witness which in effect affects the plaintiff. The ¢500 damages which he asked for is on the low side and I do therefore award him that amount as damages. He will also be entitled to costs of ¢150.”
The pith of the trial magistrate’s reasoning was that by the defendant’s conduct in saying that the land is his and demanding ¢40 as annual rent, the first plaintiff witness left the land and that the defendant’s conduct amounted to disturbance of the possession and quiet enjoyment of the land by the first plaintiff witness which, in effect, affected the plaintiff and for which the plaintiff could sue in damages. It is clear from this reasoning that he saw the action as one maintainable in trespass.
But the reasoning is full of fallacies both factual and legal. There is, in the first place, nothing to support his contention that the first plaintiff witness left the land because of any conduct of the defendant. The evidence of the first plaintiff witness was simply that the defendant pressed for the payment of the ¢40 but he refused to pay. His finding that the first plaintiff witness left the land and that the corn he cultivated “might have been rotten by now” is a product of his own fanciful imagination. The authority of Kwesi Yaw v. Kwaw Atta cited supports the contention that an action for a declaration of title will lie at the instance of the plaintiff where a defendant by oath asserts title to his land. Indeed, it is not only the exclamation of an oath that would ground an action for a declaration of title in these circumstances but also where by conduct, a defendant challenges the title of the plaintiff. An action for trespass arises where there is a disturbance of possession and the right of action in trespass essentially lies in the person in actual possession. It is for this reason that it is the tenant, and not the landlord, who can sue if a third party trespasses on the
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demised land. The statement that the disturbance of the possession by the first plaintiff witness (the tenant) affects the plaintiff and that he could sue in trespass has, therefore, no legal foundation. In so far as the conduct of the defendant complained of consisted of mere demand to perform some obligation it cannot root an action in trespass and the trial court erred in trying to use an ingenious but meritless reasoning to hold otherwise.
It cannot be disputed that the parties in a trial in a district court cannot be enslaved to the form of action. What is material for consideration is the substance of the action. The plaintiff’s action, in substance, was an action for declaration of title. The trial court, unfortunately, did not see it that way and the plaintiff himself did not attempt to prove his title. For an action for a declaration of title does not only demand that the plaintiff should establish and prove the root of his title but he must also establish the precise identity of the land over which he seeks a declaration.
This latter prerequisite is particularly important because without it a judgment obtained in the plaintiff’s favour can hardly operate as an estoppel and also because the plaintiff cannot be put back in possession of the land should it become necessary. The weight of the plaintiff’s evidence attempted to establish only one side of his boundary, i.e. his common boundary with the first plaintiff witness. He also attempted to prove that from the defendant’s ancestral land you had to cross first the land of the first plaintiff witness before you crossed this common boundary to get to his land. It is not strange that in the face of this insufficient evidence in proof of a declaration of title the court below did not consider that as the cause of the plaintiff’s action.
It was because the plaintiff failed either to adduce sufficient evidence to support any claim for a declaration of title or to prove an action for trespass against the defendant that I allowed the defendant’s appeal, set aside the judgment, damages and costs awarded against him and dismissed his action with ¢650 costs, whereof ¢150 represented his costs at the court below and ¢500 his costs in this court.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
M. C. N. – N.
