ESSIEN ALIAS BAIDU vs. ANGU II AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 60
23 March 1983 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 6 min read
[1983] SLR (HC) 9Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Lartey v. Mensah and Dedei (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 410.
(2) Welbeck v. M. Captan Ltd. and Hammond (1956) 2 W.A.L.R. 47.
(3) Re Dependable Upholstery, Ltd. [1936] 3 All E.R. 741.
(4) Temperton v. Russell (1993) 9 T.L.R. 319, C.A.
(5) Briton Medical Association and General Life Assurance Association Ltd. v. Britania Fire Association and Whinney (1888) 59 T.L.R. 888.
(6) Wanyinara v. Bassan [1972] 2 G.L.R. 277.
(7) Saunders v. Jones (1877) 7 Ch.D. 435; 147 L.J. Ch. 440; 37 L.T. 769; 26 W.R. 226, C.A.
(8) Hewson v. Cleeve [1904] 2 I.R. 536, C.A.
(9) Spedding v. Fitzpatrick (1888) 38 Ch.D. 410; 58 L.J.Ch. 139; 59 L.T. 492; 37 W.R. 20; 4 T.L.R.
505, C.A.
(10) Aga Khan v. Times Publishing Co.; Dawson v. Times Publishing Co. [1924] 1 K.B. 675; 93 L.J.K.B. 361; 130 L.T. 746; 40 T.L.R. 299, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for further and better particulars as to notice served on the plaintiff for a family meeting to remove him as head of that family. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.
COUNSEL
James Mercer for the plaintiff.
William Hammond Amarteifio for the defendant.
JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.
The capacity in which the plaintiff instituted this action against the defendant was the ebusuapanyin of the Kukordo Ebiradze stool family of Fijai. The writ was filed on 4 December 1980. It is crystal clear from the pleadings filed by the defendant and co-defendant that they both by necessary implication admit that at the time the plaintiff filed his writ of summons he occupied the exalted and most revered position of ebusuapanyin of the Kukordo Ebiradze stool family to which all the parties belong. But both the defendant and the co-defendant, the latter being more vocal, aver in their pleadings that the plaintiff was removed from his office as head of the stool family at a meeting of the principal members of the stool family held sometime in February 1981. Most prominent among the averments in the co-defendant’s amended statement of defence and counterclaim are paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 couched in the following terms:
“(2) The co-defendant says that some time in February 1981, the members of the family served the
plaintiff with notice to attend a family meeting to be held on or about 8 February
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1981 to answer various charges failing which the family would proceed against him.
(3) The co-defendant says that the plaintiff refused to attend the said meeting.
(4) The co-defendant further says that in the absence of any explanation by the plaintiff, the family removed him as such head and notified him accordingly.”
Mercer for the plaintiff in an application to this court, prays for an order that the co-defendant does, within fourteen days, serve on the plaintiff the following particulars:
“(a) The precise date of the alleged service of notice (there being only seven days between 1 and 8 February 1981)
(b) The manner of the alleged service of notice.
(c) By whom the alleged notice was served.
(d) The date and manner of the alleged notification referred to in paragraph 4 of the amended statement of defence.
The issue that crops up at this stage of the pleadings relates to family meetings under customary law. Our law insists that whenever it becomes necessary for a family meeting to be held for the purpose of appointing or removing a head of family, prior notice of such meeting should be given to all members of the family entitled by custom to participate in the appointment or removal, as the case may be, of a head of family: see Lartey v. Mensah and Dedei (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 410 and Welbeck v. M. Captan and Hammond (1956) 2 W.A.L.R. 47. The word “notice” in this context means no more than an invitation to attend a family meeting. It is important in all cases to determine the context in which the word “notice” or “notify” is used. In the instant case, the co-defendant has pleaded that the plaintiff was served with certain notices to attend a family meeting, but he refused to attend and further that he was notified of the proceedings of the meeting. The form and precise terms of these notices have been exhibited and the allegation is that these notices were served on the plaintiff. So the plaintiff comes to the trial court with knowledge that the co-defendant is going to prove service of written notices of a family meeting held on 8 February 1981. I do not see how evidence of the service of such notice should spring a surprise on the plaintiff so that he can say that he is coming to court without knowing what his opponent is going to prove against him. In the English case of Re Dependable Upholstery Ltd. [1936] 3 All E.R. 741, Crossman J. held, and rightly in my view, that where a material fact is pleaded, particulars will not be ordered of the facts relied on in support of that allegation, if such facts are no more than the evidence by which the allegation is to be proved. It seems to me clear that if the co-defendant
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is ordered to file particulars of the date, the persons by whom and the manner in which the alleged notices (exhibited in the case docket) were served on the plaintiff, he shall for all practical purposes have been compelled to place down all his cards even before the game commences.
In other words, the co-defendant will at the trial do no more that to repeat what he is being asked to plead and will add nothing more to establish his case. This mode of pleadings should be disallowed. Indeed, a court ought to disallow all applications for particulars if it is satisfied that its allowance would inure to obtain for the applicant the names of witnesses or some other clue to the evidence of the other party: see Temperton v. Russell (1893) 9 T.L.R. 321 and Briton Medical Association v. Britania Fire Association (1888) 59 L.T. 888.
The attention of this court was drawn to the local case of Wanyinara v. Bassan [1972] 2 G.L.R. 277 where Edusei J. (as he then was) in characteristic language made a resume of the general principles in pleadings. That statement of the law is supported by authority. He stated at p. 278:
“The whole purpose of pleading is to set out in a summary form the material facts on which a party relies for his claim or defence so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise at the trial. The opposite party must come to court knowing the case he has to meet. It is on these principles that further and better statement of particulars will be ordered by this court.”
The operative words in the statement are “material facts.” This implies that a party pleads only the material facts, not evidence, on which he relies.
The purpose of further and better particulars is plainly to narrow the generality of the averments in pleadings and thus define the issues which have to be tried. A party to a suit is entitled only to such material facts or particulars of his opponent’s case as will enable him to avoid being taken by surprise at the trial but a party is not entitled to particulars for the purpose of ascertaining the evidence upon which his opponent proposes to prove his case. No hard and fast rules can be laid down. What is a material fact as distinct from evidence to support such material fact depends upon the nature of each case: see Saunders v. Jones (1877) 7 Ch.D. 435, C.A.; Hewson v. Cleeve (1904) 2 I.R. 536, C.A.; Spedding v. Fitzpatrick (1888) 38 Ch. 410, C.A. and Aga Khan v. Times Publishing Co.; Dawson v. Times Publishing Co. [1924] 1 K.B. 675, C.A.
Applying the principles in the foregoing cases to the co-defendant’s allegation I am of the firm view that to order the
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co-defendant to mention how, when and by whom the alleged service of the notice of a family meeting were served would be to compel him to disclose his witnesses and his evidence. I would therefore refuse the application. The co-defendant will have ¢200 costs.
DECISION
Application refused.
J. A. A.
