ODOTEYE vs. ODOTEYE [1984-86] 1 GLR 519
27 May 1982 · GRIFFITHS-RANDOLPH J · ≈ 19 min read
[1982] SLR (HC) 24Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Majolagbe v Larbi [1959] GLR 190.
(2) Quartey v Martey [1959] GLR 377.
(3) Button v Button [1968] 1 WLR 457; [1968] 1 All ER 1064, CA.
(4) Gyamaah v Buor [1962] 1 GLR 196.
[p.520] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 519
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
CLAIM for ancillary reliefs after a grant of petition for divorce.
The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
T A Tagoe for the Petitioner.
T K Agadzi for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF GRIFFITHS-RANDOLPH J.
This suit was commenced on 22 March 1977 by the filing of a petition, which contained these averments:
“1. That the petitioner, who was a production manager of Seraphim Textiles and the respondent, a teacher of Ramana School and both of whom were Ghanaian citizens and domiciled in the Republic, were lawfully married at the Presbyterian Church, Adukrom, Akwapim on 1 February 1941;
2. That thereafter, the married couple lived together at Takoradi, Half Assini and Accra, and their union was blessed with four children, who were all alive, viz Ruth Evelyn Odole, Angeline Marigold Odorkor, Mercy Odokai Mansah and Elizabeth Odotso born on 30 July 1942, 25 January 1946, 11 October 1950 and 8 February 1952, respectively; and 3. That the parties had lived apart in Accra since June 1971; also that diligent efforts made to settle their differences had been unsuccessful, with the result that their marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation; and that there had been no proceedings in any court with reference to their marriage.”
On 4 April 1977, Mr Agadzi entered an appearance for the respondent; and in an answer which was filed on 13 April 1977 the latter admitted the above averments of the petitioner and offered the following explanation:
“(i) That after the petitioner had left the Police Service they lived as man and wife at their Osu estate house, which both of them ‘had contributed jointly to acquire and maintain’, but that in 1967 the petitioner moved ‘to his new house’, leaving her behind; and that ‘as a result of the intervention by friends” the petitioner accommodated her in the out-house of the new home for some time, after which she ‘went to live with him in the same bedroom but the petitioner refused to have sex with the respondent’ while he ‘kept a girl friend by name Catherine Magnussen, who cooked’ his meals;
(ii) that on 8 June 1971 the petitioner locked her out and later he ‘requested the respondent to bring her relatives and pack out of the house’, and she had to move to a house at Asylum Down; and
[p.521] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 519
(iii) that “for most of the time that the respondent lived with the petitioner at Osu, the petitioner gave the respondent and the children only ¢5 a month as ‘maintenance’, also that the petitioner who treated the respondent, ‘with inhumane and extreme cruelty’, had committed adultery; and that since she took up residence at Asylum Down, the petitioner had ‘refused or neglected to maintain’ her and two of their children, who were being looked after by her.”
In a reply filed on 9 May 1977 by the petitioner’s counsel, Mr. Tagoe, it was stated that the respondent had not “contributed anything towards the purchase of the petitioner’s estate house at Osu”, also that the petitioner did not move to his other house without the respondent, who, in fact, lived with him there, and occupied the out-house for only five days when there was some misunderstanding between them; also that the petitioner had not treated the respondent cruelly; and that he had neither locked her out of the matrimonial home nor asked her to leave; but that she had left “voluntarily and without any just cause.”
Further, that it was not true that during their married life the “petitioner gave the respondent and the children only ¢5 a month as maintenance”; also that the two children living with her “are all in gainful employment and are earning well”, and that his friendship with Miss Catherine Magnussen commenced after the respondent had left the matrimonial home. Furthermore, that the petitioner committed adultery with Catherine Magnussen because of the respondent’s “wilful act of leaving the matrimonial home without just cause and staying apart from the petitioner.
On 30 May 1977 Mr Tagoe applied for the registrar’s certificate, and on 20 June 1977 the senior registrar certified that the pleadings and proceedings were in order as provided in Order 55, r 29 (1) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A).Then the case was set down for hearing on 19 October 1977 at the request of Mr Tagoe, but the case was adjourned a few times at the request of counsel, and the hearing actually commenced on 23 December 1977.
Meanwhile on 23 August 1977 Mr Agadzi filed a motion on notice for alimony pending suit with a supporting affidavit sworn to by his client; also on 1 September 1977 the petitioner’s affidavit in opposition was filed; and the motion was heard on 22 September 1977 by a vacation judge, who ordered the petitioner to pay the respondent ¢30 per mensem.
When the case was called on 23 December 1977, the respondent made the following statement:
“As my lawyer explained the other day, he is engaged elsewhere and cannot be here today; but the case can proceed as far as the
[p.522] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 519 prayer for dissolution is concerned, so that the other reliefs can be considered on the next adjourned date, when my lawyer will be in court.”
And Mr Tagoe also said, “In the circumstances the petitioner alone will give evidence in support of his petition as respects the dissolution.
Thereupon, the petitioner in his evidence-in-chief repeated all the averments in his petition, which I have mentioned above, and tendered the marriage certificate which was accepted and marked as exhibit A in the absence of any objection. He added that there had also been no court action with reference to the issue of their marriage; also that they were unable to settle serious differences which arose between them; and that since the respondent left the matrimonial home in June 1971 they had not lived as husband and wife. He concluded by saying “there is no hope of our being reunited. Indeed, our marriage has broken down irretrievably; and I therefore pray that it should be dissolved by the court.”
Under cross-examination by the respondent, he denied that he had ordered the respondent to pack her belongings and leave the matrimonial home, and that he had not budged when Rev Richter and Rev Dodoo had pleaded with him to change his mind. He also did not agree that “no one had tried to effect a settlement” of their differences, because when the Very Rev Dodoo whose help he had tried to enlist in that regard, had sent for her, she had failed to attend to his call. There was no re-examination; and Mr Tagoe announced, “That is our case.” Thereupon the respondent made this statement:
“The petitioner and I have not lived as a married couple for so many years that it will be foolish to deny that our marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. Hence I have not been against the dissolution of it, so that I shall not offer any evidence in that regard but I shall certainly give evidence when the other reliefs are being considered on the next adjourned date.”
And I recorded the following decision:
“In the light of the above evidence, and the statement by the respondent, the court is satisfied that the marriage solemnized in 1941 at the Adukrom Presbyterian Church has truly broken down beyond reconciliation, and it is therefore declared dissolved by me.”
I also adjourned the case to 20 January 1978 for consideration of the other reliefs; and it is pertinent to note that in the answer, the respondent who cross-petitioned for the dissolution of their marriage, also prayed for these other reliefs:
[p.523] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 519
(a) That the petitioner be ordered to pay the cost of these proceedings;
(b) that the petitioner be ordered to pay alimony pending suit;
(c) that the petitioner be ordered to pay alimony or permanent maintenance to the respondent;
(d) that the court orders settlement of property; and
(e) any other order or orders.
Then on the day fixed for the consideration of the other reliefs, the petitioner stated on oath that his monthly take-home pay was about ¢300; also that he received a monthly car allowance of ¢85 and ¢65 per month as housing allowance; but at that stage of his evidence, further hearing was adjourned to 30 January 1978 at the request of counsel to enable the petitioner to “ascertain the actual figures of his income and expenditure”, and the petitioner was ordered to pay the respondent an amount of ¢180 being arrears of alimony pendente lite.
Then after the case had been further adjourned to 28 February, 21 March and 7 and 25 April 1978, at the request of the respondent’s counsel, his client again requested an adjournment and also informed the court that her maintenance allowances for the period January – April 1978 were in arrears, and the case was adjourned to 12 May 1978, after the court had ordered the petitioner to pay the respondent an amount of ¢120 due to her without further delay; but there were further adjournments because counsel failed to attend court.
Contrary to expectation, on 23 July 1979, the respondent’s counsel indicated that he wished to address me on the “permanent maintenance and settlement of property” and stated that his client accepted the amount of ¢1,300.17 as being the monthly income of the petitioner that appeared in the amended statement of his income and expenditure, also the sum of ¢122.66 shown therein as annual house rates, but instead of the amount of ¢1,127 which was said to be his expenditure per month, his client was prepared to allow ¢774, so that his net income per month would be ¢515.95. He said further that his client’s monthly income was ¢83.99, so that the joint monthly income of the parties was ¢1,384.16; also that “the convention was that the income of the applicant after the award had been made should be one-third of the joint income of the parties, which was ¢461.38”; and that his client was “asking for ¢400 out of the petitioner’s ¢515.95.”
Furthermore, he contended, that alternatively his client ought to be awarded a lump sum of ¢27,682.80, being “the amount calculated for five years”; but that as there was “no laid down rule for assessing this figure” his client would accept ¢5,000 as lump sum plus the estate house No F752/2, Osu, or the estate house and a monthly allowance of ¢400 until the respondent died or re-married; also that as the parties had been married for 38 years the presumption was that the respondent
[p.524] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 519 had “contributed in one way or the other to the acquisition of property by the petitioner”, who owned the estate house and another house in which he resided; and that since there was a provision in the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367) for settlement of property, “his client who had no place of her own to live in” was “asking for one-third share of the estate house.” The respondent’s counsel also asked for ¢600 as costs.
In replying to Mr Agadzi’s address on 25 July 1979, Mr Tagoe said that there were no arrears as far as the order for alimony pending suit was concerned; also that they agreed to the reduction of the expenditure on food from ¢700 to ¢600 and Mr Agadzi’s figure of ¢72 for laundry, but to no other amendment of the amounts appearing in their final statement of income and expenditure, so that his client’s monthly income stood at ¢1,300.17 and his monthly expenditure ¢1,171.66, leaving him with ¢128.51 each month, and that whereas they had explained their position to the court, neither the respondent nor her counsel had thought it fit to say anything about the respondent or inform the court about her circumstances.
Further that, his client, who was 65 years of age and a pensioner, might not be able to work beyond two years, so that his client could not discharge the burden of paying the amount claimed by the respondent; also that the petitioner must have performed his fatherly duty well towards their children, all of whom were of age; and that the respondent had “not contributed anything to the acquisition of property by his client.”
Furthermore, that “it was unreasonable of the respondent’s counsel to ask that the petitioner should give the estate house to the respondent”, since within four years the petitioner’s income would comprise only his pension and rents from the estate house with its out-house; and that therefore “the court should not order the petitioner to give the estate house to the respondent.” Moreover, so far the petitioner had paid the respondent a total of ¢840 by way of alimony; and that they were suggesting that the respondent should be awarded a lump sum of ¢3,000 and ¢300 costs.
It came as a bolt from the blue, when the respondent too uttered these words, “I have heard all that the petitioner said. All along nobody has asked me to speak; but if I had been asked to speak I would have told the court some of the things he did to me in the house.”
Then on 31 July 1979 the respondent disclosed that she wished to make a statement, also her counsel pleaded, “The respondent may be allowed to make her statement” And the respondent made the following statement:
“What I shall say is in connection with the estate house. When we came back to Accra from transfer, and we realised that we
[p.525] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 519 needed a house, both of us chose the house and started living in it. I stayed there with the children, while he was in the barracks, and later he joined us there. He was the one who paid the monthly rent of £5.10.3, but sometimes when he was in outstation I paid the rents. He did not give us regular monthly maintenance, and asked me to use my money as I was teaching. When he was in Takoradi and Cape Coast I paid the rents all the time and maintained the children. I therefore feel that I did contribute towards the acquisition and maintenance of that house. We are being removed from the house in which we are for renovation, and so I feel we need the house to stay in, ie the children and myself. When the children were in secondary school I paid part of their fees, so that it is wrong to say that I did not pay anything towards their education. Most of the time I used my money on the children’s clothing. I also cooked meals with my money, he ate them. I therefore feel that I did contribute during the 38 years that I lived with him, so that he should let me have the estate house. By doing all this I could not make any saving, and I have now retired, so that I have left the rest to the court to decide.”
The petitioner retorted, “I do not wish to say anything except that I stand by my affidavit. I cannot afford any more than I have offered.
Like many a married couple, the petitioner and respondent must have met, also fallen in love with each other, and been lawfully married, after a period of courtship, during which they were convinced that they were meant for each other. I have no reason to doubt that for an appreciable part of their life together, which spanned a period of more than three decades, they enjoyed connubial bliss; also as their union was blessed with as many as four children, they could be said to have enjoyed all the blessings of a happy married life; and it was not unreasonable to expect that they would be true to the vow they took on the occasion of the solemnization of their marriage to love and cherish each other until cruel death parted them, so that their love could have been considered as one which knew no ending.
But alas that has not been the case, since both parties prayed for the dissolution of their marriage, explaining that some differences arose between them which they were unable to settle, also that they had not been man and wife for over seven years, and that there was not a glimmer of hope of their being reunited, so that their marriage had broken down beyond retrieval. Moreover their pronouncements and behaviour in court left me in no doubt that they had suffered a revulsion of feeling towards each other, and there was no love lost between them. Hence taking all the circumstances of the case into account, although I have never been enamoured of putting asunder
[p.526] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 519 what the great architect of the universe has joined together “for better, for worse”, I was on 23 December 1977 constrained to hearken to their prayer, by declaring their marriage dissolved.
Therefore what remains for me to do in this case is to decide the entitlements of the respondent as far as the ancillary reliefs sought by her are concerned, viz (a) award of costs, (b) order for the payment to her of “alimony or permanent maintenance” by the petitioner, and (c) order for settlement of property in her favour; and I should say straightaway that there cannot be an atom of doubt that she deserves to be awarded costs, so that I award her ¢500 costs, which I consider is a reasonable assessment of her entitlement.
With regard to the other two reliefs, I regret to say that the respondent and her counsel have not been of much assistance to the court, for although the respondent’s averments about the alleged unseemly treatment meted out to her by the petitioner, and especially her contribution to the acquisition of the Osu estate house were controverted by the petitioner, and her counsel was well aware of the legal requirement that averments capable of proof that are made by a party to a suit and which are denied by the other party require proof thereof, they strangely enough decided that she should not even offer any evidence; but of course, her lamentation that she had not been asked to speak, which was made after Mr Tagoe’s expression of dismay that neither she nor her lawyer had “thought it fit to say anything about her or inform the court about her circumstances” was a gross misrepresentation of fact because when the petitioner gave evidence on 23 December 1977 in connection with the dissolution of their marriage, she was expected to follow suit, but she rather made a short statement in which she said she preferred not to give evidence at that stage as she also had cross-petitioned for that relief, and even intimated that she would certainly testify when the court was considering the other reliefs claimed by her. Then when, after she and her counsel had had time to consider the statements of income and expenditure filed by the petitioner, her lawyer announced to the court that he would address the court, it became obvious that the petitioner was not required to give further testimony about his income and expenditure, and that the respondent also had abdicated her right to testify. I can only say that their’s may have been a purported tactical move, which unfortunately for them turned out to be unrewarding.
I would refer to the case of Majolagbe v Larbi [1959] GLR 190 at 191 in which it was held that where a party made an averment capable of proof in some positive way and his averment was denied, it was not enough for him or his witness to go into the witness-box, and repeat the averment, but he had to offer other evidence of facts and circumstances which would satisfy the court that the averment was true; also to draw
[p.527] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 519 attention to these averments in the answer: (a) that she “had contributed jointly to acquire and maintain” the Osu estate house; (b) that on 8 June 1971 the petitioner “locked her out”; (c) that “for most of the time” the petitioner gave her only ¢5 a month for the maintenance of herself and their children; and (d) that the petitioner treated her “with inhumane and extreme cruelty”, all of which are capable of proof, e.g. by the production of receipts for payments made by her in respect of the house or the children’s school fees, or calling witnesses who knew much about their married life and could support her allegations of ill-treatment, etc; I would say that the respondent seems to have ignored the requirement laid down in the above case to her detriment.
Besides, it was not enough for Mr Agadzi to say that, .”the convention was that the income of the applicant for permanent maintenance after the award had been made, should be one-third of the joint income of the parties”, it is also not enough to say that as an alternative to permanent monthly maintenance she was entitled to ask for a reasonable amount by way of lump sum, since there was no rule for assessing the amount; and that not only was there the presumption that the respondent, who had married the petitioner for 38 years, had “contributed in one way or the other to the acquisition of property by the petitioner”, but also there was provision in Act 367 for settlement of property. Even though the law is said to be in the bosom of the judge, he could have been more helpful to the court by giving the full reference of the specific provision of Act 367, as well as drawing my attention to decided cases in support of his further contention.
Concerning the statement which the respondent was permitted to make on 31 July 1979, it would be said that there was no strict adherence to court procedure, and I have to explain that the reason why I appear to have been over-indulgent was that I felt that no harm could be done if I heard what she had to say, however belated it seemed.
Indubitably, it is not inconceivable that a female spouse will contribute to the cost of property being acquired by her husband, also the courts have in some cases declared such property to be jointly owned by them, and the court can order a husband to pay a monthly or lump sum to his wife by way of financial provision under Act 367,s 19. However, recourse must be had to these few relevant cases: First, in Quartey v Martey [1959] GLR 377 at 380, Ollennu J (as he then was) stated:
“Again, by customary law it is a domestic responsibility of a man’s wife and children to assist him in the carrying out of the duties of his station in life, e.g. farming or business. The proceeds of this joint effort of a man and his wife and/or children, and any property which the man acquires with such proceeds, are by
[p.528] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 519 customary law the individual property of the man. It is not the joint property of the man and the wife and/or the children. The right of the wife and the children is a right to maintenance and support from the husband and father.”
Secondly in Button v Button [1968] 1 WLR 457 at 462, CA it was held:
“The wife does not get a share in the house simply because she cleans the walls or works in the garden or helps her husband with the painting and decorating. Those are the sort of things which a wife does for the benefit of the family without altering the title to, or interests in, the property.”
And thirdly, Gyamaah v Buor [1962] 1 GLR 196, which supports the view that a wife or child is under a customary duty to assist the husband or father in the daily tasks of his station in life and in any acquisition of and development of property movable or immovable but does not thereby become a co-owner of such property unless such assistance was substantial or was agreed as creating a proportionate share in such property; and in which it was held that assistance in the cultivation of a cocoa farm was not enough.
In the light of the above cases, the respondent is without doubt entitled to an order for maintenance, so that considering their standard of living and other circumstances, as the court is empowered to do in making such financial provision, I would award her a lump sum of ¢5,000 to be paid by the petitioner; but it is obvious that her claim to the Osu estate house fails, because her mere assertions that she accompanied the petitioner to choose that house, also that while the petitioner was posted to Takoradi and Cape Coast she sometimes paid the monthly rent of £5.10.3, and that at times too she used her salary not only to feed and clothe the children but also to pay their school fees, did not amount to proof of substantial contribution by her towards the acquisition by the petitioner of the Osu estate house.
DECISION
Claim for ancillary reliefs allowed in part.
M C N -N
