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[1983] SLR (HC) 13High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL II)

NKRUMAH vs. FOLI AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 1046

31 January 1983 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 18 min read

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OSCOLANKRUMAH v FOLI AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 1046 [1983] SLR (HC) 13
APANKRUMAH v FOLI AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 1046, [1983] SLR (HC) 13 (Ghana).
BluebookNKRUMAH v FOLI AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 1046, [1983] SLR (HC) 13 (Ghana High Ct. 1983).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Hopkins v. Crowe (1836) 4 Ad. & El. 774; 7 C. & P. 373; 3 Nev. & M.M.C. 440; 2 Har. & W. 21;

5 L.J.K.B. 147; 111 E.R. 641.

(2) Grinham v. Willey (1859) 4 H. & N. 496; 157 E.R. 934.

(3) Morgan v. Parkinson Howard Ltd. [1961] G.L.R. 68.

(4) Narwu v. Armah [1972] 2 G.L.R. 331, C.A.

(5) Christie v. Leachinsky [1947] A.C. 573; [1947] L.J.R. 757; 176 L.T. 443; 63 T.L.R. 231; 111 J.P.

224; [1947] 1 All E.R. 567; 97. L.J. 369, H.L.

[p.1050] of [1982-83] GLR 1046 (6) Gelberg v. Miller [1961] 1 W.L.R. 153; [1961] 1 All E.R. 291; 105 S.J. 89.

(7) John Lewis & Co. Ltd. v. Tims [1952] A.C. 676; [1952] 1 W.L.R. 1132; [1952] 1 All E.R. 1203;

96 S.J. 342, H.L.

(8) Danby v. Beardsley (1880) 43 L.T. 603.

(9) Tewari v. Singh (1908) 24 T.L.R. 884, P.C.

(10) Watters v. Pacific Delivery Service Ltd., Sandover and Cotter (1964) 42 D.L.R. (2d.), 661. (11) Fitzjohn v. Mackinder (1860) 8 C.B. (N.S.) 78; 141 E.R. 1094.

(12) Alhadi v. Allie (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 323.

(13) Aubin v. Ehunaku [1960] G.L.R. 167, C.A.

(14) Soadwah alias Sondura v. Obeng [1966] G.L.R. 338, S.C.

(15) Inneh v. Aruegbon (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 73.

(16) Hicks v. Faulkner (1881) 8 Q.B.D. 167; 46 L.T. 127; 46 J.P. 420; 30 W.R. 545. (17) Herniman v. Smith [ 1938] A.C. 305; [1938] 1 All E.R. 1; 107 L.J.K.B. 225; 82 S.J. 192, H.L. (18) Tempest v. Snowden [1952] 1 K.B. 130; [1952] 1 All E.R. 1; (1951) 2 T.L.R. 1201, C.A.

(19) Meering v. Grahame-White Aviation Co., Ltd. (1919) 122 L.T. 44, C.A.

(20) Tims v. John Lewis & Co., Ltd. [1951] 2 K.B. 459; (1951) 1 T.L.R. 79; [1951] 1 All E.R. 814, C.A.

(21) Willans v. Taylor (1829) 6 Bing. 183; 3 Moo. & P. 350; 7 L.J. (O.S.) C.P. 250; 130 E.R. 1250. (22) Abrath v. North Eastern Railway Co. (1886) 11 App. Cas. 247; 55 L.T. 63; 50 J.P. 659; 2 T.L.R.

416, H.L.

(23) Baksh v. R. [1958] A.C. 167; [1958] 2 W.L.R. 536; 102 S.J. 228, P.C.

(24) Bynoe v. Bank of England [1902] 1 K.B. 467.

(25) Everett v. Ribbands [1952] 2 Q.B. 198; [1952] 1 All E.R. 825; (1952) 1 T.L.R. 933; 116 J.P. 221;

96 S.J. 229; 50 L.G.R. 389.

(26) Danso v. Oteng; Danso v. Abaka (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 167, W.A.C.A.

(27) Pike v. Waldrum and P. & O. Steamship Navigation Co. [1952] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 431. (28) Onogen v. Leventis & Co., Ltd. [1959] G.L.R. 105.

(29) Batanhene and Mbir v. Krampah and Aggrey (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 188, W.A.C.A. (30) Gyimah v. Donkor [1974] 2 G.L.R. 237.

[p.1051] of [1982-83] GLR 1046

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the plaintiff against the defendants—claiming damages for unlawful arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Richard Apaloo for the plaintiff.

Kobena Acquaye for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.

The plaintiff claims against the defendants jointly and severally ¢10,000 damages for unlawful arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The facts of the case were that on 21 November 1979, the plaintiff and her four daughters were arrested by the Sekondi Police and locked up in cells. They were released on bail the next day and later prosecuted before the District Court, Sekondi, on a charge of assault. The first defendant gave evidence as the complainant and victim of the assault. The second defendant is the father of the first defendant. He never accused anybody of assaulting him. He, however, went to the police station on the day the plaintiff and her four daughters were arrested and detained. He also attended court during the trial but never gave evidence. The criminal prosecution terminated with the acquittal of the plaintiff and the conviction of her four children. The plaintiff thereafter instituted this action claiming that her arrest and detention were unlawful and were caused by the defendants. She also accused the defendants of malicious prosecution. She claims damages for loss of earnings for the period of the trial which took fifteen adjournments at the rate of ¢200 a day. She also claims ¢600 as solicitor’s fees and transport charges to and from court during the trial. Her daughters did not sue.

The first defendant states that she alone lodged a complaint of assault with the police against the plaintiff and her four daughters and that her father, the second defendant, merely came to meet her at the entrance of the police station. She and her father vehemently deny ever causing the arrest and detention of the plaintiff and also responsibility for the subsequent prosecution of the plaintiff. They also dispute the plaintiff’s entitlement to the damages claimed. I would first deal with the plaintiff’s arrest. There is no dispute that policemen arrested the plaintiff and her four daughters upon a complaint of assault lodged by the first defendant against them. The plaintiff’s evidence and that of her daughter, Grace York, the first plaintiff witness, showed that none of the defendants actually led the police to the houses of the plaintiff and her daughters. The first defendant said she mentioned the names of her assailants to the police and the latter went to arrest them. She never authorised or directed the arrest. Her father never did so either. How then did the police know the plaintiff and her children so as to be able to go and arrest them without the first

[p.1052] of [1982-83] GLR 1046 defendant identifying them? This is a matter for the plaintiff to explain because she accuses the defendants of causing her arrest. In answer to a question in cross-examination the plaintiff called out the names of the three policemen who arrested her and her four children as Constables Krah and Awuku and Sergeant Mensah. She did not call any of them to testify on her behalf as to whether they were authorised and directed by the defendants to effect her arrest. The plaintiff said a policeman went to her and told her to follow him to the police station. She asked him what for, but the policeman told her that she would know the reason for her arrest at the police station. And the first plaintiff witness said the plaintiff came in company with the police to arrest her and her other sisters to the police station.

The law is quite clear that for a person to be held liable for an arrest effected by a policeman there must be cogent evidence that that person actually authorised and directed the arrest using the policeman as a mere agent not acting on a discretion of his own. In other words, the person, if he is a complainant, must be considered not as a party reporting a crime to the police officer in consequence of which the other person was arrested but as a principal party causing the arrest to be made and therefore liable in trespass: see Hopkins v. Crowe (1836) 4 Ad. & EI. 774; Grinham v. Willey (1859) 4 H. & N. 496; Morgan v. Parkinson Howard Ltd. [1961] G.L.R. 68 and Narwu v. Armah [1972] 2 G.L.R. 331 at p. 334, C.A. In Hopkins v. Crowe (supra) X called a policeman and told him to arrest Y for an offence. The policeman told X that if he was prepared to charge Y then he the policeman would arrest him. X said he would charge Y. Thereupon the policeman arrested Y. This was held to be actual direction and authorisation. Where therefore a person upon making a report of a crime committed against himself or another, leads the police to the house or place of abode of the suspect for the purpose of identifying him to the police for his arrest he would not be liable for the consequence of the arrest unless he actively does some act beyond mere identification such as instructing the police officer to effect the arrest, or that he does something beyond the mere complaint to instigate the policeman to effect the arrest. In the instant case, the mere mention by the first defendant of a crime to the police and giving the names of the suspects to the police who then on their own volition went and arrested the suspects does not amount to actual authorisation and direction.

In determining the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an arrest reference must be made to the criminal law. Our law has always been solicitous of the freedom of the individual. Section 10 of our Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), empowers a police constable to effect the arrest of any person on reasonable grounds that the person has committed a felony or misdemeanour. He may exercise this statutory [p.1053] of [1982-83] GLR 1046 power upon a complaint by a member of the public. Any person arrested whether with or without a warrant shall be taken with all reasonable despatch to a police station or other place for the reception of arrested persons, and shall without delay be informed of the charge against him. The person arrested is entitled to these benefits designed to secure for him the protection of the law. If he is denied those rights without cause the arrest becomes unlawful: see sections 9 and 15 respectively of Act 30. Our law is exactly the same as the English common law on the subject and English judicial decisions are applicable: see Christie v. Leachinsky [1947] A.C. 573, H.L.; Gelberg v. Miller [1961] 1 W.L.R. 153 and John Lewis & Co., Ltd v. Tims [1952] A.C. 676, H.L.

Our law further insists that a person arrested and taken to a police station must have his case expeditiously investigated and where there is no good reason to believe that the person has committed an offence he must be released forthwith or where there is good reason to believe that he has committed an offence he must be granted bail if the offence does not appear to be of a serious nature: see section 15 of Act 30. Felonies and misdemeanours are serious crimes involving imprisonment, but offences punishable by fine only are certainly not of a serious nature, e.g. breach of the peace. Consequently, refusal in such cases to grant bail amounts to unlawful detention actionable at the instance of the person arrested. In the instant case, the offence reported by the first defendant was assault which is a misdemeanour. The police had good reasons to believe that the offence had been committed. The first defendant said she had scratches on her body as a result of the assault and her medical report supports this. The fact that a court acquits a person whom the police had good reason to believe has committed an offence of a serious nature is completely irrelevant in determining the lawfulness or otherwise of his arrest and detention. I do not find any evidence that the police unduly delayed in taking the plaintiff and her daughters to the police station or investigating the case. The arrest and detention of the plaintiff were therefore lawful in so far as it was based upon the complaint lodged by the first defendant.

The evidence against the second defendant adduced by the plaintiff was that he told the plaintiff that he had caused the arrest of the plaintiff and her daughters. It was also alleged by the plaintiff and her daughter, the first plaintiff witness, that the second defendant had told the police not to grant bail to the plaintiff and her children. I was unable to find that the second defendant uttered these statements. The point which ought to be remembered is that where a mother and her daughter or son or a father and his daughter or son or a husband and wife are interested in the outcome of a case a court ought not to accept

[p.1054] of [1982-83] GLR 1046 allegations made by them which are denied unless on the facts proved in the case there is some independent piece of evidence substantiating those allegations. It would be wrong for a court to treat the testimony of one interested party as corroborative of the testimony of another interested party. There was no such independent evidence. I therefore hold that the allegations made against the second defendant were unestablished.

I now proceed to deal with the prosecution of the plaintiff. I have always thought it right that a person cannot be held liable or responsible for the criminal prosecution of another person against whom he has lodged a complaint of commission of a criminal offence unless that person has played such a preponderant and overbearing role in setting the machinery of the law in motion against the alleged offender that a reasonable man who is apprised of the facts would unhesitatingly conclude that the law enforcement agents were used by that person as mere robots to serve his personal interest. To hold otherwise would amount to discrediting the sense of duty and integrity of the law enforcement agents who alone are charged with the detection and prosecution of crimes even though the co-operation and assistance of members of the public are essential for the efficient administration of the criminal law. A member of the public whether he has been offended by crime or not, is not supposed to be actively instrumental in criminal prosecution. The discretion to prosecute is entirely that of the law enforcement agents. But this does not prevent the person lodging the complaint from assisting in the process under the guidance of the law enforcement agents. Once he acts under the directions of these agents he cannot be held liable for the prosecution. Mere information to the police of a crime must be distinguished from instigating the police to prosecute the offender: see Danby v. Beardsley (1880) 43 L.T. 603; Tewari v. Singh (1908) 24 T.L.R. 884, P.C.; Watters v. Pacific Delivery Services Ltd., Sandover and Cotter (1964) 42 D.L.R. (2d.) 661; Fitzjohn v. Mackinder (1860) 8 C.B. (N.S.) 78; Alhadi v. Allie (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 323; Aubin v. Ehunaku [1960] G.L.R. 167, C.A. and Soadwah alias Sondura v. Obeng [1966] G.L.R. 338, S.C. Also the mere fact that a person who has interest in the prosecution of a particular criminal offence committed either against him or a relation of his, does any act to ensure an expeditious dispensation of justice, e.g. helping to procure evidence or querying any delay in the case, is not sufficient to make him liable for instigating the prosecution. The plaintiff has not adduced any evidence to show that the first defendant did anything beyond the mere complaint she lodged with the police apart from giving evidence at the trial before the district court as a prosecution witness. Nor has there been evidence that the second

[p.1055] of [1982-83] GLR 1046 defendant instigated the police to prosecute the plaintiff and her daughters.

The next issue is whether there was any reasonable and probable cause for the arrest, detention and prosecution of the plaintiff and her four daughters. Under our law, criminal proceedings may be commenced in either two ways; either by lodging a complaint with the police or by making a complaint to a district magistrate: see sections 10 and 60 of Act 30. The police officer must act if he has reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has been committed. The district magistrate must be satisfied that there is a reasonable and probable cause. Any person who lodges a complaint of the commission of a crime is obligated to ensure that the complaint is based upon either reasonable grounds or reasonable and probable cause. It seems to me that the phrase “reasonable grounds” means the same as “reasonable and probable cause” and are perfectly synonymous or interchangeable. All that the law requires is that a complaint must not be false and baseless; it must have some reasonable foundation. For instance if the incident complained of never occurred at all as alleged by the complainant and the latter knew that it did not occur he would be guilty of lodging the complaint without reasonable and probable cause: see Inneh v. Aruegbon (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 73. And this in turn involves the question as to whether the complaint was honestly and genuinely made of an incident which has occurred: see Hicks v. Faulkner (1881) 8 Q.B.D. 167; Herniman v. Smith [1938] A.C. 305, H.L. and Tempest v. Snowden [1952] 1 K.B. 130, C.A. Mere suspicion is not enough: see Meering v. Grahame & White Aviation Co., Ltd. (1919) 122 L.T. 44, C.A. and Tims v. John Lewis & Co., Ltd. [1951] 2 K.B. 459, C.A. But suspicion based on reasonable ground is enough (see sections 10 and 60 respectively of Act 30). The defendant has no burden of proving that he had reasonable grounds for lodging the complaint or instituting the prosecution. On the contrary, it is the plaintiff who has the onus of proving that the defendant had no reasonable and probable cause: see Willans v. Taylor (1829) 6 Bing. 183 and Abrath v. North Eastern Rly. Co. (1886) 11 App. Cas. 247, H.L.

In the instant case, the first defendant was victim of assault and the fact of her having reasonable and probable cause is ipsa loquitur. The question is whether she had no reasonable and probable cause to say that the plaintiff took part in the assault. The onus lay on the plaintiff to prove that the first defendant had none. The evidence adduced by the plaintiff was that a fight took place between her daughter and the first defendant. She heard of it and went to the scene but the fight had ended so she returned to her house and never returned to the first defendant’s place again and there was no reason why the first defendant could say that she, the plaintiff, assaulted her.

[p.1056] of [1982-83] GLR 1046

The plaintiff’s daughter also said that only one fight took place and it was between her and the first defendant, thus supporting what her mother the plaintiff said. But it is significant to observe that the plaintiff’s four daughters were convicted for assaulting the first defendant. How did the others come into the picture? The facts show clearly that the first defendant spoke the truth that a second fight took place and she saw those involved to include the plaintiff. I found it difficult to understand why upon the basis of the same evidence adduced by the first defendant at the trial the court should convict the daughters and acquit the plaintiff being a co-accused? If the court believed the first defendant with respect to the four daughters why did it not believe her with respect to the plaintiff? The plaintiff said she lived in a separate house thus suggesting that she could not have gone to the first defendant’s house to beat her, but it is on record that she rushed to the first defendant’s place during the first fight between her daughter and the first defendant. The trial court erred in law in acquitting the plaintiff and convicting the plaintiff’s daughters on the basis of one and the same testimony of the first defendant. It has always been the law that a trial court cannot accept the testimony of one and the same witness to convict one accused and reject the testimony against another accused and acquit him in a joint trial on the same charge: see Baksh v. R [1958] A.C. 167, P.C. It is my view that in determining absence of reasonable and probable cause in an action for malicious prosecution, the fact that this principle is violated by the trial criminal court, as in the instant case, should create doubt as to absence of reasonable and probable cause and it is legitimate for the court to resolve the doubt in favour of the person sued for malicious prosecution and conclude that the plaintiff has failed to prove absence of reasonable and probable cause. And I do so hold in this case.

The next point to mention is that no action for malicious prosecution will lie until or unless the criminal proceeding has terminated in favour of the plaintiff: see Bynoe v. Bank of England [1902] 1 K.B. 467 and Everett v. Ribbands [1952] 2 Q.B. 198; or if a conviction at the trial court is quashed on appeal: see Herniman v. Smith [1938] A.C. 305, H.L. and Danso v. Oteng; Danso v. Abaka (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 167. The plaintiff has proved that the action terminated in her acquittal but she still has to satisfy another requirement of the law, namely that the prosecution was actuated by malice. Malice has been expressed to mean the presence of some improper and wrongful motive which actuates the person suing to use the legal process not for the purpose of genuine adjudication of an issue but for some collateral purpose and thus to abuse the legal process: see dicta of Barry J. in Pike v. Waldrum [1952] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 431 and of Adumua-Bossman J., as he then was, in Onogen v. Leventis & Co.,

[p.1057] of [1982-83] GLR 1046

Ltd. [1959] G.L.R. 105 at p. 122. The machinery of justice is designed to secure for all citizens the ends of justice. The test in each case is therefore whether the person who instituted the prosecution acted with the sole desire to secure the ends of justice. The onus lies on the plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution to prove malice. The plaintiff never adduced any evidence to show that the first defendant lodged the complaint against her and her four daughters for a purpose other than the adjudication of her being assaulted. And there was no evidence of malice against the second defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the second defendant threatened her and her daughters that he would teach them sense, meaning that he would use the legal process to cause them some hardship or inconvenience but all the evidence shows that the second defendant did nothing to use the legal process for any purpose other than to get those who assaulted his daughter brought to justice. Mere threat by a person that he would see that a person who has committed a crime is prosecuted is no evidence of malice. In any event, the second defendant denied the allegation and the plaintiff could not substantiate it. In certain cases malice has been inferred from absence of reasonable and probable cause: see for example Batanhene and Mbir v. Krampah and Aggrey (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 188 and Gyimah v. Donkor [1974] 2 G.L.R. 237. There must be caution of the danger of injustice in this practice as it tends to relieve a plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution from adducing separate evidence to support the two separate essential ingredients of malice and want of reasonable and probable cause. A court should not draw such inference but should let the plaintiff adduce evidence to support malice. The law is insistent upon the requirement that the plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution must prove all the essential elements, namely:

(a) that he was prosecuted by the defendant, that is to say, that the law was set in motion against him on a criminal charge;

(b) that the prosecution terminated in his favour;

(c) that it was without reasonable and probable cause; and

(d) that it was malicious.

See Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (13th ed.), p. 1060 and Soadwah alias Sondura v. Obeng [1966] G.L.R. 388. Like counts in a criminal charge each condition must be supported by separate and independent evidence. Evidence in support of one should not be borrowed to support another condition. The plaintiff here failed to prove a single ingredient of malicious prosecution. Nor did she prove unlawful arrest and false imprisonment. Her action therefore fails. With regard to the first defendant’s counterclaim for damages for assault, I think it is sufficient to say that I have not been furnished with the positive evidence

[p.1058] of [1982-83] GLR 1046 that one would expect from the first defendant. My view of the law is that where one offence such as assault gives rise to both civil and criminal liability the standard of proof should be the same in appropriate cases. In a criminal trial for assault the prosecution fails if it does not call a material witness. This rule must apply with equal force to a civil action for assault. With this in mind, I would come to the conclusion that there was one material witness in the person of Hagar Money whose evidence could have established the first defendant’s counterclaim but who was not called for no obvious reason. For this reason, I would hold that the first defendant’s counterclaim should also fail. I would order no costs to either party.

DECISION

Claim and counterclaim refused.

M. C. N.-N.

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