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[1984] SLR (CA) 15Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

CONNEY vs. BENTUM – WILLIAMS [1984-86] 2 GLR 301

21 May 1984 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 27 min read

Cite as[1984] SLR (CA) 15
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OSCOLACONNEY v BENTUM – WILLIAMS [1984-86] 2 GLR 301 [1984] SLR (CA) 15
APACONNEY v BENTUM – WILLIAMS [1984-86] 2 GLR 301, [1984] SLR (CA) 15 (Ghana).
BluebookCONNEY v BENTUM – WILLIAMS [1984-86] 2 GLR 301, [1984] SLR (CA) 15 (Ghana Ct. App. 1984).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Wakeford v Lincoln (Bishop) (1921) 90 LJ PC 174, PC.

(2) Appea v R (1951) 13 WACA 143.

(3) Credland v Potter (1874) 10 Ch App 8.

(4) Ankrah v Ofori [1974] 1 GLR 185, CA.

(5) France v Quartey (1925) D Ct, ‘21-’25, 194 (6) Hammond v Lamptey, High Court, Accra, 10 May 1961, unreported.

(7) Brown v Darko [1961] GLR (Pt II) 539.

(8) Asare v Brobbey [1971] 2 GLR 331, CA.

(9) Odoi v Hammond [1971] 1 GLR 375, CA.

(10) Amefinu v Odametey [1977] 2 GLR 135, CA.

(11) Ntem v Ankwandah [1977] 2 GLR 452, CA.

(12) Ussher v Darko [1977] 1 GLR 476, CA.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from a decision of the High Court, Accra in which the plaintiff’s claim for a declaration of title to a disputed land was upheld, The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court delivered by Abban JA.

COUNSEL

P A Adjetey (with him Lartey and Goka) for the appellant.

C O Nyanor for the respondent

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN JA

Abban J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. In 1957 the James Town Mantse, Nii Kofi Akrasi II, granted a piece of land about 1.561 acres, situate and lying at McCarthy Hill, Accra to George Frank Okpesisa Cleland. The grant was evidenced in writing by a deed of conveyance dated 23 January 1957 and registered as Lands Registry No 2776 1958, exhibit B. According to the plaintiff – respondent (hereafter called the plaintiff) George F O Cleland by a deed of conveyance dated 5 June 1964 and registered as Lands Registry No

[p.306] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 301

1401/1972, exhibit C, sold a portion of this land to one Emmanuel Kofi Danso. It is this portion which is the subject matter of the present dispute. The said Emmanuel Kofi Danso by a conveyance dated 19 December 1964 and registered as Lands Registry No 179/1965, exhibit D, sold the disputed land to a Maxwell Elliot Badu who in turn sold it to the plaintiff-respondent by a deed of conveyance dated 1 August 1969 and registered as Lands Registry No 2056/71, exhibit A.

In paragraphs (7) and (8) of the statement of claim the plaintiff pleaded as follows:

“(7) All the purchasers of the said land took immediate possession of the land when they purchased it. The plaintiff took immediate possession by fencing the land and by constantly weeding it. He also built a kiosk to store his building materials.

(8) The defendant has from 30 April 1977 without any lawful justification and without the consent of the plaintiff trespassed on the land by excavating the land apparently to start building a foundation.” The plaintiff’s case was that on the said 30 April 1977 when he saw the defendant-appellant (hereafter called the defendant) and his workmen conducting building operations on the land, he challenged them and reported the matter to the Odorkor Police. The police visited the site and persuaded the defendant and his workmen to stop the excavations. Later the parties met at the police station in an attempt to settle the matter. The plaintiff produced his title deeds but the defendant could not produce any. To avoid a possible breach of the peace the police warned the defendant and his workmen off the land but they did not take heed. The plaintiff therefore instituted the present action.

The defendant’s case was that the late George Frank Okpesisa Cleland by his will dated 26 November 1959 devised the disputed land to his three sons, namely Willie, Charles and George Cleland. George F O Cleland died on 30 April 1966 and probate in respect of the said will was granted by the High Court, Accra on 13 December 1967 to the four named executors. According to the defendant the three devisees sold the disputed land to him and he went into possession and cleared the land. A year later he started constructing a building on the land. The building had almost been completed when the plaintiff turned up to claim ownership of the land. Apart from the will and its probate, exhibit 1, the defendant did not tender any document or conveyance which was executed in his favour by his said vendors.

However, it is clear that both parties traced their root of title to the late George F O Cleland. But the defendant maintained, in his pleading

[p.307] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 301 and at the trial, that the deed of conveyance dated 5 June 1964 from George F O Cleland to Emmanuel Kofi Danso (exhibit C) was a forgery. Paragraph (2) of the statement of defence states, “The defendant denies paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the plaintiff’s statement of claim and states in answer to paragraph 4 that the alleged conveyance was a forgery.” It is to be noted that no particulars of the said forgery were given in the statement of defence and so at the summons for direction’s stage, the plaintiff asked the court to order the defendant to file particulars of the alleged forgery. The said order was made and on 2 December 1977 the defendant filed the required particulars alleging that the signature on the conveyance, exhibit C, was not that of the late George F O Cleland and that:

“the plaintiff [respondent] to produce and show to the court for onward transmission to the police the original conveyance showing the original signatures of G F O Cleland to E K Danso. For the purpose of investigation the defendant [appellant] is prepared to submit documents showing the original signature of G F O Cleland.”

The learned trial judge acceded to the defendant’s request for police investigations and on 14 December 1977 made the following order, “The issues have already been set down for hearing. As regards the question of forgery the whole issue is being referred to the police for investigation and report.”

The first witness for the defendant handed over to the police four receipts which bore the signature of the late G F O Cleland. This witness was the brother of the late Cleland and the signature on those four receipts were accepted by the defendant as the genuine signatures of the late Cleland. The four receipts (exhibits CW1, CW2, CW3 and CW4) and the disputed conveyance, exhibit C, were eventually submitted to the Police Forensic Laboratory for examination. The detective sergeant, Lawrence Boadi Mensah, who actually carried out the scientific classification of the signatures was called to give evidence. In the course of his evidence, he tendered a report containing the result of his investigation. In short his conclusions were that the signatures of the late G F O Cleland on the disputed conveyance, exhibit C, and those on the receipts which were produced by the first witness for the appellant were similar.

The learned trial judge found much assistance from this expert witness – Lawrence Mensah – and on the evidence before him, he held that the defendant had failed to prove forgery and that the disputed conveyance bore the genuine signatures of the late G F O Cleland and that the plaintiff had established his title to the disputed land and was therefore entitled to judgment.

[p.308] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 301 In this appeal learned counsel for the defendant attacked the judgment on four main grounds, and three of them were argued together. Learned counsel contended that the original of exhibit C, and not a photocopy thereof, should have been used in the investigation by the police and that the learned judge erred in relying on a photocopy of exhibit C in the determination of whether the signature of the late Cleland was genuine or forged in view of the defendant’s defence. Counsel submitted that in order to have proper comparison, the original duplicate should have been used in the absence of the original.

There is not much substance in this contention. The evidence showed that the original of exhibit C was missing and in the circumstances its photocopy was used. Since the disputed deed of conveyance was registered with the Lands Registry, Accra, the duplicate original of it must be in the Lands Registry; and if the defendant on whom the onus of proving forgery lay, was so minded and thought the photocopy could not serve the same purpose so far as the investigation was concerned, he should have taken steps to obtain the duplicate original from the Lands Registry and submitted same to the police. From the proceedings the defendant was, right from the beginning, aware that the original was not available because it was lost and that its photocopy was going to be used. Yet he never made any attempt to secure the said original duplicate but chose to rely on the four receipts.

In any case, there is nothing in the evidence of the expert witness which suggested that the photocopy he used gave him any difficulty. On the contrary, during the investigation he was able to analyse all the necessary characteristics of the signatures on exhibit C as well as those on the four receipts by the aid of optical instruments; and all his observations were compiled into a photographic chart. We do not think that the use of the duplicate original in the circumstances could have made any difference. In our view, the expert witness would have arrived at the same conclusions as he did.

Still on the signature, learned counsel for the defendant contended that the learned trial judge erred in concluding that because the police report, exhibit CW6, stated that the signatures on the receipts and that on the disputed conveyance were similar then the signatures on the disputed conveyance must have been written by one and the same person, namely G F O Cleland. Counsel submitted that the report was not positive that the disputed signature as on exhibit C was that of G F O Cleland and it was therefore wrong for the learned judge to hold that the disputed conveyance was not a forgery.

It does not seem to us that the learned judge relied solely on the report. In any case, the learned judge was entitled to draw his own inference from all the pieces of evidence before him, including the

[p.309] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 301 report. The expert evidence or the report could not have gone any further than to indicate similarities or dissimilarities in the various signatures which were analysed and compared. The report contained the result of the scientific examination of the signatures conducted by the expert. That is the signature of the disputed conveyance compared with the signatures on the four receipts submitted by the defendant’s witness, and the report should not be expected to be positive that the disputed signatures were written by the late G F O Cleland.

A handwriting expert is not required to state definitely that a particular writing is by a particular person. His function is to point out similarities or differences in two or more specimens of handwriting submitted to him and leave the court to draw its own conclusions: see Wakeford v Lincoln (Bishop) (1921) 90 LJ 174 at 179, PC where the Lord Chancellor (Lord Birkenhead) reading the judgment of the Privy Council had this to say:

“Their Lordships now turn to the examination of the words themselves. The expert called for the prosecution gave his evidence with great candour. “It is not possible,’ he says, `to say definitely that anybody wrote a particular thing. All you can do is to point out similarities and draw conclusions from them.’ This is the manner in which expert evidence on matters of this kind ought to be presented to the Court, who have to make up their minds, with such assistance as can be furnished to them by those who have made a study of these matters, whether a particular writing is to be assigned to a particular person.”

In other words, an expert in handwriting having examined, deciphered and compared the disputed writing with any other writing, the genuineness of which is not in dispute, is only obliged to point out the similarities or otherwise in the handwriting; and it is for the court to determine whether the writing is to be assigned to a particular person. So in the case herein, the report was supposed merely to assist the court in deciding the vital issue of whether or not the conveyance, exhibit C, was a forgery and it would therefore have been an undue and unwarranted interference if it had gone further to pronounce on the very issue which the court was called upon to determine.

The next ground argued was that the plaintiff failed to give satisfactory explanation as to why the originals of his documents could not be produced as the very originals had earlier on been produced at the Odorkor Police Station and the learned judge should have rejected the photostat copies. The criticism is not borne out by the evidence on record. In the course of his evidence, the plaintiff testified to the effect that he was given a conveyance after the purchase. But his original

[p.310] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 301 documents, including the original of the disputed conveyance, got lost in the course of transferring from his old station (Tarkwa) to Accra to assume duty; and so he applied to the Lands Registry for a photocopy which was certified by the Registrar of Lands. This, in our view, was good and sufficient basis for accepting the certified photostat copy in evidence. In fact the defendant could not furnish evidence to show that the original was still in existence and it could have been produced.

It was also contended that the learned trial judge failed to appreciate or evaluate fairly and adequately the evidence of Charles Cleland and Robert Diaba, witnesses called by the defendant. It was submitted that Charles Cleland, the brother of the late G F O Cleland, knew the signature of his late brother and he stated that when the signature on the disputed conveyance was compared by him with that of the admitted signature, he found that the signatures on the disputed conveyance were different from the admitted signatures (exhibits CW1, CW2, CW3 and CW4); and the court should have given considerable weight to his evidence.

Under normal circumstances there is no doubt that due weight must be given to the evidence of persons like the witness, Charles Cleland, who was acquainted with the signature of this late brother. One of the methods of establishing the genuineness or otherwise of a handwriting is by producing from the proper custody other documents admitted to be genuine or proved to have been acted upon as such by the parties interested in them and by permitting witnesses to compare such documents directly with the handwriting in the disputed document. This I think is what Charles Cleland was supposed to have done in the court below. But it is clear from the evidence that he was seriously handicapped to make any meaningful comparison. The eyesight of this witness was so bad that the court had to move to his bedside to take his evidence. His eyesight had been bad for some four years prior to 14 July 1979 when he gave evidence.

It meant that in April 1977 when the present dispute first arose, his eyesight had already been in a bad state for nearly two years. It was therefore unfair to expect him to make any reliable comparison of the signatures on the documents presented to him. It is very dangerous to give any credence to the evidence of comparison made by a person with failing eyesight like this witness and the learned trial judge rightly, in our view, rejected it.

The evidence of Robert Diaba was no better. He was an official from the Deeds Registry branch of the Lands Department. The substance of his evidence was that “there seemed to be a slight difference in the signatures on the disputed document and those on the conveyance from Nii Akrashie to G F O Cleland.” He continued, “In

[p.311] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 301 the first one it seems the man has got a shaky handwriting whilst in the second one it appears to be straight forward.” This witness never claimed to be a handwriting expert and the most important of all, he never claimed to have been familiar with the signature of the late G F O Cleland through business or any other association. Neither did he claim to have had an occasion to see the late Cleland sign his signature or in some other way had become acquainted with his signature. In short, Diaba was an inexperienced person so far as handwriting was concerned and he could also not be said to be a person capable of forming a correct judgment or opinion on those signatures. This is borne out by the fact that he could not testify as to whether the characteristics of the signatures were similar or dissimilar and he could not go any further than to say “the first one was in a shaky handwriting and the second appears to be straightforward.” His evidence was as useless as that of Charles Cleland. The only reliable evidence which could assist the trial judge in deciding the issue of forgery one way or the other was that of the detective sergeant, Lawrence Mensah, who conducted scientific examination of those signatures.

At any rate, it is clear from our reading of the judgment that the learned judge treated the evidence of the expert as a guide and he used it as such in arriving at his conclusion. However, the appellate court can itself examine documents in cases of disputed handwriting and form its own conclusion: see Appea v R (1951) 13 WACA 143. Thus, we have ourselves examined the disputed signatures and compared them with those admitted by the defendant to be genuine (exhibits CW1, CW2, CW3 and CW4) and we have formed the opinion that they were all written by one and the same person and the conveyance, exhibit C, could not in the circumstances be a forgery.

We therefore endorse the conclusions of the learned trial judge on the issue of forgery, namely the defendant totally failed to prove forgery.

It was the further contention of counsel for the defendant that since the defendant had completed or substantially completed the building before the plaintiff turned up to lay claim, the court erred in refusing to apply the provisions of section 1 of the Land Development (Protection of Purchasers) Act, 1960 (Act 2). We think the conditions which must exist before the provisions of section 1 of Act 2 can be invoked were absent in the present case. Section 1 (1) of Act 2 reads:

“1. (1) Where – (a) a person (in this section referred to as “the purchaser”) has taken a conveyance of land in a prescribed area at any time after 31st December,

[p.312] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 301

1944 (whether before or after the date on which the area became a prescribed area), and (b) the purchaser or a person claiming through him has in good faith erected a building on the land, and (c) proceedings are brought to obtain a possession order in relation to the land on the ground that a person other than the purchaser or a person claiming through him is entitled to the land, the court, where it considers that if this Act had not been passed the possession order would fall to be made by reason that the conveyance taken by the purchaser did not operate to confer on him the title to the land, but that to make the order would cause hardship and injustice to the person against whom it would fall to be made, may, instead of making the possession order, make an order providing that the conveyance taken by the purchaser shall be deemed for all purposes to have operated to confer on him the title to the land.”

Some of the conditions to be proved by the party seeking protection under Act 2 are that he is a purchaser, he took a conveyance and has in good faith constructed a building on the disputed land. These are all questions of fact to be determined by the trial court. But what are the findings of the learned judge in these matters? His findings have been neatly stated in the following passages in the judgment:

“The defendant said he purchased the land from Willie Cleland and Amaa Cleland. He does not say in what year he purchased the land and he does not tell us whether the sale was by customary grant or was by deed.

All he produced in evidence of his title was the will of G F O Cleland together with the probate. His vendors were not called as witnesses to support his claim that he took a conveyance of the land in dispute.”

Pausing here for a moment, is this not a clear indication that the defendant never had a conveyance within the meaning of the section? As was stated by Lord Cairns LC in Credland v Potter (1874) 10 Ch App 8 at 12, “the word `conveyance’… denotes an instrument which carries from one person to another an interest in land.” In Ankrah v Ofori [1974] 1 GLR 185 at 191, CA, Azu Crabbe CJ said:

“In my judgment, the word `conveyance’ in subsection (1) (a) of section 1 [of Act 2] must be taken to bear its ordinary meaning, that is, an instrument in writing transferring title to land, and does not include an agreement for sale.

[p.313] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 301

Quite apart from the absence of a conveyance, the defendant failed to show whether the sale to him was in accordance with the customary law, as this could have brought his transaction within the interpretation clause, section 4. This section provides that the expression “conveyance” includes “a transfer of land by customary law.” The learned judge in Ankrah v Ofori (supra) after discussing other possible meanings of the term “conveyance” arrived at the following conclusion at 192:

“In my judgment, ‘conveyance’ for the purposes of the Land Development (Protection of Purchasers) Act, 1960 (Act 2), comprehends that which is a conveyance either in the ordinary meaning among lawyers, or in the enlarged meaning given to the term by the interpretation section of the Act.”

Again, the defendant failed to name the purchase price, if any, as this would have enabled the court to double that price for him to pay in case the other conditions of the Act had been fulfilled.

But the finding of the absence of good faith on the part of the defendant dealt a final and decisive blow to the application of Act 2. This finding could not be faulted. We may here refer to that part of the judgment which dealt with good faith. The learned judge stated as follows:

“The defendant has not said that he has constructed the building in good faith. He does not seem to have made a search to see whether or not there were any transactions affecting the land which might be adverse to his interest therein. He appears to have constructed the building in a hurry. The Inspector of Police at Odorkor Police Station said in evidence that in April 1977 when he went to the site he saw a wooden structure and a water tank which the plaintiff claimed as his. There were sand and stones. He also saw workers digging a trench on the land. He asked the men to stop.

After this the defendant went to the police station and was asked to produce his document on the land. The plaintiff produced his but the defendant failed to do so. At this point the work on the land had only just commenced. However in an affidavit sworn on 26 May 1977 the defendant in paragraph 6 thereof said that `I have since the land in dispute was granted to me, put up a substantial building thereon. That the said building has been roofed and completed. It is also occupied.’ The building if it was put up in April and May 1977 must have been constructed at a great speed.”

[p.314] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 301 We think, on the evidence, the defendant acted recklessly in putting up the building. He just wanted to steal a march over the plaintiff, because despite the adverse claim being made by the plaintiff and indeed, in the teeth of opposition from the plaintiff, he went ahead to construct the building, completely indifferent as to the outcome of the dispute. There is no doubt that he put up the building in bad faith; and as rightly found by the learned judge, what the defendant sought to do was to gain title to the land by hurriedly putting up a building on the land. In the circumstances, section 1 of Act 2 could not possibly be applied for his benefit.

The last but very important ground argued by learned counsel for the defendant was that in view of the fact that G F O Cleland died on 30 April 1966 and probate of his will dated 26 November 1959 was granted by the High Court to his executors on 13 December 1967 and the further fact that neither at the date of the testator’s death nor of the grant of probate was there in effect a conveyance of his interest in the land in dispute to anyone other than the devisees under the will, Danso conveyed nothing to Badu by exhibit D. By exhibit C, George F O Cleland had, in fact, conveyed nothing to Danso which in December 1964 Danso could have conveyed by exhibit D to Badu, the plaintiff’s vendor; because exhibit C, not having been registered as at the death of George F O Cleland, was null and void. So the conveyance, exhibit A, from Badu to the plaintiff was also a nullity. Learned counsel submitted that it followed irresistibly that the plaintiff obtained no title to the land and since this was an action for a declaration of title to land the plaintiff could not establish title based on a document which was a nullity.

On a critical examination of this apparently impressive argument, we are of the view that it is not correct to say that at the time of the death of Cleland on 30 April 1966, there was no valid conveyance of his interest in the disputed land to any person other than the devisees who happened to be the defendant’s vendors. At the death of Cleland his will just became operative and no more. For his intentions as expressed in the will did not have any legal effect until the will had been admitted to probate. Probate was granted to the named executors on 13 December 1967, more than a year after his death. Consequently, it was only after 13 December 1967, that the provisions of the will could be carried out.

Furthermore, the executors should have transferred the legal estate in the land to the defendant’s vendors by formally executing a vesting deed or assent in their favour. The contention of counsel for the defendant would have been valid in the absence of the Administration of Estates Act, 1961 (Act 63). Before the passing of that Act, real estate devised under a will vested in the devisee at the death of the

[p.315] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 301 testator; because the English Land Transfer Act of 1897 which on the death of a testator vested the property first in the personal representative never applied in this country and so they had no power to assent to its vesting in the devisee: see France v Quartey (1925) DCt ‘21-’25, 194. In that case Michelin J at 196 stated the position in the following words, “The law simply regarded the will as a conveyance of the property.” And in Hammond v Lamptey, High Court, Accra 10 May 1961, unreported Ollennu J (as he then was) made the position even clearer when he said:

“First, the real estate: by the law applicable to this country which is the same as was in England in 1874 and before 1898, as under the Wills Act, 1873, real estate devised vested at the death of the testator in the devisee thereof and not in the personal representative. The devisee therefore takes the devised property without the necessity of formal conveyance thereof to him by the executor.”

In Brown v Darko [1961] GLR (Pt II) 539, the same view was expressed by the same learned judge where at 541-542 he said:

“But neither the said Land Transfer Act, 1897 [60 & 61 Vict., c. 65], nor the Conveyancing Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 37] applies to Ghana they not being statutes of general application in force in England on July 24, 1874. Under the Wills Act, 1837 [7 Will. 4 and 1 Vict., 26] which is the statute applicable to Ghana, real estate does not vest in personal representatives and so they have no power to assent to its vesting in a beneficiary, or to convey it to such person.

The situation has now been altered completely by the provision in Act 63 which came into effect on 7 June 1961; and the testator Cleland having died after this date, his will was caught squarely within the ambit of this Act. The relevant sections of the Act, ie sections 1 (1), 2 (1) and 96 (1), are as follows:

“1. (1) The movable and immovable property of a deceased person shall devolve on his personal representatives with effect from his death …

2. (1) The personal representatives shall be the representative of the deceased in regard to his movable and immovable property…

96. (1) A personal representative may assent to the vesting, in the form set out in the Third Schedule to this Act, in any person who (whether by devise, bequest, devolution, appropriation or otherwise) may be entitled thereto…”

[p.316] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 301

It is therefore necessary that before carrying out the intentions of the testator, the will must first be admitted to probate and thereafter a beneficiary of any real estate under the will must have a vesting assent executed in his favour by the executors to whom probate has been granted. Until this is done, any purported sale of the real estate by the beneficiary or the devisee will be of no legal consequence and the purchaser thereof will not have a valid title. The defendant’s vendors were in this serious predicament; for the evidence clearly showed that no vesting assent was executed in their favour by the executors in respect of the disputed land and this has still not been done. It followed that they could not transfer or confer a valid and effective title on the defendant.

It must also be observed that even after the vesting assent has been executed, it will still not have legal efficacy until after it has been registered under the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122), and its priority will run from the date of the registration. And this brings us to the question as to whether the will of a testator must also be registered in so far as it relates to an interest in land before it will have legal effect. Counsel for the defendant says nay and counsel for the plaintiff says yes. Learned counsel for the defendant seriously contended that there was no need to register the will or its probate in the Land Registry and since the will in question was registered in the registry of the High Court, that should be sufficient. With respect to learned counsel, the contention cannot be right. Any will whose provisions affect any land in Ghana should be registered after the death of the testator under Act 122; if it is not so registered, it will be ineffective in so far as that land is concerned and the beneficiary or the devisee of the said land cannot claim priority over other registered documents affecting the same land.

Provision for registration of wills has been made in section 26 (3) of Act 122. It reads as follows:

“(3) The will of a testator dying on or after the 24th day of March, 1833, shall, so far as regards any land affected thereby, take such effect from the death of the testator if registered within such of the following periods as is applicable, that is to say, (a) in the case of the will of a person dying in Ghana, the period of two months next after the death of the testator;

(b) in the case of the will of a person dying abroad, the period of eighteen months next after the death of the testator; and in any other case, the will shall take effect from the date of its registration.

[p.317] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 301

The registration in this context refers to registration in any of the registry offices of the Land Registry which is usually located in the Lands Department and the mode of effecting the said registration has been clearly set out in Part III of the Act. There is no mention of registration of wills, or any other instrument for that matter, in the registry of the High Court by the Act. Thus the so-called registration of the will and its probate in the High Court registry did not comply with the provisions of Act 122.

The testator, Cleland, died after 1833. To be precise, he died on 30 April 1966 in Ghana. That being the case, his will, “so far as regards any land affected thereby”, should have been registered in the Lands Registry by 30 June 1966 so as to take its priority from the date of his death, But this was not done and it has not been done up to date. Consequently, the devise of the disputed land as contained in the said will made in favour of his three children (through whom the defendant claimed title) is ineffective and cannot claim priority of any kind over exhibits A, C and D, all of which were properly registered after their execution. The fact that exhibit C was registered in 1972 and after the death of Cleland did not detract from the plaintiff’s title to the land. Late registration only meant that exhibit C was ineffective until 11 August 1972 when it was in fact registered. Before the registration the conveyance, exhibit C, was not a nullity as contended by learned counsel for the defendant. This is in accord with the spirit and tenor of section 24 (1) of the Act. That section provides, inter alia, that any instrument affecting land and executed after the commencement of the Act “shall be of no effect until it is registered.”

Of course, we are aware of the different interpretations which this court has put on this section 24 (1) of the Act. For example, in Asare v Brobbey [1971] 2 GLR 331, CA the mortgage deed on which the case of the respondents depended was not registered under the Land Registry Act and the Court of Appeal held, among other things, that the fact of non-registration defeated the respondents’ case. But the court emphasised that if the words “shall be of no effect” were to be taken alone, they would mean that an unregistered instrument would be a complete nullity; but the additional words “until registered” meant that it was not since it could be rendered effective by registration. In other words, its effectiveness was non-existent until it was registered. However, it appears Odoi v Hammond [1971] 1 GLR 375, CA lends support to the contention of learned counsel. Here there were conflicting instruments made by the same grantor. Azu Crabbe JA (as he then was) held that the earlier document was null and void and of no effect for lack of registration. This interpretation was followed in the later case of Amefinu v Odametey [1977] 2 GLR 135, CA. However,

[p.318] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 301 in Ntem v Ankwandah [1977] 2 GLR 452, CA, Apaloo CJ held the view that the interpretation given to section 24 (1) of the Act in Odoi v Hammond by Azu Crabbe JA (as he then was) was rejected by implication in Asare v Brobbey. The most important of all, Asare v Brobbey was followed in Amefinu v Odametey and in Ussher v Darko [1977] 1 GLR 476, CA. In the latter case, Apaloo CJ reading the judgment of the Court of Appeal said at 493:

“The decision in Asare v. Brobbey (supra) implies that where there is nothing intrinsically invalid about an instrument, section 24 (1) of the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122), does no more than deny it legal efficacy until it has been registered. The Land Registry Act, 1962, did not prescribe a time limit by which an instrument must be registered. This means that the plaintiff can perfect his title by the formality of registration at any time.”

We have had a careful re-reading of the section and we agree with this view as being the correct interpretation of section 24 (1) of the Act. Thus since exhibit C was not a nullity it could be registered at any time after its execution and a belated registration was as good as prompt registration. And since at the time of the registration of exhibit C, the late G F O Cleland had not made any valid and effective transfer of the disputed land to his said children, as already pointed out, there was no basis for the contention of learned counsel.

We are therefore of the opinion that before the cause of action arose, the plaintiff had a valid title to the disputed land and the learned judge was right in upholding the plaintiffs’ claim. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

DECISION Appeal dismissed J A A

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