BORKLOE AND ANOTHER vs. NOGBEDZI AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 1003
8 June 1983 · MENSA BOISON JA · ≈ 11 min read
[1983] SLR (CA) 5Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Liesbosch Dredger v. S.S. Edison [1933] A.C. 449; 102 L.J.P. 73; 149 L.T. 49 T.L.R. 289; 38 Com. Cas. 267; 18 Asp. M.L.C. 380; [1933] All E.R. Rep. 144, H.L.
(2) Martin v. London County Council [1947] K.B. 628; [1947] L.J.R. 1231; 177 L.T. 38; 63 T.L.R.
284; 111 J.P. 310; 91 S.J. 264; [1947] 1 All E.R. 789; [63 L.Q.R. 414]
(3) Campbell (Donald) & Co., Ltd. v. Pollak [1927] A.C. 732; 96 L.J.K.B. 1132; 137 L.T. 656, H.L.
(4) Worbi v. Asamanyuah (1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 669.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a decision of the High Court, Ho, wherein damages and costs awarded for the total loss of the respondent’s petrol tanker were alleged to be excessive. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of the court delivered by Mensa Boison J.A.
COUNSEL
Miss Amassah Senior State Attorney, for the appellants.
A. A. Ackuaku for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF MENSAH BOISON J.A.
Mensah Boison J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court, Ho, dated 10 November 1980. By that judgment the appellants (hereafter called the defendants) were found liable in substantial damages for damage caused to the five-ton Bedford tanker of the first respondent (hereafter called the owner) as a result of the negligent driving of the first defendant.
The facts which gave rise to the action were straight-forward, and may be briefly stated. On 17 April 1978, the owner of the tanker and the second respondent (hereafter called the second plaintiff) as the driver in charge of the tanker, registered as No. GL 4146, were travelling from Tema to Denu, when at a point near Laklevi village, on the Agbozume – Denu road, the first defendant, driving a Bedford threeton truck, ran head on into the owner’s tanker. The truck being driven by the first defendant, with registration No. GS 2041, belonged to the Ministry Agriculture, a fact which explains the presence of the Attorney-General as the second defendant representing the Ghana Government. The first defendant was travelling in the opposite direction from Aflao to Adidome, and the time was about 7.30 p.m., with both vehicles having their headlights on.
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The learned trial judge accepted the evidence that on sighting the Ministry of Agriculture truck some distance away, the second plaintiff dipped his headlights, and being somewhat apprehensive of the approaching vehicle, pulled further into his own lane of traffic, right unto the verge of the road. For extra caution the second plaintiff, at the same slowed down his speed considerably. But the Ministry of Agriculture truck was observed still wandering off its lane of traffic, and eventually struck at the front, then at the rear offside of the tanker. The tanker reeled down on its near side into a ditch, with the Ministry of Agriculture truck sitting on top of the tanker.
The first defendant admitted the fact of the collision having occurred in the lane of the tanker, although he would describe the impact as a mere graze. Consequently, his protestations that the second plaintiff put on full headlights on getting nearer to him, and so blinded him to stray into the second plaintiff’s lane, could not avail him in his plea of contributory negligence. The learned judge held that the collision was attributable wholly to the negligent driving of the first defendant and so he was answerable for the damages flowing therefrom.
It is unnecessary to set out the particulars of damages except to say that the trial court found that the tanker No. GL 4146 was written off as a total loss. The owner employed his tanker in conveying petroleum products from Tema to Denu District, five days in the week. The evidence that this business earned the owner a commission of between 2,500 cedis and 4,000 cedis monthly was accepted. The original cost of the vehicle was 50,000 cedis in 1970, the replacement cost was given by as him 240,000 cedis as at November 1980. Together with miscellaneous damages the learned trial judge finally awarded the owner the sum of 244,375 cedis damages made up as: (1) replacement value — 240,000 cedis (ii) cost of removal — 875 cedis, and (iii) loss of earnings for the month of the accident — 3,500 cedis.
In this appeal, learned counsel for the defendants, Miss Amassah, with leave of the court, argued three additional grounds filed by her. The first was that the learned judge erred in law in holding that the accident occurred solely as a result of the negligence of the first defendant; and second alleges that learned judge failed to consider the evidence before him on contributory negligence. We have considered these grounds and only think it necessary to say that we find no substance in them.
The third ground of complaint was that the learned judge failed to hold that the pre-accident value should be the damages to be awarded. This was an attack against the award of ¢240,375 cedis as the replacement value. The case was that the second plaintiff witness had said in evidence that the present cost (at the time of giving evidence) of a tanker of similar capacity as the owner’s was ¢22,645.32 cedis including the cost
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of mounting it on the chassis. This witness was a representative of Dorman Long Ltd; and had also given the life span of a tanker, properly maintained, to be ten years. He further said that his company could make one then at that price, although he added significantly that they had no materials at the time. Finally, it was his opinion that the cost of a tanker in 1970 would have been roughly between ten to twelve thousand cedis.
Secondly, learned counsel pointed out that on the owner’s evidence in exhibit K, the cost of a five-ton Bedford diesel chassis in 1975, 1977, 1979 and 1980 was 16, 445 cedis, 20, 759 cedis 50,219 cedis and 44,884 cedis respectively. The effect of the evidence, counsel explained, was that having seen the better part of a decade, the pre-accident value of the owner’s vehicle, at the outside, could not be more than 22,600 cedis for the tanker and 50,000 cedis for the chassis. Consequently, it was submitted that the learned judge erred in failing to be guided by the evidence of the second plaintiff’s witness and the contents of exhibit K as to the market prices; resulting in his awarding the unreasonably excessive figure of 240,000 cedis as the replacement value.
Pausing a while, it seems that the terms “pre-accident value” and “the replacement value” cannot be used with any exactitude. Each is meant to express the value of the first plaintiff’s vehicle until its loss. The basic principle of the measure of damages in cases of loss of chattels is restitutio in integrum. It was stated in a leading case where damage was caused to a dredger that:
“. . . the owners of the former vessel are entitled to what is called restitutio in integrum, which means that they should recover such a sum as will replace them, so far as can be done by compensation in money, in the same position as if the loss had not been inflicted on them, subject to the rules of law as to remoteness of damage.”
See Liesbosch Dredger v. S.S. Edison [1933] A.C. 449 at p. 459, H.L.
In our opinion, reliance merely on the market price, i.e. the cost of the vehicle, as urged by counsel for the defendants, would not replace the owner in the position he was before the accident. The second plaintiff witness himself confessed that his company had been out of production since 1978, which meant that they had no materials to produce a similar tanker for the owner. In exhibit K there were no sales for 1976 and 1978; obviously meaning that there was no Bedford chassis available for sale in these years. Nor did the defendants elicit evidence that a chassis could have been procured from Africa Motors, the agents, at the date of trial. Of what use was a compensation of
[p.1008] of [1982-83] GLR 1003 ¢22,600 cedis or ¢50,000 cedis to the owner then?
The truth of the matter is that a replacement may well cost more than the original price of that chattel because inflationary trends and other market forces might operate to increase the cost. Thus in Martin v. London County Council [1947] K.B. 628, it was held that when purchase tax had been imposed on jewellery since the plaintiff acquired it he was entitled to recover this tax because, in order to buy a replacement now, he would have to pay that tax. Indeed, the trial judge was not unmindful of these matters, when he said: “It is true that the pre-accident market value of chattels affords a guide to the measure of compensation when, and only when, a similar chattel can be obtained in the open market.” Then he adds:
“Therefore, the measure of damages would be the value of the tanker in the market provided there is a market in which it could be bought. Since it is a total loss the measure of damages would be its value. I think the owner would not be entitled to damages on the basis of a replacement of the tanker, but to the reasonable cost of another tanker which reasonably meets his needs and is reasonably in the same condition.
Further on the learned judge took note of the “prevent value of the cedi not being inflation proof.” It is plain that in arriving at the sum of ¢240,000 cedis it cannot be said that the trial court ignored the market price as a guide. Besides, that was the amount the owner, the first plaintiff, desposed could give him one, and that evidence was not questioned. Learned counsel’s further complaint that there should have been a deduction from the figure of ¢240,000 cedis for the value of the scrap, which must be of some use to the owner, cannot be entertained. The fact found was that the vehicle was a total loss. It was for the defence to have led evidence to show the value of the scrap to the owner. No such evidence was adduced, and the contention advanced may be said to be a mere speculation. We think the trial judge correctly addressed himself to the principles governing the award of such compensation, to reflect the value of the tanker to the owner as a going concern. This ground of appeal therefore fails.
As part of the general ground, learned counsel for the defendants complained of the costs of ¢20,00 cedis awarded to the plaintiffs as being excessive. Learned counsel pointed out the absence of any special factors which should attract heavy costs, namely that the action was far from being complicating as to require undue time of counsel in advising on or conducting the hearing; that the actual hearing itself took only about six days and that only two witnesses were called by the owner, the first plaintiff, to establish his case. The general principle on which the High Court acts as regards costs is governed by
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Order 65, r. 1 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), namely:
“1. Subject to the provision of these Rules, the costs of and incident to all proceedings in the Supreme Court, including the administration of estates and trusts, shall be in the discretion of the Court or Judge . . .”
The power under the rule has been said to be an absolute and unfettered discretion to award or not to award costs, but that “this discretion, like any other discretion, must of course be exercised judicially . . .” : See Donald Campbell & Co., Ltd. v. Pollak [1927] A.C. 732 at pp. 811-812 per Viscount Cave L.C., H.L., cited with approval in Worbi v. Asamanyuah (1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 669, which further stated that if there were grounds upon which the High Court could exercise the discretion their sufficiency was a matter for his discretion, which would not be interfered with by the appellant court. In the Worbi case (supra) itself the refusal by Jackson J. to award costs to some of the successful parties was indeed interfered with and fresh orders substituted.
This was because the learned judge had misapprehended the fact that what he described as belated amendment of the writ of summons was in fact an application that had been made very early at the native court, but had not been attended to by the registrar.
In this case the learned judge did not give reasons for what appears to be very high costs, and it is left to learned counsel to show that the award was palpably against principle. The grounds of absence of “aggravating factors” are not unanswerable. First the amount of damages awarded points to the gravity of the claim. The record of proceedings at the court below indicates several unrecorded adjournments. For instance, at the end of the hearing on 27 November 1979, further hearing was adjourned to 12 February 1980. The next proceedings was on 27 February 1980 rather, without any record of what took place on 12 February. I note about three such instances and learned counsel for the plaintiffs had explained that the judge was at the time engaged on the Armed Forces Inquiry, which occasioned his enforced absence from court. But without prior notification the plaintiffs were obliged to bring their expert witnesses from Dorman Long and African Motors to court at consideration cost each time. It would also appear that having withheld from the first plaintiff, the owner, substantial loss of earnings in the claim, the trial judge sought to make it up in costs. These we think are factors which will justifiably swell costs, and as the learned counsel has not succeeded in showing the discretion to have been wrongly exercised, we do not find good
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reasons to interfere with the costs of 20,000 cedis awarded in this action. It is for the reasons above that we dismiss the appeal.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
J. A. A.
