AMUKYI vs. THE REPUBLIC [1982-83] GLR 1010
1 March 1983 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 10 min read
[1983] SLR (HC) 2Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Lodonu v. The Republic [1973] 2 G.L.R. 355, C.A.
(2) Baksh v. R. [1958] A.C. 167; [1958] 2 W.L.R. 536; 102 S.J. 228, P.C.
(3) R.v. Akatia (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 98.
(4) Danso v. R. (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 16.
(5) R.v. Ajani (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 3.
(6) Nyarko v. The State [1963] 2 G.L.R. 59, S.C.
(7) Lawson v. The Republic [1977] 1 G.L.R. 63.
(8) Frimpong v.The Republic [1980] G.L.R. 575.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against the decision of a circuit court, wherein the appellant was convicted and his wife acquitted, on a charge of conspiracy to defraud and defrauding by false pretences contrary to sections 20 and 131 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
O. K. Brenu for the appellant.
Ahlijah, Chief State Attorney, for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.
TWUMASI J. The appellant and his wife and one other now at large, were jointly charged with conspiracy to defraud and defrauding by false pretences contrary to sections 20 and 131 respectively, of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). Before the Circuit Court, Sekondi, only the appellant and his wife were jointly tried. The trial terminated in the conviction of the appellant and the acquittal of his wife.
The salient facts of the prosecution’s case as I was able to assemble from the testimonies of the first and second prosecution witnesses (hereinafter referred to as the complainants) are as follows: The man at large went all the way from Agona Junction to Shama to inform the complainants, both being fishermen, that the appellant had imported some outboard motors and intended to sell them to would-be purchasers at ¢20,000 each. He arranged a meeting in the house of the appellant at Agona Junction at which the complainants were present for the purpose of negotiating for the purchase of the outboard motors. At this meeting the appellant made a representation that he had imported outboard motors for sale at ¢20,000 each and they were at the Takoradi Harbour. An agreed price of ¢16,000 was reached. The complainants had sufficient money to pay for the outboard motors but they felt hesitant of what the appellant told them. At that juncture, the appellant’s wife appeared on the scene and added her voice to the story that the appellant had imported outboard motors from overseas and they had arrived at the Takoradi Harbour. The complainants testified that by what the appellant’s wife said they believed the story and
[p.1013] of [1982-83] GLR 1010 right on the spot they paid the sum of ¢32,000 to the appellant’s wife who in turn gave the whole money to the appellant.
The complainants did not receive the outboard motors. On the day appointed by the appellant for the delivery of the outboard motors, the appellant brought some men in fake military uniform who upon seeing the complainants in the appellant’s house beat them severely using their belts and accused the complainants of conspiracy with the appellant to steal outboard motors from the harbour. The story that the appellant framed was that while he was bringing the outboard motors from the harbour he was intercepted by military personnel who accused him of having stolen the outboard motors for the complainants to buy.
Subsequent investigation by Apremdu military personnel revealed that in actual fact those men in military uniforms could not have been genuine military men. A search was mounted for the appellant and the man at large. The latter took to his heels upon seeing the Apremdu soldiers. Later the appellant and his wife were arrested. Each of them denied the charges both in their cautioned statements to the police and at the trial in their evidence on oath by setting up the plea of alibi, the appellant saying he was on his way to Abidjan and the wife saying she had gone to a village called Asani on the day and time the offences were alleged to have been committed.
At the close of the prosecution’s case the learned trial circuit court judge overruled defence counsel’s submission of no case but, curiously enough, he found reasons to reject the appellant’s plea of alibi while he accepted that of his wife. Having regard to the facts, the verdicts were patently inconsistent and have been a target of a virulent attack by counsel for the appellant in this court. And I entirely share counsel’s reaction to the verdict because it runs counter to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Lodonu v. The Republic [1973] 2 G.L.R. 355, C.A. which counsel cited where the Court of Appeal speaking through Annan J.A. said at p. 363 that:
“In our view where two or more accused persons are tried on the same charge and the evidence adduced before the court with regard to all the accused persons is substantially the same the conviction of some and the acquittal of others of the accused persons would be an inconsistent result unless it be shown that the apparent inconsistency in the result of the trial is attributable to some significant difference either as to matter of fact or law which affects some and not the others of the accused persons. Where there are no such matters of difference the results are inconsistent and cannot stand together. Where a person convicted in such circumstances appeals against his conviction the proper decision we think is that the conviction is unreasonable or that it
[p.1014] of [1982-83] GLR 1010 cannot stand having regard to the evidence which the court or jury had, or must be taken to have accepted.
In the result, we allow the appeal, quash the conviction and set aside the sentence. The appellant is acquitted and discharged.”
In another case decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Baksh v. R [1958] A.C. 167 two persons charged with murder pleaded alibi. Three witnesses gave evidence for the prosecution before the High Court of British Guiana. Upon their conviction by the jury they appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal of British Guiana. There certain statements made by the prosecution witnesses to the police, which had not been available at the trial and which conflicted with their evidence on oath, were proved to discredit them. The Court of Criminal Appeal ordered a retrial in the case of one accused but held that the conviction of the other accused should not be disturbed because they were of the opinion that nothing favourable to him could have been obtained from the statements which were not obtained at the trial and he appealed to the Privy Council. Lord Tucker delivering the advice of the judicial committee said of the prosecution witnesses at p. 172:
“Their credibility cannot be treated as divisible and accepted against one and rejected against the other. Their honesty having been shown to be open to question, it cannot be right to accept their verdict against one and re-open it in the case of the other. Their Lordships are accordingly of opinion that a new trial should have been ordered in both cases.”
The question in this case is whether there is any significant difference either as to fact or law which affects the appellant and not his wife. I am unable to find any. The fact is that the evidence of the complainants was the same as against the two accused. They said they gave the money to the wife and the latter gave it to the appellant. This implies that the case of the complainants was that both accused were present and a plea of alibi could not avail them. In his ruling on counsel’s submission of no case the learned trial circuit judge stated:
“After considering the prosecution’s case including the cautioned statements of both accused I find a prima facie case has been established on all the counts.
I would like to sound a note of warning to trial lower courts that when they come to consider whether a prima facie case has been made by the prosecution in a criminal trial they should confine themselves to the analysis of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses with regard to the credibility. Thus a police statement made by an accused
[p.1015] of [1982-83] GLR 1010 person, unless it is a confession statement admitted in evidence, need not be taken as part of prosecution’s case. This is because police statements are not evidence on oath and as they constitute denial of the offence they do not form part of the case for the prosecution on whom lies the burden of proving the affirmative that the accused has committed the offence charged. It is therefore wrong for a trial court or judge to consider cautioned statements of accused persons which are not confessions admitted in evidence, in determining a prima facie case.
As it turned out the learned trial circuit court judge carried this wrong approach to his consideration of the final verdict by acting upon the cautioned statement of the appellant’s wife, a co-accused, and held that that cautioned statement made him believe the evidence of the complainants. In other words the learned trial circuit court judge treated the unsworn statement of a co-accused as corroborative of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses against another co-accused in a trial.
This is wrong in law. The true law as I understand it is that the trial court can act on the evidence of a co-accused where the co-accused is called as a prosecution witness against another co-accused. In such a case the co-accused giving evidence for the prosecution becomes an accomplice and the law relating to the evidence of accomplices would accordingly apply: see R.v. Akatia (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 98 and Danso v. R. (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 16. The irony of it all was that shortly after stating the law that an unsworn statement of a co-accused was not binding upon another co-accused as indeed it is firmly settled in such cases as R. v. Ajani (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 3; Nyarko v. The State [1963] 2 G.L.R. 59 at p. 61, S.C.; Lawson v. The Republic [1977] 1 G.L.R. 63 and Frimpong v. The Republic [1980] G.L.R. 575, the learned trial circuit court judge dramatically did violence to the very principle he had correctly stated. The learned trial circuit judge stated as follows:
“I am aware that in law the second accused’s (unsworn) statement binds the second accused alone and is no evidence against the first accused. But this statement by the first accused’s wife convinces me to accept the evidence of the complainants that it was alleged the first accused had been arrested for stealing outboard motors. I therefore rejected and disbelieved the first accused’s evidence that he was not at the time at Agona Junction but on his way to Abidjan.
The learned chief state attorney endeavoured to defend the conviction by submitting that the learned trial circuit court judge did not act on the unsworn statement and that all he said was that the statement convinced him of the truth of the complainants’ story. But it was upon
[p.1016] of [1982-83] GLR 1010 the basis of the acceptance of the truth of the complainant’s case that the appellant was convicted. In my view, since the learned trial circuit court judge misdirected himself on the treatment of the credibility of the complainants without pointing out clearly in his judgment what significant differences as to fact or law affected the appellant but did not affect his wife, the appellant’s conviction cannot stand. It is hereby quashed.
The question of ordering a retrial has, however, agitated my mind. In Lodonu v. The Republic [1973] 2 G.L.R. 355, the Court of Appeal never ordered a retrial and offered no guidance in such circumstances but some guidance was given by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Baksh v. R. (supra). Lord Reid said at p. 172:
“The appeal will be allowed and the case remitted to the Court of Criminal Appeal of British Guiana with a direction that they should quash the conviction and either enter a verdict of acquittal or order a new trial, whichever course they may consider proper in the interests of justice in the existing circumstances.”
The guiding principle is whether in the interest of justice in the existing circumstances surrounding the case a retrial ought to be ordered. In my view, this is a case where the complainants can take a civil action to recover their money and I feel inclined to spare the parties the ordeal of a fresh trial. I would acquit and discharge the appellant on all the charges.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
Appellant acquitted and discharged.
M.C.N.-N
