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[1983] SLR (SC) 4Supreme Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

SARKODEE I vs. BOATENG II [1982-83] GLR 715

18 May 1983 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 108 min read

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OSCOLASARKODEE I v BOATENG II [1982-83] GLR 715 [1983] SLR (SC) 4
APASARKODEE I v BOATENG II [1982-83] GLR 715, [1983] SLR (SC) 4 (Ghana).
BluebookSARKODEE I v BOATENG II [1982-83] GLR 715, [1983] SLR (SC) 4 (Ghana Sup. Ct. 1983).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Sarkodee I v. Boateng II [1977] 2 G.L.R. 343, C.A. (full bench).

(2) Dove v. Wuta-Ofei [1966] G.L.R. 299, S.C.

(3) Republic v. Wiamoasehene Stool Affairs Chieftaincy Committee; Ex parte Oppong Kwame [1971] 1 G.L.R. 321; affirmed [1972] 1 G.L.R. 60 C.A.

(4) Dadeasoabahene I v. Prempeh II (Asantehene’s Case) (1935) unreported.

(5) Darkwa v. Kesse, New Juaben Traditional Council, 29 August 1967, unreported.

(6) Mensah v. Toku (1887) Sar. F.L.R. 42.

(7) Ahenkora II v. Ofe [1961] G.L.R. 17, P.C.

(8) Vanderpuije v. Akwei [1971] 1 G.L.R. 242.

(9) Chinery, Re; Ex parte Chinery (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 342; 53 L.J.Ch. 662; 50 L.T. 342, C.A.

(10) Riddell, Re; Ex parte Earl of Strathmore (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 512.

(11) Amoako Atta IV v. Nuamah [1963] 1 G.L.R. 432, S.C.

(12) Standard Bank of West Africa Ltd. v. Boaitey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 308.

(13) Angu v. Attah (1916) P.C. ‘74-’28, 43, P.C.

[p.718] of [1982-83] GLR 715 (14) Ibrahim v. Amalibini [1978] G.L.R. 368.

(15) Mate v. Amanor [1973] 1 G.L.R. 469.

(16) Johnson v. Clark [1908] 1 Ch. 303; 77 L.J.Ch. 127; 98 L.T, 129; 24 T.L.R. 156; 52 S.J. 115. (17) Diki v. Agiman, Div. Ct., Axim, 21 October 1901, unreported referred to in casely Hayford’s Gold coast Native Institutions (1903), p. 34).

(18) Jima v. Dente (1916) Danq. C.A.L. 260.

(19) Duro v. Asumang (1916) Danq. C.A.L. 265.

(20) Ghambrah v. Ewea (1892) Sar. F.L.R. 64 (21) Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., Ltd. [1944] K.B. 718; [1944] 2 All E.R. 283; 113 L.J.K.B. 513;

171 L.T. 113; 60 T.L.R. 536; 88 S.J. 332, C.A.; affirmed [1946] A.C. 163; [1946] 1 All E.R. 98;

115 L.J.K.B. 63; 174 L.T. 39; 62 T.L.R. 99; 38 B.W.C.C. 48, H.L.

(22) Kuma II v. Boafo IV (1922) ‘74-’28, 59, P.C.

(23) MacFoy v. United Africa Co., Ltd. [1962] A.C. 152, P.C.

(24) Akowuah v. Commissioner of Police [1964] G.L.R. 475, S.C.

(25) Donkor v. The Republic [1964] G.L.R. 598, S.C.

(26) Kwakye v. Attorney-General [1981] G.L.R. 944, S.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the judgment of the full bench of the Court of Appeal affirming the ruling of the National House of Chiefs wherein a ruling by the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs that the appellant (the Kyidomhene) was competent to prefer destoolment charges against the respondent, the Omanhene of the New Juaben Traditional Area, was reversed. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Apaloo C.J.

COUNSEL

Tsatsu Tsikata for the appellant.

Osei Nyame for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

The appellant is the Kyidomhene of the New Juaben Traditional Area. On 20 August 1973, he filed a “chieftaincy petition” in the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs. The prayer of the petition was for the “Destoolment of Nana Kwaku Boateng, Omanhene, New Juaben Traditional Area.” He is the respondent to this appeal. The petition was brought on a stereotyped form and paragraph 2 of the form requires the petitioner to state the capacity in which he brought the petition. He stated his capacity as “Kyidomhene.” The petitioner was required by paragraph 6 of the form to “state in a concise form the facts and particulars” on which he would seek to rely in proof of the charges. His answer was, “see attached charges.”

The appellant attached to the petition, twenty charges serially numbered — some of them involving the commission of named

[p.719] of [1982-83] GLR 715 criminal offences, of the others, one at least, is an offence involving moral turpitude. He then made a certificate to the charges in the following words:

“This is to certify that the contents of the above twenty charges preferred against Nana Kwaku Boateng II, Omanhene of New Juaben Traditional Area, were read by me in the Twi language, interpreted and explained to such of the signatories therein who could not read and write, but who are perfectly prepared to substantiate the same before touching pen with which their marks and thumbprints were made thereto.”

The names of five persons were then given and their customary offices were stated against their names. These include the Krontihene, the Twafohene and the Sanaahene. Except the Abosohene, Nana Adonten Boateng, who apparently signed the petition, all the others were illiterates and their marks were made. The charges were then signed by the appellant and bears the date, 18 December 1968.

The wording of the certificate suggests that the named elders were not co-petitioners but proposed witnesses. A period of almost five years elapsed between the date of the signing of the petition and the date it was actually lodged before the tribunal. We have been told that by that date, all the named elders were dead. Apparently, only the petitioner survived.

The fact of their deaths before the lodgment of the petition and the wording of the certificate which shows that their role was merely going to be that of witnesses, make it plain that the only real petitioner was the appellant. Yet when the petition was formally put before the chieftaincy tribunal, it was intituled:

“In the matter of the complaint lodged by Nana Poku Sarkodee I, Kyidomhene of New Juaben Traditional Area and Others v. Nana Kwaku Boateng II, Omanhene, New Juaben Traditional Area and Others.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

At its sitting on 6 September 1973, the tribunal appears to have inquired of the appellant who the “others” in the title were. According to the record, the appellant’s counsel undertook to give to the tribunal the names and identities of the other “destooling parties.” Accordingly, the tribunal ordered as follows, “The names of the other destooling parties should be divulged at the next sitting and also their authentication.”

As all these parties were, to the appellant’s knowledge, dead, it was obvious he would find difficulty in truthfully complying with this order unless, of course, he was going to say his co-petitioners were all

[p.720] of [1982-83] GLR 715 deceased persons. So at the next sitting of the tribunal, he took the only available course. He sought leave to delete from the title of the suit the words “and others” and to re-word his capacity as follows:

“That the petitioner is the Kyidomhene, a senior divisional chief, of New Juaben Traditional Area and brings this petition as one of the persons entitled under customary law to bring a claim or complaint against or to institute proceedings for the destoolment of a chief.”

Thus obliged to concede that he was in truth the only real “destooling party” his capacity to bring the petition was instantly challenged. The respondent by his counsel sought and obtained leave to contend that:

“By the native customary law of New Juaben Traditional Area, a single divisional chief and for that matter the Kyidomhene alone is incapable of preferring destoolment charges against the paramount chief without the knowledge and approval of the senior divisional chiefs, Krontihene or in his absence or infirmity, of Akwamuhene and Gyasehene. The present action is a direct contravention of the customary law and usage…”

At its resumed sitting on 17 September 1973, the tribunal invited argument on the preliminary issue of the appellant’s capacity. Both counsel then addressed rival argument to the court on this. After a few minutes’ adjournment, the tribunal delivered a ruling in which it rejected the objection to the appellant’s capacity to bring the petition and expressed as its opinion that “the present plaintiff who is the Kyidomhene is not disqualified under customary law from instituting proceedings for the destoolment of the Paramount Chief of New Juaben.”

That conclusion did not answer the question in controversy which was, whether the appellant by himself and without the consent or concurrence of other stool holders could do so. Accordingly, to contest this holding, the respondent brought an interlocutory appeal to the National House of Chiefs.

The appeal was heard by that appellate tribunal on 18 February 1975. Both counsel for the appellant and the respondent addressed the court that day. It would seem that the issue of customary law involved gave no trouble to the tribunal. It adjourned for judgment the following day and when it reassembled, it proceeded to allow the appeal and reserved its reasons. It gave this on 29 April 1975. The ratio decidendi of that judgment as expressed by the tribunal was:

“… no one single kingmaker has ever had the right in Akan custom of instituting proceedings for the destoolment of a chief. Unless such a person has under native custom a right to act by

[p.721] of [1982-83] GLR 715 himself alone, he will not have the right to institute proceedings by himself alone under section 35 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370).”

The court then proffered advice as to the right thing to do. It said:

“If one kingmaker becomes aware of any serious customary offence committed by his chief, the correct customary procedure is that he should solicit the support of at least the majority of the kingmakers before instituting destoolment proceedings against the chief.”

Aggrieved at this holding, the appellant sought leave of the National House of Chiefs to appeal to the full bench of the Court of Appeal. Such leave was granted. In due course, the appeal was heard by the full bench of the Court of Appeal. On 19 May 1977, the court delivered judgment and substantially affirmed (Francois J.A. dissenting) the conclusion of the National House of Chiefs: see Sarkodee I v. Boateng II [1977] 2 G.L.R. 343, C.A. (full bench). Clearly, the appellant was dissatisfied with this holding also. Accordingly, he, by counsel on 14 February 1979, applied to the full bench for review. That application was pending before that court at the date the Constitution, 1979, came into force and was converted by the force of section 5 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution into an appeal before this court. It is in that capacity that we heard it.

There were no fewer than 23 grounds of appeal, thirteen of these were filed originally. On 18 April 1983, when hearing of this appeal commenced before us, we granted leave to the appellant to add ten further grounds. Leave was also sought to amend the title of the suit and the capacity in which the appellant commenced the suit by adding to the name of the appellant, the words “for himself and on behalf of the kingmakers of New Juaben.” Such leave could properly be granted if its object was to conform with the evidence and is not otherwise productive of injustice: see Dove v. Wuta-Ofei [1966] G.L.R. 299, S.C. and the cases therein cited.

In this case, we declined leave because it would, if granted, have altered the whole basis of the case. The suit was fought on the clear and unmistakable basis that as the Kyidomhene, the appellant was entitled by himself and without the consent and concurrence of the other kingmakers to sue for the destoolment of the respondent. It was on that question that both tribunals and the court below pronounced. It was that holding of the National House of Chiefs and the court below that provoked this appeal, and no fewer than eight of the grounds of appeal complained that their pronouncement of the customary law was erroneous. Having refused leave, the appeal proceeded on the basis that the Kyidomhene was the only plaintiff and the sole appellant before us.

[p.722] of [1982-83] GLR 715

As I said, many of the grounds in varying language, assert that the proposition of the customary law by the National House of Chiefs that a single kingmaker has no right by himself and without the consent and concurrence of the other kingmakers to institute destoolment proceedings was wrong and is not truly reflective of the customary law. But our attention was not drawn to any authority either in case law or statute which supports this contention. Customary law is within the bosom of the traditional courts and the highest traditional court in our national set-up is the tribunal whose pronouncement of the customary law is being impugned. If is it not shown that the statement of the customary law by the highest traditional tribunal, i.e. the National House of Chiefs, is in conflict with a binding judicial decision or a statutory provision, then it must be shown to be clearly unreasonable or so defends our notions of justice that we should refuse to accept it.

Is the statement of the customary law as propounded by the National House of Chiefs unreasonable? I do not think so. The enstoolment of a chief is not a one-man affair. Before this is done, the custom is that there must be a union of minds. It cannot be unreasonable if when a chief is to be unmade, so to speak, that decision is taken by as many minds as possible. Surely, a group right must be exercised by the group and it would be unreasonable to assert that such right can inhere in a single individual.

It also ought to be borne in mind that a person who is installed a chief is placed in a position of great reverence and authority. Much is owed to him and the decision to inflict on him the indignity of removal, is a step that ought not be taken lightly. There is wisdom in the saying that many heads are better than one. If the customary law demands that the deposition of such a highly placed individual should be the product of more than one mind, namely the majority of the kingmakers, such a requirement would seem to make good sense.

The prescription of Akan customary law that the decision to depose a chief should meet the wishes of the majority of the kingmakers and should not be a one-man affair, is to some extent, reflected in our national Constitutions. The President of Ghana is the highest placed individual in the country. He has not only executive authority of the State vested in him, but is also the fount of honour. Yet, he is not irremovable. He too can be removed from office, but being the serious step that it is, the machinery to secure his disposition cannot be set in motion by any one individual, however highly placed, patriotic or public-spirited. Article 48 of the Constitution, 1969, demanded that a notice seeking his deposition must be “signed by no less than twenty-five members of the National Assembly.” Article 56 of the Constitution, 1979, prescribed an even greater number. Under it a notice for the removal shall be “signed by not less than one-third of

[p.723] of [1982-83] GLR 715 all the members of Parliament.” In a 140-member House, that works out to at least 47 members. Although the numerical requirement of our Constitution does not tally with the customary law requirement, it reflects the same philosophy, i.e. the removal of a highly placed political personage should not be the prerogative of a single individual but must be the result of the meeting and union of minds of a number of persons who are so placed that they would give the matter the earnestness it deserves. I would decline to say that the customary law requirement for capacity to bring destoolment proceedings propounded by the National House of Chiefs, is unreasonable.

If not, does it offend any principle of justice? I cannot see that it does. On the contrary, it conforms with the democratic practice that where a decision does not require to be reached by unanimity, it can normally properly be reached by the majority. And a requirement that majority of the kingmakers must agree before proceedings are set in motion to destool a chief, cannot offend one’s notions of justice.

Although many of the grounds of appeal contest the main holding of the National House of Chiefs about capacity to institute destoolment proceedings, the appellant did not seriously invite us to say that that holding was wrong. The full bench of the Court of Appeal made a slight qualification of that holding by making provision for what was called “minority rights.” It was accepted that the right to initiate destoolment proceedings is normally exercisable by the majority of the kingmakers, but it was said if after due consultation, the majority withheld their consent or support unreasonably or through improper motive, the minority was entitled to do so.

The court below did not claim that this was part of the customary law. The reason for this qualification was not articulated in depth but seems to be an attempt by the court to mould the customary law to meet the needs of today’s society. This qualification is not per se unreasonable nor is it offensive to other branches of law. For example, minority shareholders of a company may obtain relief against an oppressive majority. It is not necessary in this appeal to express any concluded opinion on whether or not this is a valid qualification on the customary requirement for initiating destoolment proceedings.

But the concession to the minority or the “minority rights” became the main plank of counsel’s argument. It was urged for the appellant that whether he obtained the support or consent of the majority of the kingmakers before launching these proceedings or whether the majority were unreasonable in withholding support, or did so for improper motive could only be determined by the adduction of evidence and that as no evidence was led, the court was in error in dismissing the suit in limine.

[p.724] of [1982-83] GLR 715

That argument is not without substance but inasmuch as it is a factual point resolvable on the evidence, it seems fairly clearly settled by the available evidence, a lot of which was recited at the beginning of this judgment. Whether or not the appellant obtained the support of the majority of the kingmakers before he lodged the petition, was a matter peculiarly within his knowledge. The petition ex facie, shows that he was acting alone. But when he formally lodged it before the tribunal the title of the suit suggests that he brought it with “others.”

The tribunal, perhaps not ignorant of what goes on behind the scenes in these destoolment cases, wanted to be satisfied who those others were. Not only that but also, according to the record, “their authentication.” That would seem to mean that the tribunal wished to be further satisfied that they were genuine co-petitioners. The appellant, by his counsel, undertook to provide the particulars required. But he well knew that those “others” were no more. So instead of providing the tribunal with the names of the other “destooling parties” he sought and obtained leave to delete the “others” and go it alone — so to speak. The appellant’s conduct in this matter is not such that any evidence he gave about obtaining the prior support of the five other kingmakers he named in his petition can be relied on.

The only persons whose evidence would bear a badge of neutrality and truth were all dead and were known to him to be dead at the date of the filing of the petition. If the tribunal had requested proof that he had obtained the concurrence of the other kingmakers before he lodged the petition, from whom would such evidence be forthcoming? It is elementary that a plaintiff or petitioner whose capacity is put in issue, must establish it by cogent evidence and it is clear that the appellant would be unable on a purely evidential point to establish it. In the circumstances, an order that evidence be led to determine whether the appellant had obtained the prior consent or support of the other five chiefs he named in his petition, would be wholly pointless.

It is claimed in one of the more serious grounds of appeal, that substantial questions were involved in the suit and it was unjust for the appellant to be driven from the “judgment seat” on the preliminary objection raised by the respondent. But it is no answer for a party against whom a serious issue of locus standi is raised, to plead that he should be given a hearing on the merits because he has a cast-iron case against his opponent.

The appellant has failed to show that he had a locus standi by himself to institute these proceedings. In our opinion, the petition was rightly dismissed by both the National House of Chiefs and the full bench of the Court of Appeal. It follows that this appeal fails and ought to be dismissed.

[p.725] of [1982-83] GLR 715

JUDGMENT OF ADADE J.S.C

I agree with the opinion just read by his Lordship the Chief Justice which I have had the privilege of reading in advance.

I only wish, in recognition of the industry of the appellant and his counsel, to add a short comment, limited to the three cases mentioned in the affidavit of the appellant dated 14 February 1979, which, he says, completely disproves the ratio decidendi in the findings of the National House of Chiefs and the full bench of the Court of Appeal. The said three cases are:

(a) Republic v. Chieftaincy Committee of Wiamoase Stool Affairs [1971] 1 G.L.R. 321; affirmed [1972] 1 G.L.R. 60, C.A.;

(b) Dadeasoabahene I v. Prempeh II (Asantehene’s Case) (1935) unreported, which the appellant unearthed from the National Archives; and

(c) Darkwa v. Kesse, New Juaben Traditional Council, 29 August 1967, unreported.

When he argued the case on 20 April 1983 counsel for the appellant did not seek to enlighten the court on the effect of these cases, nor did he comment on them significantly to show that he relied on them for success. Perhaps he took the view that there already was enough on file.

Commenting on the Wiamoase case (supra) the appellant says in paragraph 15 of his said affidavit that this was:

“a case from Ashanti in which proceedings had been brought by the queenmother [of Wiamoase] without any overt support or co-operation from any other kingmaker, and fought on the merits to a conclusion without objection taken to the singularly isolated position of the queenmother.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

I must say at once that this statement, having regard to the references made, is grossly misleading. The decision in the Wiamoase case (supra) both in the High Court and the Court of Appeal has no bearing whatsoever on the issue in this case, viz whether one person can by himself without the support of any other kingmaker, institute an action to destool a chief. The Wiamoase case (supra) turned on the rival claims to validity of two Gazette notices published by the National Liberation Council relating to the Wiamoase chieftaincy dispute. A chieftaincy committee, to which a decision involving the chief of Wiamoase had been referred by way of appeal, had found in favour of the appellant and allowed the appeal. In conformity with the statute law at the time, the committee reported its findings to the National Liberation Council. By section 39 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1961 (Act 81), as amended by the Chieftaincy (Amendment) Act, 1964 (Act 243), s. 4 it is provided that:

[p.726] of [1982-83] GLR 715

“(2) If it appears to the [NLC] that the findings in the report are correct [it] shall confirm the report.

(3) If it appears to the [NLC] that the findings are substantially correct, but require to be varied in certain respects [it] shall confirm the findings as so varied.

(4) In any other case the [NLC] shall either remit the matter to the Judicial Commissioner, for further consideration and the taking of such further evidence as the [NLC] may direct, or shall amend the findings as [it] thinks fit.”

It would be noticed that under the said section 39 of Act 81 the NLC could confirm the findings only under section 39 (2) and (3). The word confirm does not appear in section 39 (4). The NLC decided to confirm the findings of the committee, and accordingly published a notification in the Gazette on 28 March 1969. The notice read, “… the following finding of the Committee … has been confirmed by the NLC … `That the appeal should be dismissed’.” (The emphasis is mine.)

Since the committee allowed, but did not dismiss the appeal, it was clear that the notification was erroneous. The NLC’s attention must have been called to this error, for in September 1969 it published a corrective notice that:

“… the following finding of the Committee … has been confirmed by the NLC `That the appeal should be allowed and in order to promote cordial relations between the appellant and the Agonahene and his Elders, there should be no order as to cost.’ This cancels the notice which appeared at p. 110 of the Local Government Bulletin No. 15 dated 28 March 1969…”

Upon an application for certiorari to quash this latter notice of September 1969 the High Court (Hayfron Benjamin J.), granting it observed that when the NLC published the first notice in March 1969 to dismiss the appeal, it became functus officio. It therefore had no jurisdiction to proceed to publish a second notice in September 1969 to allow the same appeal. This view was upheld by the Court of Appeal (Bentsi-Enchill J.S.C and Sowah J.A., with Koi Larbi J.S.C. dissenting).

It would seem to me that since by the confirmation the NLC purported in effect to merely announce to the world the decision or finding of the chieftaincy committee the use of the word “dismissed” instead of “allowed” in the March notification was a clear error (typographical, careless or fraudulent it does not matter which) which ought to be susceptible to correction by subsequent notification; particularly so, as the NLC purported to confirm “… the following finding of the Committee,” and proceeded to quote the said finding.

[p.727] of [1982-83] GLR 715

The NLC was therefore not deciding the appeal afresh, as it could have done under section 39 (4); it was merely relaying to the public what the committee had said. If the information is wrongly conveyed, the question of functus officio does not arise. The finding or decision on the appeal was not the NLC’s; it was that of the committee. So it is the committee that was functus officio, not the NLC. It would seem to me that the ratio decidendi in the Wiamoase case (supra) was given per incuriam and I do not support it.

Whatever it was, that case is of no assistance to us in this appeal which has turned on an entirely different issue of whether or not the appellant alone was competent, under customary law, to institute destoolment charges. This issue, as the appellant himself admits, was not raised in the Wiamoase case (supra). I grant that the title of the Wiamoase case creates the impression that the charges were levelled by the queenmother alone. But this is neither here nor there, since we do not know what the evidence revealed by way of support: see for example Mensah v. Toku (1887) Sar. F.L.R. 42.

The option of leading evidence to establish support is, however, not open to the appellant in this case, since he himself has indicated in no uncertain terms that he was alone, and has fought his case on the basis that he was entitled to do it alone. He said so before the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs; he said so before the full bench of the Court of Appeal; and he has said so before this court. As late as 18 April 1983 when this appeal was argued before us, his counsel, Mr. Tsatsu Tsikata, confirmed to the court that by 20 August 1973 when the petition was filed, all the signatories thereto, except the appellant, had died. Counsel declared:

“They died on various dates between 1968 [when the petition was prepared] and 20 August 1973. But I am certain that by the date of the filing of the petition they were all dead. At the moment my client stands alone.

There are eight kingmakers.”

In these circumstances, and in the face of such clear and unequivocal declaration on the standing of the appellant, can it be properly contended that the question of support vel non, and therefore of the appellant’s locus standi, ought to have been stood over to be determined on the evidence? I think not, for the simple reason that support (or rather no support) was not in issue, so as to fall to be resolved on evidence. The appellant, in effect, says. “No support, but I can come.” The respondent on his part, says, “No support, therefore you cannot come.” “No support” therefore is common ground. In these circumstances, what would any evidence on support be required for? If it is to establish the “no support” it is irrelevant, because there is no issue

[p.728] of [1982-83] GLR 715 joined on that. Both parties agree that there is no support. If on the other hand it is to establish support, it will strictly be inadmissible as running counter to the appellant’s own position and pleading. Therefore the contention that the court or tribunal should have heard all the evidence before ruling on the preliminary objection to the appellant’s locus standi is in my opinion, misconceived. The appeal cannot be remitted to the trial tribunal for this purpose.

The appellant next refers to the Asantehene’s case, a case which he says, is “even more relevant to his argument”, i.e. that he is entitled to proceed alone. My reading of the available documentation on this case fails to persuade me that that is the position. I grant that the inquiry seems to have been commenced by Chief Kofi Sekyere, Dadeasoabahene of Kumasi, alone. But it is clear from the records that he did not stand alone. For instance, from the judgment of his Honour Mr. Justice Strother-Stewart dated 23 July 1936, we learn:

“The evidence of James Evergreen Essel states that at a meeting held at Agyeman’s house in the month of June of last year, at which he and all the accused, with the exception of Kojo Ansah were present, Agyeman stated that they, and certain chiefs, were furthering a scheme which had as its object the destoolment of the Asantehene. It was to be carried out by three methods, first a press campaign, second the presentation of certain grievances by one Kofi Nsiah or Sekyere, who was then the Dadeasoabahene of Kumasi, and third by obtaining the support of the most influential of the Kumasi clan chiefs…”

(The emphasis is mine). On this last point, the judgment proceeds:

“I now come to the third method of bringing about the destoolment of the Asantehene, namely that of obtaining the support of the most influential of the Kumasi clan. Here again there is, in my opinion, ample evidence of the carrying out of this common purpose by all four of the accused … I believe the evidence of the prosecution that they were consistently meeting together in Kumasi. There is the evidence of the Ex-Adoomhene — Kwaku Ado Kwarbo — as to how Agyeman sent for him when he heard of his financial trouble, and offered him help, if he would join them, their movement, and that he (Agyeman) made accusation against the Asantehene, which ultimately appeared in the charges sent out in the name of Kofi Nsiah or Sekyere. Kwaku Ado Kwarbo further stated that it was Atta Kwadjo who came and took him to Agyeman, and he said that both Akuffo-Dampare and Bobie-Ansah personally urged him to join them. Kofi Nsiah or Sekyere was present at the same meeting.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

[p.729] of [1982-83] GLR 715

Interestingly enough, there is in that judgment, a statement of customary law, which I find refreshing, even though, having regard to the nature of the proceedings before the learned judge this statement was clearly obiter. Said he:

“The Native Administration Ordinance is framed to bring stability to native authorities and to free such authorities from the worry of unjustifiable intrigue, or reckless slander. There can be no peace for paramount chiefs or people, otherwise. There is a proper method by which men, who have genuine grievances affecting their state can have them enquired into according to native custom. It is by reporting their grievances to their immediate Chief.”

In further support of my observation that the Dadeasoabahene was not acting alone, there is the letter dated 28 October 1935, exhibit NPS 4F, addressed by Osei Kwadjo, the Ankobeahene, to the Native Commissioner, Kumasi. The letter reads:

“Ankobea House Kumasi, Ashanti.

28 October 1935 Sir, With reference to my interview with your Worship this afternoon at which you suggested to me that Nana Osei Agyeman Prempeh II, should be examined by the Medical Officer of your own choice, I beg to inform you that since Nana is not sick and it is not in conformity with our custom which demands his examination by the Oman, I fail to see the object of the government finding a Medical Officer for the purpose of examining Nana and then inform the Oman of the result thereby incurring unnecessary expense. If, however, this course is adopted it is the absolute wish of my people that I should be present at the examination to notify myself on their behalf of the genuineness and to verify the correctness of the report, or for us to be represented by a medical man of our own choice at the said examination and at my expense, that is, Nana and the government paying their own medical man and mine.

I am raising this question because it concerns the abominable defilence of our sacred Golden Stool and not the individual causing it. The bare suggestion of an examination in this way is to my mind a bold attempt at stifling our age-long custom and tradition at the expense of the Golden Stool.

[p.730] of [1982-83] GLR 715

Should the government refuse to accede to this request. I shall be reluctantly compelled to refer the matter to His Excellency the Governor with a copy of this letter which will be preceded by a telegram of protest.

I am enclosing a copy of this letter also for his Honour the Chief Commissioner.

I have the honour to be Sir, Your most humble servant, (Sgd.) OSEI KWADJO Ankobeahene

Writer & Witness to mark E. C. BOBIE-ANSAH Ashanti New Town-Ksi.

Free of charge.

HIS HONOUR THE NATIVE COMMISSIONER, KUMASI.”

Do we need further evidence to convince us that the Dadeasoabahene was not alone, and that, at least, the Ankobeahene was firmly in his camp.

The last of the three cases relied upon by the appellant is the Koforidua Queenmother’s case. Of this case the appellant says in paragraph 40 of his affidavit, earlier referred:

“40. Apart from the Asantehene’s case I have also supplied counsel with the record of proceedings in a case from the New Juaben Traditional Area in which one chief by himself, Gyasehene Baffour Kwabena Darkwa, brought charges against the queenmother, Nana Akyiaa Kesse, before a council meeting presided over as chairman by the present respondent, Nana Kwaku Boateng, and attended by me the present applicant, on 29 August 1967. The charges were heard and discussed and the queenmother was destooled by the council the same day. A copy of the minutes of that meeting is hereto attached marked exhibit NPS 5.”

Here again I find the appellant’s contention, as framed in the said paragraph 40 misleading. The meeting of 29 August 1967 was an ordinary meeting of the chiefs of the New Juaben Traditional Council,

[p.731] of [1982-83] GLR 715 under the chairmanship of the Omanhene Nana Kwaku Boateng. It was not a meeting of the judicial committee of the said traditional council, to go into destoolment charges against anyone. I notice that part of the minutes is missing. The queenmother herself is not recorded as being present at the meeting, and it would seem that the meeting would have proceeded to a conclusion without her, if the Gyasehene at some stage had not intimated that:

“… he had something (a matter) to place before the council, and since that matter concerned or affected the Queenmother, Nana Akyia Kesse, it would [be] worthwhile if Nana Akyia Kesse could be present at the meeting before he, Gyasehene, stated his case…”

The queenmother was accordingly sent for from her house. The Gyasehene then unveiled a catalogue of misdemeanours against the queenmother, and “asked the council to call on her to show cause why she should not be destooled to give way to a proper, eligible and fit person to relief (sic) her.” In this he was supported by the Dabehene, Kwasi Sarpong, and Nifahene, Nana Frimpong Mposo.

In view of the position taken by the appellant in these proceedings, his own contribution at the traditional council meeting cannot escape attention.

“Kyidomhene, Nana Poku Sarkodee, gave his views and commented on the matter saying one should face facts and went on, that the procedure being adopted by the council to destool the queenmother was improper and not in accordance with native custom since her electors had not preferred destoolment charges against her. Kyidomhene was supported by Opanin Yaw Wusu, Odikro of Jumapo, who said he shared the same views with the first speaker. It was uncustomary for the traditional council to destool the queenmother in the absence of the requisite procedure and her electors…”

(The emphasis is mine.)

If this is the procedure, why is the appellant seeking to change his position in this proceedings? But this may all be beside the point. Nana Akyia Kesse was declared destooled, not on account of the charges levelled by the Gyasehene and supported by some other chiefs, but for a customary offence committed, as it were, ex facie curiam.

After a number of chiefs had aired their views on the statement made by the Gyasehene, the council recessed for a few minutes, to enable the Ayokohene and the Anouhene to “go into consultation with the old lady . . . the queenmother, and ask her to come forward with some satisfactory statement or explanation . . . “ When the council resumed at 2.40 p.m. it was observed that the queenmother was

[p.732] of [1982-83] GLR 715 nowhere to be found: she had left the meeting place for her house, and, in the process, had removed her seat. This was considered a heinous crime meriting instant destoolment. It was for this that she was destooled.

“Dabehene Kwasi Sarpong stated that since the queenmother had left the council meeting unceremoniously and in scorn to the council by removing her seat from the council meeting uncustomarily she had by such act violated the obligation and allegiance she owed to the paramount stool, and should therefore be destooled.

He was supported by Okyeame Kofi Poku who said it was a taboo for a chief or any stool occupant to remove his or her seat from a meeting of chiefs with the Omanhene as head without permission; and since the queenmother had so acted, especially when she had been accused, she should be destooled. Adontenhene supported the first two speakers, and said it was wrong for the queenmother to so remove her seat.

Kyidomhene further said, in regard to the removal of the queenmother’s seat, that action was against native custom and so the queenmother’s action as such was wrong. The speakers received the support of the council and therefore ordered that the Queenmother Nana Akyia Kesse be destooled forthwith; she was therefore declared destooled accordingly…”

This is why she was destooled. It had nothing to do with the Gyasehene’s charges, nor whether the Gyasehene had properly laid them or not, nor whether he alone, like the appellant in this case, without the support of any of the kingmakers, could institute destoolment proceedings. I do not find that any of these three cases referred to assists the appellant in any way.

The National House of Chiefs found that:

“the Kyidomhene by himself alone is not entitled to institute proceedings for the destoolment of the Omanhene without the support and concurrence of the majority of the kingmakers of the traditional area concerned … There must be a concerted action of the majority of the kingmakers in bringing destoolment charges against a chief.”

This view was confirmed by the full bench of the Court of Appeal with Francois J.A. dissenting. I support this statement of the customary law. It cannot be encouraged that one person, in the name of so-called “minority rights” should be permitted to unmake a paramount chief for a whole traditional area.

I would agree with his Lordship the Chief Justice that this appeal be dismissed.

[p.733] of [1982-83] GLR 715

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C.

[His Lordship, after making some introductory remarks including the fact that he had only two days within which to prepare his judgment, continued.] Like Francois J.A. in the full bench of the Court of Appeal (see [1977] 2 G.L.R. 343 at pp. 356-367), I find myself with the greatest respect and a very deep sense of regret unable to concur in the judgment delivered by his Lordship the Chief Justice in this case, this morning. I am really very sorry because I had the advantage of reading beforehand the judgment of his Lordship the Chief Justice and although I tried hard I, nevertheless, found it extremely difficult to accept the reasoning which was adopted to support the central conclusion on the customary law in this chieftaincy case. In the circumstances and with respect, I must confess quite frankly that I consider the situation in which I find myself to be quite embarrassing and the embarrassment I feel is painfully increased by my knowledge that my views are not shared by any other member of this court. For this reason, I would have been very happy if faithful to my conscience, I can honestly say, “I concur.”

As this is not to be, I have chosen the lonely path of the dissenter. This, of course, is nothing new and I venture to think that it is our capacity in this Supreme Court to tolerate and ponder on divergent views that would enable us to achieve beneficial development of our laws to meet the demands of the ever changing patterns of life that are sweeping through our country and that will continue to beset our people.

This is supposed to be a chieftaincy matter concerning the capacity of the petitioner, an elder of New Juaben, to institute destoolment proceedings against the Omanhene of New Juaben Traditional Area. I have used the word “supposed” advisedly as will appear hereafter.

This case is now before us because on 19 May 1977 in Sarkodee I v. Boateng II [1977] 2 G.L.R. 343, the full bench of the Court of Appeal (per Azu Crabbe C.J., Sowah, Anin and Annan JJ.A. concurring, with Francois J.A. vigorously dissenting) dismissed an appeal from the judgment of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs which had set aside a supposed ruling of the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs in the matter. Dissatisfied with the dismissal, the appellant, on 2 April 1979, proceeding under the provision of rule 33 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (LI 218), which provides for review of its judgment by the Court of Appeal in exceptional circumstances in the interest of justice, applied to the said full bench of the Court of Appeal for a review. The application was pending before the full bench on 24 September 1979 when the Constitution, 1979, came into force and by virtue of section 5 of the transitional provisions specified in the First Schedule to the said Constitution, it was converted into an appeal before this court. Since it is a

[p.734] of [1982-83] GLR 715 review converted into an appeal, the record of the proceedings before the full bench and our own record are a sure source to indicate the procedural steps which the appellant and the respondent adopted in the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs, the traditional court of first instance, before the case became ripe, if indeed it did, for hearing.

I would have preferred to deal at once with the relevant legal point involved in the case as the majority did in the Court of Appeal, but unfortunately the procedural steps I have referred to have been somewhat canvassed by the Chief Justice in this appeal and they were to some extent alluded to in the dissenting opinion of Francois J.A. It seems to me with the greatest respect, that the said procedural steps have in both instances not been accurately stated, and, in the form in which they have been expressed, they are sure to give a misleading view of the relevant petition in this appeal presented by the appellant, the Kyidomhene of New Juaben, before the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs.

I have in the circumstances decided to point out the facts of the actual procedural steps taken by the parties before the commencement of the hearing before the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs. I am humbly and with the utmost respect, merely doing so in order to put the said facts in their proper perspective, and to obviate misconceptions and errors of the type stated in the headnotes of Sarkodee I v. Boateng II (supra) and the comments of a learned writer on that case: see (1978) 10 R.G.L. 175, to the effect that the appellant with five other divisional chiefs preferred destoolment charges by way of petition against the respondent, the Omanhene of New Juaben in 1968, when the records as would appear presently clearly contradict this.

In this regard, it is significant that the history of the events which led to the alleged decision of the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs, began according to the record, somewhere in 1968, when on 27 December 1968 Adonten Boateng, the Abosohene of New Juaben, swore to an affidavit that he had on 27 December 1968 effected service of a document containing twenty destoolment charges on the Omanhene of New Juaben, the respondent. The said document dated 18 December 1968 was signed by the Abosohene and the appellant and four other chiefs made their marks after the document had been read and interpreted to those making their marks by an undisclosed person. The six persons referred to signed and made their marks in the document in the following order as numbered in the record:

“1. Bafour Asafo Boateng — Krontihene New Juaben) X Their 2. Nana Obiri Sampah — Twafohene New Juaben) X

[p.735] of [1982-83] GLR 715

3. Nana Adjepong — Santanhene New Juaben) X Marks 4. (Sgd.) Nana Adonten Boateng — Abosohene New Juaben 5. Nana Kwabena Ababio — Ntetiahene New Juaben X his mark 6. (Sgd.) Nana Poku Sarkodee — Kyidomhene New Juaben.”

There is no proof that the document was ever filed in any relevant traditional tribunal.

Three things are noteworthy about this document and its service: Firstly; it was headed as follows: “DESTOOLMENT CHARGES PREFERRED AGAINST NANA KWAKU BOATENG II, OMANHENE OF NEW JUABEN TRADITIONAL AREA — KOFORIDUA.” Secondly, just before the said two chiefs signed and the four others thumbprinted it, it was certified as his Lordship the Chief Justice has noted in his judgment as follows:

“This is to certify that the contents of the above twenty charges preferred against Nana Kwaku Boateng II, Omanhene of New Juaben Traditional Area, were read by me in the Twi language, interpreted and explained to such of the signatories therein who could not read and write but who are prepared to substantiate the same before touching pen with which their marks and thumbprints were made thereto.”

I think it is clear from the wording of the certificate that only the four illiterate elders referred to in the said certificate were put forward as possible witnesses. Thirdly, the heading of the affidavit of service on the Omanhene as is contained in the record is:

“In the High Court of Justice of Ghana Eastern Judicial Division In the matter of the destoolment charges preferred against Nana Kwaku Boateng II, Omanhene of New Juaben Traditional Area, Koforidua AND In the matter of the proof of the service of the said charges.”

I believe the persistent use of the word preferred can easily lead the unwary reader to think that the charges were preferred on a petition although, as I have already indicated, it was never filed before any traditional authority to warrant this inference and, indeed, as I hope to show presently, the subsequent history and so-called ruling of the judicial committee indicated beyond doubt that these twenty charges and the petition of 20 August 1973 should be completely ignored in any consideration of this chieftaincy matter in the Court of Appeal and in this court because it was subsequently withdrawn. As

[p.736] of [1982-83] GLR 715 for the reference to the “High Court of Justice” I am unable on the record and without evidence to appreciate its significance. All these matters are really unnecessary and irrelevant. I have, nonetheless, dwelt at length on them because they are unfortunately the facts that ground the judgments of the majority in this appeal.

Be that as it may, on 13 February 1973, a petition was actually filed by the appellant, hereafter called the plaintiff, for the first time before the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs and had attached to it eleven destoolment charges dated 8 February 1973 which was signed: “Nana Poku Sarkodee I, Kyidomhene, New Juaben Traditional Area for himself and other destooling party.” This, infact, is the proper petition in this appeal. These evelen destoolment charges were headed “Supplementary Charges” and the petition and destoolment charges were each headed thus:

“In the matter of the complaint lodged by Nana Poku Sarkodee I Kyidomhene of New Juaben Traditional Area and others (Plaintiffs)

AND In the matter of the alleged deposition of Nana Kwaku Boateng II, Omanhene of New Juaben Traditional Area, Koforidua, New Juaben (Defendant).”

For reasons which I am unable to fathom, the petition was omitted in the record to the full bench of the Court of Appeal and in the record before us. So we have not seen the petition to decide the capacity in which the appellant brought his action in the said petition of 13 February 1973.

The Omanhene as the defendant, however, filed a statement of his case dated 7 May 1973 in answer to each of the eleven charges and in it he raised, as he put it, in the said statement four “preliminary points of law objecting to the institution of this action.” The points and the remedy requested as stated in the record are:

“(a) The plaintiff has no capacity to bring or lead in any action to initiate destoolment proceedings against the occupant of Yiadom and Hwire Paramount Stool, the defendant. At the time of lodging this complaint, the plaintiff’s allegiance to the defendant had broken.

(b) In bringing this action against the defendant, the plaintiff failed to comply with the customary and statutory provisions as spelt out in the Chieftaincy (Destoolment Proceedings) Regulations, 1963 (LI 309).

(c) In the absence of proof of the nature and effect of the original charges preferred against the defendant, the present

[p.737] of [1982-83] GLR 715 charges described as “supplementary charges” cannot be entertained.

(d) The procedure adopted by the plaintiff to initiate the present action against the defendant is fundamentally irregular as it directly offends the existing relative statutory provisions.

By reason of the foregoing the defendant prays that this action be dismissed in limine with costs against the plaintiff.”

(The emphasis is mine.) As would appear presently, he later agreed to abandon the prayer or remedy emphasised above.

On 7 August 1973, the plaintiff filed a reply dated 7 June 1973 to the Omanhene’s statement of case and signed describing himself as “the plaintiff herein Nana Poku Sarkodee I, Kyidomhene of New Juaben Traditional Area for himself and others.”

On 13 August 1973 when the judicial committee met for the first time to hear the charges, it is recorded as follows:

“The chairman of the panel asked for the reason of the charges being headed “Supplementary Charges.” The counsel for the plaintiff explained that some charges had already been preferred against the Omanhene. The present charges are merely a duplication of the first one and the word “supplementary” should therefore be struck off. Counsel for the Omanhene argued that if there are no original charges, he had no objection to the word “supplementary” being struck off. Order: The word “supplementary” in the charges should be struck off on the petition filed on 13 February 1973.”

Obviously the reference to previous charges was in relation to the twenty charges dated 18 December 1968 served on the Omanhene on 27 December 1968 but which were never filed before any tribunal and which as I shall demonstrate presently were in any event withdrawn. A further order was made as follows, “Order: The memorandum on the issues should be filed within ten days by both parties and sent to the registrar. The matter is postponed to 5 September 1973.”

The plaintiff filed a memorandum of issues dated 17 August 1973 in compliance with the order of the committee and applied for four issues to be set down for trial. The issues were numbered 1 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), 2, 3, 4. On 24 August 1973, the defendant also filed his memorandum asking for thirteen issues serially numbered to be set down for hearing. Although he filed his memorandum of issues a day late, this is not relevant in this appeal and on 29 August 1973 he filed a notice of amendment for leave to amend his statement of case.

In the meantime, before the judicial committee assembled following its adjournment, the plaintiff-appellant, although represented by counsel, personally filed another petition on 20 August 1973 and it is

[p.738] of [1982-83] GLR 715 to this petition that he attached the twenty destoolment charges dated 18 December 1968 already referred to in this judgment. Still undaunted, on 5 September 1973, he filed yet two other supplementary charges.

This was the stage of the proceedings when the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs met at its sitting on 6 September 1973 for further hearing. At that meeting the committee expressed concern at the haphazard manner in which the plaintiff, although he had counsel, was personally filing document after document; and this is what was, inter alia, recorded:

“The panel informed Mr. Quansah that his client has filed supplementary charges and replies. They were not clear with the whole procedure. Mr. Quansah asked leave of the chairman to withdraw Nana Poku’s document dated 5 September 1973, the reply which was also filed on 7 August 1973 and another one dated 20 August 1973. Mr Quansah agreed that the confusion had been caused by his client Nana Poku Sarkodee and that the supplementary charges should be withdrawn with the reply. The petition filed under the plaintiff’s name dated 20 August 1973 should also be withdrawn.

Documents to be withdrawn:

1. Petition dated 17 August 1973 filed 20 August 1973.

2. The reply dated 7 June 1973 filed 7 August 1973.

3. Supplementary charges filed 5 September 1973 dated 4 September 1973.

By Court: Order accordingly.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

The consequence of this order is that the only petition before the judicial committee was the petition filed on 13 February with its attachment, i.e. the eleven destoolment charges dated 8 February 1973, and it is therefore clear beyond all doubts that it is, with respect, this petition and none other which initiated the destoolment proceedings which is the subject-matter of this appeal. Any reliance on the withdrawn petition filed on 20 August 1973 to found any judgment is, with respect, per incuriam and as can be seen, this is precisely what the majority judgment delivered by his Lordship the Chief Justice has done. Orders were also made by the tribunal accepting the amendment to the defence dated 29 August 1973 and filed on 29 August 1973, and the issues of the plaintiff numbered 1(a), (b), 2 and 3, and with the exception of the fourth issue all the other twelve issues of the defendant. The fourth issue of the plaintiff stated, “whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of destoolment if the charges so contained in paragraphs 1-11 of the petition are proved viz — the

[p.739] of [1982-83] GLR 715 destoolment of Nana Kwaku Boateng II, Omanhene of New Juaben.” With regard to this issue, Mr. Campbell, counsel for the Omanhene raised an objection and the committee ordered as follows:

“Mr. Quansah sought to amend the issue to read … wherefore the petition herein asks the following reliefs ‘destoolment from the stool as Omanhene of New Juaben Traditional Area.’ Committee accepted the amendment but asked counsel to file it properly.”

The amendments to the defence which were accepted are important and they are:

“A (1) (a) (i) By the native customary law of New Juaben Traditional Area, a single divisional chief and for that matter the Kyidomhene alone is incapable of preferring destoolment charges against the paramount chief without the knowledge and or approval of the senior divisional chiefs, Krontihene or in his absence or infirmity of Akwamuhene and Gyasehene. The present action is a direct contravention of this customary law and usage and it is an usurpation of the prerogative rights of the Krontihene and the Gyasehene of New Juaben Traditional Area. The action is also offensive to the entire kingmakers of Yiadom paramount stool and the New Juaben Traditional Authority. This customary law relates to Juaben Traditional Area in Ashanti…

B (2) (a) In New Juaben Traditional Area, there are and have been chiefs including the plaintiff who have been convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Their convictions have never deprived them of their natural status as chiefs. Nor had such convictions ever become grounds for destoolment.”

(The emphasis is mine.) I have already pointed out the heading of the destoolment charges dated 8 February 1973 attached to the petition of 13 February 1973 and the capacity in which the plaintiff signed those documents. The heading and the capacity had “and others” and “other destooling party” respectively and on counsel for plaintiff agreeing to inform the committee of the names and identities of the other destooling parties, the tribunal made a final order before adjournment to 17 September 1973: “Order: The names of “other destooling parties” should be divulged at the next sitting and also their authentication.”

At the adjourned sitting on 17 September 1973, counsel for the plaintiff having filed on the same day a notice of amendment to the petition in respect of (1) the heading of the petition, (2) the plaintiff’s capacity, and (3) the deletion of paragraph 11 of the petition and the substitution of a new paragraph, moved the court to accept the three amendments of the plaintiff. The proceeding on this date is so

[p.740] of [1982-83] GLR 715 important that it is absolutely essential to have a firm grasp of what happened in order to understand what the appeal is all about. The starting point is the application on notice to amend. All that the plaintiff sought was to amend his petition in respect of three matters and therefore the notice to amend needs to be appreciated and I set if down here fully:

“AMENDMENT OF PETITIONER’S PETITION Take notice and notice is hereby given that at the hearing of this petition, the petitioner will ask leave of the committee to amend his petition as follows:

(1) By deleting the words `and others’ appearing at the end of the plaintiff’s title as amended to read as follows:

In the matter of complaint lodged by Nana Poku Sarkodee I, Kyidomhene of New Juaben Traditional Area.

AND In the matter of the alleged deposition of Nana Kwaku Boateng II, Omanhene of New Juaben Traditional Area.

(2) By adding paragraph (h) 1A hereunder.

`That the petitioner is Kyidomhene, a senior divisional chief of New Juaben Traditional Area, and brings this petition as one of the persons entitled under customary law to bring a claim or complaint against, or to institute proceedings for the destoolment of a chief.’ (3) By deleting the whole paragraph II (sic) of and substituting in its place wherefore the petitioner herein seeks the following:

(1) Declaration that the defendant be destooled from the paramount stool of New Juaben as Omanhene.”

It would be recalled that at the judicial committee’s sitting on 6 September 1973, objection was taken to the fourth issue already set down herein which the plaintiff had filed as an issue for trial and counsel for the plaintiff sought to amend that issue verbally and although the committee accepted the amendment, he was requested to file it properly and the third amendment was obviously filed in accordance with the committee’s order of 6 September 1973. And so at this session of the committee no arguments at all were advanced on the third amendment.

Mr. Quansah formally moved the judicial committee to accept the three amendments which he had filed that morning. With regard to the

[p.741] of [1982-83] GLR 715 first amendment, he asked that the word “others” should be deleted as “these others are since dead.” Mr. Campbell opposed this amendment on various grounds, but he was overruled and as the record shows the committee “decided to accept the amendment.” With regard to the second amendment it is necessary to keep its terms in mind very clearly, because apparently counsel objected to it very strenuously and its legal significance touching the capacity of the plaintiff was canvassed at length, thus confusing the issue before the tribunal which is whether the amendment sought to be made should be granted or refused. In this connection it must be remembered that the plaintiff wanted it added to his petition and any successful attack would merely result in its rejection and nothing more. In this regard, Mr. Campbell made submissions opposing it quite strongly. He quoted section 33 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), and portions of (CI 27) and as the record shows in conclusion he referred to:

“section 24 (5), (6), (7) and (8) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1972 (Act 370) and quoted the following proceedings… etc. He finally submitted that the Kyidomhene cannot prefer charges. The Krontihene and Gyasehene are the proper persons to prefer charges. The amendment therefore should be struck off.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

Observe here his very last words in the record on the application for the amendment; they are the words emphasised; they represent significantly in his own words the prayer of Mr. Campbell on behalf of his client: “The amendment… should be struck of.” This is quite understandable since the memorandum of issues filed on behalf of the defendant, contained thirteen issues and at the sitting of the committee on 6 September 1973, it was agreed that twelve issues would be accepted for trial but that the fourth issue should be dropped. That issue is worded as follows: “whether or not the action should be struck out or dismissed.” For this reason, nowhere in the record was a submission made for the action to be struck out or dismissed. And it seems counsel for the Omanhene took advantage of the plaintiff’s application for amendment to make submissions on the plaintiff’s capacity and to request that on the basis of the submission on capacity the plaintiff’s second amendment dealing with his capacity should be struck off. Clearly if his prayer is accepted, the second amendment will not be part of the petition; that is all, but the petition will still be pending for hearing. It is his prayer to strike off the amendment which counsel for the plaintiff had to contend with and Mr. Quansah naturally resisted this and he also relied on section 33 of Act 370, and suggested that he would agree to a trial within a trial, for that purpose, I cannot conjecture, since at that stage of the proceedings, it need not be resorted to, to enable the committee

[p.742] of [1982-83] GLR 715 to decide whether to reject or accept his amendment. I think at that stage of the proceedings this was an entirely unnecessary burden, and the judicial committee was right to ignore it, although I cannot help feeling that that concession, a veritable red herring, must have contributed in no small measure in deflecting the attention of the judicial committee from the matter it was being called upon to decide into thinking that it had to pronounce on the customary law contained in the terms of the second amendment. Whatever that pronouncement is, it will only enable the committee to reject or accept the amendment and whichever happens, the case proceeds.

Surely, the matter before the judicial committee is, as I have already indicated, very simple. Mr. Quansah asked leave of the judicial committee for his client’s petition to be amended in the terms he had set down under paragraph (2) in his notice of amendment. Mr. Campbell made legal submissions referring to many statutory provisions but having regard to what was before the tribunal he was merely contending that the effect of his submission is to use his own words that “The amendment therefore should be struck off.”

Instead of dealing with this very simple matter the judicial committee, rather ignored what both Mr. Quansah and Mr. Campbell specifically requested and I am inclined to think that, fascinated by the interesting and probably intriguing legal arguments which Mr. Campbell no doubt put forward with learning and forensic skill, they must have got carried away, and must have felt obliged to also make pronouncement on the customary law on the matter and unfortunately, they thus inadvertently forgot to reject or accept the amendment. But in my respectful opinion, that ruling is neutral, for they did not indicate in it whether they have rejected or accepted the amendment. After counsel’s submission they adjourned only for a few minutes and on resumption delivered their ruling and because it is the basis of the various appeals that have ultimately ended in this court, I set down hereunder the full ruling:

“(a) Mr. Campbell raised the point that the Kyidomhene is not entitled to commence proceedings for the destoolment of the Omanhene of New Juaben Traditional Area, according to New Juaben customary law and quoted section 33 of Act 370 to support his case.

(b) Mr. Quansah says the Kyidomhene of New Juaben, who is a senior divisional chief has got the capacity under Akan customary law which is not different from New Juaben customary law.

(c) Section 24 (7) states that if the committee is in any doubt as to the customary law applicable, the committee can order a trial within a trial to ascertain the same.

[p.743] of [1982-83] GLR 715

(d) The committee has seriously considered the submissions made by both counsel and it is of the opinion that the customary law in New Juaben is essentially Akan law, and in Akan customary law, the Gyasehene is the closest dignitary within the palace hierarchy and almost invariably it is from the other wing chiefs that destoolment charges or proceedings are normally instituted. Therefore in the opinion of the committee the present plaintiff who is a Kyidomhene is not disqualified under customary law from instituting proceedings for the destoolment of a Paramount Chief of New Juaben.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

Clearly as can be seen from the emphasised word in the above quotation, the committee has merely given its opinion on the customary law. It has determined nothing and although it headed its opinion “ruling” this is a malapropism, for it ruled on nothing. It did not give a ruling, it has merely expressed its opinion. After this, evidence was led by the plaintiff in which he said on oath that the appellant had committed some criminal offences, for which he was convicted and tendered documentary evidence to prove the conviction. He also led evidence showing that an adverse finding has been made against the Omanhene charging him with dishonesty. He proved this by tendering a copy of the finding of the competent committee of inquiry which made the finding. He tendered evidence showing charges of assault which had been preferred against the Omanhene. He also showed his immoral connection with a school girl aged seventeen and his attempt to shy away from the problem that it created, but a competent court fined the Omanhene 920 pounds. He also led evidence showing that the Omanhene had been guilty of desecration of a stool. The case was not completed on that day but was adjourned to 24 September 1973. Instead of answering the charges an appeal was lodged on 21 April 1973 to abort the further hearing. Is this right? I would like to protest since justice cannot be so circumvented. The matter before the judicial committee was, as I have already pointed out, to determine whether or not to grant leave to the plaintiff to amend his petition of 13 February 1973 in terms of the second amendment in his notice of amendment. Mr. Quansah for the petitioner said the amendment should be accepted, Mr. Campbell said it should be rejected and the committee inadvertently failed to determine the matter or make any determination whatsoever. Instead of reminding the judicial committee that it has forgotten to determine the question before it, counsel rather lodged an interlocutory appeal to the National House of Chiefs. Now the right of appeal of parties from decisions of regional chieftaincy tribunals to the National House of Chiefs was at

[p.744] of [1982-83] GLR 715 the time of the appeal contained in article 154 (3) (a) of the Constitution, 1969, a right which was saved by section 23 of the National Redemption Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1972. The relevant portion of the article reads:

“154. (3) The National House of Chiefs, shall . . .

(a) have appellate jurisdiction in any matter relating to chieftaincy which has been determined by the House of Chiefs in a Region…”

(The emphasis is mine.)

In this case nothing was determined and so there was no right of appeal. In filing his notice of appeal, counsel for the Omanhene must have noticed the incongruous nature of the appellate jurisdiction he was invoking, for in filing his appeal form, under “The part of decision complained of” he stated: “Entire ruling and order that the Kyidomhene is not disqualified from filing filing destoolment proceedings.” This, of course, is not borne out by a study of the ruling. The committee did not make any order at all. It merely expressed its opinion on the customary law. The parties made rival arguments before the committee to prevail on the committee to decide the issue of whether or not to add the second amendment to the petition filed on 13 February 1973. The committee having considered these rival arguments also expressed its opinion on the matter and forgot to determine the issue or make any order. The opinion could be used as a ratio decidendi to make an order or determine the said issue before the tribunal, unfortunately apart from merely stating its opinion it did not use the opinion to determine any matter or make any order. The inevitable effect is that since no matter has been determined the condition precedent for the exercise of the right of appeal given by article 154 (3) of the Constitution, 1969, as saved by the National Redemption Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1972, has not matured. By law an appeal under such circumstance has to be abortive.

The most extraordinary aspect of this matter is the appeal proceedings in the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs. At the hearing of the appeal the bald opinion which the regional committee had expressed on the customary law was attacked. Counsel for the Omanhene said his submissions before the regional committee were misunderstood, that what the committee had recorded he said was not what he, in fact, said. He sought to show that his exposition of the customary law which he charged had been misunderstood by the regional committee should be accepted. He then quoted a passage at page 37 of Dr. Busia’s book, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti (1968) and the heading of the case of Ahenkora II v. Ofe [1961] G.L.R. 17 at p. 19, P.C. as supporting his

[p.745] of [1982-83] GLR 715 stand on the customary law, and the record shows as a final submission on the relief he claims on the effect of the customary law he propounds:

“submits that the appeal be allowed, the ruling and order that the charge or complaint not having been brought with the consent or support of other divisional chiefs is incompetent as uncustomary and that the charge is accordingly struck out and dismissed with costs.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

It is quite obvious to me that the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs was being grossly misled by these submissions. I have read Dr. Busia’s book, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti (1968) very carefully. He discusses destoolment at pp. 21-22, 37-38, 82, 105-109, 183, 191, 205, 209, 211 and 214-216. None of the passages in Dr. Busia’s book covers the proposition of customary law advanced before the house by counsel that for a destoolment under customary law to be valid, the charge or complaint must be brought with the consent or support or both of other divisional chiefs. I have also read the headnotes of Ahenkora II v. Ofe (supra) and the judgment of the judicial committee of the Privy Council delivered by Lord Keith in that case and I find that that case also did not support the proposition of customary law propounded by counsel before the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs. A careful study of counsel’s submission in the light of the proceedings in the regional tribunal shows further unsatisfactory aspects of his submission. He submits that the ruling and order of the regional tribunal must be declared incompetent as uncustomary and yet the committee, as I have demonstrated by reference to the record, made no order at all. Clearly, such submission coming particularly from learned counsel can easily lead an unwary tribunal made up of non-lawyers, to think that an order had been made and that therefore an appealable matter was before it. But the most curious, unfortunate and unfair submission is the prayer to the effect that the action of the petitioner be struck out and his petition dismissed with costs. This was a submission that counsel could not legitimately make before the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs because as I have already shown in this judgment, at the sitting of the regional committee on 6 September 1973, the parties agreed and their agreement was embodied in an order of the tribunal that the fourth issue filed by the Omanhene on 24 August 1973 in the memorandum of issues should be dropped and not pursued. That issue as I have already stated is “whether or not this action should be struck out or dismissed.” Obviously, it is because of this agreement that on 17 September 1973 when the plaintiff’s application for leave to amend was being considered by the committee counsel for the Omanhene was not able to submit that the action be struck out or dismissed, but rather requested that the amendment should be struck out. In the light of this, to submit before the appellate tribunal that the action be struck out and dismissed is a volte-face that cannot be justified on any moral or legal ground.

I think I have said enough to demonstrate that there ought not to have been an appeal before the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs in this matter. I have also said enough to show that the appeal should have been dismissed. Since, however, the appeal was heard and the matter has ascended the appellate ladder and is now before us, what is the proper order to make? In order to answer this question it is necessary to consider the nature of the appeal made to the National House of Chiefs, the judgment or order of the house of chiefs and the relief which the Omanhene asked for and was granted by the judgment.

At this stage in my judgment I do not think it necessary to embark on any critical analysis of the judgment of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs. I only wish to consider the relief which the appellant to the house asked for and the relief, if any, which the house granted. In the notice of appeal filed by counsel, Mr. R. D. Amofa, for the Omanhene at the National House of Chiefs, under “Reliefs sought by the appellant” are the following:

“(a) Reversal of the ruling and order of the judicial committee and the substitution of an order dismissing the respondent’s petition as incompetent or alternatively;

(b) Reversal of the ruling and order and remission of the case for an inquiry into the customary law regulating the institution of destoolment proceedings against an Omanhene of New Juaben.”

I can quite understand why an alternative relief was asked for. Clearly, it was not open to the counsel for the Omanhene to ask for the first relief since as I have already demonstrated, by the agreement embodied in the order of the regional tribunal, the Omanhene had in effect undertaken not to pursue that relief without having the charges preferred against him investigated. He must have anticipated that in all probability his bona fide would be called in question, and I apprehend it is to meet this eventually that he asked for an alternative relief. Speaking for myself, I think the conduct of counsel is reprehensible in view of the issue agreed to be abandoned. The second relief would have been innocuous but for the fact, which I have already pointed out, that the regional tribunal had made no order at all to warrant a prayer for it to be reversed. Admittedly, it made an interlocutory ruling, giving merely its opinion. It was not a judgment it delivered, and

[p.747] of [1982-83] GLR 715 in this matter, I am persuaded by the views of Hayfron-Benjamin J. (as he then was) in Vanderpuije v. Akwei [1971] 1 G.L.R. 242 at p. 247 where he considered the English cases of Re Chinery; Ex parte Chinery (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 342 and Re Riddell; Ex parte Earl of Strathmore (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 512 and our own local case of Amoako Atta IV v. Nuamah [1963] 1 G.L.R. 432, S.C. and said:

“A judgment as I understand the term, must ascertain or establish a previously existing liability of a defendant to a plaintiff… or it must determine in favour either of a plaintiff or of a defendant the question whether there was a pre-existing right of a plaintiff against defendant.”

I hold therefore that there was no judgment delivered and counsel for the Omanhene appreciated it and asked for the ruling not a judgment to be reversed.

In the light of this, what was the decision of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs and the relief it granted in its judgment delivered on 29 April 1975? I have read the judgment very carefully. I propose to examine as meticulously as I am capable of, the statements of the customary law in the said judgment. For the present purpose I am only concerned with the relief it granted. A thorough examination of the judgment revealed that after stating the history of the case relevant for its judgment, it considered the rival statements of customary law which had been propounded before the regional tribunal and apparently repeated before it and it accepted the proposition of the customary law propounded on behalf of the Omanhene giving some reasons of a sort for so accepting it and it concluded: “It was for the above reasons that this judicial committee allowed the appeal.”

The judgment was singularly silent about the reliefs claimed and apart from allowing the appeal it made no order whatsoever. I can understand why no order was made. The manner in which the judgment was written showed quite clearly that the judicial committee had studied the proceedings in the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs quite carefully and meticulously. It was therefore aware of the undertaking embodied in the memorandum of issues to the effect that the issue of “whether the petition should be dismissed or struck out” in limine was apparently not going to be pursued and must have realised how embarrassing it would be to make such an order in the face of the undertaking.

In my view, the failure to make the order, having regard to the facts I have adverted to, must be taken to be deliberate and I think the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs must be congratulated, for it did the right thing by refraining from making such an embarrassing order which would have been improper in the circumstances. So all that the

[p.748] of [1982-83] GLR 715 appellant at the National House of Chiefs obtained by his appeal is an order allowing the appeal with no relief granted. Therefore the only effect of this judgment, although it is not a valid judgment because it was not founded on an appealable matter, is that it made pronouncements on what the customary law procedure of destoolment is as against what is said to be the pronouncement by the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs. That is all.

I would have thought that since the interlocutory appeal was lodged at the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs on 21 September 1973, the question of whether the proceedings should proceed or be stayed was very relevant. At the said date when the appeal was lodged, section 27 of Act 370, the applicable provision, provided:

“27. An appeal to the National House of Chiefs or to a Regional House of Chiefs shall operate as a stay of execution of the judgment or order appealed against and any other order made consequently upon it, unless the appellate tribunal otherwise directs.”

Clearly, it is execution of the judgment or order appealed against and not the proceedings in the lower tribunal which is stayed. You cannot do anything enjoined by the judgment or order. If there is nothing enjoined then nothing can be stayed. Where there is therefore, in fact, no judgment or order the provision is inapplicable as I endeavoured to show in Standard Bank of West Africa v. Boaitey [1971] 2 G.L.R. 308 at p. 313, the reasoning I adopted in which case is inferentially supported by Hayfron-Benjamin J. (as he then was) in Vanderpuije v. Akwei (supra) at p. 249. But these two cases dealt with appeals to the Court of Appeal from judgments and orders of the High Court and the relevant provision we were there dealing with, which is not substantially dissimilar to the provisions of section 27 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), is section 27 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1962 (LI 218), as amended by the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules, 1969 (LI 618) and it reads, “An appeal shall operate as a stay of execution or of proceedings under the judgment or decision appealed from except so far as the court below or the court may otherwise order.” (The emphasis is mine.) Although the word “proceedings” was used here, it is proceedings under the judgment or decision appealed from, and not any other proceedings as Hayfron-Benjamin J. (as he then was) so admirably demonstrated in Vanderpuije v. Akwei (supra). The use of that word in an enactment dealing with stay shows clearly that the legislature is not unaware of its significance. Under section 27 of Act 370 the word “proceedings” is singularly absent and I should conclude that stay of proceedings was never contemplated by the section.

[p.749] of [1982-83] GLR 715

On 9 November 1973, after the appeal to the National House of Chiefs had been lodged, the Chieftaincy (Amendment) (No.2) Decree, 1973 (NRCD 226), came into force and it substituted a new section 27 as follows:

“27. An appeal to the National House of Chiefs or a Regional House of Chiefs against a final judgment or order shall operate as a stay of execution of the judgment or order appeal against, and any other order made consequentially upon it unless the appellate tribunal otherwise directs.”

Once again it is the execution of the judgment or order appealed against and not the proceedings in the trial tribunal which is stayed. It is not necessary to consider which of these two provisions must be considered applicable as the exercise would be quite fruitless because the all important point is that if the amendment provision is resorted to then since the ruling is not final, the question of stay does not arise at all and if the last provision is applicable stay of proceedings will be equally not covered by it. The inevitable conclusion is that when the appeal was lodged the proceedings in the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs was not affected in any way whatsoever and the committee ought to have continued to hear the case. Indeed, from a study of the history of this case from the record, nothing has happened in any tribunal or court or this Supreme Court, which should inhibit them from carrying out their function of adjudicating on the petition of 13 February 1973 which is clearly pending before them.

Having established the legal pendency of the appellant’s petition in the tribunal of first instance, I now proceed with the legal significance of the appellate history of the case. When the appellant appealed to the full bench of the Court of Appeal, various opinions were expressed touching the issue of the customary law in the case. I shall deal with these opinions later in this judgment, but the decision of the full bench was that the appeal “should be dismissed” thus retaining the judgment of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs. Now what does dismissal of the appeal involve, for like the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs no order of any sort was made. The various judgments are therefore, like the judgment of the House of Chiefs, mere pronouncements of the customary law. Such a law when accepted by a court can form the ratio decidendi of a judgment, as I have conceived it here on the Hayfron-Benjamin definition in Vanderpuije v. Akwei (supra) or of an order or decision. Apart from making these pronouncements on the customary law, the said customary law was never used to ground a decision. Indeed, it could not be used because I have already pointed out, the

[p.750] of [1982-83] GLR 715 point was only canvassed in the trial tribunal for the purpose of helping the tribunal to decide whether or not the appellant’s second amendment would be accepted for trial. As I have already pointed out, whichever proposition is accepted its effect is only to tell the trial tribunal one of two things: (1) Accept the second amendment and proceed to trial, or (2) Reject the second amendment and proceed to trial. The decision as I have said, is really a neutral one and with respect, a complete waste of time. Since the majority judgment as delivered by his Lordship the Chief Justice, is also for dismissal, it is with regret, but in the circumstances with the utmost respect, that I have to say that my observations on the various judgments of the full bench apply equally to the judgment just read by his Lordship the Chief Justice.

Now what is the right thing to do here? Do I dismiss or allow the appeal having regard to the views I have so far expressed? I have indicated that in the circumstances of the case there was no appealable matter that warranted an appeal from the ruling of the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs to the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs. So the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs should, with respect, have dismissed the appeal as incompetent, since there was no decision or order from which an appeal should have been lodged with their committee. Instead of doing that, they allowed the appeal. Clearly, they were wrong and so when an appeal was lodged to the full bench of the Court of Appeal that court ought to have allowed the appeal and ordered the tribunal to continue with the case and investigate the charges. Instead of doing this, the appeal was dismissed and in this court the further appeal has been dismissed this morning. With the greatest respect, I do not appreciate what the dismissal would achieve, but in my opinion, I think the appeal should be allowed for the reasons I have stated, and since the proceedings founded on the petition filed 13 February 1973 is pending, the trial court ought to be left alone to continue with the hearing. Any stay of proceedings ordered by this court would with respect, be null and void because it would be a stay on the petition of 20 August 1973 and that petition abated with its withdrawal on 6 September 1973. As in my respectful opinion and with respect, the dismissal of the appeal would be meaningless, the proper thing is to allow the appeal and order the trial judicial committee to continue with the petition filed on 13 February 1973. That hearing, in fact, has never been stayed.

With this decision, it would be easy to think that pronouncements on the customary law involved would be unnecessary. I think not. The customary law on the matter was propounded by the trial tribunal, the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs also gave a different exposition and the full bench of the Court of Appeal delivered five

[p.751] of [1982-83] GLR 715 judgments containing three different propositions of the customary law and the majority judgment delivered today has accepted without question the view of the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs and that which was expressed by Anin J.A. (as he then was) at the full bench. Although in the view I have taken of the question which went before the National House of Chiefs, all these pronouncements are clearly obiter dicta since they do not form the ratio decidendi of any decision, nevertheless, most people including lawyers and the judges in the lower courts would find it highly embarrassing and would find it hard to consider a pronouncement of law by the highest court of the land as obiter. It would not be a case of lack of courage but it would be the respect which by the great traditions of the legal profession, the judges have acquired over the ages which would inhibit a disregard of the pronouncements of the highest judicial organ of the State, obiter or ratio decidendi notwithstanding. It is for these reasons, inter alia, that I have chosen the path of the dissenter in an effort to elucidate these matters for the future development of our customary laws. In the circumstances, I am afraid I am obliged to examine the various pronouncements on the said customary law in order to put forward what in my respectful opinion, I conceive to be the correct customary law on the matter.

I think the starting point for the ascertainment of the customary law in Ghana today by our courts is section 50 of Act 372. A provision which, with very slight modification to be noticed presently, is virtually similar to a comparative provision in section 24 (6), (7) and (8) of Act 370. It is not relevant in this appeal because although the judicial committee of both the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs and the National House of Chiefs were invited to consider it, for reasons not apparent on the record, they completely ignored considering it applicability. I suppose the application of the provision is time consuming and for tribunals anxious to deliver quick judgments, its application may be exasperating. The provision of section 50 of Act 372, however, is so well-known that I need not quote it in extenso at all. It is, however, set out in its entirety in the judgment of Azu Crabbe C.J. in Sarkodee I v. Boateng II (supra). C.A. (full bench) and I am thus saved the trouble of sheer repetition. It is this statutory provision which I think ought to guide all courts of inferior and superior jurisdiction in their search for the customary law. And speaking for myself, I would have thought the responsibility of the Supreme Court to be guided by it cannot be gainsaid or over-emphasised particularly in cases where rival propositions of the customary law, all intrinsically reasonable, are being propounded by very responsible bodies. Its basic and essential propositions are contained in section 50 (1) and (2). Subsection 1 discarded the well-known old rule in Angu v. Atta

[p.752] of [1982-83] GLR 715 (1916) P.C. ‘74-’28, 43, P.C. and provided in effect that “any question as to the existence or content or a rule of customary law is a question of law for the Court and not a question of fact.” Subsection (2) provides:

“(2) If the court entertains any doubt as to the existence or content of a rule of customary law relevant in any proceedings after considering such submissions thereon as may be made by or on behalf of the parties and consulting such reported cases, text-books and other sources as may be appropriate, the Court may adjourn the proceedings to enable an inquiry to take place…”

(The emphasis is mine.)

I take it that if after the exercise of examining and consulting cases and textbooks and other sources, the court or tribunal entertains no doubt then the inquiry becomes pointless. Provisions are made in subsection (3) for the inquiry. The most important proviso is a discretionary power for the court if it so decides to hold the inquiry, to ask a house of chiefs or a divisional or traditional council or other body possessing knowledge of the customary law in question to submit its opinion in a written form for the inquiry. This is now not relevant for no such inquiry was held at any of the courts which dealt with this appeal. In the case, the existence, however, of this proviso is with respect, a complete negation of a proposition which found favour with the majority judgment just delivered that “customary law is within the bosom of the traditional courts,” a proposition reminiscent of an archaic English jurisprudence that the law is in the bosom of the judges merely because they are the interpreters of the law. Such a concept cannot be maintained in a regime of hierarchic courts having a group of judges at the apex of last resort. I think the use of the word may in subsection (2) makes the decision to undertake an inquiry discretionary. And it is a discretion exercisable if the court entertains doubts under four conditions:

(1) after considering submissions on the customary law,

(2) after consulting appropriate reported cases on the said customary law

(3) after consulting appropriate textbooks, and

(4) after consulting other appropriate sources.

If after satisfying these four conditions a court has no doubts, then, of course, it has then found the customary law and can apply it in the case before it. I do not with respect think that I can, faithful to my conscience and my judicial oath, for the sake of convenience or expedition, acquiesce in any other method for ascertaining the

[p.753] of [1982-83] GLR 715 customary law, which would end up in encouraging disregard of the statutory duty imposed on this court by section 50 of Act 372.

Happily for me, I have considered all the submissions made at the various tribunals and courts that dealt with this case; I have also read reported and unreported cases relevant to the customary law involved. I have consulted furthermore, all the appropriate textbooks I have succeeded in laying hands on and I have finally, conducted research into other sources that are likely repositories of the customary law. The research has not been as complete as I would wish but the materials I have thus so far stumbled upon have removed my doubts and persuaded me as to the correctness of the customary law I propose to lay down in this judgment.

Before examining the materials I now have, I wish to make some comments in regard to the guideline adumbrated upon and adopted by Azu Crabbe C.J. in the Court of Appeal and acquiesced in the majority judgment of this court. Although the majority judgment did accept it, it was, with respect, a rather brief exposition but because Azu Crabbe C.J. in his judgment in Sarkodee I v. Boateng II (supra) at p. 348 did articulate the rational foundation for this approach more fully, it is his contribution that deserves examination although I do not propose to ignore the majority exposition. He said at p. 348:

“The National House of Chiefs is the highest traditional judicial body in this country, for section 22 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), confers upon it the appellate jurisdiction in any matter relating to chieftaincy which has been determined by the house of chiefs in any region. Section 40 of the Act also vests it with the very important responsibility of undertaking the progressive study, interpretation and codification of the customary law with a view to evolving, in appropriate cases, a unified system of rules of customary law. By section 45 of Act 370, the National House of Chiefs may on its own initiative and shall, upon request so to do, made to it in writing by the Head of State or by a joint committee comprising representatives of all the Regional Houses of Chiefs consider the assimilation of the customary law by the common law. It seems to me that one of the important objects of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), was to make the National House of Chiefs subject to the reviewing power of this court, the authoritative exponent of the customary law in Ghana.

Although by section 24 (6) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), the existence or content of a rule of customary law is now a question of law for the superior courts, in my judgment, the opinion of the National House of Chiefs on the customary law

[p.754] of [1982-83] GLR 715 relating to chieftaincy should be preferred to the opinion of the Regional House of Chiefs, unless it is shown that it is either (i) in conflict with a statute; or (ii) contrary to a decision of the Court of Appeal or the highest court of the land for the time being; or (iii) repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience; or (iv) palpably wrong.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

In the majority judgment read by his Lordship the Chief Justice in this case, it was also stated at p. 722 (supra) that:

“Customary law is within the bosom of the traditional courts and the highest court in our national set-up is the tribunal whose pronouncement of the customary law is being impugned. If it is not shown that the statement of the customary law by the highest traditional tribunal, i.e. the National House of Chiefs, is in conflict with a binding judicial decision or a statutory provision, then it must be shown to be clearly unreasonable or so offends our notions of justice that we should refuse to accept it.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

I wish with respect to dissent strongly from these views. I intend to show in this judgment that the statement of customary law accepted by the full bench and acquiesced in by my Lord the Chief Justice is, with respect, unreasonable and offends our notions of justice as have been accepted in our courts since 1876. Furthermore, I cannot, with respect, accept a guideline in substitution for the statutory guideline provided in section 24 of Act 370. A bald statement of customary law by the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs and not by the whole house is here being raised to such a pedestal as to make otiose the elaborate process for ascertaining customary law so painstakingly devised by the legislature in Act 370, s. 24 to enable us to make authoritative pronouncements of the customary law. The basis of the Azu Crabbe C.J.’s formula, novel and unprecedented, is predicated on the elaborate functions and duties which the National House of Chiefs qua National House of Chiefs has been given under act 370. Merely because of these functions and duties conferred on the whole National House of Chiefs, the pronouncement of a committee of the house, which is not shown to have conferred with the whole house is supposed to be an ex cathedra pronouncement of the National House of Chiefs, although that committee is recognised by statute to be liable to fall into error and elaborate provisions in section 24 of Act 370 have been devised and promulgated by the legislature to help the committee to avoid error. With the utmost respect, I regret I cannot accept this new judicial guideline in this court of last resort. I am inclined to be recalcitrant and follow the

[p.755] of [1982-83] GLR 715 statutory guideline in section 50 which decidedly binds me. But this is not all. The imperialist repugnancy provisions of “natural justice, equity and good conscience” which were statutory yardsticks introduced by the colonial power and which were applied from 1876 to 1960 to measure the validity of our customary laws but which were abolished by our Republican legislature on 1 July 1960 on the coming into force of the Courts Act, 1960 (CA 9), are here being resuscitated, although the present Act 372, has continued the initiative of the Nkrumah regime in laying to rest these colonial relics. Where two persons are subject to the same customary law, as is the customary law in this appeal, it is that law which is applicable and the question of these repugnancy provisions does not enter the picture at all and this is the statutory position under section 49(1), r. 5 of Act 372. I recall considering the matter in Ibrahim v. Amalibini [1978] G.L.R. 368 at p. 399 after tracing the history of these colonial creatures and considering the views of Abban J. (as he then was) in Mate v. Amanor [1973] 1 G.L.R. 469, I then said:

“The trinity ‘natural justice, equity and good conscience’ are the ghosts of the colonial era and no judge in modern Ghana can now minister to their pretensions as arbiters of the contents of our customary laws. When they infiltrate into our law with imperialist airs and challenge the validity of our customary laws they must be exorcised for as Abban J. rightly pointed out in Mate v. Amanor [1973] 1 G.L.R. 469 at p. 476, the application of the customary law under rule 5 of section 49 of Act 372 is now mandatory!”

With regard to the proposition concerning the customary law as I have emphasised it in the formulation of my Lord the Chief Justice, I fear I cannot subscribe to that view of the law. Customary law must be the law of our various communities which were in existence by the time the Supreme Court Ordinance was passed in 1876. Practices which developed after that date may be usages but they are certainly not customary laws and if the proposition of the law contained in the majority judgment is accepted, a pronouncement of any of the judicial committees of the National House of Chiefs, as long as it satisfies the proffered criteria would be taken as customary law although it was developed after 1876. Before I come to grips with the customary law, I must say that I cannot, with respect, understand how a judgment of the nature given by his Lordship the Chief Justice can be legally given in this Chieftaincy matter. With all due respect, in order to be able to give the decision which my Lord the Chief Justice with the acquiescence of my brother Adade J.S.C. has seen fit to give in this appeal this morning, it is absolutely essential not only to have sight of the

[p.756] of [1982-83] GLR 715 petition filed on 13 February 1973 to see the capacity stated therein but also to have sight of the decision of the regional committee touching the capacity of the appellant as thus stated in the said petition in accordance with section 2 (a) of the Chieftaincy (National and Regional Houses of Chiefs) Procedure Rules, 1972 (CI 27). We have not seen the said petition because it was not made part of the record before this court or the Court of Appeal or apparently the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs. Furthermore, the trial regional committee has given no decision on the capacity as is stated in the petition of 13 February 1973. It was never invited to give a decision on it. It only dealt with amendments.

In such circumstances, I venture to think, with the utmost respect, that any judgment of this court given, as the Chief Justice with the concurrence of my brothers has given, on the non-existent petition of 20 August 1973 and without sight of the proper petition of 13 February 1973, is with respect, so clearly per incuriam as to leave no room for doubt whatsoever.

The decision given by the Chief Justice this morning is a decision which the regional committee itself had by the agreement of the parties lawfully undertaken not to give. This court can only give a judgment which the regional trial tribunal can lawfully give as by the Constitution, 1979, art. 116 (4) we cannot exercise jurisdiction larger than the trial court’s lawful jurisdiction. I think the majority judgment is obviously an error.

I am sure we shall have no difficulty to depart from this decision in future because of article 116 (3) of the Constitution, 1979, saved as it has been by the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1981.

I now come to grips with the customary law in these proceedings. I propose to deal very briefly with the submissions before us and at the various tribunals and courts, then with the textbooks before dealing with the reported cases and other sources. I shall also deal with what I conceive to be statutory provisions which I consider to be at least marginally, if not directly, in point.

All the submissions which were made were generally bald statements of the customary law propounded, and not supported by any authority directly in point. One or two cases, however, which seemed in point, were referred to in some of the submissions, particularly before us, and I propose to canvass them when I consider the cases.

I now move to consider the textbooks. In this respect, I have been tremendously assisted by the efforts of Anin J.A. (as he then was) in his exposition on the matter reported in Sarkodee I v. Boateng II [1977] 2 G.L.R. 343 at pp. 349-352. I have read Dr. Danquah’s Akan Laws and Customs; Sarbah’s Fanti National Constitution (2nd ed.)

[p.757] of [1982-83] GLR 715 and Rattray’s Ashanti Law and Constitution, passages from all of which were quoted by Anin J.A. (as he then was) in his judgment to which I have made reference. I have studied the quoted passages very carefully, there is no need for me to repeat the exercise of also quoting them.

My only regret is that I have consulted many lawyers particularly old practitioners and lawyer-descendants of deceased old practitioners as well as eminent Supreme Court judges in my effort to obtain a copy of Warrington’s Notes on Ashanti Custom, the Matson’s edition or any other edition but my efforts have been fruitless and time consuming, and I have had to fall back on Anin J.A.’s passages without the benefit of my own research to find out what other possible construction can be elicited from other passages in Warrington’s Notes. However, on a close study of the passages from the textbooks, Anin J.A. (as he then was) elicited eight broad principles to found his judgment and since it is his view of the customary law position that has been accepted by his Lordship the Chief Justice and my brother Adade J.S.C. in this court, it is essential, with respect, to examine these alleged principles. These were stated in his judgment reported in [1977] 2 G.L.R. 343 at pp. 351-352 as follows:

“(1) Only those who elect a chief can destool him.

(2) Any person is entitled to lay a complaint against a chief before an elder (i.e. kingmaker). An elder is likewise entitled to lay a complaint against his chief before his fellow elders.

(3) Upon the receipt of such complaints from individuals, the elders must confer together (as indeed they are obliged to do in all important affairs of state). Through private deliberations the elders may agree either to bring destoolment proceedings against their chief if they deem the complaints serious enough to warrant such a drastic course, or else admonish him in the case of minor offences and promote reconciliation and pacification.

(4) If the majority of the elders agree to institute proceedings against their chief for this destoolment, the elders themselves formulate the destoolment charges; and the chief is tried in public before the appropriate forum.

(5) Prior consultation and the obtaining of a consensus among the elders or at least a majority of them are conditions precedent for the institution of formal destoolment proceedings against a chief.

(6) The power to destool a chief is under Akan customary law exercisable by, and in the name of, the elders collectively, and not by one of them acting alone or without the support of his colleagues.

[p.758] of [1982-83] GLR 715

(7) Only the majority of the elders of the chief are competent under Akan customary law to bring destoolment charges against him.

(8) The rationale underlying these Akan customs appears to be that the destoolment of a chief being a grave matter of legitimate concern to the entire populace, the elders in their capacity as kingmakers and hereditary representatives of all the constituent sections and families and the channel of communication between the head and the scattered members of the Oman, must consult together and act in concert on any complaint levelled against the chief by an aggrieved individual.”

I agree entirely with Anin J.A. (as he then was) that the principles numbered (1), (2), (6) and (8) are correct principles and are supported by the passages in the texts quoted, and by my own research in other textbooks and other sources, which I will discuss presently but I must say at once and emphatically that with the greatest respect the principles numbered (3), (4), (5) and (7) are not supported by any of the passages quoted by Anin J.A. (as he then was) in his judgment. They seem to be inferences drawn from a consideration of the principles numbered (1), (2), (6) and (8) and the general tenor of the passages but I think they are, with respect, illogical deductions and both Annan J.A. and Francois J.A. (as he then was) were struck at once by their illogical and non-sequitur character after their consideration of the passages and Annan J.A. typified their appreciation when at p. 354 of Sarkodee I v. Boateng II (supra) he protested:

“In my view, and I say this with the greatest respect, the sources already referred to by Anin J.A. do not in themselves directly answer the point raised here. I think that answer is to be arrived at through a process of consideration and development of the general principle uniformly set out in those sources that they are competent to destool who have the right to enstool. Clearly a right to enstool or destool is a substantive right and is not to be seen in the same light as a right to nominate for enstoolment or a right to bring charges for destoolment. In the one case what is involved is a decision by a body of persons whether they shall make a person who is not one, a chief or whether they shall unmake one who already is. In the other case the decision that is to be made is whether a process that may result in enstoolment or destoolment may be lawfully set in motion or not. The one act is final or substantive, the other preliminary or procedural.”

I agree entirely with Anin J.A.’s views, supported as they are by the similar views of Francois J.A. (as he then was), in drawing attention to the distinction between the substantive and procedural rights.

[p.759] of [1982-83] GLR 715

Now let us consider what customary law principle emerges from a consideration together of principles 3, 4, 5 and 7. Principle 8 is, of course, correct and I would accept it. When pruned of its verbiage it rightly lays down the principle that the proper forum to adjudicate on destoolment charges against a chief is the council of elders. The proposition of customary law contained in Anin J.A.’s principles 3, 4, 5 and 7 can clearly be formulated as follows:

“It is only the whole of the council of elders or a majority of the said who are competent to formulate destoolment charges and to commence or institute destoolment proceedings on the said charges before the whole council of elders.”

Can this proposition be supported by the quotations in the texts? I think not. Surely, given the premises derivable from the quotations from the texts this statement of the customary law as an inevitable conclusion breaks down as a logical syllogism; but this is not all. In Johnson v. Clark [1908] 1 Ch. 303 at p. 311, Parker J. laid down a test for appraising the legal validity of any custom. He said:

“… a custom to be valid must be such that, in the opinion of a trained lawyer, it is consistent, or, at any rate, not inconsistent, with those general principles which, quite apart from particular rules or maxims, lie at the root of our legal system.”

It is now trite learning that a person should not be a judge in his own cause. All students of our legal system are acquainted with this rule succinctly expressed in the Latin Maxim nemo judex in causa sua. The customary law propounded here is that all the elders or the majority of them should jointly formulate charges and then prosecute the charges before themselves. A more monstrous breach of the rule it is difficult to imagine! I think it is unreasonable. The contrary rule propounded by the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs is more reasonable, although I can understand the proposition in cases so clearly serious as to merit instant or summary destoolment.

I will now refer to the texts which I have laid my hands on and consider what conclusion they give rise to as the proper statement of the customary law. Let me say at once that the quotation by Anin J.A. (as he then was) in Sarkodee I v. Boateng II (supra) at p. 350 from Dr. Danquah’s Akan Laws and Custom is, with respect, inaccurate and misleading. I have the same book and at the relevant pp. 117-118 this is what Dr. Danquah actually says:

“With regard to the other point whether the act of destooling a Chief is effective if carried out by all or a section of the Council, we have to emphasize this fact, that every hereditary member in the Council represents a section of the community;

[p.760] of [1982-83] GLR 715 and as every section of the community has an inherent right to self-determination, it follows that no single section of the town could be properly ignored in a matter of this nature. (The hereditary Councillors in a Chief’s Council are all elected by single Family Sections, and those hereditary Elders can only be deprived of their positions as Councillors by the Family Sections, and not in any way by the Chief under whom they serve as Councillors.) Legally, however, some hereditary Councillors or Elders have more powers in destoolment and enstoolment questions. The Osomanyawa, as the next person to the Chief in the community, has great powers in destoolments and enstoolments. The exercise of such powers is, however, subject in one way or the other, to the considered opinion of the Council or a majority thereof…”

(The emphasis is mine.)

All the emphasised words in the above passage were omitted in Anin J.A.’s quotation (as reported in [1977] 2 G.L.R. 343 at p. 350) from Dr. Danquah’s book with no indication of the omissions or of the reasons for the omission. The passage then ran in such a way that what was emphasised in the passage regarding “the exercise of such powers” although it was meant in the Danquah text to relate to the exercise of powers of enstoolment and destoolment by one person, namely, the next person to the chief, yet this was for some unaccountable reason omitted with the result that though Dr. Danquah conceded that the next person to the chief has powers in relation to destoolment, that statement was omitted. I have, however, in the above quotation now supplied the omission.

In his Fanti National Constitution (2nd ed.) Sarbah drew a distinction between an Omanhene or paramount ruler and other subordinate chiefs. The paramount ruler he called superior ruler and the ordinary chief he called just a ruler. Anin J.A.’s quotation in Sarkodee I v. Boateng II (supra) were taken from pages 42-43 of the book and the passages referred to an ordinary chief. On the same page 42, Sarbah dealt with complaints against a paramount chief or Omanhene whom he called superior ruler and, with respect, it is extraordinary that once again quoting from the same page this passage was inadvertently overlooked. What is even, with respect, more amazing is that the passage quoted in Anin J.A.’s judgment is separated by only one sentence from the passage dealing with the case of an Omanhene or a superior ruler. The said passage dealing with an Omanhene or a superior ruler states:

“Complaint by the Gyasi against the superior ruler is heard and decided by the second ruler and the councillors. Complaint against the superior ruler by his own councillors or by the second

[p.761] of [1982-83] GLR 715 ruler is heard by the Gyasi headmen, and as many of the subordinate rulers as can attend… Complaint against the superior ruler by his family or any principal member thereof is heard by the ruler’s councillors and Gyasi.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

This passage, in my respectful opinion, completely contradicts the Anin J.A.’s statement of the customary law which has found favour with his Lordship the Chief Justice in this court. As I have already indicated, I have not succeeded in obtaining any copy of Warrington’s Notes on Ashanti Custom and I am therefore unable to appraise the statements there. Suffice it to say that these statements are innocuous and do not support the customary law propounded in Anin J.A.’s judgment and accepted by the Chief Justice and my brother Adade J.S.C. in this court. Dr Busia, however, who would seem too have studied a number of destoolment cases in the manner reminiscent of Rattray’s sociological studies in Ashanti and Northern and Upper Regions of Ghana, and in his invaluable book, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti, has drawn attention to aspects of the customary law which are worth noting. Under the title “destoolment of a chief” at p. 21 he writes:

“The Ashanti had a constitutional practice which ensured that the will of the people was given consideration.

They had ultimately the constitutional right to destool a chief. As the fundamental principle was that only those who elected a chief could destool him a destoolment required the consent of the elders. Sometimes they initiated a destoolment themselves when, for example, a chief repeatedly rejected their advice, or when he broke a taboo or committed a sacrilegious act.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

This passage clearly contradicts the assumption in the Anin J.A.’s formulation that only the elders or a majority of them can initiate destoolment proceedings. I would like to quote again from Busia at p. 107:

“The report of a destoolment case which occurred at Bekwai in 1920 confirms the view that in these political disputes the commoners were exercising a recognized constitutional right. The Commissioner who investigated the dispute reported:

‘In the case of Bekwai, for instance, the ‘youngmen,’ that is to say the lower classes, those who were not Elders, complained that they were not consulted in the choice of the Headchief, that they did not regard him as a credit to the Stool, that people did not respect him in Bekwai itself, or

[p.762] of [1982-83] GLR 715 when he visited the villages, and to a man they refused to serve him. The Elders remarked that one cannot be a chief without subject. If we support the Headchief we shall be alone. The whole of the youngmen refused to serve the Headchief and we support them.’ There was no dispute about the legitimacy of the youngmen’s action in accordance with native custom.”

And one reason for the youngmen’s action was maladministration of stool revenue: see Busia’s book at p. 214. Once again Anin J.A.’s formulation is completely exploded for apart from the elders, there are other elements in the state who can lodge complaints for the destoolment of a chief in an Akan state.

The Bekwai case was in 1920. At p. 108 of his book Dr. Busia gives another instance. Kwame Afram, Omanhene of Kumawu, was destooled apparently on the initiative of the commoners, not his elders.

All these cases show that by the research of an eminent sociologist, it is not a correct factual statement of the custom pertaining to destoolment to say that only the elders of a majority of them can commence proceedings by lodging complaints before the elders.

I shall now deal with the cases. The first case, very relevant in regard to the customary law, is the case of Hema Diki v. Agiman Divisional Court, Axim, 21 October 1901, unreported, referred to in Casely Hayford’s Gold Coast Native Institutions (1903 ed.) at p. 34. It concerned the destoolment of the King of Dixcove and the destoolment proceeding was lodged by the townsmen or commoners not the elders; and their right to so institute the proceedings was never called in question as Dr. Busia was to remark 50 years later in his book when he commented on the 1920 similar procedure in the destoolment of the Bekwaihene.

Another destoolment case reported in Danquah’s Cases in Akan Law is also quite relevant. In Kwasi Jima v. Kwadjo Dente (1916) Danq. C.A.L. 260 decided on 15 February 1916, the defendant filed destoolment charges against the plaintiff and the plaintiff was destooled. He sued for unlawful destoolment and the competence of the defendant, an apparent member of the stool family, was never impugned although the destoolment was declared unlawful on other grounds. See also Odikro Kwame Duro v. Kwabena Asumeng (1916) Danq. C.A.L. 264 at p. 265. In any event the important thing as far as the customary law of destoolment is concerned, is merely to summon the chief to appear to hear the charges. As was said in evidence in one case: “[I]n the event of it being necessary to depose the king, he is called before a meeting to answer the charges preferred against him”

[p.763] of [1982-83] GLR 715 see Mensah v. Toku (1887) Sar. F.L.R. 42 at pp. 45-46. Thus the essence of destoolment proceedings against a chief as Francis Smith J. remarked at p. 47 in his judgment in that case is clear: “… by native law… he must be called upon to answer the charges for which he is to be deposed, before he can be deposed.”

Now we are adding glosses to this, merely because of the traditional convention by which discussions, consultations and attempts at reconciliation and settlement are generally followed in most Akan litigious cases: see the view of N. A. Ollennu, a famous jurist, when he considered this in regard to divorce in “The Changing Law and Law Reform in Ghana” (1971) 15 J.A.L. 155. The case of Kudjoe Ghambrah v. Kwamin Ewea (1892) Sar. F.L.R. 64, however, decided by the Full Court on 7 September 1892 in which the celebrated Mensah Sarbah appeared as counsel is completely against the proposition of law propounded by the Court of Appeal and acquiesced in this morning by my brothers and my Lord the Chief Justice. In that case, it was not disputed at p. 65, “that there is no evidence that the council [of elders] ever made any charge against” the chief, the defendant in the proceedings. Nevertheless, the submission of Sarbah at p. 66 that the fact that “The people of Yamsu went to the defendant and (as he says) told him that they would not serve him any longer, is sufficient evidence of his deposition,” was accepted by the Full Court and the judgment of Hutchison C.J. and Redwar Ag. J. pronouncing that the destoolment was in accordance with native law and custom although the charges were not made by the elders, has never been impugned until this morning, after it had stood for over 90 years, and a new proposition is now being propounded without even considering or even over-ruling Ghambrah v. Kwamin Ewea (supra).

Azu Crabbe C.J. delivering the majority judgment in Sarkodee I v. Boateng II conceded at p. 348 that if it is shown that that his statement of the customary law is “contrary to a decision of the Court of Appeal or the highest court of the land for the time being” (the emphasis is mine) then it ought not to be considered a correct statement. Here is the decision of the highest court in the land delivered by the full bench on 7 September 1892, by Hutchison C.J. then the Chief Justice in Ghambrah v. Kwamina Ewea (1892) Sar. F.L.R. 64 and Hayes Redwar Ag. J. so well known to the students of our legal system.

And the decision contradicts Azu Crabbe C.J.’s majority decision and the majority decision in this case. My Lord the Chief Justice who has given the majority view in his judgment framed the Azu Crabbe C.J.’s proviso differently. He would only reject the statement of the customary law by the National House of Chiefs if “it is in conflict with a binding judicial decision.” Well, here is a binding judicial decision, and if it is not binding the reason why it is not binding should be

[p.764] of [1982-83] GLR 715 shown. I think with respect, the decision of my Lord the Chief Justice acquiesced in by my brother Adade J.S.C. was given per incuriam for failure to consider the effect of Order No. 4 of 1904 on the Akwapim destoolment case and the 1892 Ghambrah case and this is so on the authority of Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., Ltd. [1944] 1 K.B. 718, C.A. With respect, I am not and would not consider myself as bound by the majority decision in this case: see article 116 (3) of the Constitution, 1979.

In Kuma II v. Boafo IV (1922) ‘74-’28, 57 at p. 61, P.C. Lord Parmoor reading the judgment of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in a chieftaincy matter did make reference to the destoolment of Nana Akuffo, the Omanhene of Akwapim, in a context which showed that one Ekua Oye, abrewatia and head of the stool family of the Omanhene, instituted by herself alone destoolment charges against the Omanhene which led to his destoolment, and her right alone to institute the proceedings was never impugned or adversely commented upon by the Privy Council, the highest appellate court within our judicial hierarchy at the time. I think the case law does show that Anin J.A.’s formulation of the customary law which found favour with my Lord the Chief Justice and my brother Adade J.S.C. in the present case cannot be accepted as correct.

I wish to move on to deal with other sources and the starting point is the Privy Council case which led me to examine the Akuffo destoolment case. Some time in 1907, Ekua Oye who was alleged to be abrewatia, but who virtually acted as de facto queenmother and had nominated Akuffo to the vacant stool of Akwapim, which ended up in his installation and enstoolment as Omanhene of Akwapim in 1895, acting alone, instituted destoolment charges against the Omanhene in 1907 and had the Omanhene destooled and an application was made to the Governor for confirmation of the destoolment. And so on 14 August 1907 by Proclamation, Sir John Pikersgill Rodger, Governor of the then Gold Coast, appointed Mr. W. F. C. Robertson, then Secretary for Native Affairs “to enquire whether Kwesi Akuffo, Omanhene of Akwapim… has been destooled according to native custom”: see Gold Coast Government Gazette Extraordinary No. 51 of 1907 dated 17 August 1907. The inquiry was held from 23 August 1907 at Akropong, Akwapim, and was concluded on 10 September 1907. And his finding was that the destoolment was in accordance with native law and custom. The Governor according to the Proclamation acted under section 5 of the Chiefs Ordinance 1904 (No. 4), which empowered the appointment and in section 4, it was provided:

“4. (1) Any head chief or chief deposed from office in accordance with native custom and whose deposition shall be

[p.765] of [1982-83] GLR 715 confirmed by the Governor by writing under his hand shall be deemed in all courts of the Colony to have been lawfully deposed.”

And in section 6 it was provided: “Every confirmation of the election, installation or the deposition of a headchief shall be published in the Gazette.” In the Government Gazette No. 99 of 1908 dated 31 October 1908 at p. 1145 it is recorded:

“. . . [I]t was reported by the various sub-chiefs of the division, including those who had hitherto supported Kwasi Akuffo, that he had been destooled an application was made for the confirmation under the Chiefs Ordinance. Mr. Robertson, Secretary for Native Affairs, the acting as Commissioner for the Central Province, was appointed to hold a Commission of Inquiry under the Chiefs Ordinance, and the result of an exhaustive investigation was the confirmation of the destoolment.”

Having regard to the provisions of section 6 of the Ordinance, the legal effect of the confirmation was that the destoolment was in accordance with native customary law. This means that the destoolment has been sanctioned by statute and as the procedure was in an Akan state, it means the Akan procedure for destoolment adopted in that case has statutory backing. No less than 33 persons comprising mostly chiefs and linguists gave evidence. I have read most of the evidence in the inquiry. The relevant portion of Ekua Oye’s evidence, inter alia, is, “I took an action against the Omanhene before the oman. Such an action by the head of family brought against the person managing the family is not uncommon.” Reverend Philip Johannes Kwabi giving evidence on 29 August 1907 said, inter alia, “The procedure by which the head of the family Ekua Oye has acted, viz: to appeal by an action to the Chief of the Adonten Right Left (sic) is quite correct …” see Case No. 59/1907 of Adm. 11/1665 in the National Archives, Accra.

In the case of the Dadeasoabahene I v. Asantehene Nana Osei Agyeman Prempeh II (1935), unreported to which our attention has been drawn, thirteen destoolment charges were preferred against the Asantehene by Dadeasoabahene and at least one of the charges alleging the defiling of the Golden Stool was investigated. With all due respect to the opinion of my brother Adade J.S.C., I think the gravamen and relevance of the Dadeasoabahene case is that a single person did present a petition and a charge in that petition was investigated. The question of support of the elders which he alluded to in his judgment did not arise in any way whatsoever in regard to the preferment of the charges. That act was unquestionably done by the ex-Dadeasoabahene alone and those alleged to be supporting him before the preferment of the charges all to a man denied the alleged support or concurrence.

[p.766] of [1982-83] GLR 715

Sir Alan Burns, Governor of the then Gold Coast, in his first Sessional Address to the Legislative Council in 1942 showed concern at the growing number of destoolment cases involving paramount stools from 1932 to 1942. He observed, inter alia: “… within the last ten years, no less than twenty-two paramount chiefs have been destooled”: see page 109 of Dr. Busia’s book. Furthermore, at p. 216 and other pages, Dr. Busia gives quite a great number of destoolment cases. Now to baldly state the customary procedure for instituting destoolment proceedings in this court of last resort without examining these cases by having recourse to the legislative guidelines so elaborately devised in section 50 of Act 372 is, with respect, very regrettable indeed. The matter becomes exceedingly grave when not only is the legislative guideline ignored but a novel judicial guideline is also out-doored.

I do not think it is necessary for me to say more or to consider any other cases or other sources. The case law, text-writers and statute are all at one in contradicting the statement of the customary law which was propounded in the judgment of Anin J.A. (as he then was) in the full bench of the Court of Appeal and has been now accepted by this court, without any question. And this is singularly unfortunate because this final appellate court did not, with respect, examine the accuracy of the sources from which Anin J.A. (as he then was) drew his clearly erroneous conclusion.

I venture to think, with respect, that the proposition of law stated by Anin J.A. (as he then was) was given per incuriam as the sources were for inexplicable reasons inaccurately quoted. I venture to think further, with the greatest respect, that the majority judgment of this court is also given per incuriam for the simple reason that that judgment apart from accepting in effect Anin J.A.’s views is also based on the petition of the appellant which he filed on 20 August 1973 and to which he attached twenty destoolment charges dated 18 December 1968. The petition was with the leave of the judicial committee of the Eastern regional House of Chiefs withdrawn on 6 September 1973. It is therefore, with respect, not lawful to base any judgment on such a non-existent petition. The petition which is pending before the Eastern regional judicial committee is the petition dated 8 February 1973 and filed on 13 February 1973 but which was never forwarded to the full bench or to us for us to examine whether it is a proper petition or not. How we can, with respect, found a judgment on a petition which is not before us, is in my considered opinion, difficult to understand.

Before I am done on the law, I must regretfully therefore repeat this finally and I say it genuinely believing it, and with the utmost respect, that the judgment and conclusions of my Lord the Chief Justice

[p.767] of [1982-83] GLR 715 concurred in by my brother Adade J.S.C. is definitely given per incuriam, for the simple reason that it was founded on the petition filed on 20 August 1973. As that petition had, as I have demonstrated, been withdrawn to the knowledge of all the parties, it ceased to exist. A judgment founded on a non-existent petition must perforce collapse and cannot possibly be a legal judgment. As was said by Lord Denning in MacFoy v. United Africa Co., Ltd. [1962] A.C. 152 at p. 160, P.C. “You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will collapse.” What will collapse? I venture to say it must be all judgments based on the withdrawn petition!

I am, however, for reasons which I propose to articulate here, extremely disturbed by this chieftaincy case, and its implication for the future of this sacred institution which our forefathers painstakingly forged for our governance before the advent of the British colonial administration. A sacred institution which has been consistently guaranteed by Constitution after Constitution and government after government which have bedevilled our country.

In his book on Akan Laws and Custom, Dr. Danquah at p. 116 gave instances of destoolable offences some of which are apparently dealt with summarily. I only note a few:

1. A chief defiling his stool is liable to instant destoolment.

2. A chief circumcising is liable to instant destoolment.

3. A chief who repeatedly ignores the advice and counsel of his people, especially of his elders and councillors is liable to destoolment.

(The emphasis is mine.) Sarbah gives some pertinent cases of removal in his Fanti National Constitution at pp. 43-44, 1. “For some offences, such as cowardice, theft and conduct deemed by his subjects derogatory, he can be removed at once if his defence or explanation be found unsatisfactory.” (The emphasis is mine.) Casely-Hayford writing in July 1903 in his book: Gold Coast Native Institutions at p. 36 stresses the essence of destoolment offences:

“It is not every petty act of misconduct that a King’s destoolment can be called for. He must have been convicted of acts seriously detrimental to the State or otherwise gravely unbecoming the kingly dignity.”

Dr. Busia in his book at p. 214 also gives examples. I mention only a few:

“Before 1900 chiefs were mostly destooled for failure to consult the elders or the breaking of custom…

‘Nowadays the most common cause is that of misappropriating stool funds…’ A common feature of … destoolment cases was the charge of the maladministration of stool revenues.”

[p.768] of [1982-83] GLR 715

And Captain Rattray in his Ashanti Law and Constitution at p. 377 pointed out, “A Chief who was always ordering his subjects to be flogged would, however, soon be destooled.” I have not seen Warrington’s Notes on Ashanti, but in his dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeal, Francois J.A. hinted that Warrington corroborates Rattray, showing therefore that repeated assault by a chief is a destoolable offence.

Now the eleven charges which were brought against the respondent in these proceedings involved conviction for bribery and corruption, adverse finding of dishonesty by a commission of inquiry, misappropriation of funds of the traditional authority in circumstances amounting to stealing, two cases of assault, desecration of the ancestral black stool, selling stool lands and converting the proceeds to his own use in circumstances amounting to stealing, misappropriation of stool property, plain stealing and immoral conduct. I have indicated under customary law offences which if proved, would justify destoolment proceedings. As the text-writers show some of such cases like stealing and conduct derogatory of his office and desecration of the stool, charges included in the eleven charges merit summary destoolment hearing and in such cases, I apprehend formal proceedings must necessarily be abandoned.

I think the second principle in Anin J.A.’s broad principles (see [1977] 2 G.L.R. 343 at pp. 351-352) is right and it does show that the ultimate conclusion that an elder cannot commence proceedings by complaint is an error. The part emphasised in the second principle (as stated at p. 351) shows that such a complaint can be laid and if laid, I do not see any objection to the elders who are the councillors dealing with it, particularly as there are cases like theft and desecration of stools which are dealt with summarily. I should have thought in such cases when the elders consider the charges proved and the chief is unable to offer satisfactory explanation he will be “removed at once,” a case of instant destoolment, as the authorities to which I have referred so clearly demonstrates. That such cases are summarily dealt with is beyond doubt as seems to have been clearly the process in the Dadeasoabahene case against such a highly placed dignitary as the very occupant of the Golden Stool, a dignitary enjoying the peculiar status of having even paramount chiefs under him. And yet only one person instituted the charge at a time when that person was a commoner having been destooled. Writing about the status of a destooled chief, Rattray in his Ashanti Law and Constitution at p. 83 notes, “On the Stool he was almost a god; off it, i.e. after the official ceremony of destoolment, he became an ordinary being, who at any rate might be soundly abused for his past misdeeds.”

I remember that when in 1964 in Akowuah v. Commissioner of Police [1964] G.L.R. 475, S.C. and again in Donkor v. The Republic

[p.769] of [1982-83] GLR 715

[1964] G.L.R. 598, S.C., the legislature detected a tendency in the then Supreme Court to ignore the merits of cases and to resort to foreign technical notions of justice to acquit accused persons whose crimes are but for artificial reasons very clear, they endeavoured to arrest the situation and passed into law the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 216), to ensure that guilty persons are punished and corruption controlled. It seems to me that the mood of the nation today (with the Citizens Vetting Committee and National Investigations Committee and what have you) and the general attitude of our law-givers from the time of our First Republic to the present day, is not to allow the guilty to escape behind any facade of technicality. I recall remarking in Kwakye v. Attorney-General [1981] G.L.R. 944, S.C. that the intent behind section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, was not meant to impeach innocent persons, but was calculated to advance this apparent philosophy. I can only hope that like the erstwhile Supreme Court, we have not now stirred up a hornet’s nest and started a trend ignoring the real merits of cases and fastening on technicalities, a trend which would invite subsequent legislative interference with our decisions, having regard specially to the present unfortunate provisions of the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation (Supplementary and Consequential Provisions) Law, 1982 (PNDCL 42). In Ashanti, for example, with all due respect to the views of my brother Adade J.S.C., the Dadeasoabahene case is a clear indication that in destoolment cases under Ashanti customary law where the charges are extraordinarily serious, the technical requirements of procedure would be completely ignored in the greater interest of the State. Is this unreasonable? Indeed, in that case the records do show that at the time the petitioner applied to the traditional court he had been destooled; he was no more an elder and yet the charge involving as it does, the desecration of the Golden Stool, was investigated and technical notions of prior support and consent were not even harboured.

If our customary laws are to develop to meet the demands of a civilised populace and if we are to play any meaningful role in a concerted national effort to clean our country of corruption and unsavoury practices, then we must endeavour to remove these artificial barriers that tend to block our way and disable us from carrying out our functions.

What is one to think of an Omanhene of a traditional area who in this day and age (when there is an allegation against him that he is a convict and a thief — charges likely to be proved by the production of the conviction to show that he is dishonest — charges which the plaintiff actually went into the witness — box and endeavoured to substantiate) is able to say that:

[p.770] of [1982-83] GLR 715

“In the New Juaben Traditional Area there are and have been chiefs, including the plaintiff, who have been convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment. These convictions have never deprived them of their natural status as chiefs. Nor had such convictions ever become grounds for their destoolment.”

Such a person must have poor regard for the capacity of the customary law and the general moral standard of the country to discipline him. Assuming the charges against the Omanhene can be proved, then, with the greatest respect, our inability to aid the process of weeding the country of such shameless elements in the nation’s power structure must indeed, be regrettable.

I can quite understand why a distinguished writer on our chieftaincy system, J. Ofori-Boateng, was able to write after studying our law (as stated in (1974) 6 R.G.L. 93 at p. 104) that:

“… once the National House of Chiefs is able to obtain two decent men to preside over it, all the Houses of Chiefs and traditional councils should be made up of unpardoned criminals and convicts, undischarged bankrupts, dishonest doctors, lawyers, parsons and other professionals who have been dismissed or suspended from their calling because of conduct which amounts to moral turpitude — the sort of people who will certainly not be given any responsible post, and probably may not be given any post at all, in the public service.”

With respect, is that what we in this Supreme Court would want to see in our chieftaincy system? I would not be a part of any decision that would tolerate this assault on the intergrity of our time-honoured institution! It is quite remarkable that animated purely by a broad sense of justice without any meticulous examination of the case law and textbooks, Francois J.A. (as he then was) in the full bench of the Court of Appeal (see [1977] 2 G.L.R. 343 at pp. 356-367) had no difficulty at all, in identifying the true principle applicable in this case. I agree completely with his view of the law even when he had to contend with the withdrawn and discredited petition of 20 August 1973. I think with respect, that his effort in exposing the outrageous result which the majority view would seem to encourage is, indeed, praiseworthy.

Can we not also in this Supreme Court by a beneficial construction of the statutes governing this our sacred institution of chieftaincy avoid this monstrous and outrageous result? A result which our forefathers, supposedly illiterate, would certainly not tolerate but which it seems, we in our new-found enlightenment are now prepared to accept. Have the national standards fallen so low? I say no more!

As I have already indicated, I would allow the appeal and would with regret, but with the utmost respect, further declare the

[p.771] of [1982-83] GLR 715 proceedings in the full bench of the Court of Appeal and in the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs and indeed, even the majority decision in this court to be null and void. I would order the case to continue in the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs. As I said at the beginning of this judgment, my views may be considered by many fine minds to be outrageous, but these are my honest views and my well-considered decision. I consider the majority judgment to be given per incuriam because apart from my other reasons, it was clearly based on the petition dated 17 August 1973 and filed on 20 August 1973 and as that petition is no more, having been withdrawn, any decision based on it is, as I have already pointed out, null and void. I would accordingly allow the appeal on the terms I have already indicated, particularly as the proceedings on the petition of 13 February 1973 is legally pending before the judicial committee of the Eastern Regional House of Chiefs.

JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.

I wish to express my full support for the opinions of his Lordship, the Chief Justice, and my brother Adade J.S.C. I only desire to emphasise that the pronouncement by the judicial committee of the National House of Chiefs that enstoolment as well as destoolment of a chief is the prerogative of the majority of the kingmakers is a correct statement of the Akan customary law. Indeed, it would be disastrous to permit a single kingmaker without support to prefer destoolment charges against a chief, for such a step definitely runs counter to Akan customary law: see Warrington’s Notes on Ashanti Custom (1934 ed.) under the heading “destoolment.” Mr. Warrington who was at the time an Assistant Chief Commissioner for Ashanti made exhaustive researches into certain areas of the customs and usages of the Ashanti people and his work must be treated with respect. See also Sarbah’s Fanti National Constitution (2nd ed.) where it is stated that those immediately connected with the stool have the customary right to enstool and destool a chief. Again Captain Rattray also researched into the customs and constitution of the Ashanti nation and his book Ashanti Law and Constitution was the result. In Ashanti Law and Constitution (2nd ed.), p. 85, Rattray stated in no uncertain terms that “the persons who select a chief are those who can destool him.” There can be no dispute that where there is no unanimity among the kingmakers as regards destoolment the majority can prefer destoolment charges but a single kingmaker cannot.

I wish, however, to make it clear that the issue that was fought throughout the tribunals up to this court was not whether commoners have a right to prefer destoolment charges against a chief but whether one single kingmaker, as in this case, can do so in accordance with customary law. Even if such a right were vested in the whole body of commoners it would certainly not be permissible for one commoner to

[p.772] of [1982-83] GLR 715 prefer destoolment charges against a chief. As already stated herein, one kingmaker cannot prefer destoolment charges against a chief.

I agree, therefore, that the appeal be dismissed.

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON. J.A.

I also agree with the judgment as delivered by his Lordship the Chief Justice. I have nothing further to add and concur that the appeal be dismissed.

DECISION Appeal dismissed D. R. K. S.

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