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[1983] SLR (SC) 2Supreme Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEAL AND OTHERS; EX PARTE AGYEKUM [1982-83] GLR 688

29 March 1983 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 48 min read

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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v COURT OF APPEAL AND OTHERS; ex parte AGYEKUM [1982-83] GLR 688 [1983] SLR (SC) 2
APAREPUBLIC v COURT OF APPEAL AND OTHERS; ex parte AGYEKUM [1982-83] GLR 688, [1983] SLR (SC) 2 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v COURT OF APPEAL AND OTHERS; ex parte AGYEKUM [1982-83] GLR 688, [1983] SLR (SC) 2 (Ghana Sup. Ct. 1983).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Agyei II v. Abudulai [1977] 1 G.L.R. 453, C.A.

(2) Akainyah v. The Republic [1968] G.L.R. 548, C.A.

(3) Shell Co., of Australia Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1931] A.C. 275; 100 L.J.P.C. 55;

144 L.T. 421; 47 T.L.R. 115, P.C.

(4) Kwakye v. Attorney-General [1981] G.L.R. 944, S.C.

(5) Tamakloe v. Mitchell (1892) Red. 146.

(6) Republic v. Special Tribunal Registrar; Ex parte Aidoo, High Court, Accra, 19 May 1980, unreported.

(7) Republic v. Special Tribunal: Ex parte Akosah (1980) G.L.R. 592, C.A.

(8) Orthodox Coptic Bishop of Jerusalem v. Minister of Police (1971) 25 P.D. (1) 225. (9) Abdul Rauf v. Abdul Hammed Khan PLD (1965) S.C. 671.

(10) R.v. Ontario Labour Relations Board; Ex parte Kitchener Food Market Ltd. [1966] 1 O.R. 482. (11) Powell v McCormack 395 US 486 (1969); 25 L.Ed. 2d. 491; 89 S.Ct. 1944.

(12) Claye, Re; Ex parte Northern Rivers Rutile Ply Ltd. [1965] N.S.W.R. 135.

(13) Nwankwere v. Ademuni [1962] W.N.L.R. 298.

(14) Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] A.C. 147; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 163;

[1969] 1 All E.R. 208; 113 S.J. 55, H.L.

(15) R.v. Local Government Board (1882) 10 Q.B.D. 309; 52 L.J.M.C. 4; 48 L.T. 173; 47 J.P. 228; 31 W.R. 72, C.A.

(16) R.v. Shoreditch Assessment Committee; Ex parte Morgan [1910] 2 K.B. 859; [1908-1910] All E.R.

Rep. 792; 80 L.J.K.B. 185; 74 J.P 361; 26 T.L.R. 663; Konst. & W. Rat. App. (1909-12) 203; 8 L.G.R. 744.

[p.692] of [1982-83] GLR 688

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for, inter alia, an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the Court of Appeal referring a land dispute to the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner, on an appeal by the plaintiff from the decision of the Circuit Court, Cape Coast. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgments of Apaloo C.J. and Taylor J.S.C.

COUNSEL

Adumua-Bossman for the applicant.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

Apaloo C.J. delivered the judgment of the court. This matter commenced as an ordinary land suit between two subjects from the Ajumako Traditional Area in the Central Region. The parties are subjects of two stools which own land contiguous to each other. They are the Amia and Ochiso stools. The action was brought before the Circuit Court, Cape Coast.

The learned circuit judge found for the defendant who traced his title through the Ochiso stool. The plaintiff laid his title in the Amia stool. Having lost the suit, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal. In that court, the point was taken on his behalf that as the real issue of ownership between the parties could not be determined without a prior determination of the boundaries of the stool lands of Amia and Ochiso, the circuit court’s jurisdiction was ousted by section 4 of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D. 172).

That point was hotly contested by the defendant. In the result the court sustained the jurisdictional point and held that the court’s jurisdiction was ousted by N.R.C.D. 172. The court thought that the proper forum to determine the suit was the court of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner. It accordingly set the judgment aside and referred the matter to the commissioner to determine the boundaries of the lands of the two stools in contention. After this, the matter was to be returned to the circuit court to pronounce on the issue of ownership in the light of the commissioner’s finding. In so holding, the court drew support from its earlier decision in Agyei II v. Abudulai [1977] 1 G.L.R. 453, C.A.

The applicant who persuaded the Court of Appeal to make the order of reference, now says we should prohibit the commissioner from obeying the Court of Appeal’s order and from entertaining the reference. Mr. Adumua-Bossman who successfully obtained this order in the court below and who now seeks the prohibition order, says he is not unaware of his somewhat inconsistent position but he says since the point he now urges is a jurisdictional one — that is of law, he is entitled to be heard. His position was not a particularly enviable one, but we granted him full hearing on his submissions.

Two main grounds were urged by Mr. Adumua-Bossman in support of his application. They were fully set out in his written case. In

[p.693] of [1982-83] GLR 688 sum, they are namely firstly, the office of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner was not preserved by the Constitution, 1979. As such, it ceased to exist when the Constitution came into force on 24th September 1979. But being a commission envisaged by section 10 of the transitional provisions, it was kept alive only for the limited purpose of concluding pending matters and submitting its report. A reference to it to exercise jurisdiction in December 1980, was ultra vires and void; secondly, N.R.C.D. 172 in having conferred final “judicial power” on an agent of the executive was violative of article 114(1) of the Constitution, 1979, and was voided by article 1 of the Constitution.

We are unable to accept that the office of the commissioner set up by N.R.C.D. 172 came within the purview of section 10 of the transitional provisions. It is a permanent adjudicating body and is the type of adjudicating body that article 119 of the Constitution envisages and over which it gives this court supervisory jurisdiction. In our opinion the commission or committee contemplated by section 10 of the transitional provisions is the ad hoc body that is normally set up to inquire into any matter affecting the public welfare within the intendment of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1964 (Act 250), or one whose appointment is permissible under article 196 of the Constitution, 1979.

They are the type of bodies that would submit a report to the Head of State after completion of their duties. And as is well known, their findings and recommendations bind no one and may, indeed, be rejected by the government. The finding of the Boundaries Settlement Commissioner is binding on the stools concerned and can, in appropriate cases, be set up as res judicata.

Mr. Adumua-Bossman’s real ground for contending that the commission has ceased to exist is that:

“By an amazing oversight the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission was never mentioned in the 1979 Constitution. All other regular adjudicating bodies . . . were continued in existence and function by the Constitution . . .”

Unless counsel was able to show that the legislation that gave birth to the commission or any portion of it was repealed expressly or by necessary implication when the Constitution, 1979 came into force, we cannot subscribe to that view.

N.R.C.D. 172 was part of the existing law at the date the Constitution, 1979, came into force, within the meaning of clause 1(d) of article 4. Its continued operation was not therefore affected by the coming into force of the Constitution. In other words, N.R.C.D. 172 was continued in force. It was on that law that the Boundaries Settlement Commission was bottomed. If it was preserved, so was also the commissioner. It was again kept alive by section 4 (2) of the

[p.694] of [1982-83] GLR 688

Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1981. We are accordingly unable to accept Mr. Bossman’s contention that because the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner was not mentioned eo nomine in the Constitution, 1979 that office was abolished.

We accept that the office of the Settlement Commissioner is part of the executive. Article 114 defined the judiciary in terms which exclude the commissioner. Under section 5 of N.R.C.D. 172, his jurisdiction is ordinarily invoked at the instance of the Minister responsible for Lands. After public delivery of his findings, it is to the minister that he hands his findings and the latter is statutorily obliged to publish it. Indeed, the minister can, with the approval of the executive, suspend or remove him from office. The contention that the commissioner is an agent of the executive is plainly acceptable.

Mr. Adumua-Bossman pleaded that:

“ . . . since section 9(3) of N.R.C.D. 172 purports to confer final judicial power on the commission, it is caught by article 114(1) of the Constitution, 1979, and the whole Decree is struck down as inconsistent with the 1979 Constitution.”

The provision of the Constitution, 1979 art. 114(1) allegedly violated by section 9(3) of N.R.C.D. 172 is in these words:

“114. (1) The judicial power of Ghana shall be vested in the Judiciary … and accordingly no organ or agency of the executive or the legislature shall be given any final judicial power.”

If it is shown that final judicial power was in fact conferred on the commission which clearly is an agency of the executive, this complaint is made out. That brings us to a consideration of the meaning of the term “judicial power.” The Constitution, 1969 by article 102(1) forbade the conferment of final judicial power on the executive and legislature in identical terms. Article 41(2) of the Republican Constitution, 1960, also provided as follows: “. . . the judicial power of the State is conferred on the Supreme Court and the High Court, and on such inferior courts as may be provided for by law.” Neither the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4), nor any article of either Constitution provided any guidelines as to the meaning of the term “judicial power” as used in these three Constitutions.

In 1968, in the appellate case of Akainyah v. The Republic [1968] G.L.R. 548, C.A., the Court of Appeal was invited to strike down the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act, 1964 (Act 230), on the ground that it conferred “judicial power” on a commission in violation of article 41 of the Constitution, 1960. That court felt constrained to examine in some depth the concept of “judicial power” and in the process

[p.695] of [1982-83] GLR 688 considered a number of American, Australian and English decisions – common law jurisdictions in which the term “judicial power” was not only the power to decide on claims of parties in accordance with established principles of law but also power to enforce those decisions. Before reaching that conclusion, the court distinguished the exercise of judicial function, that is a duty to Act judicially, from the exercise of judicial power. In the result, it felt unable to hold that any provision of Act 230 conferred on the commission established by the Act in question “judicial power,” and accordingly declined to strike down that Act.

That decision was given by a court whose decision is not binding on this court. But it was arrived at after considering the views of three common law jurisdictions which examined and pronounced on this concept. In all probability, the term was copied from the much older constitution of one of them. Mr. Adumua-Bossman who founded his argument of repugnancy on this concept, provided no other definition of the term “judicial power”. In those circumstances, we think it right to construe the term “judicial power” in the sense in which the Court of Appeal conceived it in the Akainyah case.

That being so, it is important to notice the language in which the jurisdiction was conferred on the commissioner. Section 4(1) of N.R.C.D. 172 enacts that: “The Commissioner shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine boundaries of stool lands and to hear and determine questions or disputes relating thereto.”

Section 6 of N.R.C.D. 172 gives directions as to how he is to perform the duties imposed on him by section 4, namely to hear all relevant evidence in public, permit legal representation, make full notes of evidence led before him and thereafter deliver his finding in public. The section confers binding efficacy on his finding. A duty is also cast on the commissioner to deliver a copy of his finding to the Minister of Lands who himself incurs a mandatory duty to publish these findings in the Gazette. Having done this, the commissioner’s statutory duties are at an end. It is a fair inference that the cumulative effect of sections 4 and 6 of N.R.C.D. 172 is to impose on the commissioner, functions which he has to discharge judicially, i.e. impartially and in accordance with established principles of law.

It is plain that unlike a court, he had no power to enforce his decisions. The commissioner’s importance in this wise can be illustrated by a simple example. Suppose stools A and B own land adjoining to each other and the land contains a creek, and suppose there is dispute between the two stools as to the ownership of the creek and the consequential right to fish in it. The Minister of Lands may in exercise of his power under section 5 of N.R.C.D. 172 refer the dispute to the commissioner for determination of the boundaries of the [p.696] of [1982-83] GLR 688 stool lands of A and B. Suppose that the commissioner determined the boundaries in such a manner that the creek is found to lie wholly on the stool land of stool A and that this decision was not contested on appeal or was affirmed by the Stool Lands Boundaries Appeal Tribunal pursuant to section 10 (5) of N.R.C.D. 172.

If the minister published this finding in the Gazette, that determination is final by section 9 (3) of the Decree. And suppose stool B in defiance of that finding sent its subjects to fish in the creek. That stool and its subjects would have been guilty of the tort of trespass and would be liable in damages to stool A. The latter can also claim a perpetual injunction against stool B and its subjects; should it return to the commissioner, the latter would be powerless to assist him. This is because he has no power to enforce his decision. To obtain this relief, stool A will have to seek the aid of the court and the latter in the exercise of its judicial power cannot only mulct stool B and its subjects in damages, but grant a perpetual injunction against them and if this is not obeyed, proceed to attach them for contempt.

It follows from this that although the commissioner may perform duties like a court, he had not the power of enforcement which a court has. To enforce a decision, is to compel its observance. The commissioner is entirely without power to do this. That is why we think Mr. Adumua-Bossman’s written conception of the nature of the office of the Boundaries Settlement Commissioner appears substantially accurate. In his pleaded case, counsel expressed as his view:

“ . . . the commission was essentially a specialised kind of court whose basic objective or purpose was by judicial techniques to assist the executive arm of the State to map out with accuracy all the various stool lands in Ghana and to make the results of that accurate survey work easily accessible. Furthermore, to attain this objective in as short a time as possible (notwithstanding the laws’ delays) finality of the commissioner’s findings or decisions was laid down by section 9 (3) and by section 10 (5) for the appeal tribunal’s determination at the appellate level.”

That description of the commissioner’s duties fits an institution clothed with jurisdiction to function like a court and while borrowing some of the techniques of the latter in order to discharge its functions, is in reality not a court strictu sensu. We think the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner has no “judicial power,” a fortiori, final” judicial power” and his office cannot be struck down as violative of the Constitution, 1979.

Although section 9(3) of N.R.C.D. 172 seeks to give finality to its finding once it is published in the Gazette, we think inasmuch as it is an adjudicating authority within the meaning of section 5 of the

[p.697] of [1982-83] GLR 688

Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), it is within our supervisory jurisdiction and his findings can be questioned before this court in an appropriate case and the provisions of that section can be no valid ouster of our supervisory jurisdiction. In that sense, at any rate, its findings cannot be said to be final.

In order to provide a final answer to Mr. Adumua-Bossman’s plea for an order of certiorari to quash the Court of Appeal’s order and to prohibit the commissioner from carrying it out, it is necessary to consider the purport of the former’s order. Properly looked at, the Court of Appeal merely invited the commissioner to exercise his lawful jurisdiction under section 4 of N.R.C.D. 172 to determine the boundaries of the stool lands of Amia and Ochiso. Thereafter, the circuit court would be enabled to pronounce for either of the parties litigant. Any decision eventually reached by the circuit court is appealable to the Court of Appeal by virtue of section 10(2) of Act 372, and thereafter to this court under section 3(1) of the said Act.

In our opinion, the order of the Court of Appeal referring the issue of the boundary to the commissioner was lawful and no valid ground exists for quashing it by an order of certiorari. We also think prohibition does not lie against the commissioner.

It follows that this application fails and ought to be dismissed.

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C.

I have had the advantage with ample opportunity of reading beforehand the ruling of the court delivered by the Chief Justice in this application. I agree entirely with the conclusion that the application should be dismissed and I do not have any quarrel whatsoever with the steps in the reasoning adopted by the court in arriving at the conclusion. I find, nonetheless, that some aspects of the case which do not seem to affect the reasoning, do, however, give rise to problems which I cannot in conscience and with my cast of mind, gloss over.

The gravamen of this case for instance, is that it involves quite apart from the problems I have alluded to, a decision as to whether or not the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner appointed under the provisions of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D. 172) continues to exercise his functions after the Constitution, 1979, had come into force on 24 September 1979 only for the limited purpose of disposing of stool lands boundary cases then pending before him, but that he is incapacitated by the said Constitution from entertaining new cases after 24 September 1979.

It is for this reason particularly, though not exclusively, that after anxious reflection, I have decided to write a concurring ruling in which I will be free without any inhibition to ventilate my own views on these problems. I do so without any disrespect whatsoever. On the contrary, I have ventured to offer my own humble and respectful contribution in what I conceive as a necessary effort to

[p.698] of [1982-83] GLR 688 support the said reasoning and conclusion which as I have indicated I whole-heartedly concur in.

I recall that on 10th May 1982, in the course of adjourning this application, to ensure a fair hearing, this court, sitting with its full complement endeavoured to give some guidance and for this purpose we said:

“As the applicant is alleging invalidity of legislation vis-a-vis the Constitution, 1979, we direct that the Attorney-General be served and we should feel obliged for any assistance he can render us on the hearing of the application.”

I must, speaking for myself, register my profound regret that on a matter as grave as the continuing validity of so important a legislation as N.R.C.D. 172, neither the Attorney-General nor his office has seen fit to respond to our courteous invitation for assistance. Be that as it may, the questions and problems agitated by the interesting arguments of the applicant’s counsel must be resolved for the benefit of the law, the contesting parties and the Republic.

It is of some importance in this matter and an aid to clarity of exposition to delineate the crucial facts of the case and the attendant circumstances which gave rise to the application if justice is to be done to the ingenious and plausible arguments which counsel has in the best tradition of his profession legitimately and strongly urged on this court. In this regard, it is my view that it is necessary to appreciate that the dates on which certain events occurred are important features and give rise to certain relevant legal consequences which are capable of helping, even if marginally, to resolve the matters in controversy between the parties. It is, therefore, against this background that I now proceed to consider the said facts and circumstances and in the process highlight the events I have alluded to.

On 15th April 1975, the applicant herein, a native of Amia, as the plaintiff representing his family, instituted an action in the Circuit Court, Cape Coast, against two defendants, namely the third respondent, a native of Ochiso and the predecessor in title of the fourth respondent also a native of Ochiso. The action was for a declaration of title to two parcels of farm land, damages for trespass and perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the land in dispute. Each party, it seems maintained at the trial that his ancestors, that is to say his predecessors in title, acquired the lands in dispute as of right by breaking the virgin forest.

It was given in evidence that although Amia and Ochiso are both within the Ajumako Traditional Area in the Central Region, both are in point of fact distinct areas with their separate peoples and stools and respective stool occupants. It was also given in evidence that a subject of the Ochiso stool cannot as of right break the virgin forest on Amia Stool land so as to entitle

[p.699] of [1982-83] GLR 688 him to acquire interest in the said land, and vice versa, a subject of the Amia stool cannot as of right by the same process acquire interest in Ochiso stool land.

After evidence had been heard on a number of days the circuit court judge on 27 September 1978, gave judgment for the defendants, and in the result dismissed the plaintiff’s claim. The plaintiff, the applicant herein, appealed timeously to the Court of Appeal on 6 October 1978 and on 2 December 1980 after the Constitution, 1979, had come into force, the Court of Appeal heard argument after the fourth respondent had been substituted for his predecessor in title one Kwabina Baah, the second defendant who had died a few weeks before that date.

In the course of the said hearing, counsel for the appellant, who is the applicant in the present proceedings, took a preliminary objection directed at challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court in hearing the case to its end and giving judgment. He argued that the claims of the parties could only be settled by deciding the boundary between the Amia and Ochiso stools. He urged this point because the evidence led by both parties suggests that the Amia and Ochiso stool lands are contiguous and consequently, for the plaintiff to succeed, the lands must be adjudged to belong to the Amia stool, and for the defendants to succeed the lands must be considered Ochiso stool lands.

The issue, he said, is a boundary dispute and as it involves the boundary line of two stools, he submitted that the provision of section 4(2) of N.R.C.D. 172, becomes applicable, the effect of which he pointed out was, at the relevant trial date, to oust the jurisdiction of the circuit court judge to determine the boundary in the case in favour of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner. In the circumstances, the circuit court judge, counsel argued, ought to have stayed the proceedings in his court and should have rather referred the matter to the said commissioner and it was only after the commissioner had settled the said boundary, that the circuit court judge could then resume the hearing and with the boundary now lawfully identified decide the case accordingly.

The Court of Appeal readily conceded the jurisdictional point raised by counsel and held in effect that the trial court’s jurisdiction was ousted at the date of trial by the mandatory provision of section 4(2) of N.R.C.D. 172. It accordingly, as specifically requested by counsel of the appellant, set aside the judgment and made two consequential orders: Firstly, it referred the matter to the commissioner to determine the boundary between the Amia and Ochiso stool lands; and secondly, it ordered that after the determination, the matter should be sent back to the Circuit Court, Cape Coast, for it to decide whether in the light of the commissioner’s findings, the plaintiff is entitled to his reliefs.

[p.700] of [1982-83] GLR 688 Although it was the applicant who initially invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal as the appellant and specifically made the application asking for these orders of the Court of Appeal which counsel for the third and fourth respondents resisted but which he nevertheless successfully obtained, he has, nonetheless, come to this court now by motion complaining that he is aggrieved that he has been granted the very orders which he himself asked for, and would like the Supreme Court to exercise its supervisory powers by issuing (a) orders of certiorari to quash the said orders of the Court of Appeal designated as the first respondent herein; (b) prohibition directed at the second respondent, the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner, enjoining him to desist from entertaining the reference from the Court of Appeal; (c) consequential orders as may be appropriate for a trial de novo of the original action; and (d) an interim stay of proceedings until the final determination of this application before us.

When I think about the tactics adopted on behalf of the applicant in pursuing these applications successively before the court below and this court, I cannot help but deprecate this brand of advocacy that blows hot and cold at the same time. I am afraid, I feel obliged to protest in the interests of law and justice and I think it is enough if I say that it is altogether a reprehensible strategy and does no credit to professionalism or competency. As, however, the Chief Justice did indicate in reading the judgment of the court, counsel has raised a jurisdictional point, and I agree that if it is indeed a valid point, his conduct though questionable. will be lawful.

The apparent grounds pressed upon us by counsel for the applicant and upon which he seeks these reliefs from a judgment and orders which, as I said, he had himself claimed are the four itemised hereunder, if allowance is made as I have made, for obviously inaccurate legal wording with its consequential inelegant formulation:

1. That after the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979, on 24 September 1979 the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner ceased to have jurisdiction to hear and determine any fresh reference as to disputed stool lands boundaries save in respect of such matters pending before him on that date.

2. That the commissioner is operating as a branch of the executive arm of the State (i.e., of the Lands Department of the Ministry of Lands and Mineral Resources) and therefore he has no jurisdiction to exercise final judicial power since he would then be acting in violation of the Constitution, 1979, which vested judicial power in the judiciary and denied final judicial power to all other organs of State.

[p.701] of [1982-83] GLR 688

3. That there is no existing statute consistent with the Constitution, 1979, which confers judicial power on the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner, in a manner as to differentiate his exercise of power from the normal exercise of power by the usual commissions and committees of inquiry provided by Act 250 and other adjudicating authorities which are all outside the hierarchy of the judiciary.

4. That the value of the lands in dispute is over ¢30,000 and since by law the jurisdiction of the circuit court is restricted to land suits where the value of the land does not exceed ¢15,000 the circuit court has no jurisdiction and therefore a trial de novo should be ordered before the High Court which is the only competent court with original jurisdiction in the matter.

Now it is necessary to examine the validity of the arguments which were canvassed around these grounds in support of the claim of the applicant in his bid for these reliefs. Counsel’s stand assuming his appraisal of the factual and legal positions are accepted, is convincingly simple, and devastatingly logical.

By his first argument which is centred around grounds 1 and 3 above, he equates the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner appointed under N.R.C.D. 172 for the purpose of inquiring and determining stool lands boundaries under the said Decree with a commission or committee of inquiry as is apparently provided in articles 196-199 of the Constitution, 1979, and the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1964 (Act 250), an Act now repealed retrospectively since 31 December 1981 by the combined effect of sections 65 and 67 of the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation (Supplementary and Consequential Provisions) Law, 1982 (P.N.D.C.L. 42).

The repeal does not affect the argument. He concedes though that such commissions and committees of inquiry are ad hoc bodies and the commissioner envisaged by N.R.C.D. 172 is a permanent adjudicating authority. His position, however, is that due to the institutional structure contemplated by N.R.C.D. 172, the difference thus conceded is irrelevant and does not preclude the commissioner from being a commission or a committee within the purview of the said constitutional provisions and the said Act 250. On these premises, his submission is that the commissioner and his functions are caught by the provisions of sections 10-12 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979. The said provisions are:

“10. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution to the contrary, any commission or committee of inquiry in existence immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution may continue in existence until the submission

[p.702] of [1982-83] GLR 688 of its report or until it is otherwise dissolved in accordance with law.

11. For the removal of doubt, the report and findings of a commission or committee of inquiry established before the coming into force of this Constitution under any enactment shall have the same effect as the report or findings of a commission of inquiry established under this Constitution.

12. Where any matter or thing has been commenced before the coming into force of this Constitution by a person or authority having power in that behalf under the existing law, that matter or thing may be carried on and completed by the person or authority having power in that behalf on or after such commencement and it shall not be necessary for any such person or authority to commence any such matter or thing de novo.”

Having regard to what counsel conceives as the combined effect of these provisions, he puts forward the further submission that the commissioner is merely continued in existence on the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979, on 24 September 1979 for the limited purpose of only disposing of matters actually pending before him and that he is bereft of jurisdiction to take on fresh matters. For this reason, counsel invites this court to hold that after 24 September 1979, it became incompetent to refer any new matter to the commissioner and that therefore the consequential order of the Court of Appeal dated 18 December 1980 enjoining the commissioner to determine the boundary between the Amia and Ochiso stool lands is ultra vires, null and void.

Before dealing with his second argument I propose to demonstrate that counsel’s conclusion is for good reason non sequitur, and for this purpose it is necessary to consider the legal validity of the first argument and to examine the conclusion which it is said to give rise to. The fulcrum on which the whole of the first argument is supported is the predicate that the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner, the predecessor of the settlement commissioner under the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Ordinance, Cap. 139 (1951 Rev.), which commenced to exercise statutory functions of demarcating boundaries between stools in this country in the early fifties is a specie of the commissions or committees of inquiry as these bodies have existed in this country since 29 June 1893 (see Ordinance No. 7 of 1893). I think this is a fallacy, although even if it is valid, it will be irrelevant and will still not sustain the conclusion advocated by counsel that the reference by the Court of Appeal is ultra vires, null and void. The obvious reason for this is because both bodies exercise statutory functions of adjudication and it is rather this common element of their functions which is essentially relevant and decisively

[p.703] of [1982-83] GLR 688 crucial in this case. Whether one can even be considered to be a specie of the other or not is neither here nor there and is in the circumstance, of no practical legal consequence for the purpose of supplanting the jurisdiction of the circuit court or the Court of Appeal on the question of their competence in referring the issue of the boundary settlement in the matter to the commissioner.

It is, however significant and noteworthy that within all the provisions of Cap. 139 and its apparent successor, the subsequent N.R.C.D. 172 and their schedules the word “commission” or “committee” was nowhere mentioned even once. Strictly speaking therefore there is no such legal body in existence as a Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission under N.R.C.D. 172, and the second respondent in these proceedings is an entity virtually unknown to our law. It is remarkable that in his rather exhaustive arguments, counsel for the applicant persistently and consistently referred to this non-existent body.

In considering his ground and arguments, however, I have taken the liberty to expunge this body and substitute the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner on the basis that it was probably a rather careless and inadvertent reading of the relevant legislation that led counsel to this unfortunate and untidy slip. That is the reason why I commenced the critique of the applicant’s grounds by emphasising and daubing them “apparent grounds” in order to reflect the unrealistic reference in the filed grounds to a so-called “Boundaries Commission.”

Now the principal enabling legal provision from which counsel’s thesis is said to draw its authenticity is for all practical purposes, section 10 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, already referred to in this opinion. It seems to me that even if the said section 10 is applicable, its substantive operative provision on the question of the continued existence of any commission or committee is two-fold in that, the said committee or commission may continue (1) until the submission of its report, or (2) until it is otherwise dissolved in accordance with law.

A critical analysis and consideration of these two facts show quite clearly that the provision is concerned with the ad hoc committees and commissions reminiscent of the type of bodies envisaged under Act 250 which normally after investigations or inquiries merely submit reports and recommendations to government. Their reports bind no one and their activities are rather administrative techniques and proceedings calculated to aid the government to gather the necessary information and the expertise of knowledgeable persons for efficient administration. Speaking for myself, I would venture to say that my understanding of section 10 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, is that if such a committee or commission submits its report for which it was

[p.704] of [1982-83] GLR 688 purposely appointed, its functions and duties become exhausted and that ipso facto brings its existence to an end. Furthermore, even if it does not submit its report, its existence can be brought to an end by an enabling law.

This is as it should be; on the other hand, the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner does not submit a report. He makes findings and decisions in the fashion of an administrative adjudicating authority and although he is obliged to make available a certified copy of the findings and decisions to the Secretary responsible for Lands, who has an administrative duty devoid of any discretion to merely publish the said findings and decisions in the Land and Concession Bulletin or the Gazette, it would clearly be an abuse of language to conclude that a report is being made to the said Secretary for Lands when documents are only being furnished to him, the content of which is not only legally no concern of his but of which he can also exercise no other functions whatsoever.

As at now structured under N.R.C.D. 172, the settlement commissioner is a permanent official appointed at a point in time, and it is quite possible to visualise circumstances under which there would be no cases pending before him if there have been no occasion to resort to his jurisdiction before 24 September 1979, having regard to the date of his appointment or if he had before the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979, dealt with all the cases referred to him. To argue then that under such circumstances his appointment has been, or must be taken to have been abrogated by the operation of section 10 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, would be palpably an unjust conclusion which would obviously do violence to the language of the said section 10.

In the result, since N.R.C.D. 172 is an existing law in force on 27 September 1978, the trial date, and was continued in force by article 4(1)(d) of the Constitution, 1979, the reference of the stool land dispute in these proceedings to the commissioner by the Court of Appeal by virtue of section 4(2) of N.R.C.D. 172 is clearly competent and neither null nor void and in my view it cannot at least be assailed by the first arguments canvassed by counsel in these proceedings.

I have dealt with the first and third grounds filed. These cover the first argument which counsel made before us. I now move to consider the second ground filed and argued. In arguing this ground, counsel made legitimate references to many provisions of N.R.C.D. 172 and successfully demonstrated that the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner operates as an official of the Lands Department of the Ministry of Lands and therefore an executive arm of the State.

In support of this he drew our attention to section 2(3) of N.R.C.D. 172 under which the commissioner may resign by writing in that regard to the government executive however designated,

[p.705] of [1982-83] GLR 688 whether Commissioner, Minister or Secretary with responsibility for the Ministry of Lands and also the provision under which the said government executive, if the prescribed conditions for removal are satisfied, can remove or suspend the commissioner with the approval of the government. On his supension from office, section 2(4) vests the statutory power of appointing a qualified person to act for the commissioner in the said government executive responsible for the Ministry of Lands acting with the approval of the government. He showed that under section 3 (1) of N.R.C.D. 172 after consultation with the government, the remuneration of the commissioner is fixed by the said officer of the executive responsible for lands.

I think he overwhelmingly succeeded in demonstrating to my satisfaction by his further reference to sections 5(2) and (4), 9(1) and (2), 11(1) and 13(1) that the settlement commissioner is an operative of the Lands Department of the Ministry of Lands and carries out his functions as a servant of the executive branch of government, in order to map out stool lands in Ghana in cases where questions or disputes arise as to where any stool land is in a particular traditional area or not.

He went further, however, to argue that the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner is essentially a specialised kind of court and in another peroration he categorised him variously as “a species of court limited to the attainment of executive policy objectives”; “an inferior kind of court outside the hierarchy of the ordinary courts”; “an inferior court and hence subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.”

The functions of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner and his office so described as a court by counsel ignores the clear distinction between a court and statutory bodies exercising functions of a judicial or quasi-judicial character. Lord Sankey L.C. reading the opinion of the Privy Council in Shell Co. of Australia Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1931] A.C. 275 at p. 296, P.C. drew the distinction between the exercise of judicial power and the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, when he said:

“The authorities are clear to show that there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power.” The noble lord went on to itemise in a negative sense characteristics which such statutory bodies have in common with courts and which can deceptively lead one to overlook their apparent lack of judicial power, as counsel was no doubt misled in this case. He said at p. 297:

“[I]t may be useful to enumerate some negative propositions on this subject: 1. A tribunal is not necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it gives a final decision. 2. Nor because it hears witnesses on oath. 3. Nor because two or more contending

[p.706] of [1982-83] GLR 688 parties appear before it between whom it has to decide. 4. Nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects. 5. Nor because there is an appeal to a Court. 6. Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

I have already pointed out that in all his arguments counsel equated in my view erroneously and without legal justification, the Settlement Commissioner with a so-called Settlement Commission and no doubt this must have led him to the further error that N.R.C.D. 172 created a commission.

However, in my opinion and in my judgment, the question of the designation of the status of the commissioner as a court is not of any importance. A careful reading of N.R.C.D. 172 for instance, demonstrates beyond peradventure that the Decree set out a machinery for determining the boundaries of stool lands in certain circumstances and empowered the government to appoint a public officer to exercise functions of a quasi-judicial character in the inquiry and determination of the said boundaries.

No commission was created, but clearly the settlement commissioner carried out duties in the capacity of an adjudicating authority. This of course, counsel conceded but it was a concession adjectival to the court’s concept that all courts whether inferior or superior are necessarily a specie of adjudicating authorities. The argument that the commissioner is a court though clearly an error is of no practical consequence in the build-up of the premises from which counsel drew his tendentious conclusion that the settlement commissioner’s exercise of power under section 4(1) of N.R.C.D. 172 inconsistent with the provisions of article 114(1) of the Constitution, 1979, with the allied result that the whole Decree is struck down as void save as is provided in the sections of the transitional provisions which is said to save pending matters, already referred to in this ruling.

The effect of this view, as counsel will have it, is that the commissioner now has no power to exercise in entertaining a new reference and so nothing can now be referred to him.

Now section 4 (1) of N.R.C.D. 172 is as follows: “The Commissioner shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the boundaries of stool lands and to hear and determine questions or disputes relating thereto. “And article 114(1) of the Constitution, 1979, is in the following terms:

“114. (1) The judicial power of Ghana shall be vested in the Judiciary of which the Chief Justice shall be the Head; and accordingly no organ or agency of the executive or the legislature shall be given any final judicial power.”

[p.707] of [1982-83] GLR 688

Counsel’s approach in construing these provisions, as I understand him, is that the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner whether he is considered as a court or adjudicating authority is an entity outside the hierarchy of the judiciary created, or to some extent continued in existence by the Constitution, 1979.

He points out that under section 9(3) of N.R.C.D. 172, it is provided in regard to the findings and decision of the commissioner that “ Any findings or decision published under this Decree shall be final and shall not be questioned in any court or else where.” By section 10 of the Decree also a Stool Lands Boundaries Appeal Tribunal comprising three persons was established to hear appeals from the findings and decision of the commissioner and it is provided in section 10(5) thereof as follows: “The decision of the majority shall be the decision of the Tribunal and shall not be subject to any further appeal.

In the light of these provisions, the argument pressed on this court on behalf of the applicant, not without some force, is that the settlement commissioner and the appeal tribunal under N.R.C.D. 172 have in the scheme of N.R.C.D. 172 been vested with final judicial power contrary to the provisions of article 114 (1). He considered this conclusion irresistible since their decisions are not only non-appealable to the judiciary established by the Constitution, 1979, but they are also said to be final and cannot be questioned in any court or elsewhere.

I think this argument would seem to pose two questions:

1. What is “judicial power” or, at any rate, and more immportantly, what does “final judicial power” mean?

2. What is the legal significance of the expression “Any findings or decision … shall be final and not be questioned in any court or elsewhere.

The final element inherent in the concepts of final judicial power and final findings or decisions running through the two questions emphasises the inter-related nature of the two questions.

Clearly, the idea of a final finding or decision is in the thesis of counsel inextricably bound up with the concept of judicial power. In my view, however, the bald acceptance of a final decision of a tribunal or statutory body having limited jurisdiction is incompatible with good government. I recall adverting to this problem in my dissenting opinion in Kwakye v. Attorney-General [1981] G.L.R. 944 at p.1046, S.C. when I said:

“[T]he idea that any statutory institution, authority or tribunal of inferior jurisdiction is outside the control of the judiciary is surely incompatible with the essence and regime of a democratic system; it undermines the rule of law; it is subversive of orderly government and is an erosion of the people’s liberties. In all

[p.708] of [1982-83] GLR 688 cases the very fact that it is a creature of statute which gives it limited powers, means that it is ipso facto not outside the control of the superior courts.”

I do not propose to subject the concept of judicial power simpliciter to any comprehensive analysis for the purpose of this decision because that concept is not really decisive in this case. I am content and quite satisfied for my present purpose with the description of its relevant characteristics so ably proffered by the Court of Appeal in its judgment delivered by Apaloo J.A. (as he then was) in Akainyah v. The Republic [1968] G.L.R. 548 at p.554, C.A. after he had examined the concept as it has been considered in the courts in Australia, America and England. He there said: “It would seem therefore that an essential attribute of judicial power is not only the power to decide but also the power to enforce those decisions.

The emphasised expression in the Court of Appeal formulation of the attribute, satisfies me that the Akainyah decision, admittedly not binding on this court, did not pre-empt a further consideration of the problem at the appropriate time, particularly as the case source of the 1891 opinion of Miller J. is unfortunately and perhaps inadvertently not cited in the said decision and I have not succeeded in laying my hand on the actual judgment.

As I have already indicated, I am, however, for present purpose, inclined to agree with the commonsense ring in the Court of Appeal formulation in the Akainyah decision. I am as of now persuaded by his reasoning to the view that the mere vesting of a power to decide without the additional power to enforce the decision is not the grant of judicial power but merely a grant of a judicial function, and a function may really connote the carrying out of a duty or an obligation rather than the exercise of power. So I accept the attributes of judicial power as enunciated in the Akainyah case.

Tested against these attributes it seems to me that the settlement commissioner and the appeal tribunal under N.R.C.D. 172 have merely the power to decide the locations of boundaries. After delivering their findings and decisions regarding the said locations they are functus officio and have no other further judicial function to perform. They cannot suo motu enforce their decisions. They do not therefore have judicial power in consonance with the Akainyah test and although as I have already indicated that test does not bind me, I am inclined to agree with its postulate and would wish to adopt it now, as I have already said, for the purpose of this decision. Assuming, however, that I am wrong and that test, on subsequent reflection, breaks down as case after case comes before us for decision, I would still think that even if the commissioner is adjudged to have judicial power, the decision would still raise another question as to whether

[p.709] of [1982-83] GLR 688 the judicial power so conceded to him and the appeal tribunal is final judicial power. This, however, is related to the second question and because of the legal significance of that second question, I do not feel obliged to give any further consideration to the concept of final judicial power because the consideration of the second question would adequately canvass its implication for the purpose of this decision.

The said second question dealing as it does with the legal purport of the expression “any findings or decisions… shall be final and not be questioned in “any court or elsewhere,” raises the perennial question to a privative clause in legislation. This is the famous and rather well known ouster clause about which there has been so much learning and the ambit of which has been settled in all the common law jurisdictions that my researches have reached.

The legal implication of these finality or ouster clauses did engage the attention of our courts in the first few years of their establishment in 1876. For the past couple of years our courts have been inundated with cases involving these ouster clauses. Some have been disposed of and some are still pending before even this Supreme Court. On the occasions when our courts in the lower hierarchy have handled them their true legal implications have been examined by the finest minds in our judiciary and their true significance restated ad nauseam at the commendable perspicacity.

I am really at my wits end as to how to handle these apparently endless arguments touching these ouster clauses in the face of such abundant case law, local and foreign, laying down their imports consistently with overwhelming clarity.

I must say I am fed up with the concept of ouster clauses. We must exercise it from its power and although the exercise would seem to be really unnecessary, the persistent ability with cocksure arrogance of the ouster clause to rear its ugly head with bewildering regularity when our courts are faced with serious issues, persuades me to think that further reiteration and a valiant effort at actually identifying it as the usurper it really is, would perhaps finally dispose of this our apparent nemesis.

I think the ouster clause is a sorry and shameless pretender in our legal system aspiring to elude our vigilance and lay fantastic and ridiculous title to pomp and power. Its finality claims are the babblings of an impotent iconoclast. It is in truth nothing but a bogus incubus which purports to lay its dead weight so heavily on our law in a manner as to seem to create a potential danger of presumptuous capacity to paralyse the progress and beneficial development of our law by its sheer inert and useless mass. I propose to examine how it has fared in many courts during the past 100 years.

On 22 January 1892, less than sixteen years after the establishment of the Supreme Court, Hutchinson C.J. in Tamakloe v. Mitchell

[p.710] of [1982-83] GLR 688

(1892) Red. 146, sitting at the Divisional Court in Accra, demonstrated that an ouster clause does not protect acts done without jurisdiction. Recently while sitting as a High Court judge in the Republic v. The Registrar, Special Tribunal: Ex parte Aidoo, High Court, Accra, 19 May 1980, unreported I traced the history of the ouster clause in its probable country of origin – England; and I canvassed its ambit and legal significance an exercise which was consistent with an earlier and similar approach of the Court of Appeal in Republic v. Special Tribunal; Ex parte Akosah [1980] G.L.R. 592, C.A.

Furthermore, in my dissenting opinion in this court in Kwakye v. Attorney-General (supra) dated 10 November 1981, I once again dealt with the problem and endeavoured to show that the concept and the legal significance of the ouster clause have been specifically accepted in any other foreign jurisdiction. For instance, I pointed out that in Israel in Orthodox Coptic Bishop of Jerusalem v. Minister of Police (1971) 25 P.D. (1) 225, the Israeli Supreme Court accepted the traditional legal purport of the ouster clause.

I showed that the Pakistani Supreme Court accepted it in Abdul Rauf v. Abdul Hammed Khan P.L.D. (1965) S.C. 671; so also did a court in Ontario in Canada in R. v. Ontario Labour Relations Board; Ex parte Kitchener Food Market Ltd. [1966] O.R. 482 indorse the traditional reasoning sustaining the invalid effect of the ouster clause when the body claiming immunity has acted without jurisdiction. In Britain, in America, in Australia and in Nigeria thought I demonstrated that in these jurisdictions also where a body exercising judicial powers or functions lacks jurisdiction, its purported acts can be controlled by supervisory process by the constitutional or legal bodies vested with paramount judicial powers; and whether the supervising powers are constitutional, statutory or inherent the exercise of such powers and the power to so supervise cannot normally or generally be abrogated by a finality or an ouster clause. See also the American case of Powell v. McCormack 395 U.S. 486 (1969); the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Australia in Ex Parte Northern Rivers Rutile Ply Ltd.; Re Claye [1965] N.S.W.R. 135; the Nigerian case of Nwankwere v. Adewumi [1962] W.N.L.R. 298; and the illuminating decision of the House of Lords in Britain in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147, H.L.

The jurisprudential foundation for this supervisory jurisdiction in superior courts is this: When the legislature has taken the trouble by legislation to spell out quite clearly the area of jurisdiction exercisable by an inferior tribunal, and that tribunal because of an ouster clause defies the legislature and travels outside its allotted jurisdiction and decides matters completely alien to its jurisdictional powers, upon what logical foundation can such a decision be considered valid and

[p.711] of [1982-83] GLR 688 what is the machinery to ensure that the legislative will prevails? As Brett L.J. with commendable incisive mind saw the problem and said in the English case of R.v. Local Government Board (1882) 10 Q.B.D. 309 at p.321:

“. . . wherever the legislature entrusts to any body of persons other than to the superior Courts the power of imposing an obligation upon individuals, the Courts ought to exercise as widely as they can the power of controlling those bodies of persons if those persons admittedly attempt to exercise powers beyond the powers given to them by Act of Parliament.”

The judicial power of review by supervision thus vested in the Supreme Court is obviously founded on the premises that bodies that have been given limited jurisdiction by legislation must be supervised to operate within the jurisdictional limit and not outside it. Speaking apparently of the jurisprudential under-pinnings of the inherent power of the English High Court to supervise, Farwell L.J. in R.v Shoreditch Assessment Committee; Ex parte Morgan [1910] 2 K.B. 859 at p. 880, C.A. said:

“Subjection in this respect to the High Court is a necessary and inseparable incident to all tribunals of limited jurisdiction; for the existence of the limit necessitates an authority to determine and enforce it: it is a contradiction in terms to create a tribunal with limited jurisdiction and unlimited power to determine such limit at its own will and pleasure- such a tribunal will be autocratic, not limited…”

In his book on Judicial Review of Administrative Actions (3rd) at p. 322, Professor de Smith after an exhaustive study of the court’s power of judicial review in spite of the so-called finality clauses concluded:

“It is clear, . . . that a finality clause does not affect their power to award a declaration that a decision or order made by a statutory body is invalid. Even such words as ‘final and conclusive’ are ineffective to abridge or attenuate judicial review.”

Clearly, it is about time we realise in this country that to err is human and therefore the vesting of power or duties in an inferior judicial human institution and the denial of power to a superior judicial human institution to control the inferior institution when it falls into error cuts across a universal principle of human experience and is an intransigent failure to appreciate the nature of man and the fallible character of human behaviour even when the erring human beings running the institutions are motivated by the best of intentions. Failure to accept this universal truth acceptable by all peoples, ancient

[p.712] of [1982-83] GLR 688 and modern, civilised and primitive is to erode the liberties of our people and to create in our country autocratic judicial bodies reminiscent of the ex cathedra doctrinaire philosoph of the Roman Catholic papalcy.

It seems to me that the settlement commissioner and the appeal tribunal under N.R.C.D. 172 in these proceedings are, as conceded by counsel, adjudicating authorities and by virtue of article 119 of the Constitution, 1979, and a consistently long line of authorities some of which I have discussed herein spreading over 100 years, their acts can be called in question before the Supreme Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers, finality or ouster clauses notwithstanding. The powers of these adjudicating authorities are easily reconcilable with article 114(1) of the Constitution and the powers of the commissioner and the appeal tribunal under N.R.C.D. 172 to adjudicate in questions and disputes involving stool lands still remain unimpaired. I hold therefore that a reference of a boundary settlement question or dispute to the commissioner is accordingly competent and valid.

The only observation which does not detract from the reasoning in this case but which I feel obliged to refer to is that on 24 September 1979, the judiciary of Ghana and in particular the High Court were vested by articles 114(2) and 125(1) of the Constitution, 1979, with jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal. On that same day one of the existing laws N.R.C.D. 172 which is in question in these proceedings had vested in the settlement commissioner “exclusive jurisdiction to determine the boundaries of stool lands and to hear and determine questions or disputes relating thereto.”

(The emphasis is mine.) I would interpret exclusive to mean to the exclusion of all other bodies or institutions including the judiciary and the High Court and even the Supreme Court. I find it difficult to reconcile the continued acceptance of this exclusive jurisdiction with the obviously all inclusive jurisdiction of the High court, the Supreme Court and the judiciary. I think they are inconsistent and in conflict and article 2(1) of the Constitution in mandatory terms provides that any such provision of any law inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Constitution is to the extent of the inconsistency void and of no effect. This means that logically the word “exclusive” in section 4(1) of N.R.C.D. 172 became void and of no effect as from 24 September 1979; and although N.R.C.D. 172 is an existing law, by the operation of article 4 of the Constitution it is to be:

“ . . . construed with such modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of [the] Constitution, or otherwise to give effect to, or enable effect to be given to any chances effected by [the] Constitution.”

[p.713] of [1982-83] GLR 688

It seems therefore that N.R.C.D. 172 with the word “exclusive” expunged from section 4(1) thereof by virtue of the said article 4, continued in force from 24 September 1979 until 31 December 1981 when, following the suspension of the Constitution, 1979, as a result of the revolutionary events of that day, it was continued in force by section 4(2) of the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1981, and it now continues in force with the word “exclusive” still expunged by virtue of section 61 of the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation (Supplementary and Consequential Provisions) (Amendment) Law, 1982 (P.N.D.C. 42), but only to the extent that it is compatible with national aspirations especially, if any of its provisions are derived from foreign sources. I do not think the change which I have referred to herein effected by the Proclamation, 1981 and P.N.D.C. 42, has any effect which is capable of upsetting the reasoning contained in the decision of the court read by the Chief Justice this morning.

It seems to me therefore that since 24 September 1979 the judiciary and the commissioner have concurrent jurisdiction under N.R.C.D. 172 but at the date of the trial which is 27 September 1978, the settlement commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction and since the applicable law at the circuit court at the relevant time ought to be the pre-24 September 1979 late, the reference to the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner by the Court of Appeal was quite unexceptionable.

Even if the post 24 September 1979 law was to be applied, the existence of concurrent jurisdiction with the necessary adaptation and modification gives the circuit court judge a discretion as to whether to refer or to decide on his own, and in such a case reference cannot be said to be contrary to law unless it can be shown that the discretion to refer has been exercised either by taking note of factors which should be ignored or ignoring factors which should have been considered. No such arguments were urged before us and the proceedings reveal no such factors. I hold therefore that the reference even in such circumstances is not lawful.

A feeble attempt was made by counsel to urge on this court that the value of the lands in dispute is about ¢30,000. The argument that was then indulged in is that since under section 32(1)(a)(iii) of Act 372, the jurisdiction of the circuit court to entertain a cause or matter involving ownership, possession and occupation of, or title to land is restricted to cases where the value of the land does not exceed ¢15,000 the alleged value of ¢30,000 ousts the jurisdiction of the circuit court and by elimination, the proper forum for trial de novo should be the High Court. Attractive though this argument appears, in my view, it must be rejected.

This jurisdictional point can only properly be raised at the trial court upon evidence as to value. It is a novel point in these [p.714] of [1982-83] GLR 688 proceedings and was singularly overlooked by counsel, whether inadvertently or by design it is difficult to conjecture. It was, however never raised either in the trial court or the Court of Appeal. It is now being thrown at us, when there is no doubt that by law the value of the property in dispute before the circuit court judge is irrelevant in regard to jurisdiction once the parties submit to his jurisdiction.

Now let us examine this jurisdictional raised belatedly by counsel for the applicant. Under section 32(3) of Act 372 it is specifically provided that although the value of the land in dispute may prima facie exceed the amount or value for which the circuit court had jurisdiction, nevertheless, notwithstanding the excess value, the circuit court is empowered to proceed to hear the case if the parties agree that it should do so.

In this case, the parties did agree to have the case heard by the circuit court, and the court, indeed, heard the case to a conclusion. This issue as to the value of the land was not raised in either the circuit court or the Court of Appeal. In my opinion, it is now too late for one party to resile after he had so unequivocally and with the agreement of his opponent submitted to the jurisdiction. I think this point has no merit whatsoever and ought never to have been raised.

For all the reasons I have advanced in this case, it should now be clear why I find myself in entire agreement with the conclusion and the reasoning of the court read by the Chief Justice just now. In the result, I hold that the application for certiorari to quash the orders of the Court of Appeal is without merit, and should be dismissed. Obviously dismissal would abort the application for prohibition restraining the commissioner from entertaining the reference and this would also make otiose the motion for trial de novo and the application for stay of proceedings pending the outcome of the present proceedings.

In all the circumstances of this case, and having regard to all the points I have canvassed, I concur in the judgment of the court read by the Chief Justice that the application be dismissed with costs.

DECISION

Application for orders of certiorari and prohibition dismissed.

D.R.K.S.

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