GHANA UNION ASSURANCE CO., LTD. vs. ASSAD FAKHRY AND SONS [1981] GLR 634
24 March 1982 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 23 min read
[1982] SLR (SC) 1Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Issiw V v. Wiabu IV, Court of Appeal, 12 January 1970, unreported; digested in (1970) C.C. 108.
(2) Kyiafi v. Wono [1967] G.L.R. 463.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of Appeal in which the appellants, the insurers, were pronounced liable to indemnify the respondents, the insured, for loss incurred by them under a fire policy.
COUNSEL
E. D. Kom (with him Gbeho) for the appellants.
Tsatsu Tsikata for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
He delivered the judgment of the court. The main facts of this case are not in dispute. The respondents (hereinafter called the firm) are general merchants and wholesalers. They so described themselves in a printed “Fire Insurance Proposal Form”’ of the appellant-company (hereinafter called the company). The company, as its name implies, is an insurance company. Both the firm and the company seem to have had a long business association. The firm’s representative put this as “over twenty years.” It would seem that this association generated mutual confidence in each other. Indeed, the company’s representative said although the premises in which the firm stored the textiles which it proposed to insure, was not satisfactory to them, they obliged because “the proposer was an old customer and he claimed the goods belonged to them.”
On 6 April 1977, a representative of the firm filled a printed form described as “Proposal for Fire Insurance.” The merchandise he proposed to insure were textiles and the insured value was ¢2,500,000. Apparently, the interests which the firm were prepared to insure were described in the form in these words: “. . . the property of the proposer or held by him in trust or on commission for which he is responsible.” It is plain that the firm were then not required to state either the nature or extent of their interest. The company were only then concerned with the “stock or materials in trade.”
On the very next day, that is 7 April, the company informed the firm in writing that they hold the stock of textiles provisionally covered in the sum of ¢1,700,000. On 27 April, they then felt able
[p.637] of [1981] GLR 634 to extend the cover to the amount proposed by the firm, namely, ¢2,500,000 and so informed the latter by exhibit B1. They then requested the payment of the premium. This request was duly met. The contract which the parties concluded seems clearly to be that the company in consideration of the premium paid to them by the firm, undertook to insure the textiles for a period of one year from 6 April 1977, provided the stock-in-trade was the property of the firm or held by it in trust or on commission. As is common practice, the policy itself was not issued to evidence the contract until 1 June 1977. The firm was entitled to assume that faith would be kept and that the policy would conform with the anterior agreement. Indeed, in the Schedule to the policy of insurance, it is expressly stated that, “The property insured is in accordance with the proposal dated 6 April 1977 and lodged with the company.”
This, however, was not the case. In the seventh condition of the policy, it is stated that, “Unless otherwise expressly stated in the policy, this insurance does not cover ‘Goods held in trust or on commission’.” Whether the firm noticed this material discrepancy between the proposal and this contract condition, it is impossible to say. Its subsequent conduct suggests that it did not. There is no reason for it to suppose that it was being insured for a lesser interest than it proposed and which proposal was expressly accepted by the company.
On 25 August 1977, during the currency of the policy, fire broke out in the warehouse of the Ghana Rubber Products’ premises where, to the knowledge of the company, the textiles insured were being kept. That fire almost wholly destroyed the goods insured under the policy. What was salvaged was negligible. As was,to be expected, the firm purported to claim from the company, the value of the goods at the time of their destruction. It seems that, to do this, it had to fill a printed “claim for loss by fire” form of the company. For the first time, it was asked to state the nature of its interest in the property. The printed request, exhibit D1 was in these words, “Here state nature of your interest, whether sole owner or holding the property in trust or on commission or otherwise.” (The emphasis is ours.) In answer thereto, the firm declared that, “We are the owners.” (The emphasis is ours.)
It seems to be the normal practice for insurance companies to employ agents knowledgeable in insurance practice to investigate the genuineness or otherwise of a claim of this sort. In insurance parlance, such an agent is called an adjuster. The company employed as adjusters, a firm called Risk & Indemnity Associated Consultants. The latter entered upon the inquiry in early September 1977
[p.638] of [1981] GLR 634 and upon completion of investigations submitted to the company, a report dated 30 November 1977. In reliance on their finding, the company wrote the firm by exhibit K1, on 6 December 1977 and repudiated liability on the ground that, “ . . . you were not the owners of the goods at the time of the loss as declared by you on your claim against your policy.”
The scene was thus clearly set for litigation. Barely two months after the receipt of this letter, the firm commenced the proceedings which culminated in this appeal. It sought to recover the loss it incurred “under a policy of fire insurance issued by the defendants to the plaintiffs dated 1 June 1977 and expressed to be in accordance with a proposal made by the plaintiffs on 6 April 1977 . . .”
The position which the firm took in both the High Court and the Court of Appeal was that it was the owner of the goods or at any rate held them in trust or on commission within the true intendment of the contract and was entitled to recover. It claimed that, in so far as the seventh condition of the policy provided otherwise, it failed to reflect the true intention of the parties and ought to be rectified. The company asserted, founding itself on their adjusters’ report, that the firm was not the owner of the goods. They laid the ownership firmly in a registered business called Sally Trading Enterprise of which a lady called Sally Hage Ali was said to be the sole proprietor.
Thus the crucial questions which the parties invited the High Court to determine were whether (a) the firm was the owner of the goods, and (b) if it was not the real owners, whether it held them in trust or on commission. The fact that if either of these questions was decided in favour of the firm, it would in law have been held to have an insurable interest seems to have been conceded albeit sub silentio. After a considerable review of the evidence, the learned judge, Amua-Sekyi J. decided both questions against the firm: see Assad Fakhry and Sons v. Ghana Union Assurance Co., Ltd. [1980] G.L.R. 704. The judge expressed himself in a language which suggests that had he decided the latter question in favour of the firm, that is the “trust or commission” issue, he would have acceded to its claim for rectification.
The firm contested that judgment in the Court of Appeal on the general ground that the judgment of the High Court was against the weight of evidence. The proceedings show that the attention of the Court of Appeal was drawn to various pieces of evidence to show that the firm was in fact the owners of the goods. Apparently, as a last ditch argument, the firm also contended that, even if it was not the owner of the goods, it still had an insurable interest. As recorded it was submitted for the firm that “Assuming that
[p.639] of [1981] GLR 634
Sally. Trading Enterprise were the owners, and we deny that, we still have an insurable interest. We hold in trust . . . for Sally Trading Enterprise.” On this ground, it sought rectification of the proposal to include in addition to the owners, “holding in trust or on commission.” The firm argued that it was, on the evidence, in possession of the goods.
Although it did not speak too clearly, it is this latter submission that found favour with the Court of Appeal: see Assad Fakhry and Sons v. Ghana Union Assurance Co. Ltd. [1981] G.L.R. 163. The Court of Appeal rectified the policy by adding thereto the words “held by him in trust or on commission for which he is responsible.” And concluded that, “Even quite apart from the question of contract, the mere fact of lawful possession is sufficient to found insurable interest.” That court accordingly pronounced for the firm on the issue of liability. On the measure of the loss, the court felt no difficulty. It found that on 30 June 1977, the firm had declared the value of stock of textiles covered by the policy of insurance as ¢1,870,000 to the company. The latter’s representative conceded in evidence that that was the value of the goods in the warehouse as at 30 June. As there was no evidence of any disposal of any part of it thereafter, the court held that to be the market value of the goods at the time of the loss and entered judgment for the firm for that sum. These holdings provoked this further appeal to this court.
Both the company and firm submitted statements to this court pursuant to rule 13 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I.13), and in each, the case of each party was fully argued. For this reason, we heard very little by way of oral argument.
In a nutshell, the company complained that as the firm claimed to be the beneficial owner of the goods and lost on that ground, it was not open to it to turn round in the appellate court and rest its claim on being holders of the goods in trust or on commission. To claim that the goods are held in trust or on commission is to admit that the goods belong to some one else and that is contradictory of the case the firm presented unsuccessfully in the High Court. At all events, it was contended for the company that there was no evidential basis for holding that the firm held the goods in trust or on commission and that the Court of Appeal was not entitled to so find.
As the evidence led by the firm and all the surrounding circumstances point to the firm being the beneficial owner of the goods, we invited the company’s counsel to address us on the soundness of the trial judge’s holding that at the time of the loss, the plaintiffs were not the owners of the goods. As the final appellate court, we
[p.640] of [1981] GLR 634 consider ourselves entitled to do this because the thrust of the company’s grievance as presented in their written case dealt with facts and the proper inference that should be drawn from them. The accepted principle as stated in Kyiafi v. Wono [1967] G.L.R. 463 at p. 466, C.A. is that:
“. . . where the appellate court is satisfied that the reasons given by the trial court in support of its findings are not satisfactory, or where it irresistibly appears to the appellate court that the trial court has not taken proper advantage of having seen and heard the witnesses, then in any such case the matter will become at large for the appellate court, in which case the appellate court is under a duty to give such decision as the justice of the case requires, and, if need be, reverse the decision of the trial court and substitute its own judgment for it.”
See also Issiw V v. Wiabu IV, Court of Appeal, 12 January 1970, unreported; digested in (1970) C.C. 108. It will be necessary later in this judgment to look closely at the reasons the trial judge gave for finding against the firm on the issue of ownership. That evidence is virtually uncontradicted.
It is not in dispute that the subject-matter of the suit arrived in two consignments, i.e. 80 bales of crimpline by the vessel known as Ilorin Palm and 366 bales of the same material by the vessel called Hiddensee. Although the consignees were Sally Trading Enterprise, there is evidence that in actual truth the suppliers were the consignors and as they are not registered in this country as importers, they used that firm’s name as a matter of convenience. What is clear, however is that as soon as they were cleared from the port of Tema, the goods were delivered into the possession of the plaintiff firm. It is the plaintiff firm that arranged for it to be warehoused in a building belonging to the Ghana Rubber Factory. It was described in the proposal as a sister company. Indeed, the proprietor of the firm who gave evidence in this case, said he was both the chairman and managing director of that company.
Apparently, soon after warehousing the goods, the firm had them insured. Although the proposal form is none too clear what the firm claimed then to be its interest in the goods, the company’s representative testified that in a discussion which preceded the insurance, the firm claimed to be the owners of the goods. Except the 171 bales that were sold and delivered to the Ghana National Trading Corporation, the remainder remained in the continuous possession of the firm until their destruction by fire.
[p.641] of [1981] GLR 634
What in law is the significance of the firm’s continuous uninterrupted possession of these textiles which, on the evidence, is one of the firm’s normal line of trading? Is it not indicative of ownership? According to Salmond on Jurisprudence (10th ed.) at p. 285:
“The legal consequences which flow from the acquisition and loss of possession are many and serious.
Possession, for example, is evidence of ownership; the possessor of a thing is presumed to be the owner of it, and may put all other claimants to proof of their title . . . The transfer of possession is one of the chief methods of transferring ownership.”
Even in land law, a person in possession of land is deemed to be the owner. That is why declarations made by deceased persons showing that they had a lesser interest than absolute ownership are receivable as a declaration against interest and as an exception to the hearsay rule. As is put in Phipson on Evidence (8th ed.) at p. 274.
“And as, in the absence of other proof, mere possession implies seisin in fee, any declaration of an occupier tending to cut down, change, or fetter his presumably absolute interest, will be receivable under this head . . .
[i.e., that is a declaration against interest].”’
While the learned author of MacGillivray on Insurance Law (5th ed.) believes that there is no doubt that a person in possession has an insurable interest by reason only of that fact, he thinks there is some doubt whether a person in possession of property has on that ground alone an insurable interest to the full value. But he feels certain that the insurance of the property by the person in possession is evidential of his ownership. As the author puts it at p. 222, para. 448:
“But even if possession is not by itself sufficient to give an insurable interest up to the full value of the property, the possession of it by the person who has insured it is prima facie proof of ownership . . . “
Apart from its undisturbed possession, there is also reliable evidence of a significant exercise of ownership by the firm of part of the goods in question. One of the most important incidents of ownership, is the right of alienation: between 25 April and 2 May 1977, the firm sold 171 bales of the crimpline which arrived by the Hiddensee to the Ghana National Trading Corporation and four way-bills covering the transaction were tendered in evidence. The invoice to the Ghana National Trading Corporation on these goods was made out by Sally Trading Enterprise because the local purchase
[p.642] of [1981] GLR 634 order was made out to Sally. These invoices recited the numbers of the firm’s way-bills (exhibit 3). The firm testified that Sally merely acted as its nominee and when they received payment from the Ghana National Trading Corporation, they in turn paid it over to the firm. There is nothing incredible about this evidence. True, the art of commerce may have its mysteries but there is nothing so esoteric about the type of transaction deposed to by the firm as to make it impossible of comprehension or difficult of acceptance.
At the time the accident occurred, the muniments of title to the goods were in the possession of the firm. These they handed over to the adjuster at his request. These include the customs bill of entry on the goods, bill of lading, suppliers’ and manufacturers’ invoices. The firm also handed to the adjuster what the latter described as the “plaintiff’s stock book.” He said he took particulars of what he “needed” from it (exhibit RRI). The stock book has a label pasted on it on which is written “Local and Imported Assorted Textiles, Carpets, Fridges, etc.” Two folios were tendered in evidence as exhibits R and R1 respectively. Exhibit R contains an entry headed Ilorin Palm, and under the heading appears the date “24 February 1977, crimpline 80 bales.” Exhibit RI is headed Hiddensee S.R.P. and under the heading, appears, “366 bales crimpline.” There is also the record of sales. The quantity of goods sold the dates and way-bills tally with the way-bills of the sale to the Ghana National Trading Corporation and tendered in evidence as exhibits G-G3. The stock book and the entries therein show that the firm in the ordinary course of business not only recorded these goods in its books, but also its disposals.
Although the firm produced to the adjuster what seems satisfactory evidence of its ownership of the goods, the latter seems to have demanded a receipt of payment by it of the purchase price of the goods. So the firm appears to have requested the vendors and suppliers both with offices in Manchester, namely, Concord Yarns Ltd. and H. Mousa to provide it with documentary evidence of payment. Both did. The former acknowledged receipt of payment of the purchase price of the 80 bales textiles consigned by the Ilorin Palm and the latter of the 366 bales consigned by the Hiddensee and these receipts are dated 13 and 16 January 1978 respectively. They were produced in evidence as exhibits J1 and J2 respectively.
The goods were almost wholly destroyed by the fire, but a very insignificant portion was salvaged. These were sold to a firm called Janet Trading Company and fetched the sum of ¢2,100. The adjuster, not without significance, advised that the proceeds of the sales be paid to the firm.
[p.643] of [1981] GLR 634
It is clear that the subject-matter cannot be without an owner. So the company sought to suggest that Sally Trading Enterprise was in truth the owner of the goods. But the evidence of Sally’s association with the goods is extremely tenuous. Apart from being the consignee of these goods and apart from making out an invoice and receiving payment from the Ghana National Trading Corporation when the plaintiff firm sold and delivered these goods to that company, Sally had hardly any connection with the goods. They were at no time in their possession. They certainly did not insure them. They did not have in their possession any document of title and apparently made no claim to the ownership of these goods or even the salvage. On the contrary, the evidence of ownership produced by the plaintiff firm seems weighty and impressive.
It is now necessary to consider the reasons given by the trial judge for finding against the firm’s ownership. The court could not accept that the firm’s witness, who claimed to have a thirty-year business experience, could purchase goods worth ¢2.5 million without documentary evidence “made contemporaneously with the purchase.” The judge also refused to accord any weight to the two letters produced by the firm in which the vendors of the merchandise acknowledged the sales to the firm and testified to the full payment.
It is reasonable to expect a purchaser of goods especially where the value is large to ask and obtain receipt acknowledging payment. But this is not a requirement of law. On a sale of chattels, title passes by delivery. The issue in this case is whether the firm was the owner of the goods. It would be the owner and title would have passed to it by delivery even on a credit sale. It would, indeed, be strange if a person who bought chattels and was in possession of them could have his title defeated because he did not at the date of purchase obtain a receipt to acknowledge either the sale or payment.
As we said, the judge also said the two letters produced by the firm from Concord Ltd. and Mousa had no probative value. True, those letters were written post litem motam and were, on that account, suspect. But their production was virtually forced upon the firm. Notwithstanding the fact that the firm produced cogent evidence of its ownership of the goods, the adjuster said he asked the firm to produce documents to show that they bought the goods. There was no suggestion that these “receipts’’ were forgeries or that those who wrote them had no authority to do so. It is hardly just for the appellant company by its agent, to insist on the production of evidence of payment and when this is done, to contend that such evidence had no weight because it came after
[p.644] of [1981] GLR 634 the event. However slight may have been the probative value of these documents, as aides to the firm’s case, they wholly destroyed the company’s basic thesis that the goods insured belonged to Sally Trading Enterprise.
The judge also said that apart from “the way-bills which the plaintiffs issued when Sally Trading Enterprise sold part of the goods to G.N.T.C., there is nothing to connect them with the custody of the goods.” That holding is a little surprising. The evidence is that the goods were cleared from customs by a clearing agency called Parkobi Agencies ostensibly on behalf of Sally Trading Enterprise. But soon after leaving customs, the goods were warehoused by the firm in the factory of a sister company. The company’s representative inspected that building. It was from this warehouse that the goods sold were carted and delivered to the Ghana National Trading Corporation. These goods remained in this warehouse until their eventual destruction. Indeed, even the salvage was found there by the adjuster. Quite plainly, the firm did not only have custody but also legal possession of the goods in the juridical sense together with its attendant legal consequences.
The judge could not help being struck by the evidence that the firm kept a stock-book in which not only the goods insured but transactions connected with there were recorded. But he made short shrift of the impact on the case of that evidence by saying that:
“The stock-book exhibits R and R1 does not bear their name (meaning the firm’s); it was tendered in evidence during the cross-examination of a witness for the defendants who, naturally could not vouch for the truth of its contents.”
That observation is less than fair to the firm. The maintenance of a properly kept stock-book is one of the warranties the company imposed on the firm under the policy. The second item to the schedule provides, “Warranted that proper stock-books and records are maintained and currently posted and always kept in safe possession of the insured.” The adjuster knew of this warranty and called for the stock-book during his investigations. It was produced to him. He apparently found no reason to discredit its contents. Indeed, he testified that:
“I saw the plaintiffs’ stock-book. This was during my inquiries. I took particulars from it. I saw the stock-book a second time when I called at the offices of the plaintiffs with Mr. Yamoah in March 1979. The book shown to me is the stock-book. I see a page with entries on the shipment on the Ilorin.
[p.645] of [1981] GLR 634
I also see another page with entries on the shipment on the Hiddensee.”
It was at this stage that the stock-book was tendered without objection through him. A fairer observation on this issue would have been that this was the stock-book the firm kept in pursuance of its obligation under the policy and in the ordinary course of its business. The company’s counsel’s feeble attempt to impugn the genuineness of that book in this court was singularly unimpressive.
In view of the somewhat exhaustive analysis we have made of the evidence, we feel unable to support the trial judge’s conclusion that “at the time of the loss the plaintiffs were not owners of the goods.” We think the contrary is the case. In our opinion, the reasons given by the trial court for its conclusion are unsatisfactory and at all events, that conclusion was based on a wholly inadequate consideration of the firm’s case. We think the proper inference drawable from the totality of the evidence, is that the firm has proved not only that it was the owner of the goods but was such owner at the time of the loss and was entitled to recover under the policy.
As we said, the Court of Appeal held that the firm was entitled to recover under the policy and entered judgment for it after rectifying the policy and holding that the firm had lawful possession. If we understand the ratio decidendi of that judgment alright, it is that the “appellant (meaning the firm) entered into a contract with the respondent to insure the safety of goods belonging to others for which he had responsibility.” On the evidence in this case the “others” referred to in that judgment can only refer to Sally Trading Enterprise. If the Court of Appeal’s judgment properly construed, means that it found ownership in the goods to be in Sally Trading Enterprise but that the firm held them in trust for it, or that Sally entrusted the goods to the firm, to use “trust” in its mercantile sense, then, we respectfully differ from it. Such a finding would be plainly contrary to the facts. While we are in agreement with the Court of Appeal that the firm was in lawful possession of the goods at the time of the loss, our conclusion is that the firm was in such possession in its right as beneficial owners within the true intendment of the policy. For that reason, we are also of opinion that the firm was entitled to be indemnified by the company for the loss it sustained.
The question is, what is the quantum of the firm’s loss? It quantified that loss as ¢2,170,421.05. Although that is well within the maximum insured sum, the basis on which that figure was
[p.646] of [1981] GLR 634 arrived at was not satisfactorily established. The company, by its adjuster, computed the total loss as ¢413,872.39. We do not accept that as the market value of the goods at the time of the loss. That is an unrealistic sum. It is in any case, too conservative a figure.
The adjuster admitted that he did not consider the value of the goods in the open market “because there was none in the market.” He agreed that Loyalty Garment Factory and Millet Textiles produce similar materials but he did not check their market prices, because as he put it “they are not of the same quality.” The peculiar circumstance of the market conditions in this country with the well-known high inflationary trends make the estimation of the quantum of the loss particularly difficult. But a party is not denied compensation to which he is rightly entitled because its assessment is difficult.
It is in these circumstances that a helpful piece of evidence emerged at the company’s behest. The firm incurred a contractual obligation under endorsement 1 of the policy to make a monthly declaration of the value of its stocks. According to clause 2 of the endorsement:
“The basis of value for declarations shall be the market value and any loss hereunder shall be settled on the basis of the market value immediately anterior to the loss.”
In apparent discharge of its obligation under this clause, the firm declared the value of the “stock of textiles covered by the above insurance” as ¢1,870,000 as at 30 June 1977. Mr. Yamoah, the company’s Deputy Underwriting Manager who testified on behalf of the company said in cross-examination that, “I accept the figure of ¢1,870,000 as the value of goods in the warehouse at the time the declaration was made.”
The Court of Appeal accordingly reasoned that as there was no evidence that any part of the goods was disposed of between 30 June and the date the fire occurred, i.e. 25 August, that sum represented the loss in terms of money. In our view, that approach to the matter was right and the court’s reasoning was impeccable. We accordingly agree that the market value of the goods at the date of the fire was ¢1,870.000 and like the Court of Appeal, we also think that the firm is entitled to judgment for that sum.
Before we part with this case, there is one observation we feel obliged to make. Formal written contracts of insurance with their numerous conditions and endorsements are highly technical legal documents hardly comprehensible to a layman. Experience shows that the policies are normally received after agreement has been
[p.647] of [1981] GLR 634 reached, premium paid and after the insurance has validly come into operation. Often, the insured do not trouble to read the actual policies when they eventually arrive. For this reason, it is necessary that the stronger of the contracting parties, i.e. the insurance companies should ensure that the actual policy conforms with what the insured was led to believe. Otherwise, these policies will be no more than pitfalls for the unwary.
We make this observation because of the singular facts of this case. Clearly, the insured was led to believe that his stock-in-trade was being insured either because the goods belong to himself or he held them in trust or on commission. A condition of the policy, i.e. condition 7, unilaterally inserted by the company, negates this and this obvious divergence between the anterior agreement and the actual written policy became one of the contentious issues of this case. This caveat is the more necessary in this country where the bulk of the persons who enter into these contracts are barely literate.
In our opinion, the conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeal was right. It arrived at its conclusion on the basis that the firm held the goods in trust or on commission and felt it necessary to rectify the policy to achieve this result. Had the Court of Appeal analysed in depth the evidence as we have done, it would have found it unnecessary to rectify the policy. We are clearly of the opinion that the firm was the beneficial owners of the goods and was entitled to succeed on that basis.
We think, therefore, that this appeal fails and ought to be dismissed with costs.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
J. K. E. E.
