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[1983] SLR (HC) 17High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL II)

REPUBLIC vs. WESTERN NZIMA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; EX PARTE MFRAMA AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 1102

7 February 1983 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 11 min read

Cite as[1983] SLR (HC) 17
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v WESTERN NZIMA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; ex parte MFRAMA AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 1102 [1983] SLR (HC) 17
APAREPUBLIC v WESTERN NZIMA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; ex parte MFRAMA AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 1102, [1983] SLR (HC) 17 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v WESTERN NZIMA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; ex parte MFRAMA AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 1102, [1983] SLR (HC) 17 (Ghana High Ct. 1983).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Republic v. New Juaben Traditional Council; Ex parte Sarkodee I [1980] G.L.R. 915, C.A.

(2) Akufo-Addo v. Quashie-Idun [1968] G.L.R. 667, C.A.

(3) Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors (1852) 3 H.L. Cas. 759; 8 State Tr. (N.S.) 85; 19 L.T.

(O.S.) 317; 17 Jur. 73; 10 E.R. 301, H.L.

(4) Serjeant v. Dale (1877) 2 Q.B.D. 558; 46 L.J.Q.B. 781; 37 L.T. 153; 41 J.P. 694. (5) New Par Consols Ltd., Re (No. 2) [1898] 1 Q.B. 669; 67 L.J.Q.B. 598; 78 L.T. 312; 46 W.R. 369;

14 T.L.R. 287, C.A.

(6) Republic v. Western Nzima Traditional Council; Ex parte Nana Kpani Ackah III [1973] 2 G.L.R.

107.

(7) R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw [1952] 1 K.B. 338; (1952) 1 T.L.R. 161; 116 J.P. 54; 96 S.J. 29; [1952] 1 All E.R. 122; 50 L.G.R. 193, C.A. affirming [1951] 1 K.B. 711; (1951) 1 T.L.R. 270; 115 J.P. 79; 95 S.J. 76; [1951] 1 All E.R. 268.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for an order prohibiting the Western Nzima Traditional Council from hearing a chieftaincy matter referred to its judicial committee by the Court of Appeal. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

[p.1105] of [1982-83] GLR 1102

COUNSEL

George Thompson for Quansah for the applicants.

R. E. Gaisie for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF ANSAH-TWUM J.

This is an application for an order prohibiting the respondents from hearing and determining the suit entitled:

(1) Asamoah Ebbah (2) John Mokye v. Aduku Mframra and Others Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the applicants’ affidavit in support read as follows:

“4. That the case travelled on successive appeals to the full bench of the Court of Appeal under the title aforementioned in paragraph 1 of this affidavit.”

“5. That the full bench of the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment as follows:

‘I am of the opinion that this is a proper case to remit to the appropriate tribunal to be heard de novo. In the result I shall allow the appeal and send the case back to the Western Nzima Traditional Council or its successor to be heard de novo’.”

The applicants who appear to have brought this application mainly against the first respondents, the Western Nzima Traditional Council, have stated as follows in paragraph 9 of the affidavit in support:

“9. That it has become clear to the applicants that the whole of the Western Nzima Traditional Council including the officials herein are secretly acting as parties in this suit in that it does appear to the claimants herein that— (i) The council is deliberately putting the machinery of the administration of the council, to wit the registry of the council at the disposal of the plaintiffs, by preparing the papers of claim for the third respondent.

(ii) That indeed there is evidence that the papers were prepared by the registrar of the said council.”

There is an affidavit from the registrar of the Western Nzima Traditional Council, John Akom Ntsiful, to the effect that the chieftaincy dispute concerned here has been fixed for hearing and the parties have been notified. Members of the judicial committee elected to hear the case are: Nana Ahumatupi, Nana Abouloa and Nana Nawule. These three members of the committee were not members of the traditional council in 1969 when the original decision was arrived at. The

[p.1106] of [1982-83] GLR 1102 registrar denies ever preparing any papers for the plaintiffs-respondents, and states that the three members of the judicial committee were elected from the council of 66 members.

Counsel for the applicants still urges upon the court that there is actual bias or likelihood of bias on the part of the judicial committee of the council. The Omanhene in having instructed his sub-chiefs not to have anything to do with the applicants, has shown real bias. The Omanhene participated in the original arbitration and expressed his support for the third respondent, the rival of the third applicant herein. The third respondent has already been installed by the Omanhene, the second respondent. The Omanhene has shown open hostility towards the second applicant as well as the remaining applicants. Learned counsel concedes that under the provisions of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), the Western Nzima Traditional Council (comprising 66 members) has exclusive jurisdiction to hear the matter. He, however, refers to Republic v. New Juaben Traditional Council; Ex parte Sarkodee I [1980] G.L.R. 915, C.A. Counsel submits further that the third respondent has already been installed and so he would lose nothing if the application is granted.

Counsel for the respondents has, on the other hand, submitted that where a statute imposes an obligation, strict rules of natural justice are obviated. He cites Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. II, p. 67 and Akufo-Addo v. Quashie-Idun [1968] G.L.R. 667 at p. 673, C.A. Counsel submits that section 15 of Act 370 imposes an obligation on the Western Nzima Traditional Council to hear the matter in question. He refers to section 28(1) and (2) of the Act which provides that jurisdiction of the council shall be exercised by the judicial committee of the traditional council which shall hear and determine chieftaincy matters arising within the traditional council area. Jurisdiction is vested in the judicial committee of the council when appointed. Counsel submits that the applicants themselves have stated on oath that the full bench of the Court of Appeal has heard the matter and remitted same to the Western Nzima Traditional Council or its successor to be heard de novo, so the applicants cannot now stop this. Counsel refers to paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 8 of John Akom Ntsiful’s affidavit filed on 3 June 1982 and submits that since it is undeniable here that the appointed members of the judicial committee who are to hear the case have not been made respondents or shown to be biased against the applicants, the order will not lie against them. There is no proof of either real bias or likelihood of bias in any of the appointed members of the judicial committee ready to hear the matter and therefore the order of prohibition being sought will not lie against any of them.

The applicants are by this application asking that the entire Western Nzima Traditional Council made up of 66 chiefs be prohibited

[p.1107] of [1982-83] GLR 1102 from hearing a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy arising in the area of the council. The applicants’ chief complaint is that there is actual bias or likelihood of bias shown by members of the traditional council against the applicants. That the Omanhene, who is the second respondent, has instructed all his sub-chiefs not to have anything to do with the applicants. The Omanhene himself participated in an earlier arbitration in the matter and the Omanhene expressed his support for the third respondent who is one of the plaintiffs in the matter, and a rival of the third applicant. In addition, the Omanhene has shown open hostility towards the applicants.

It is my view that for the entire members of the traditional council concerned to be precluded by an order of prohibition from hearing any chieftaincy dispute arising within the area of jurisdiction of the traditional council, there must be clear proof of actual bias or strong likelihood of bias or interest. It must be established, without doubt, that the entire traditional council has direct interest in the matter before the council. In which case, since no man can be a judge in his own cause, the entire council will be disqualified and an order of prohibition would lie to restrain the council from adjudicating on the matter, for prohibition lies against a judge of an inferior court where the judge is interested in the matter: see Dimes v. Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 H.L. Cas. 759 at p. 785 per Parke B. and Serjeant v. Dale (1877) 2 Q.B.D. 558.

The applicants have not obviously shown a bias by way of interest in the entire 66 members of the traditional council clothed with jurisdiction to hear the chieftaincy dispute. They have only accused the Omanhene of having expressed his support for the applicants’ opponents. The applicants did not specifically mention Nana Alumatupi, Nana Abuoloa and Nana Nawule, the elected members of the judicial committee of the traditional council who are ready to hear the matter and have therefore notified the parties accordingly.

It is my view that even if the applicants were able to show (and I am not satisfied that they have done so) real bias on the part of the Omanhene alone, that would not entitle them to obtain an order of prohibition against the entire traditional council, because there would still be 65 more members from whom three members can be selected to constitute the judicial committee of the council to hear the case. It is obvious here that the applicants have not alleged any bias in the three members of the committee, neither have they proved them biased in the matter against the applicants’ interest and therefore an order of prohibition would certainly not lie against them let alone the entire traditional council.

Another point which militates against a grant of this application is that it is the Court of Appeal which has, after allowing an appeal, sent

[p.1108] of [1982-83] GLR 1102 the case back to the Western Nzima Traditional Council or its successor to be heard de novo, the traditional council, having, by virtue of section 15 of Act 370, exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. It seems to me that an order restraining the entire traditional council from hearing the matter as requested by the judgment of the Court of Appeal would amount to amending the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which order this court has no power to make. It would appear that the applicants want a review of the court’s order and they must therefore go back to the Court of Appeal to apply for same, if they so desire.

It is also without doubt that section 15 of Act 370 gives exclusive jurisdiction in the matter to only the Western Nzima Traditional Council. Section 15 of Act 370 provides:

“15. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and to any appeal therefrom, a Traditional Council shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy which arises within its area, not being one to which the Asantehene or a Paramount Chief is a party.”

It would seem from the foregoing that no other traditional council apart from the Western Nzima Traditional Council, shall have jurisdiction over the matter pending before the council. It is my view that where a statute imposes such a duty, as in the case of section 15 of Act 370, by clothing an inferior court with exclusive jurisdiction in certain matters, prohibition will not lie against the inferior court inasmuch as it goes to prevent it from performing its statutory functions. An order of prohibition in such a situation should be held to be inconsistent with the provisions of the statute and cannot stand: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 11, p. 123, para. 227, where it is stated, “Where, by statute, an inferior court is, for the performance of certain duties, invested with the powers and jurisdiction of the High Court, no prohibition will be granted.” See also Re New Par Consols Ltd. (No. 2) [1898] 1 Q.B. 669, C.A.

Again section 28 (1) and (2) of Act 370 provides:

“28. (1) In the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by section 15 of this Act, a Traditional Council shall, subject to the provisions of this section conduct its proceedings according to customary law, but for the purpose of compelling the attendance of parties and witnesses and the production of documents, a Traditional Council shall have the like powers as are possessed by a District Court in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction.

(2) The said jurisdiction shall be exercised by a judicial committee of the traditional council comprising three or five persons appointed by that council; . . .”

[p.1109] of [1982-83] GLR 1102

Since in the exercise of its jurisdiction in this regard the judicial committee of the traditional council shall conduct its proceedings in accordance with the customary law prevailing and practised in the area, which may be peculiar to the area of the traditional council, it will not be lawful for this court to make an order to transfer the exercise of such jurisdiction to another traditional council area, which, by virtue of section 28(2) of Act 370 shall have no power to appoint members of a judicial committee to hear and determine the matter.

The provisions of the Act make it clear that the jurisdiction conferred under section 28(1) and (2) is also not exercisable by the whole corpus of the traditional council. There could therefore be an order to stop the council from hearing the matter if the entire body purports to determine the matter; the order would request that a judicial committee of the council be appointed to hear and determine the matter. So as was held, as stated in the headnote in Republic v. Western Nzima Traditional Council; Ex parte Nana Kpani Ackah III [1973] 2 G.L.R. 107 at p. 108:

“Since in this case, the matter was heard and determined by the whole corpus of the traditional council and not its judicial committee, the traditional council acted in excess of its jurisdiction and was therefore subject to control by certiorari. Dictum of Atkin L.J. (as he then was) in R. v. Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920), Ltd. [1924] 1 K.B. 171 at p. 205, C.A. applied.

(2) Under section 28(2) of Act 370 the jurisdiction conferred on the traditional council in chieftaincy matters must be exercised by its judicial committee of three or five persons appointed by the council .

. .”

Therefore where 29 or 35 members of the council were found to have heard and given a decision in the matter affecting the applicant, that was held to be an error on the face of the record, because only three or five members of the council could properly constitute a judicial committee to hear and determine the matter. There the dictum of Denning L.J. (as he then was) in R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw [1952] 1 All E.R. 122, C.A. was applied.

It is my view that it is only the Court of Appeal which can review its own judgment, and, perhaps, change the forum, if a change, there must, and can lawfully be. It is, however, very doubtful that an application for such an order or a review will be entertained by the Court of Appeal. What the applicants must know is that they have a right of appeal from a decision of the judicial committee of the traditional council to the regional house of chiefs; from thence to the National House of Chiefs and thence to the Supreme Court. They may

[p.1110] of [1982-83] GLR 1102 therefore be well advised that all is not lost and they may go before the traditional council and if they fail to get justice they may pursue their right of appeal even up to the Supreme Court.

I would upon the reasons given refuse the application. The application is accordingly dismissed with the respondents’ costs assessed at ¢2,000.

DECISION

Application dismissed.

J. A. A.

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