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[1984] SLR (CA) 27Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

OPPAN vs. FRANS & CO. LTD. [1984-86] 1 GLR 281

4 April 1984 · ADADE JSC · ≈ 12 min read

Cite as[1984] SLR (CA) 27
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OSCOLAOPPAN v FRANS & CO. LTD. [1984-86] 1 GLR 281 [1984] SLR (CA) 27
APAOPPAN v FRANS & CO. LTD. [1984-86] 1 GLR 281, [1984] SLR (CA) 27 (Ghana).
BluebookOPPAN v FRANS & CO. LTD. [1984-86] 1 GLR 281, [1984] SLR (CA) 27 (Ghana Ct. App. 1984).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Ghassoub v. Bibiani Wood Complex Ltd. [1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 271, C.A.

(2) Eboe v. Eboe [1961] 1 G.L.R. 432.

(3) Saunders v. Awudu (No 2) [1962] 1 G.L.R. 545.

(4) Baiden v. Ansah [1973] 1 G.L.R. 33.

(5) Abudulai v. Agyei II [1976] 1 G.L.R. 185.

(6) Fitouri Krekchi v. United Africa Co. Ltd. (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 266.

(7) Joseph v. Jebeile [1963] 1 G.L.R. 387, S.C.

(8) Cropper v. Smith (1883) 24 Ch.D. 305, C.A.

(9) VGM Holdings Ltd. Re [1941] 3 All E.R. 417.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION before the Court of Appeal for a stay of execution of an order for stay of execution made by the High Court, Sekondi on the ground that the conditions imposed by the court were onerous and inconvenient. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling of Adade J.S.C.

COUNSEL

Bright Gaisie for the applicant.

Dr. Tackie Otoo for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF ADADE J.S.C.

The only question calling for comment is whether this application is competent. The issue was raised by the court suo motu.

On 6 May 1983 the plaintiff recovered judgment against the defendant in the High Court, Sekondi (Ansah-Twum J.) in the total sum of ¢130,500 (¢125,500 special damages and ¢5,000 general damages) with costs of ¢2,500. Dissatisfied with the judgment the defendant has appealed to the Court of Appeal. Pending the appeal the defendant applied to the High Court for a stay of execution.

The application was ruled upon on 8 December 1983, as follows:

“By Court: Upon the applicant’s application it is hereby ordered that execution shall be stayed on condition that the entire judgment debt and costs in this matter be paid into court within

[p.284] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 281 two months from today. If paid the plaintiffs respondents will be entitled to have paid to them the costs awarded.

Justice of the High Court.”

Claiming that the conditions imposed by the High Court are onerous and inconvenient the defendant-judgment debtor has applied to this court under rule 28 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218) for a stay of execution.

In his affidavit, apart from alleging that his chances of succeeding in the appeal “are fair especially on the question of the special damages awarded” and that the plaintiff is a one-man company operate by a man “advanced in age and of paltry means”, the defendant also says that to pay the whole judgment debt into court as ordered by the High Court “would mean [that] I have to sell my landed property as I do not have the liquid cash for this colossal sum, and this will create great hardship on me.” Rules 27 and 28 of L.I. 218 as amended by the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules, 1969 (L.I. 618), and the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules, 1975 (L.I. 1002) read as follows:

“27. (1) An appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution of proceedings under the judgment or decision appealed from except where the Court below or the Court otherwise orders . . .” [For our purposes the other amendments effected by L.I. 1002 are unimportant].

“28 . . . . where under any enactment an application may be made either to the court below or to the Court it shall be made in the first instance to the Court below, but if the court below refuses to grant the application the applicant shall be entitled to have the application determined by the Court.”

Rule 28 of L.I. 218 (as amended by L.I. 618) clearly gives the judgment debtor the right to apply to the Court of Appeal for a stay if a previous application to the High Court is refused. The applicant says that by imposing terms which he finds inconvenient and difficult to fulfil the court virtually refused his application, and this entities him to repeat the application to this court. He founds himself on Ghassoub v. Bibiani Wood Complex Ltd. [1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 271, C.A. Is this argument tenable?

To answer this question we have to be clear as to what we mean by “execution.” We define this by reference to Order 42 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), which defines the “writ of execution” and “issuing execution against any person.” Rule 8 of the said Order reads:

“8. In these Rules the term ‘writ of execution’ shall include writ of fieri facias, capias, sequestration, and attachment, and all

[p.285] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 281 subsequent writs that may issue for giving effect thereto. And the term ‘issuing execution against any party’ shall mean the issuing of any such process against his person or property as under the preceding rules of this Order shall be applicable to the case.”

Order 42, rr. 1-6 prescribes the method of execution where the judgment directs the payment of money or delivery or transfer of property, and rule 7 deals with cases where a person is required to do any act other than the payment of money, or to abstain from doing any act. On the application of these rules and examples of judgments and orders which can be dealt with thereunder: see Eboe v. Eboe [1961] 1 G.L.R. 432 per Ollennu J. (as he then was).

For our purposes, the significance of the above rules is that a judgment creditor is entitled to resort to any of the “writs of execution”, as appropriate, in order to rake in the full benefits of his judgment. If his progression is stopped or even delayed by any order of the court, or if the court imposes any fetters on his freedom to do any act pursuant to Order 42 of L.N. 140A or provisions similar thereto, the court will have stayed execution of the judgment.

Usually a stay is granted on terms. Rarely do the courts grant a stay unconditionally. The Annual Practice (1962 ed), Vol 1, p. 1694 tells us that the terms on which a stay is ordered are a matter of discretion for the judge in the court to which application is made. It is usual to order the costs to be paid to the judgment creditor or his solicitor, but, there is no general rule as regards the judgment debt or damages awarded. The Annual Practice says:

“. . . according to the circumstances (e.g. the probability of their not being recovered if the appeal is successful, and the chances of success in the appeal) the money may be ordered to be paid into Court, or only some part of it. . . Under a Chancery practice of long standing the defendant [judgment debtor] may be ordered to pay the money to the plaintiff [judgment creditor], the plaintiff giving security for repayment if the appeal is successful, or the defendant, if the plaintiff prefers that course, to pay the money into Court.”

In Saunders v. Awudu (No 2) [1962] 1 G.L.R. 545, Apaloo J. (as he then was) applying these principles, and balancing the plaintiff’s entitlement to reap the fruits of [his] judgment “against the equally well settled right of the defendant, that the appeal, if successful should not be nugatory” ordered, in the circumstances of that case, that to achieve an equitable balance between the parties the whole of that judgment debt (£6,000) and costs (150 guineas) should be paid into court within

[p.286] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 281 ten days, the plaintiff to withdraw £2,000 and the 150 guineas costs upon “[entering] into a bond with two sureties in the sum of £1,000 each to refund this sum to the defendant if this appeal is successful.” The report summarises the result of the proceedings as: application [for stay] granted on terms (it may be observed in parenthesis that £6,000 in 1962 may be equivalent to some ¢1 million in 1983 and therefore about ten times the amount involved in this case). See also Baiden v. Ansah [1973] 1 G.L.R. 33 at 40 per Baidoo J. and Abdulai v. Agyei [1976] 1 G.L.R. 185 at 192 per Edward Wiredu J. (as he then was).

The point to be emphasised here is that an order to pay part or even the whole of the judgment debt into court is not an unusual order to make on an application for stay.

The mere fact that a defendant-judgment debtor may find payment inconvenient or onerous cannot be construed as a refusal of the application by the court. The application will have been granted on terms; for so long as the order subsists the plaintiff-judgment creditor is prevented from going into execution, which is thereby suspended. Indeed, in Fitouri Krekchi v. United Africa Co. Ltd. (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 266 the court used the two terms “stay of execution” and “suspending execution” interchangeably. Commenting at 267 on article 8 of the West African (Appeal to Privy Council) Order-in-Council, 1949 the court observed that the said article empowered it to:

“. . . either direct that the judgment shall be carried into execution or that execution thereof shall be suspended pending the appeal, as to the Court shall seem just. . . If [execution] it is to be carried out, then [it] will issue in the ordinary course and subject to such procedure as is prescribed by law for the execution of judgments in the Supreme Court. . . If on the other hand this Court orders that execution shall be suspended, then no further proceedings in execution shall be had. . .”

(The emphasis is mine.)

Therefore staying execution means suspending the enforcement of a judgment under the procedure prescribed by law for enforcing judgments, i.e. in the case of the High Court, Order 42 of L.N. 140A. An order, on an application for stay, to pay the judgment debt into court, as distinct from a judgment in that behalf suspends the invocation of Order 42 of L.N. 140A and is tantamount to a stay of execution.

The question whether a court has granted a stay or refused it can properly be answered by looking at the position of the judgment creditor immediately after the order. Is he free to apply Order 42 to get his money? If he is, then there is no stay; the application was refused.

[p.287] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 281

If he is not, then there is a stay; the application was granted. The conditions for the grant are irrelevant to this question.

I come to the conclusion therefore that in the instant case the High Court, Sekondi granted the defendant’s application for a stay of execution. The order of 8 December 1983 cannot be construed as a refusal.

This conclusion would seem to conflict with the Court of Appeal decision in Ghassoub v. Bibiani Wood Complex (supra) to which our attention was drawn by counsel. Although in that ruling, it is evident that a prior application had been made to the court below, it does not appear that the court, with the greatest respect to their lordships, applied their minds to the legal status of a grant of stay on terms. The matter was not raised. I have no doubt that if the point had been taken, properly argued and the relevant authorities drawn to their lordships’ attention their conclusion might have been different. As it happened, the issue taken here was not discussed at all in that ruling. The case therefore offers no assistance to the applicant herein.

We come back to the basic question: Can the defendant repeat his application in this court? I concede that under rule 28 of L.I. 218, both the High Court and the Court of Appeal have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain an application for stay: see Joseph v. Jebeile [1963] 1 G.L.R. 387 at 388, S.C. per Akufo-Addo J.S.C. (as he then was) where he stated:

“An application to this court for stay of execution under rules 27 and 28 [of L.I. 218] after similar application to the court below has been refused is not in the nature of an appeal from the refusal by the court below. The jurisdiction of this court in such a matter is concurrent with that of the Court below, and the application to this court is a fresh application.”

But the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal cannot be invoked until a condition precedent has been satisfied, viz until the High Court has refused a previous application (see rule 28). Until this eventuality has arisen the Court of Appeal cannot exercise its undoubted jurisdiction to entertain a fresh application: see Cropper v. Smith (1883) 24 Ch.D. 305 at 308-309 where the court considering an analogous provision in the English Rules, observed per Brett M.R. that the jurisdiction [of the Court of Appeal] is alternative and co-ordinate with that of the High Court, but “. . . the Court of Appeal will not exercise its jurisdiction until it knows whether the co-ordinate jurisdiction of the [High Court] has been exercised and how.” His lordship remarked that the Rules of Court, 1875, Order 5B, r. 17 (similar to our rule 28), limits the exercise of the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal in two respects:

[p.288] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 281

(a) there must have been an application to the High Court, and (b) the High Court must have refused the application. The report itself does not tell us explicitly what should happen if the High Court grants the application, but on terms which the judgment debtor does not like. From the dicta in Cropper v. Smith (supra) at 308-309 it would seem that their lordships were of the opinion that in that event the course open to the judgment debtor is an interlocutory appeal.

There is some support for this in Re V.G.M. Holdings Ltd. [1941] 3 All E.R. 417, the headnote reads:

“Where a judge has made an order for a stay of execution which has been passed and entered, he is functus officio, and neither he nor any other judge of equal jurisdiction has jurisdiction to vary the terms of such stay. The only means of obtaining any variation is to appeal to a higher tribunal.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

In that case the Chancery Division (Bennett J.) had granted a stay of execution pending appeal on terms which required the applicant to give security in the sum of £5,000 within four weeks. Unable to provide the security, and with only seven days to the expiry of the four-week deadline, the applicant applied to the same court to be allowed to pay £3,000 into court in satisfaction of the conditions for the stay. The application was dismissed, Morton J. observing at 418: “. . . when a judge has made an order such as that in the present case, the only remedy for [a person] dissatisfied with the order, is to go to the Court of Appeal . . .” (The emphasis is mine.) In that event the judgment debtor will be submitting the terms imposed by the High Court to the Court of Appeal for further consideration: he is appealing. He is not making a fresh application (Joseph v. Jebeile (supra)) invoking the co-ordinate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal.

I am satisfied that the order of the High Court, Sekondi dated 8 December 1983 was not a refusal of the defendant’s application for a stay: it granted it. Accordingly, under the applicable rule 28 of L.I. 218 as amended, a second application to this court does not lie.

It may be contended that rule 21 may save the situation. Under the said rule, as soon as an appeal has been entered (for which see rule 15):

“every application therein shall be made to the [Court of Appeal] and not to the [High Court] but any application may be filed in the [High Court] for transmission to the [Court of Appeal].”

I have given this rule serious consideration but have come to the conclusion that it is not helpful. By making special provisions for applications for stay in the later rules 27 and 28 the law-makers must be deemed to have intended that applications for stay shall be excluded

[p.289] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 281 from the phrase “every application” appearing in the preceding rule 21. For the same reason, I do not consider that in a situation such as this a recourse to the residual “inherent jurisdiction” of the court is open.

In my opinion the present application is incompetent, and ought to be dismissed.

JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF BOISON J.A.

I also agree.

DECISION Application dismissed.

M.C.N.–N.

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