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[1984] SLR (CA) 29Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

REPUBLIC vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS; EX PARTE YEBOAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 91

7 September 1984 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1984] SLR (CA) 29
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS; ex parte YEBOAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 91 [1984] SLR (CA) 29
APAREPUBLIC v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS; ex parte YEBOAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 91, [1984] SLR (CA) 29 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS; ex parte YEBOAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 91, [1984] SLR (CA) 29 (Ghana Ct. App. 1984).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASE REFERRED TO

State v Director of Prisons; Ex parte Schumann [1966] GLR 703, CA.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against a decision of the High Court refusing an application for an order of habeas corpus. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Johnny Hansen for the appellant.

Mrs Joyce Bamford Addo, Ag. Director of Public Prosecutions (with her Sam Baddoo, Chief State Attorney, and Williams, Assistant State Attorney) for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO CJ

On 11 June 1984, his Honour Judge Williams sitting as a district magistrate, in response to a request from the United States Government ordered that the appellant and his female companion be extradited to the United States to face no fewer than fifteen charges of stealing and abetment of stealing—an extraditable crime under section 29 of the Extradition Act, 1960 (Act 22). Pending his surrender, he was ordered to be committed to prison.

The appellant claimed that his imprisonment was unlawful as well as the order for his surrender. He therefore sought from the High Court, an order for his release by the well-known remedy of habeas corpus. In the High Court, the appellant by his counsel challenged the validity of the order surrendering him on a number of legal grounds. Having listened to and considered the very able and detailed submissions made on his behalf, the learned judge felt satisfied that the order for his surrender was well warranted and declined to order his release.

It is his refusal that provoked this appeal. The appellant invites us by counsel to hold that the judge below was in error and that he was entitled to be released. As formulated in the notice of appeal, the ground on which the appellant proposed to invite us to reverse the court below was: “That the learned judge failed to consider the defence put forward by the applicant against the charges levelled by the complainants.”

[p.94] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 91

As a factual point, that ground is hardly accurate. The appellant led no evidence in his defence before the magistrate. He was content to rest his case on submissions alone. These of course, the magistrate considered seriatim and dismissed. The judge observed that the magistrate did so painstakingly.

When hearing commenced before us yesterday, counsel for the appellant did not actually base his contention on this ground. His quarrel with the court below was founded on one sentence in the judge’s holding. The learned High Court judge said:

“I am satisfied on the evidence that the magistrate exhaustively and painstakingly considered the evidence before him. It did not matter that some other judge would have found the evidence insufficient. Provided the judge did consider the evidence as a whole and there was some evidence on record upon which he could commit, that finding by him should not be disturbed. I find that there was some evidence upon which the magistrate could commit.”

It was submitted that the observation by the judge that the conclusion should not be disturbed even if some other judge found the evidence insufficient, was a faulty conception of the legal position and as such appreciation of the matter informed his consideration of the case, his conclusion was vitiated thereby. We profoundly disagree. The judge below was not the committing magistrate. The person who should be satisfied of a case was the committing magistrate. He was so satisfied. The judge of the High Court on a habeas corpus application had a limited duty, namely to see whether there was a prima facie case before the magistrate. If there was, that is sufficient. He would not be entitled to differ from the magistrate even if he had taken a different view of the sufficiency of the evidence unless the holding that such a case existed was manifestly unreasonable. In the instant case, independently of what the magistrate held, the judge also felt that there was evidence on which the magistrate could commit. In our judgment, not only was there some evidence to warrant the committal, but that evidence was more than ample. The respondent produced depositions of a host of witnesses and also tendered documents which linked the appellant directly with the crime. It also called two witnesses who testified orally. As we said, the appellant chose to lead no evidence in rebuttal but was content to resist the requisition for his surrender on legal submissions alone. Without disrespect to counsel, we think this ground of appeal has no merit.

Although it was no part of his ground of appeal, counsel for the appellant sought to contend that the appellant should not be

[p.95] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 91

surrendered because he was in truth going to be punished for a political offence.

There was not a shred of evidence to support this. Counsel then applied to us to grant him leave to lead evidence to show this. This application was, not surprisingly, objected to by counsel for the respondent. But as we ourselves are under an obligation cast on us by section 2 of Act 22 not to order the surrender of a fugitive criminal if his offence is one of a political character or if the requisition for his surrender was made with a view to punishing him for an offence of a political character, we thought we should not deny the appellant this opportunity. The Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (LI 218), r 26, gave us a discretion to allow new evidence on appeal if we thought fit. We exercised our discretion in the appellant’s favour and permitted him to lead this evidence.

That evidence simply destroyed his contention that his offence was of a political character or that the true object of the US Government in seeking his surrender was to punish him for an offence of a political character. According to the appellant, he did intelligence work for the late President Nkrumah and reported on the activities of Ghanaians. His activity in that field ceased with the President’s overthrow in 1966. He said he resumed that work for the late Acheampong at an unspecified time. His so-called intelligence work was apparently unknown to the US Government. He was never arrested or even questioned about this. Although he claimed that he was himself minded to overthrow the US Government, he said he did not have the means to do this and his subversive intention was not manifested in any overt act. It was not suggested that his so-called intention was known to the US Government.

As we see it, the charges brought against him only related to his office as a banker and the evidence shows, prima facie, that he engaged in dishonest activities which damnified his employers, namely the Security Pacific National Bank of Los Angeles and which activities amount to punishable offences both under our law and the Criminal Code of the U.S. In the light of the evidence, to say that the appellant’s extradition was sought because he committed an offence of political character or that the true object of the US Government is to punish him for an offence of a political character, would be plainly contrary to the facts. Indeed, we think this evidence was fabricated when the appellant belatedly realised that he had no valid answer to the charges.

At all events, we do not consider that even if his evidence was true, his acts amounted to a political offence or an offence of a political character within the true intendment of section 2 of Act 22. In State v Director of Prisons; Ex parte Schumann [1966] GLR 703, CA it was held that to constitute an offence of a political character, there must

[p.96] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 91

have been some political disturbance or upheaval or there must have been some physical struggle between two opposing political parties for the mastery of the government of the country or that the offence was committed in association with a political object or with a view to avoiding political persecution or prosecution or such kindred activities. The appellant’s evidence, even if true, did not even begin to show any of these. We think therefore that this contention also fails.

On the available evidence, we think the appellant is a fugitive from justice. The issue of international comity apart, our own treaty obligation requires us to accede to the requisition of the US Government and order the appellant’s surrender. In our opinion, this appeal fails and is dismissed.

DECISION Appeal dismissed.

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