KANGAH & ANOTHER vs. KYERE & OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 649
31 March 1982 · TAYLOR JSC · ≈ 12 min read
[1982] SLR (SC) 4Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
REFERENCE by the Chieftaincy Tribunal of the Western Regional House of Chiefs to the Supreme Court under article 118 of the Constitution, 1979 for an opinion as to whether or not the tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain a chieftaincy petition involving the nomination and installation of a paramount chief, headed, “In the Judicial Committee of the Western Regional House of Chiefs.’
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C.
Taylor J.S.C. delivered the opinion of the court. This is a chieftaincy suit commenced by a petition headed, “In the Judicial Committee of the Western Regional House of Chiefs.” The matter came before the chieftaincy tribunal of the said house and they have referred the suit to us for an opinion as to whether or not they have jurisdiction to entertain the suit having regard to the apparent forum selected by the petitioners. The petitioners claim to be joint heads of the Abrashiem Ebiradzi family of Sekondi duly elected by the five houses of the family and properly authorised to convene a meeting of the said family for the purpose of nominating a candidate for the vacant paramount stool of the Sekondi Traditional Area.
They claim in their petition that their status and authority have been confirmed by the findings of a number of committees of inquiry and the judgments of the Western Regional House of Chiefs, the National House of Chiefs and the Court of Appeal. They said that though the family had not met to nominate a candidate, nevertheless, the first and second respondents had met and purported to have nominated, elected, confined and enstooled the third respondent as the Omanhene of the Sekondi Traditional Area. They maintained further that by a letter dated 16 July 1980 the second respondent had informed them that they had a queenmother known as Nana Araba Adadzewa II who had been gazetted. In the circumstance they filed a petition as already indicated claiming against the respondents:
“(a) Declaration that the nomination, confinement, and enstoolment of the third respondent as Omanhene-elect of the Sekondi Traditional Area is null, void and of no effect as being against the custom and usages of the Sekondi Traditional Area.
(b) Declaration that the first and second respondents have no authority by the custom and usages of the Sekondi Traditional Area to nominate, confine and enstool anybody as Omanhene of Sekondi, and that such nomination, election and installation of Omanhene of the Sekondi Traditional Area is the customary preserve of the Abrashiem Ebiradzi royal family of Sekondi of which the petitioners are the heads.
[p.652] of [1982-83] GLR 649
(c) Perpetual injunction restraining the third respondent from holding himself out as Omanhene of the Sekondi Traditional Area and performing functions of such Omanhene, and perpetual injunction restraining the first and second respondents from recognising the third respondent as such Omanhene and from taking steps towards his recognition as such.
(d) Declaration that the nomination, election and installation of Nana Adadzewa II as queenmother of the Sekondi Traditional Area is null, void and of no effect as being against the custom and usages of the Sekondi Traditional Area.
(e) Declaration that succession to the paramount stool of the Sekondi Traditional Area revolves among the five houses of the Abrashiem Ebiradzi royal family of Sekondi Traditional Area, namely John Fie house, Yalleh Eku house, Mensah Kuma house, Kobina Ekuwoho house and Anaisie house.”
The first respondent denies that the petitioners have capacity to initiate proceedings but the substantive case of the other respondents is that the first option to nominate a candidate for the Dutch Sekondi Paramountcy lies with the Abrashiem Ebiradzi family. When that family fails to exercise its option as it claims happened in the instant case, the oman has the final right which it has duly exercised.
It is not necessary for the purpose of this opinion to go into the merits of the case at all. On the same day as they filed their petition, the petitioners also filed a motion on notice for an order of interim injunction to restrain the third respondent from holding himself out as Omanhene of the Sekondi-Traditional Area and from performing the functions of such office. They also sought further orders to restrain the first and second respondents from recognising the third respondent as such Omanhene or taking any steps towards his said recognition pending the final determination of the said petition.
The motion was heard by the regional chieftaincy tribunal of the Western Regional House of Chiefs but because the motion paper indicated that the petitioners intended to proceed in the judicial committee of the Western Regional House of Chiefs, the chieftaincy tribunal felt that they might not have jurisdiction. Their doubts stem from a consideration of article 180 (2) (a) and (d) (3) and (6) in chapter 19 of the Constitution, 1979, contrasted with article 155 (1) (a) and (b) of the Constitution, 1969, and section 23 (1) (a) and (b) and (4) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370. To appreciate the dilemma of the chieftaincy tribunal it is necessary to consider how these provisions generate doubts as to the jurisdiction of the said chieftaincy tribunal to
[p.653] of [1982-83] GLR 649 hear this matter relating to the paramount stool of the Sekondi Traditional Area. of [1982-83] GLR 649-657
Article 180 (2) (a) and (d), (3) and (6) of the Constitution, 1979 provides:
“180. (2) The Regional House of Chiefs shall — (a) have original jurisdiction in all matters relating to a paramount stool or the occupant of a paramount stool, including a queen-mother to a paramount stool…
(b) establish a regional chieftaincy tribunal to hear and determine appeals from the highest traditional council within the area of authority of the traditional authority within which they are established in respect of the nomination, election, installation or deposition of a person as a chief.
(3) The regional chieftaincy tribunal established under clause (2) of this article shall consist of three chiefs appointed by the Regional House of chiefs from among its members.
(6) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the House of Chiefs of a Region existing immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution shall be deemed to have been established, from the coming into force of this Constitution as the House of Chiefs of the Region.”
In the Constitution, 1969, the relevant provisions, i.e. article 155 (1) (a) and (b) and (2) thereof are as follows:
“155. (1) There shall be established in and for each Region a House of Chiefs which shall (a) have original jurisdiction in all matters relating to a paramount stool or the occupant of a paramount stool;
(b) hear and determine, subject to the provisions of clause (3) of article 105 of this Constitution, appeals from the highest Traditional Councils within the area of authority of the traditional Authority within which they are established, in respect of the nomination, election, installation or deposition of any person as a chief.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the House of Chiefs of a Region existing immediately before the
[p.654] of [1982-83] GLR 649 coming into force of this Constitution shall be deemed to have been established, from the coming into force of this Constitution as the House of Chiefs of the Region.”
It is noteworthy that the Constitution, 1969 did not indicate or regulate in precise terms the exercise of the judicial functions conferred on a regional house of chiefs by article 155. That was done by the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), s. 23 (1) (a) and (b) and (4) which provided, inter alia, as follows:
“23. (1) Each Regional House of Chiefs shall have the following original and appellate jurisdiction:— (a) original jurisdiction in all matters relating to a paramount stool or the occupant of a paramount stool, and (b) appellate jurisdiction to hear and determine subject to the provisions of clause (3) of article 105 of the Constitution appeals from the highest Traditional Councils within the area of authority of the Traditional Authority within which they are established, in respect of the nomination, election, appointment, installation or deposition of any person as a chief.
(4) The original and appellate jurisdiction conferred on each Regional House of Chiefs shall be exercised by a judicial committee of that House comprising three persons appointed by that House.”
Although the Constitution, 1969 was silent as to the body that was to actually exercise the judicial function of a regional house of chiefs, Act 370, provided, as indicated herein, that the said judicial function was to be exercised by “a judicial committee of the house comprising three persons appointed by the house.” The Act persistently used the expression `judicial committee” to describe the body to exercise judicial functions at the traditional councils, regional house of chiefs and National House of Chiefs.
The Constitution, 1979, however was not silent; it used the expression “National Chieftaincy Tribunal” to describe the body to exercise the judicial functions, both original and appellate, of the National House of Chiefs. As can be seen from a study of article 180, it also used the expression “regional chieftaincy tribunal” in article 180 (2) (d) to identify the body that was to exercise appellate jurisdiction in respect of appeals to the regional house of chiefs from “the highest Traditional Council within the area of authority of the traditional authority in respect of the nomination, election, installation
[p.655] of [1982-83] GLR 649 or deposition of a person as a chief.”
Curiously and for reasons not clear from a reading of article 180 (2) (a), the Constitution, 1979, like the Constitution, 1969, before it, did not specify in express terms the body that was to actually exercise the original jurisdiction of the regional house of chiefs conferred on the house by article 180 (2) (a) and it is this apparent lacuna that has led the members of the regional chieftaincy tribunal to question their jurisdiction in this matter and to wonder whether the jurisdiction should not be exercised by the whole house, particularly as Act 370 appears to be concerned with the regional judicial committee rather than regional chieftaincy tribunal.
Under Article 118 of the Constitution, 1979, it is provided as follows:
“118. (1) The Supreme Court shall, except as otherwise provided in article 35 of this Constitution, have original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other Courts.
(a) in all matters relating to the enforcement or interpretation of any provision of this Constitution; and (b) where a question arises whether an enactment was made in excess of the powers conferred upon Parliament or any other authority or person by law or under this Constitution.
(2) Where a question relating to a matter or question as is referred to in clause (1) of this article arises in any proceedings in any Court, other than the Supreme Court, that Court shall stay the proceedings and refer the question of law involved to the Supreme Court for determination; and the Court in which the question arose shall dispose of the case in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court.”
In view of the provisions of the said article 118, the regional chieftaincy tribunal set up by the Western Regional House of Chiefs, to hear the suit herein, stayed the proceedings and have referred the matter of the interpretation of article 180 (2) (a) and (d) of the Constitution, 1979, to this Court.
We think the provisions of article 180 (2) (a) and (d), (3) and (6) of the Constitutions, 1979, should be read in the light of the existing law of the country. The existing law of the country before the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979, and its operative force after the Constitution has come into force, have been defined by the said Constitution, 1979. Under clauses (4), (5) and (6) of article 4 of the said Constitution, it is provided:
“(4) The existing law shall… comprise the written and unwritten laws of Ghana as they existed immediately before the
[p.656] of [1982-83] GLR 649 coming into force of this Constitution, and any Act, Decree or statutory instrument issued or made before that date, which is to come into force on or after that date.
(5) Subject to the provisions of this article, the operation of the existing law after the coming into force of this Constitution shall not be affected by such commencement.
(6) For the purposes of clause (5) of this article, the existing law shall be construed with such modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of this Constitution, or otherwise to give effect to, or enable effect to be given to, any changes effected by this Constitution.”
We are of the opinion that Act 370 is part of the existing law of the country and its operation, in so far as it is not inconsistent with any provisions of the Constitution, is not affected by the coming into force of the Constitution. In this regard, it is pertinent to reiterate the point that when the Constitution, 1969, was silent as to the actual body empowered to exercise the original and appellate jurisdiction of a regional house of chiefs, Act 370 made provisions which regulated the exercise of that jurisdiction. Since the Constitution, 1979, was also silent on the body empowered to exercise the original jurisdiction of a regional house of chiefs, it is clear that the provisions expressly made in Act 370, will be applicable if they are not inconsistent with other provisions of the Constitution. The relevant provisions of Act 370, in this regard are sections 9 (4) and 23 (4) which are as follows:
“9. (4) Subject to the provisions of this Act a Regional House of Chiefs may appoint such committees comprising such persons as it may determine to assist it in the discharge of its functions, and subject as aforesaid may delegate to any such committee such of its functions as it may think fit.”
“23. (4) The original and appellate jurisdiction conferred on each Regional House of Chiefs shall be exercised by a judicial committee of that House comprising three persons appointed by that House.”
We see nothing in these provisions which can be said to be inconsistent with any provisions of the Constitution, 1979, in general, and its chapter 19 in particular. If anything, the design of the chieftaincy provisions of the Constitution, 1979, and in particular the provisions of articles 179 and 180, show that it was the intention of the constitution makers that the judicial functions of the National House of Chiefs and a regional house of chiefs be exercised by chieftaincy tribunals which are to be judicial committees of the said houses. Perhaps the apparent confusion in this case has arisen because while the Constitution, 1979, uses the expression “chieftaincy tribunal”, the Chieftaincy Act, 1971, uses the expression “judicial committee”.
It seems to us on a close reading of the Constitution and statutory provisions, that a “chieftaincy tribunal” as is spelled out in the Constitution, 1979, art. 180 (2) (d) is indeed a judicial committee and since the composition and functions of a “judicial committee” as so spelled out in Act 370 are virtually consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, the two expressions are really different names for the same institution. In our view, the judicial committee of the Western Regional House of Chiefs is the same as the chieftaincy tribunal of the Western Regional House of Chiefs, for a judicial committee with judicial functions of adjudication in chieftaincy matters is best described as a chieftaincy tribunal.
We are accordingly of the view that the suit is properly pending before the chieftaincy tribunal of the Western Regional House of Chiefs and that it has original jurisdiction to determine the instant matter. We wish, however, to point out that the reliefs sought in this petition and the apparent issues appear to us to be the ones determined in the appellate case entitled Kyereh v. Kangah [1978] G.L.R. 83, C.A. (full bench) and we hope the tribunal would bear this in mind when it comes to deliberate on the merit or otherwise of this petition.
DECISION
Opinion on requisite interpretation granted.
S. Y. B. B.
