ARTHUR vs. AHEY LTD. [1984-86] 1 GLR 220
26 February 1982 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 32 min read
[1982] SLR (HC) 22Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Lamprevell v. Billericay Union (1849) 3 Exch. 283.
(2) Miller v. London County Council (1934) 151 L.T. 425; 50 T.L.R. 479.
(3) Amalgamated Building Contractors Ltd. v. Waltham Holy Cross Urban District Council [1952] 2 All E.R. 452; [1952] 2 T.L.R. 269, C.A.
(4) Dodd v. Churton [1897] 1 Q.B. 562; 66 L.J.Q.B. 477; 76 L.T. 438, C.A.
(5) Laird Brothers v. City of Dublin Steam Packet Co. (1899) 34 L.T. 9.
(6) Mensah v. The Republic [1979] G.L.R. 523.
(7) Sasu v. White Cross Insurance Co. Ltd. [1960] G.L.R. 4, C.A.
(8) Majolagbe v. Larbi [1959] G.L.R. 190.
(9) Mahama v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 569, S.C.
(10) Elmore v. Pirrie (1887) 57 L.T. 333.
(11) Benda v. Awuku [1979] G.L.R. 320, C.A.
(12) Adae v. Eyiah [1972] 2 G.L.R. 358.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
ACTION for damages and specific performance for the breach of a building contract by the defendants. The facts are set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Charles Cann (with him Quashie) for the plaintiff.
William Amarteifio (with him Miss Sutherland) for the defendants.
JUDGMENT OF ANSAH-TWUM J.
The plaintiff’s claims against the defendants herein are for:
(i) in order that the defendant company completes the building within two months from the date of judgment;
(ii) damages for breach of contract;
(iii) recovery of the amount of ¢81,000 representing rents that should have accrued from the building from September 1978 to November 1980 at ¢3,000 a month and (iv) mesne profits.
The plaintiff’s case is that she being a baker and trader contracted with the defendants, building contractors, to construct a double storey block of three flats on her plot at Windy Ridge, Takoradi. The agreed contract cost of construction was ¢189,000. It was agreed that construction of the plaintiff’s building was to commence on the day the building permit was obtained. The defendants obtained building permit on 18 October 1977. It was further agreed that the defendants were to complete the plaintiff’s building within ten months from 18 October 1977, i.e. the date of commencement.
[p.222] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 220 The written and executed agreement embodying the terms of the building contract is exhibit A. The evidence is that by the end of the ten-month period, the plaintiff had completed payment of the contract cost of construction, being ¢189,000, to the defendants, who, though had commenced building operations, had failed to complete as agreed. The plaintiff maintains that she paid the said agreed contract price between 2 April and 26 September 1977, all to the defendants, and obtained the receipts exhibits B, B1—B4.
The plaintiff maintains that she complained to the defendants when they failed to complete the building within a year after commencement. The defendants thereupon approached the plaintiff and asked for extension of time; they asked for twelve more months within which to complete and the plaintiff agreed; this was in writing, exhibit C dated 19 February 1980. The evidence is that the plaintiff did under this pay further sums totalling ¢24,000 to the defendants. The defendants did thereafter work for three days only on the building and stopped all operations.
The defendants have in all done the framework of the three flats: one downstairs and two upstairs, the topmost flat not yet floored, roofed or plastered. The defendants themselves have built a bigger house about ten yards from the building in question for the plaintiff, which the defendants know she has let out to tenants for rent. The plaintiff told the defendants she was constructing the house in question, a block of three flats, to let out for rental purposes only. The defendants know that the sizes of the flats in the plaintiff’s nearby building, constructed by the defendants, are the same as those in the new building, and that the plaintiff has been collecting rent of ¢400 a month per each flat. The plaintiff was therefore expecting not less than ¢1,200 a month as rent from the three flats the defendants contracted to construct for her, and which, she told the court, she was going to let out for ¢500 a month per flat. She has lost this and has been paying interest on the amounts she borrowed from her bankers. The plaintiff therefore asks for an order that the defendants should complete the building within two months; pay to the plaintiff the lost rent so far, and damages for breach of contract.
The building contract in question was executed between the plaintiff and the defendants in April 1977 and by clause 4 of the agreement, exhibit A, the defendants undertook under clause 10 thereof to commence construction of the building on the date the building permit was obtained, which was on 18 October 1977, and to complete the work within ten months from 18 October 1977. Clause 10 of the agreement seems to set out the agreed condition upon a breach of any of which the contract may be determined; or where time for completion
[p.223] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 220 may be extended when there is delay in completing. I will therefore set out in full clause 10, which appears to be the governing clause in the contract under consideration. Clause 10 provides:
“This contract shall determine on breach of any of the foregoing clauses. If however the works are delayed by reason of:
(a) force majeure (irresistible compulsion like war, strikes, etc.);
(b) inclement weather;
(c) variation orders issued under clause 2 of conditions;
(d) strike of workmen or civil commotion;
(e) loss or damage by fire;
(f) lack of necessary instructions from the employer, (g) delay in supplies of specified materials;
(h) delay in the payment by the employer of sums which become payable under the terms of clause 7 herein, PROVIDED ALWAYS that the contractor shall be entitled to regard this delay as constituting the employer’s breach of this contract and the contractor shall accordingly reserve his right of action having regard to all the circumstances of the delay;
(i) delay in execution of works by nominated sub-contractors;
(j) delay caused by any dispute arising out of the execution of works between the employer and the contractor; and (k) any other delay caused by circumstances beyond the control of the contractor, then the employer shall grant a fair and reasonable extension of time for the completion of the works having regard to the amount of delay already so caused.”
Now the plaintiff contends that she has brought this action because the defendants are in breach of the agreement, exhibit A; they failed to complete the works within ten months as originally agreed and have again failed to complete even after a grant of extension of time.
When the plaintiff was cross-examined she told the court that she never agreed that completion of her building depended upon availability of building materials because there was cement and roofing sheets at the time the defendants undertook to build for her. The defendants only complained to her about twice of lack of cement, and she went to the regional administration office only trying to help arrange for 50 bags a week for the defendants which they failed to use on her building.
The plaintiff admits the plan of the building is in her son Eric’s name, yet she planned to build the house for rental purposes in order to collect money to assist her son, Eric, who is studying in England. She also needs money therefrom to pay the fees and provide the needs of her
[p.224] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 220 other children. She had to bring this action because the defendants have abandoned the works and have for the past four years only been telling her stories.
The defendants are represented in this action by Mr. Joseph Seth Edjeani, the managing director of the defendant company. The witness told the court, among other things, that it was he who in fact contracted with the plaintiff to build her a block of three flats at Windy Ridge, Takoradi. The plaintiff gave the defendants some drawings for her said building but the defendants advised her to change same for the drawings they, the defendant, provided. The plaintiff accepted the drawings, being exhibit E, El and E2. They started actual construction on or about 9 November 1977, having contracted to complete the building within ten months from that date. The witness maintains that they have not been able to complete the plaintiff’s building because they could not obtain sufficient quantity of cement for the works. They placed an order for aluminium roofing sheets from Tema, yet they did not get any. The witness said these were the two major causes of delay in completing the plaintiffs building. The witness added that when the defendants commenced construction of the plaintiff’s house, building materials were available and it was after they had been on the job for about three to four months that the defendants started experiencing difficulty in securing the required building materials like cement and aluminium roofing sheets. The witness claim that the defendants did, therefore, write to the plaintiff and pleaded for extension of time within which to complete the building; the letters are marked exhibits 2, 3 and 4. The evidence seems to show that the plaintiff did grant the extension of time which expired on 30 June 1980. But the defendants appear to be saying now that a further extension requested by exhibit 4 dated 28 July 1980 was also granted orally by the plaintiff; it was for six months, i.e. expiring in January 1981.
The evidence of the first defendants witness is that it was the defendants themselves who did on 19 February 1980 suggest conversion of the aluminium roof into reinforced concrete roof slab. It appears, therefore that they did at the time have cement and were building for the Ghana Government, a Mr. R. Fynn, and Mr. Charles Cann. The witness said: “We have suspended work on the plaintiff’s building because of lack of cement, but we have not abandoned it.” The witness said the defendants made an attempt by a letter dated 27 July 1981, after commencement of this suit, to obtain 1,000 bags of cement from the Regional Office, Sekondi but had no success. This witness also told the court not to attach much weight to exhibit D, being the valuation report by the second plaintiff witness since he says, it does not take account of the contractor’s preliminaries; it does not give a true reflection of the amount of work done so far. The report
[p.225] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 220 did not also take into account the variation allowed and carried out. The valuer did not also of [1984-86] 1 GLR 220-236 use the rates shown in the appendix to exhibit A. As far as the defendants are concerned, the contract, exhibit A, still subsists as between the plaintiff and the defendants, and the defendants are prepared to complete the construction of the building.
The witness admitted under cross-examination that the cost of construction has risen by about 50 per cent from 1977 to now. He estimates the present cost of construction of the plaintiff’s building to be about ¢945,000. He gives the value of amount of work done on the plaintiff’s building by the defendants as ¢165,485.84. He also admitted that by the terms of the contract, the defendants were to supply and use every required material on the plaintiff’s said building. The plaintiff was under no obligation whatsoever to supply any of the required building materials. Hers was only to pay the agreed cost of construction.
The defendants supplying their own building materials, built for Lawyer Cann, Mr. Kofie and Mr. Ahenkan, all between 1977 and 1979. They used, in all such cases, aluminium roofing sheets which they obtained from the same source, Aluminium Products Co., Tema. The defendants never wrote complaining about lack of cement or aluminium roofing sheets between April 1977 and February 1980. The first letter complaining about lack of materials was exhibit 2, dated 19 February 1980.
Learned counsel for the defendants, Mr. Amarteifio, has submitted however, that the claim before the court is misconceived, and it is also premature. He refers to exhibit A and the terms of the contract attached. Counsel has submitted that delay, ipso facto, was not made a ground for breach and there is therefore no right to sue when there is delay. He refers to exhibit A, clauses 1-9, as being the only conditions for breach. Counsel refers also to clause 10 (c)-(g) and (k) and Creswell on Law Relating to Building and Engineering Contracts, 116 and Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.) Vol. 3, 489 at paras. 960-961. Counsel cites further Lamprell v. Billericay Union (1849) 3 Exch. D. 28 3; Miller v. London County Council (1934) 151 L.T. 425, and Amalgamated Building Contractors Ltd. v. Waltham Holy Cross, Urban District Council [1952] 2 All E.R. 452, C.A. On power to extend time for completion, counsel again cites Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 3, p. 489, para. 960; Dodd v. Churton [1897] 1 Q.B. 562, C.A, and Laird Brothers v. City of Dublin Steel Packer Co. (1899) 34 L.T. 9. He argued that delay by itself does not give right to sue.
Counsel further submits that the defendants did by exhibits 2, 3 and 4 ask the plaintiff for extension of time. Exhibit 4 asked for six
[p.226] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 220 months’ extension as from 28 July 1980, yet action was commenced on 17 December 1980. The period being less than five months, the action is premature. Counsel submits further that there is no evidence that the contract between the parties has been terminated and that the plaintiff can sue only when the contract has been terminated.
Counsel submits that the action for specific performance and damages for breach of contract are mutually exclusive remedies, and the plaintiff cannot have both in the same action. She should have put them in the alternative. The action should therefore be dismissed for being misconceived.
Counsel submits further that the defendants have offered a reasonable explanation for the delay, which they give as being lack of cement. It must be noted however, that they converted aluminium roofing to concrete roofing which required more cement and then complained about lack of cement. It is important to note here that the defendants themselves requested the change from aluminium roofing to concrete slab roofing. Counsel for the defendants nevertheless asks the court to take judicial notice of the fact that cement was scarce in 1977, and even up to now. Counsel cites Mensah v. The Republic [1979] G.L.R. 523 at 525 on judicial notice. Counsel also submits that the evidence of the second plaintiff witness is guesswork, since he did it without drawings. No weight should therefore be attached to his report: Sasu v. White Cross Insurance Co. Ltd. [1960] G.L.R. 4, C.A. Evidence of a skilled witness is always suspect, he submits. In conclusion defence counsel argues that the court cannot make an order for specific performance in this case and the action based on delay does not lie and both claims 1 and 2 must fail. The house does not belong to the plaintiff and she cannot therefore expect any rent from same.
Counsel for the plaintiff submits in reply that Lamprell v. Billericay Union (supra) does not apply in the present case before this court because there it was the owner of the building, unlike this case, who was to supply building materials, so delay occasioned by failure to supply could not be blamed on the contractor. The defendants have tendered a letter, exhibit 4, to show that they did by it plead for extension of time, but there is no written evidence that the plaintiff, who says she never agreed to that request, did in fact give the defendants that further extension of time for six months.
Counsel submits that time is of the essence in this case, and the moment there is a breach of exhibit A, the cause of action automatically accrues. The plaintiff has therefore properly instituted this action since her claim is not based on delay but on failure to complete within the stipulated time, and abandonment of the works.
[p.227] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 220
Counsel refers to paragraphs 4 and 6 of the statement of claim filed on 17 December 1980 and paragraph 2 of the reply filed on 16 March 1981. Counsel submits further that there is no question of this action being misconceived, looking at the terms of the contract, exhibit A, clause 3, and also exhibits E-E2 (the drawings); the specifications contained in exhibit F, building permit, and the bill of quantities, exhibit A, sheet 4.
Counsel concedes that exhibit C constitutes a variation in the original contract. But clause 10 of exhibit A says the contract is determined when there is a breach of its conditions, except those conditions under clause 10.
It is important to note that all the appendices form part of exhibit A. The submission is that even that variation in exhibits C and 2 was requested by the defendants themselves to enable them complete the works within the stipulated time. The plaintiff consented and time was extended only to the end of June 1980.
Counsel invites the court to read clause 10 (g) of exhibit A to mean that “supply” means supply by the contractor, i.e. the defendants, not the plaintiff. The defendants have also failed to show that there were any circumstances beyond their control, since there is evidence and they themselves admit, that they were at the same time building for others using the very materials they now claim they had run short of. Counsel then poses this question, since the defendants had entered into contract to complete the building within ten months from 18 October 1977, if in fact they had had any difficulty in obtaining cement, would they have asked for conversion from aluminium roofing sheets to that of concrete slab roof, where they would need more cement? He says the answer is No. Counsel submits therefore that failure to complete the building within six months from 19 February 1980, as granted by the plaintiff, amounted to a breach of the contract and the plaintiff therefore became entitled to sue for breach on the part of the defendants.
Counsel submits that specific performance and the claim for damages here are separate reliefs: they can both be brought independently. That where damages may be adequate, specific performance may not be ordered. He refers to Cheshire and Fifoot (8th ed.) at p. 611, and submitted that the action cannot therefore be dismissed as claimed by the defence counsel.
Mr. Cann submits further that the contract took effect from April 1977, but exhibit 1 is dated 31 July 1978, up to which date the defendants had never complained of non-availability of cement or roofing sheets. There is evidence that the defendants had never complained of non-availability of cement or roofing sheets. There is evidence that the defendants were building for and using the very
[p.228] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 220 building materials on buildings for Lawyer Cann; a Mr. R. B. Fynn and others, all at the same time; the defendants cannot therefore properly call upon the court to take judicial notice that there were no such materials at all, at the time. Paragraph 10 of the statement of defence cannot therefore be true. The defendants, however, failed to call evidence to substantiate that averment, and it must therefore be ignored; Majolagbe v. Larbi [1959] G.L.R. 190 cited.
It is submitted further that the whole of the defence is that the defendants could not complete because they could not obtain cement, but they failed to prove that they in fact had no cement. The evidence is rather that they had cement and they decided to use same on other projects belonging to other persons, deliberately refusing to complete the plaintiff’s building which they had contracted to construct with their own materials. The plaintiff is not bound under the contract to supply any materials whatsoever and, therefore, the plaintiff need not lead evidence to show that she supplied 1,000 bags of cement. Counsel asks the court to ignore exhibit 6, the letter written by the defendants eight months after the commencement of this action, since it appears to be a self-serving evidence. In any event, there is no evidence that because of exhibit 6, the defendants did not obtain cement, and counsel is not permitted to address the court on matters not before the court. Counsel cited Mahama v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 569, S.C.
It is submitted further that the evidence adduced by the second plaintiff witness (Dontoh), a qualified quantity surveyor, has immensely assisted the court and must be accepted. The evidence of cost of work done so far by the defendants and cost of the remaining work to complete have been set out by the second plaintiff witness. Sasu v. White Cross Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) respects the expertness of a witness when the court lacks expertise.
On capacity and locus standi, counsel submits that this action has been brought by the person who entered into the contract with the defendants and if she cannot sue on the contract then who can? Paragraph 3 of the plaintiff ‘s statement of claim shows that the plaintiff has fully performed her part of the contract, as admitted by paragraph 3 of the defence, and there is therefore no dispute as to the parties to the contract. The defendants just refused to perform their part of the contract and they must pay for so doing.
If the court finds it impracticable to order specific performance then the court should award damages instead. He cites Elmore v. Pirrie (1887) 57 L.T. 333. Damages being the difference between the contract price and what the plaintiff has to spend to complete: Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd. ed.) Vol. 3, p. 486, para. 933. Counsel here refers to [p.229] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 220 exhibit D. which gives the difference as ¢547,681. Here the second plaintiff witness, Dontoh, gave the amount spent so far on the building as ¢105,160, while the defendants’ representative, the first defendant witness, Edjeani, gives the amount spent as ¢165,485.84 (there being a difference of about ¢60,000). Counsel submits, however, that the figure quoted as needed to complete has not been challenged by the defendants.
Counsel submits that the plaintiff is also entitled to damages for breach of contract, her claim for rent lost is proved and she has sued on loss of user not on ownership. Counsel cites Benda v. Awuku [1979] G.L.R. 320, C.A. Where no rent is expected no damages are awarded, but where as in the present case rent of at least ¢400 for each of the three flats is expected, this is recoverable, and it is from September 1978 to the date of judgment. On the whole, counsel submits, the plaintiff has proved her case and there must be judgment for her with heavy costs.
From the pleadings and the evidence before this court now, it is quite evident that the plaintiff’s main complaint is that the defendants contracted with her to construct a storey block of three flats for her on her plot at Windy Ridge, Takoradi at an agreed contract price, which she has paid in full, within the stipulated period. That though she has fully performed her part of the contract the defendants have deliberately refused to complete their part of the contract, hence this action. I will here like to reproduce paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the plaintiff’s statement of claim and the defendants’ answer to same considering the evidence adduced in respect of the pleadings. The said paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the statement of claim are:
“Statement of claim:
4. The building works were commenced on 18 October 1977 and completion should have been on 17 August 1978 latest. The defendants have not completed the building up to now and they have for the past two years left the building uncompleted.
5. The plaintiff had to perform her obligations under the contract by paying the total contract price long before the agreed date of completion.
6. The plaintiff had to persuade the defendant to resume work and complete the building but the defendants refused to honour their obligations and rather had to work on some other buildings not belonging to the plaintiff.”
By paragraphs 7 and 8 of the statement of claim, the plaintiff pleaded in effect that she met the defendants on 19 February 1980 when the defendants appealed for extension of time within which to
[p.230] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 220 complete the building. The plaintiff accepted the terms of the conditions as contained in the letter dated 19 February 1980, now exhibit C or 2, and paid a further total sum of ¢24,000 to the defendants who have since failed, again, either to resume work or complete the building.
It seems to me that a careful reading of paragraph 3 of the statement of defence indicates that the defendants admit, in whole, paragraph 4 of the plaintiffs statement of claim, for pleading as they did, is not a denial: “Except that the completion date of 17 August 1978 was only initial and also that the defendants have withdrawn their labour for the past two years the defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 4.” This is no denial of paragraph 4 as quoted supra. The other averments in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the statement of claim that the plaintiff paid the whole of the contract price of ¢189,000 before the first date of completion expired, and after the extension of time the plaintiff agreed on 19 February 1980 and paid a further total sum of ¢24,000 to the defendants to enable them to complete, as requested by the defendants, but that the defendants have not resumed work, do not appear to have been denied by the defendants.
The contract between the parties herein, as executed by them in April 1977, is within the four walls of exhibit A. A perusal of exhibit A leaves me in no doubt whatsoever that from the very inception of this agreement, both parties agreed and knew that time was of the essence of the agreement they were entering into. I am, therefore, satisfied that time was, has been, and is still of the essence of the building contract between the parties herein. Clause 4 of the conditions attached to exhibit A reads: “Subject to the provisions of clause 10 hereunder the contractor (the defendants) shall commence and complete the works on the dates shown in the appendix to the conditions.”
By paragraph B of the appendix to the conditions in exhibit A, the date of commencement of execution of the works was to be the date when the building permit was obtained, and, it is now known that it was 18 October 1977. And by paragraph C, under the appendix to the conditions, the date of completion as provided under clause 4 of exhibit A, is within ten months after the date of commencement, i.e. on or before 17 August 1978. There is very little doubt, therefore, as provided under clause 10, that the contract becomes determined when any of clauses 1-9 is breached, except as provided under sub-clauses a-k of clause 10, when the employer shall grant a fair and reasonable extension of time for the completion of the works, having regard to the amount of delay already so caused. There is no indication that the defendants did between 18 October 1977 and 17 August 1978 complain to the plaintiff of any difficulty in obtaining any of the building materials, neither is
[p.231] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 220 there any evidence that the defendants did ask for and obtained extension of time within that period. It is my view, therefore, that the defendants were in breach of the contract by 18 August 1978 when they failed by that date to have completed the building and the plaintiff would have been entitled to have terminated the contract and have sued for damages for a breach thereof. The plaintiff, did not, however, pursue her rights as provided under the terms of the contract, but apparently waived same and gratuitously waited patiently until 19 February 1980 (good eighteen months) when the defendants, according to exhibit C or 2, did approach the plaintiff and asked that the aluminium roof originally requested by the plaintiff should be converted into reinforced concrete roof slab. The evidence is that the plaintiff acceded to that request and agreed to pay further sums of money while the defendants again undertook to complete and hand over the plaintiff’s building by 30 June 1980. Again the defendants failed to carry out the conversion or to complete the house even in its original state by 30 June 1980. The defendants have tendered exhibits 3 and 4, being further letters written by the defendants asking for further extension of time. There is no written evidence that the plaintiff granted any further extension of time after 30 June 1980, and the plaintiff has told the court that she never granted any further extension of time after 30 June 1980, and that is why she says the defendants are in breach of the contract.
It is my view that time being of the essence of the contract in this case, there is a breach of the contract when the contractor failed again to complete the works within the agreed extended period which expired on 30 June 1980. The defendants, however, claim that they were not in breach of the contract since, as they claim, the works were delayed because as under clause 10: (i) there was a variation order issued under clause 2 of the conditions; (ii) there was a delay in supplies of specified materials; and (iii) the delay was caused by circumstances beyond the control of the defendants.
It is my view that the defendants themselves having requested the variation they cannot turn round to say that the variation had delayed the work. I am of the view that the variation envisaged under clause 10 was variation to be requested by the employer herself. The defendants did not even lead any evidence to show why it became necessary for them to request conversion from aluminium roof to concrete slab roof. The defendants tendered exhibit 1, the “acknowledgment of order” dated 31 July 1978, which they received from Ghana Aluminium Products Ltd, Tema indicating that they placed an order dated 20 Jul 1978 with Ghana Aluminium Products Ltd. for aluminium roofing sheets for a block of three flats at Windy Ridge, Takoradi. There is no indication that the order could not be supplied. Exhibit 2 gives the total
[p.232] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 220 price of the order as ¢5,185.19. There is no evidence that the defendants paid that amount but the required roofing sheets were never supplied, or that they did not pay and they were not supplied at all. There is rather evidence before this court that the defendants were at the same time building for the Ghana Government and about three other individuals where they used aluminium roofing sheets and completed same. Is it not more likely than not that the defendants collected the order in exhibit 1 but used same on buildings other than the plaintiff’s? If this is not so, why did the defendants never complain about aluminium roofing sheets until 19 February 1980? Almost three years after commencement of the plaintiff’s building.
Another question that has been bothering my mind is why the defendants asked for concrete roofing instead of aluminium, if they had difficulty in obtaining cement? Knowing that cement was available they asked for only four and half months extension of time to complete, but again, they failed to complete. Does it now lie in their mouth to say that they knew they could not find cement for roofing and yet they requested a variation where they would rather need more cement? It seems to me, in the circumstances, that the defendants knowing themselves that they had woefully been in breach of the contract asked for that variation, which should have been requested by the plaintiff herself if necessary, thinking they could by that take advantage of clause 10 (c). It is my view that such variation should have been in accordance with the written order of the employer (the plaintiff): see exhibit A, clause 2 (b), if it should constitute a delay under the contract.
It is my view that “delay” ‘in clause 10 (g) applies to delay in the supplies of specified materials by the employer; but here the plaintiff who is the employer was not obliged under the contract to supply any of the building materials; so that clause 10 (g) does not apply in this case. Similarly, clause 10 (k) does not avail the defendants here because the defendants have failed to satisfy this court that the circumstances were beyond their control, in that in fact, try as they might, they could not over that long period secure the required roofing sheets and cement to complete only the plaintiff’s building when they could in the case of other buildings they constructed at the same time. The defendants themselves admit that all the materials were readily available when they commenced construction of the plaintiff’s building. There is evidence that the defendant secured these very materials for the construction of houses for Mr. Cann, Mr. Fynn and others, and there is therefore no earthly reason why they could not use the plaintiff’s money, ¢189,000, all of which she had finished paying by 17 August 1978, to buy those roofing materials which would cost only a little over ¢5,000 for the plaintiff ‘s said building as well. I think that the defendants just refused unreasonably to act here and their inaction
[p.233] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 220 amounted to a breach of the contract because it resulted in their failure to complete within the stipulated period.
I am satisfied that the plaintiff agreed only once to extend the period of completion of her building between 17 August 1978 and 30 June 1980. There is no evidence that the plaintiff ever received exhibits 3 and 4, being letters which appear to have asked for further extension. There is again no evidence, even if the plaintiff received those letters, that she replied granting any further extension from 30 June 1980. In addition there is no evidence that the plaintiff herself, being the employer, was responsible for any delay which prevented the defendants from completing the works within the agreed period. The plaintiff was therefore never at any point of time obliged to grant the defendants extension of time to complete the works as envisaged under clause 10 of exhibit A, which would apply only if the plaintiff had been responsible for the delay: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 3, p. 489, para. 960 on effect of delay caused by employer: It is there stated:
“There are many ways in which the completion of the works by the contract time may be prevented by the act or default of the employer, as, for instance, by ordering extras or not providing the site at the proper time, failure to supply drawings, etc., or failure to supply any materials which the employer has agreed to supply [Duncanson v. Scottish County Investment Co. Ltd. [1915] S.C. 1106]. Where the effect of extras being ordered by the employer is to delay the contractor, it is clear that, in the absence of special stipulations in the contract, the date fixed for completion is made inapplicable and the contractor relieved from his liability to pay liquidated damages for delay. [Westwood v. Secretary of State for India in Council (1863) 7 L.T. 736;
Dodd v. Churton [1897] 1 Q.B. 562 C.A.] The onus lies on the contractor to prove that the delay was in fact caused by some act or omission of the employer.”
It is my view that the defendants failed to discharge the burden to prove that the plaintiff was responsible for any delay or default which prevented them from completing the works within the contract time and they are therefore not entitled to seek reliance on clause 10 of exhibit A.
It is trite law that any person who is capable of entering into a bargain is bound by the terms of his bargain if he does enter into it. So as stated in Cheshire and Fifoot, The Law of Contract (5th ed.) 21: “A contracting party, unlike a tortfeasor, is bound because he has agreed to be bound.” I do not think that counsel for the defendants can be serious when he submitted that the house in question does not appear to belong to the plaintiff and therefore she cannot expect rent from it. It is
[p.234] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 220 not disputed that both the plaintiff and the defendants executed the contract exhibit A which provided that if the plaintiff paid the sum of ¢189,000 the defendants would build for the plaintiff on the plaintiff’s own plot at Windy Ridge, Takoradi, a block of three flats. The contract is here between the parties herein and therefore they are the best parties to sue or be sued on the said contract. I further accept the plaintiff’s evidence that the defendants have built a bigger house for the plaintiff on a plot just about ten yards away from the present building, containing flats of the same size as those in the present building. I am satisfied that the defendants know that the plaintiff has let the old building for rent and that she was going to let the three new flats for rent. I am satisfied that the plaintiff wanted to let the three flats for money to maintain her son Eric, a student studying overseas, and other children, and I accept her evidence that she expected rent of about ¢500 a month per flat; I think ¢500 per flat is quite reasonable in the circumstances, and also considering the situation of the building at Windy Ridge, Takoradi.
I am also satisfied that the plaintiff brought this action because the defendants have for a long time withdrawn their workmen from the site of the works, while working on other buildings belonging to other individuals. I find, therefore, that the defendants did abandon the plaintiff’s building in breach of the contract. This is therefore not a question of delay in execution of the contract, it is a pure question of failure to complete within the stipulated time, which resulted in the determination of the contract, and which gave the plaintiff the right to sue as she did. Unlike Adae v. Eyiah [1972] 2 G.L.R. 358, the plaintiff gave the defendants every opportunity to complete the work, and though they had solemnly promised to complete within ten months, the defendants had at least two years eight months, they appeared to have been more interested in the buildings being constructed for other employers for which they apparently withdrew their workmen from the plaintiff’s building.
Learned counsel for the defendants has submitted that an action for specific performance and for damages for breach of contract are mutually exclusive remedies and therefore the plaintiff cannot have both in the same action. I do not think this is right for in a proper case where time is of the essence and where the court may order specific performance damages may be awarded in addition. As in the the present case, the remedy of specific performance lies, but the court may not decree it because supervision is required. The plaintiff may also have damages, time being of the essence, if failure to complete within the specified period has occasioned pecuniary loss. The practice, however, is that the courts will not grant specific performance of an
[p.235] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 220 ordinary building contract: see Cheshire and Fifoot, The Law of Contract (5th ed.) 579 where the following passages appear:
“1. Specific performance will not be decreed if constant supervision is required to ensure obedience by the defendant. In the words of Ashburner: ‘The Court only makes a positive order for the performance of an act which can be, as a rule, done uno flatu.’ Therefore a continuing contract, to be performed from day to day by a series of acts, will not be specifically enforced. In Ryan v. Mutual Tontine
Westminister Chambers Association [[1893] 1 Ch. 116] damages were awarded instead.
2. Again the Court will not as a rule enforce specific performance of a contract to erect or repair buildings, for not only is it unable to superintend the execution of the work, but also in most cases damages afford an adequate remedy. There is however an exception to this rule.”
It seems to me that in the present case, it being a building contract, in the light of the foregoing principles, this court should not decree specific performance, being satisfied that damages will afford adequate compensation. The claim is, however, not defeated.
As I have held already, it is not the plaintiff who ordered the proposed concrete roof and she cannot be responsible for delay (if any) occasioned thereby. The suggestion that a concrete roof instead of aluminium roof would be done in four months, was a clear demonstration by the defendants that cement was available in sufficient quantity at the time and that they could secure same and complete by 30 June 1980. It does not therefore now lie in their mouth to ask the court to take judicial notice that cement was scarce at the time.
I find the evidence adduced by both the second plaintiff witness and the first defendant witness useful and I will use same in this judgment. I do not think the law is that every expert evidence must be rejected or must be seen as suspect. I think such piece of evidence becomes most useful when the witness testifying is an expert and he lays bare his expertise in an admissible and credible evidence which he places before the court. The court thereby becomes sufficiently aided to arrive at a just and equitable conclusion.
I am satisfied that the plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated by the evidence before this court that she is entitled to succeed against the defendants herein. She is entitled to damages instead of specific performance. She must also be awarded damages for the pecuniary loss she sustained as a result of the defendants’ failure to complete on schedule. Damages awarded in lieu of specific performance should be
[p.236] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 220 the total sum needed to complete the building: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 3, p. 486, para. 953 where the following appears:
“The measure of damages for failure by the contractor to complete a building or engineering contract will include, first, the difference (if any) between the price of the work as agreed upon in the contract and the cost the employer is actually put to in its completion [Dakin & Co. Ltd. v. Lee [1916] 1 K.B. 566, C.A.; Mertens v. Home Freeholds Co. [1921] 2 K.B. 526, C.A.; Newton Abbot Development Co. Ltd. v. Stockman Brothers (1931) 47 T.L.R. 616] and, secondly, any loss of rent of the building, or any loss of use of the building, or in appropriate circumstances of business profit, which may accrue to the employer in consequence of any delay in obtaining the completed building or plant through the contractor’s breach of contract.”
From the defendants’ own evidence the amount of work done so far is about ¢165,485. The amount needed now to construct the plaintiff’s building will be ¢945,000. It follows therefore that, as at present, the plaintiff will require not less than ¢779,151 to complete her building. Her own witness, the second plaintiff witness, a quantity surveyor, says she will need, as per exhibit D, ¢547, 681 to complete. The plaintiff after paying the total contract cost of construction of ¢189,000 agreed to pay further ¢50,000 for the conversion, and paid ¢24,000 of it leaving the balance of ¢26,000. It seems to me that the amount recoverable now will be ¢547,681, less ¢26,000 which, in my estimation, is ¢521,681. The plaintiff is also entitled to recover damages being loss of rent at the rate of ¢400 per flat per month, being ¢1,200 a month. The claim is for September 1978 to February 1982, which is 42 months. Damages here recoverable will therefore be ¢50,400.
There will therefore be judgment for the plaintiff against the defendants herein for:
(i) ¢521,681 being damages in lieu of specific performance; and (ii) ¢50, 400 being damages for loss of rent.
The plaintiff’s costs are assessed at ¢2,500.
DECISION Judgment for the plaintiff.
M.C.N.-N.
