GHANA COCOA MARKETING BOARD vs. AGBETTOH AND OTHERS [1984-86] 1 GLR 122
8 November 1984 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 16 min read
[1984] SLR (CA) 18Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Francis v Municipal Councillors of Kuala Lumpur [1962] 3 All ER 633; [1962] 1 WLR 1411, PC.
(2) Bank of Ghana v Nyarko [1973] 2 GLR 265, CA.
(3) Vine v National Dock Labour Board [1957] AC 488; [1957] 2 WLR 106; [1956] 3 All ER 939, HL; reversing in part [1956] 1 QB 658; [1956] 2 WLR 311; [1956] 1 All ER 1.
(4) Ayiwah v Badu [1963] 1 GLR 86, SC.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the judgment of the High Court declaring the retirement of the plaintiffs unlawful and granting perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from ejecting them from their bungalows. The facts are fully stated in the judgment of the court.
COUNSEL
Quansah for the appellants.
Kwame Tetteh for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO CJ
Apaloo C.J. delivered the judgment of the Court. The respondents (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) were until 26 November 1979 employees of the appellant board. They all held very senior positions and the evidence shows that they enjoyed the full confidence of the board. Just under a fortnight before their removal or the purported termination of their appointments, two of the plaintiffs, the first and third plaintiffs, were rewarded with promotions. The professed reason for their retirement was that “a re-organisation exercise was currently going on.” Their so-called retirement was “to take immediate effect.”
It seems a little odd that if this was the true reason, this fact should not have been known before their promotions. Mr Mumuni Bawumia,
[p.125] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 122 the self-same chairman of the interim management committee of the board, who communicated the glad tidings of their promotion to the plaintiffs on 13 November 1979, conveyed the painful news of their retirement to them on the 26 idem. The plaintiffs were servants of the appellant board (hereinafter referred to as the defendant board) and had severally entered into written contracts of personal service with it.
The available evidence shows that save salaries, the board had a stereotype type of letter of appointment and in it provision is made by which the board can dispense with the plaintiffs’ services. The latter have a corresponding right. For instance, clause 7 of the first plaintiff’s letter of appointment (exhibit 6) provides that:
“The appointment may be terminated by either party on giving three months’ notice or payment of three months’ salary in lieu of notice. The Board, however, reserves the right to dismiss you summarily on grounds of indiscipline and inefficiency.”
The charge of indiscipline or inefficiency cannot truthfully be levelled against the plaintiffs. As we said, at least two were promoted just a fortnight before their removal.
So their abrupt and hardly just termination or retirement must be put to a cause other than indiscipline or inefficiency. The proffered ground that their services had to be dispensed with because of a re-organisation was hardly credible. If this was the case, it would have been a grave policy matter which the board could not have been unaware of when two of the plaintiffs were rewarded for what, we can only conclude, was their loyal and meritorious services. At all events, the learned judge was unable to accept that as the true ground for their enforced retirement. There is no suggestion that the chairman of the interim management committee had any particular aversion for the plaintiffs or took any servants whose integrity and competence were in doubt. But all human conduct is inspired by some motive.
The plaintiffs say the chairman retired or purported to retire them in pursuance of the implementation or purported implementation of paragraph 35 of a government white paper on the report of the Archer Committee of Enquiry into the Affairs of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board popularly called, the Archer Report. Since a great deal of discussion both in the court below and before us turned on a proper interpretation of this paragraph, it is necessary to set it out in full. It reads:
“All senior officers of the Cocoa Marketing Board, the Produce Inspection Division, the Produce Buying Division and the Cocoa Marketing Company who have not been dismissed are to be redeployed outside the cocoa industry on the formation of the Cocoa Council. Those affected are all senior officers of the rank
[p.126] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 122 of Deputy Chief Executive, Directors, Deputy Directors, General Managers and Head of the various departments and units.”
This paragraph does not give rise to any serious problem of interpretation. It is clear from its wording that on the strength of the Archer Report, the government ordered the dismissal of some senior officers. There was apparently no reason or justification to dismiss others, although they were surplus to the requirements or to the reasonable needs of the board. Although redundant, it must have been felt that when a new council which was recommended to take over the functions of the defendant board came into being these categories of senior officers should be given jobs outside the cocoa industry. The clear implication of this is that it is the new Cocoa Council that would see about their redeployment or at any rate, those senior officers of unblemished record were not to be denied their livelihood until the new Cocoa Council was formed.
The learned judge found that the only reason why the plaintiffs were purportedly retired was the interim management committee’s belief that that paragraph entitled it to retire the plaintiffs. The judge held that that was not the case. Having ourselves read and considered that paragraph against the known facts, we find ourselves in respectful agreement with the judge. We think the interim management committee misappreciated the true purport of paragraph 35 and was in error in thinking that it entitled it to retire the plaintiffs.
What legal position resulted from this? At the very least, it can be said that the purported termination which is, in fact, a removal from office, did not accord with the service contract between the board and the plaintiffs. They were not removed for indiscipline or inefficiency. They were given no notice of their projected removal. In those circumstances, it cannot be gainsaid that the action of the interim management committee was unlawful. The question is: what legal remedy is open to them against the board? This being a contract of service which is not ordinarily specifically performable, the unlawful action of the board can only sound in damages. To seek to enjoin the specific performance of a contract of this sort, will turn a contract of service into a status of servitude: see Francis v Municipal Councillors of Kuala Lumpur [1962] 3 All ER 633, PC and Bank of Ghana v Nyarko [1973] 2 GLR 265 at 272, CA. Accordingly, had the rights and liabilities of the parties fallen to be decided only by the contracts of employment, the plaintiffs could only lawfully content themselves with damages; no more.
But the plaintiffs say that their right to remain in the service of the board which was established wholly from public funds, was guaranteed by constitutional provision and that the action of the board in
[p.127] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 122 purporting to dispense with their services when there was no just cause for it was violative of the constitutional injunction and was therefore invalid. It was for this reason that they claimed that they were still lawfully in the service of the board and invited the judge to so declare. The judge agreed and so declared.
There is no direct oral evidence of the respective dates on which the plaintiffs were employed by the board. The personnel manager of the board produced in evidence the letters of appointment of the first and third plaintiffs. These show that they were appointed in September 1972 and May 1977 respectively. Then as now, there was no extant Constitution on which the plaintiffs could pitch their claim. But they say that their right to non-removal without just cause, so to speak, stemmed from the Constitution, 1969 and that although that Constitution was suspended and then abrogated, such right was preserved by various legislative enactments.
To determine this, one must first look at the source on which their claim is bottomed. It is article 138(b) of the Constitution, 1969 and it says: “No member of the public services shall be … dismissed or removed from office or reduced in rank or otherwise punished without just cause.” There was some suggestion in the court below that the plaintiffs were not dismissed but retired. That is a verbal point of no substance. If the plaintiffs were retired and barred from holding the office from which they earned their living, it would be a perfect use of language to say they were removed from office. The next question is: was there just cause for their removal? There cannot have been any. The board misappreciated the true meaning of paragraph 35 of the white paper and thinking that it empowered it to do so, dispensed with the services of the plaintiffs and sought to justify its action by reliance on that paragraph.
An alternative ground relied upon in the court below that it was done in pursuance of a “reorganisation exercise” was found to be false. The judge’s finding of fact on this issue was fully justified and we find no ground to differ from it.
The next question is: were the plaintiffs members of the public service? That depends upon the category of employees the constitutional umbrella sought to cover. The extent of the coverage depends upon the meaning ascribed to “public office” by the Constitution, 1969. Article 172 of the Constitution says:
“‘public service’ includes service in any civil capacity of the Government, the emoluments attaching to which are paid directly from the Consolidated Fund or directly out of moneys provided by Parliament and service with any statutory Corporation established entirely out of public funds or moneys provided by Parliament.”
[p.128] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 122
(The emphasis is ours.) There can be no doubt that the appellant board is one of the type of statutory corporations whose servants can, on the true intendment of the article, be regarded as members of the “public service” as contemplated by article 138. They therefore acquired a right not to be removed from their offices without just cause. We have already concurred with the judge’s holding that there was no just cause for their removal or retirement or both. Accordingly, if the plaintiffs can show that the constitutional guarantee against removal without just cause enured to them in the rather different constitutional set-up in November 1979 then they are “home and dry.”
The Constitution, 1969 was suspended on 14 January 1972 by section 2 of the National Redemption Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1972. But section 5 of the Proclamation expressly preserved the “public services” as defined by article 172 of that Constitution. Clearly, rights which subsisted under the Constitution, 1969 were equally preserved. The Constitution (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Decree, 1979 (AFRCD 56) by subsection (2) of section 8 in like manner preserved such rights in language which admits of no doubt. It provides that:
“(2) Any person having rights immediately before the coming into force of this Decree under any Constitution formerly in force shall retain such rights notwithstanding the abrogation of any such Constitution.”
The only Constitution which was in force before the promulgation of the Decree was the Constitution, 1969 on which the plaintiffs founded their action. The conclusion is inescapable that in November 1979 when the board purported to remove the plaintiffs from office, they were protected against removal or retirement unless just cause existed. We have already held that no such cause existed. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ purported retirement violated the constitutional injunction laid down by article 138 (b) of the Constitution, 1969. That was precisely the holding of the court below. We think that holding was perfectly right and ought to be affirmed.
Had the plaintiffs been appointed to the service of the board on dates subsequent to 24 September 1979 when the Constitution, 1979 came into force, a contention that they enjoyed constitutional guarantee against removal without just cause would not have been open to them. This is because that Constitution defined public service in a manner that excludes service with the appellant board. It says by article 154(1) that:
“154 (1) The public services of Ghana shall include the Civil Service, the Judicial Service, The Audit Service, the Education
[P.129] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 122
Service … and public corporations, other than those set up as commercial ventures…
(The emphasis is ours.) It does not seem open to argument that the appellant board was established as a commercial venture. The blanket protection which the Constitution, 1969 provided for all statutory corporations was no longer available. The difference between the 1969 and 1979 definitions of “public service” was deliberate and was borne out of experience. It seems the intention was to leave unhampered, options available to commercial organisations to dispense with staff whose retention would not make, so to speak, commercial sense. Perhaps it made good business sense that commercial corporations should be left to stand on their own feet, and, in the employment and deployment of staff, should not be hamstrung by constitutional niceties characteristic of the civil service.
We have already observed that the normal remedy open to a servant who was dismissed or removed in breach of his contract of service, is pecuniary damages. This is because of the confidential nature of the relationship. But this is not an inflexible legal rule. There have been cases in which a purported removal of a servant from office was held to be a nullity. Mainly these are cases in which irrespective of the terms of the contract of employment, the determination of the contract is regulated by legislation.
Vine v National Dock Labour Board [1957] AC 488, HL is such a case. It was held in the High Court and affirmed by both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords that the dismissal of a servant was invalid. One of the judges of the House of Lords, Lord Keith of Avonholm explained, inter alia, at 507-508 as follows:
“This is not a straightforward relationship of master and servant. Normally, and apart from the intervention of statute, there would never be a nullity in terminating an ordinary contract of master and servant. Dismissal might be in breach of contract and so unlawful but could only sound in damages.
Here we are concerned with a statutory scheme of employment. One of its objects was to do away with the evils of casual employment at the docks. Another was to secure a regular supply of labour … These objects are concisely stated in the scheme, echoing the words of the statute.”
The court accordingly affirmed a lower court’s decision that the purported dismissal of an employee under a statutory scheme was a nullity, and so declared. In this case, the injunction against removal of public servants without just cause was laid down by the fundamental law of the land – the Constitution. And such provision was made to
[p.130] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 122 avoid a known and well-articulated mischief – the arbitrary dismissal or removal or both from office of public servants by the executive. At paragraph 612 of its report, the Constitutional Commission, 1968, on whose report the Constitution, 1969, was based observed:
“The period between 1960 and the 24 February 1966 coup d’etat saw a determined effort to further the objectives of the planned and sustained attack on the Public Services culminating when presidential power reached its apogee, in arbitrary dismissals involving a number of high-ranking civil servants and some top brass police and military officers… With the successive wave of dismissals of public servants and the growing overweening of political interference all round giving rise sometimes to patronage, favouritism and nepotism the Public Services and in particular the Civil Service began to lose their vitality, initiative, neutral bearing and sense of purposeful direction.”
It is the sentiment expressed in this paragraph that motivated the Constituent Assembly of 1969 to insert article 138 on which the plaintiffs take their stand. The desirability of according constitutional protection to public officers so eloquently expressed in 1968 is still valid. The only respect in which experience has necessitated a change of heart, is in respect of public corporations formed as commercial ventures. That change of heart was reflected in the definition the Constitution, 1979 gave to the public service in article 154 (1).
In seeking a reversal of the judgment of the court below, the board complained in ground 2 of its grounds of appeal, that the judgment ordering reinstatement of the plaintiffs was wrong because there “were no special circumstances” about contracts of service between the plaintiffs and the board and that their breach was properly redressable by damages. We believe we have answered that complaint already. The special feature of this otherwise ordinary contract of personal service is that its unjust determination was forbidden by a constitutional enactment.
It cannot be suggested with anything approaching reason, that the appellant board is entitled to do an act forbidden by the Constitution of the State.
Although the board complained about the order of reinstatement, the judge did not eo nomine make such an order. As a relief, this was not sought on the writ or statement of claim. The plaintiffs were content with seeking declaration and an order enjoining the board from interfering with their quiet enjoyment of their “residential accommodation.” They also indorsed on the writ, claims for specified sums of money as arrears of salary and other perks.
[p.31] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 122
After the chairman of the interim management committee concluded his evidence, the plaintiffs filed without leave, a notice of amendment in which they sought to add to the endorsement on the writ, the word “Reinstatement.” It is not the sort of amendment that the plaintiffs can competently make without leave under Order 28, r 2 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules. They did not seek and were not granted leave by the court. Had the court granted them leave under Order 28, r 1, they would still have had to comply with Order 28, r 7, otherwise the leave would become ineffective: see Ayiwah v Badu [1963] 1 GLR 86 at 89, SC. Accordingly, there was no valid claim for reinstatement and the court cannot be held to have granted such relief. The holding against the plaintiffs on this procedural point avails the board little, because if the removal of the plaintiffs from office in the face of a clear constitutional injunction was a nullity, as we think it was, the question of reinstatement did not arise.
It follows that in so far as the plaintiffs sought to have it declared that their purported retirements were a nullity inasmuch as they violated a constitutional injunction, they were entitled to that declaration. The plaintiffs did not themselves seek the declarations in those terms and beyond stating that the respondents were “entitled to all the reliefs indorsed on their writ”, the judge below did not direct his mind to the declaration sought. But inasmuch as what we have held can be said to be the substance of the declaratory reliefs granted to the plaintiffs, we affirm them.
With regard to the claim in the nature of perpetual injunction to restrain the board from ejecting them from their bungalows and the payment of salaries, we see some practical difficulties. It would be unreal to assume that the status quo in 1979 still exists five years afterwards in 1984. Clearly, the plaintiffs have not worked for the board all these years. They themselves were under an obligation to minimise their losses by seeking and obtaining alternative jobs. For all we know, they may well have found themselves other jobs and have been comfortably settled. To affirm today an order which secures them bungalows which they only had when they were in the actual service of the board or to order that salaries be paid to them for those years when they did not work for the board, albeit through no fault of their own, would be to set our face against realities. The reality of the situation is that although de jure they are still technically in the service of the board, de facto they have ceased to be so since November, 1979.
In all the circumstances, we think we should mark our disapproval of their unconstitutional retirement by ordering that the appellant board pay each as compensation, two years’ salary from November 1979. They should also, of course, receive their other entitlements under their contracts of service or under the board’s scheme. In so far as the
[p.132] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 122 judge’s orders properly construed, enjoin the board to keep them as it were perpetually in their residential accommodation and to pay them salaries and other benefits as if they were in actual rather than constructive service of the board, those orders ought not to be allowed to stand. We disaffirm and set them aside. Save as varied, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
As the plaintiffs have substantially succeeded in this appeal, we order that the appellant board pay their costs which we fix at ¢3,000 to all the plaintiffs.
DECISION Appeal dismissed Orders varied LKA
