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[1984] SLR (CA) 22Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

KOFI vs. KUMANSAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 116

7 November 1984 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 10 min read

Cite as[1984] SLR (CA) 22
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OSCOLAKOFI v KUMANSAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 116 [1984] SLR (CA) 22
APAKOFI v KUMANSAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 116, [1984] SLR (CA) 22 (Ghana).
BluebookKOFI v KUMANSAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 116, [1984] SLR (CA) 22 (Ghana Ct. App. 1984).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Vanderpuye v. Botchway (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 16; [1956]1 A.C. 501, [1956] 2 W.L.R. 1080, P.C.

(2) Afuah (Okomfo) v. Sarbah [1974] 1 G.L.R. 147.

(3) Donkoh v. Nkrumah [1964] G.L.R. 739, S.C.

(4) Practice Note (Kwami and Kofi v. Adzonu) [1961] G.L.R. 1.

(5) Bonney v. Yankum [1961] G.L.R. 133, S.C.

(6) Codjoe v. Kwatchey (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 371.

(7) Anane v. Krah [1966] G.L.R. 782.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decision of the High Court, Sekondi reversing the judgment of the trial district court in favour of the appellant in an action for damages for trespass to a piece of land. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court delivered by Abban J.A.

COUNSEL

E.B. Gaisie for the appellant.

Kwesi Epton for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.

Abban J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. The appellant sued the respondent in the District Court Grade II, Shama in respect of a piece of land situated and lying at Shama. The trial district court after the hearing entered judgment for the appellant. On appeal to the High Court, Sekondi by the respondent, the said judgment was reversed and judgment was entered for the respondent. It is against the judgment of the High Court that the appellant has appealed.

The appellant’s case was that he gave the land to one Afadu for farming purposes when the land was an outskirts land. Afadu cultivated coconut and plantain farms on it. Later when the town of

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Shama began to develop, the land became an urban land, and it became useful for building purposes only. The appellant said he therefore sold portions of the land as building plots to about five purchasers, one of whom was Egya Kobena Onyewhee. The latter went on to the land and started to construct a house thereon. But the respondent prevented him from so doing. Egya Onyewhee reported the respondent’s conduct to the appellant. The appellant got in touch with the respondent. Both the appellant and the respondent later went to the disputed land in order to show their respective boundaries. But in the long run the parties could not agree on any of the boundaries. According to the appellant, on the suggestion of the respondent it was agreed that the dispute was to be settled amicably later on and the parties left the land.

The appellant said the settlement never came on but the respondent went to the land and unilaterally fixed his boundary pillars. It was this conduct of the respondent that precipitated the action. The appellant’s writ reads:

“The plaintiff claims from the defendant all that piece or parcel of land situated and being at Saanasi, Shama, bounded on the north by Anona family, on the south by Kofi Badu’s family, on the east by Ekitsi’s family and on the west by River Trapo. That the land being bona fide property of the plaintiff, the defendant without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff entered the said land and put up cement pillars indicating that the said land is his.”

The respondent, however, contended that the disputed area formed part and parcel of his ancestral land and his family had been farming on it from time immemorial when it was an outskirts land. But since the land became town land and was no longer suitable for farming, portions of the land were allocated by him to members of his family who had built houses thereon. The respondent said he also granted a portion of it to the Methodist Church of Shama. But the church encroached on other portions of his land which had not been granted to the church and in order to prevent further encroachment by the said church, the respondent caused a plan of the whole area (exhibit 1) to be made and this was about five years before the dispute arose.

The respondent maintained that the pillars he fixed were on the correct boundary line between his land and that of the appellant and that they were not fixed on the appellant’s land. He however admitted that he prevented the appellant’s grantees from putting up their buildings because the portions which the appellant granted to those persons were within his (respondent’s) land.

It is significant to note that there were no pleadings in the case quite apart from the writ of summons and in such cases it is the substance that matters and not the form of the writ. That is where there

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were no pleadings the court must not only look at the wording of the writ but should also have recourse to the whole evidence in order to ascertain the real nature of the claim: see Vanderpuye v. Botchway (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 6 at 21, P.C. and Okomfo Afuah v. Sarbah [1974] 1 G.L.R. 147 at 153: See also Donkoh v. Nkrumah [1964] G.L.R. 739, S.C.

The substance of the claim, going by the evidence, is essentially that of trespass because the appellant acknowledged that the respondent’s family has land which forms boundary with the land in dispute and it was the fixing of pillars along this common boundary by the respondent that gave rise to the action. The question then was, whether the pillars which the respondent fixed were on the correct boundary line between the parties or whether the respondent unlawfully crossed the said boundary and fixed those pillars in the appellant’s land. In the latter case the respondent’s conduct would have amounted to trespass.

In this appeal the judgment of the High Court was criticised on two main grounds. It was first contended by learned counsel for the appellant that on the evidence and on the submissions made before him, the learned High Court judge should have affirmed the judgment of the trial district court. Secondly, learned counsel submitted that the learned High Court judge misconceived the issues at stake and erroneously allowed the appeal.

We find these criticisms unjustified. We are rather of the view that it was the trial magistrate who did not only misconceive the issues before him but also gave judgment which was wholly against the weight of evidence that was adduced before him. It was the appellant who alleged that the respondent had trespassed on his land and the respondent having denied trespass the burden was upon the appellant to prove, in this particular case, that the respondent crossed over the known boundary (which had existed between his family land and that of the respondent) on to the appellant’s land. The evidence of the appellant was very sketchy and apart from merely asserting that the respondent had placed cement pillars on the disputed land, he never even attempted to prove any existing boundary different from the boundary along which the respondent put the pillars. In a dispute like this the appellant should, at least, have adduced evidence either by himself or through witnesses who have their lands around the area. Or he could have called as witnesses members of his family or grantees who occupy the area near the disputed boundary.

In his evidence the appellant even failed to give the names of his boundary owners. Having given the particulars of his boundaries in his writ, he should at least have mentioned these particulars in his evidence. As already stated, he never called any of his boundary owners. Neither did he call any of the persons to whom he allegedly

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sold portions of his land, and what was worse, the extent of his land was never proved. The only witness called by the appellant was one Mame Twiba. Her evidence was so useless that the respondent, rightly in our view, did not see the need to cross-examine her.

At the close of the case for the parties no need had arisen for the land to be inspected and the parties also never asked for any inspection of the locus in quo. Yet the trial magistrate decided to inspect the land.

It must be borne in mind that the main purpose of an inspection of the locus in quo should be to clear a doubt which has arisen during the course of the hearing and not to find evidence either to support or destroy the case of one party or the other. In the present case, the magistrate visited the locus to collect further evidence. This is obvious from the judgment. For example, there was no evidence from the appellant himself or his only witness as to the distance of encroachment into the appellant’s land by the respondent. Indeed, no measurements of any sort was given by the appellant or his witness and no measurements were taken by the trial magistrate himself at the locus in quo. Yet the trial magistrate managed to get the figures fifteen feet and fourteen feet respectively, as the distance of incursion made into the appellant’s land by the respondent. It is difficult to know where he got those figures from.

From the inspection report it appears the trial magistrate got a lot of information from one Kofi Badu and A.K. Arthur, persons he found at the locus in quo, and he ought to have recalled those persons when the court re-assembled so as to give the respondent opportunity to cross-examine them. But the magistrate refused to do so in contravention of the laid down practice as set out in the case of Practice Note (Kwami and Kofi v. Adzonu) [1961] G.L.R. 1, C.A.

On the issue of the controversial eastern boundary, the magistrate after he had given judgment for the appellant made consequential orders, one of which reads as follows: “The plaintiff should demarcate his eastern boundary in the presence of the defendant and Kofi Badu within a month.” In other words, the trial magistrate acknowledged that the plaintiff could not prove any clearly defined eastern boundary, otherwise he would not have made that order. If that is the case, how did he come to the conclusion that the respondent had crossed over the common eastern boundary and placed the cement pillars on the appellant’s land? Surely the trial magistrate’s judgment was clearly against the weight of evidence and the learned High Court judge had every right to interfere with it; and in so doing he was not debarred from coming to his own conclusions on the evidence: see Bonney v. Yankum [1961] G.L.R. 133, S.C. The facts of that case were straightforward and it was incidentally a case from Sekondi which was successfully argued before the then Supreme Court by the very learned

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counsel for the present appellant. The plaintiff and the defendant had each tried to claim ownership and possession of the land in dispute, both of them tracing their root of title to the stool of Dutch Sekondi. The trial local court, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s failure to adduce satisfactory evidence, gave judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal to the Land Court, Sekondi the learned Land Court judge found that there was insufficient evidence to support the plaintiff’s case, yet he held that he was not prepared “to disturb the finding of the local court in favour of the plaintiff” On further appeal to the Supreme Court by the defendant, the Supreme Court relying on the case of Codjoe v. Kwatchey (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 371 allowed the appeal, holding that in view of the paucity of the evidence in support of the plaintiff’s claim the learned Land Court judge should not have shrunk from setting aside the decision of the trial local court.

In the case of Codjoe v. Kwatchey (supra), Webber C.J. said at 374:

“The Appeal Court is not debarred however from coming to its own conclusion on the facts and where a judgment has been appealed from on the ground of the weight of evidence the Appeal Court can make up its own mind on the evidence; not disregarding the judgment appealed from but carefully weighing and considering it and not shrinking from overruling it if on full consideration it comes to the conclusion that the judgment is wrong…”

Having ourselves carefully examined the evidence, we are of the opinion that the learned High Court judge made a correct assessment of the evidence on record and drew the right conclusions.

Learned counsel for the appellant at the tail end of his argument suggested that there could be an order for retrial because of the irregularities in respect of the locus in quo. Although it was desirable that the trial magistrate should have had the witnesses at the locus in quo re-sworn to narrate their evidence in court when the court reassembled, nevertheless we do not think that, in the circumstances of this particular case, his failure to observe the practice was fatal; especially, as we have found elsewhere in this judgment that the inspection of the locus in quo was absolutely unnecessary and quite superfluous: see Anane v. Krah [1966] G.L.R. 782.

In the circumstances, we affirm the judgment of the High Court.

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

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