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[1984] SLR (CA) 3Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

ADU vs. KYEREME [1984-86] 1 GLR 1

27 February 1984 · EDWARD WIREDU JA · ≈ 8 min read

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OSCOLAADU v KYEREME [1984-86] 1 GLR 1 [1984] SLR (CA) 3
APAADU v KYEREME [1984-86] 1 GLR 1, [1984] SLR (CA) 3 (Ghana).
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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Establissement Maurel et Prom v. The Legal Adviser of the Gambia (1938) 4 W.A.C.A. 47.

(2) Djomoa v. Amargyei [1961] G.L.R. 170, S.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from a judgment of the High Court, Sunyani upholding a claim by the plaintiff for an order of possession of a house and damages for trespass. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

E. D. Kom for the appellant.

Munufie for the respondent

JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.A.

This appeal is from the judgment of the High Court, Sunyani dated 29 June 1962. By that judgment the court upheld a claim by the plaintiff for an order of possession of house No 85 NT 48, East Sunyani commonly described as Palm Hotel and also awarded him ¢500 damages for trespass against the defendant. The court dismissed the counterclaim by the defendant for both general and special damages against the plaintiff.

[p.3] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 1

“24. (1) It shall not be lawful, without the consent of the State Council concerned, to alienate or pledge any stool property, and any instrument, and any transaction or agreement (whether in writing or not), which purports to effect any such alienation or pledge shall, in the absence of such consent, for all purposes be null and void.”

And finally, reference was made to the case of Establissement Maurel et Prom v. The Legal Adviser of the Gambia (1938) 4 W.A.C.A. 47 at 54 where Coote’s Law of Mortgage, Vol. 1 at p. 170 was quoted verbatim as: “Where a lease contains a covenant not to assign or sublet without licence, no mortgage either by assignment or demise, will be valid unless the licence is obtained.”

Learned counsel for the defendant attacked the judgment appealed from as being wrong. He argued that the provisions of the above statutes and the case referred to above were wrongly interpreted and applied. He submitted that the correct construction and application of the above had the effect of rendering exhibit E null and void ab initio thus nullifying its legal effect and passing no legal title to whoever claimed a legal right under it.

I have carefully read the record of proceedings in this appeal and the judgment appealed from. I have also carefully studied the provisions of the various statutes and the case relied on by the defendant but whilst I share the view of learned counsel for the defendant that certain portions of the judgment appealed from, on the view taken by the learned trial judge on the interpretation of section 75 (1) of Cap. 64 and the applicability of the Establissement case (supra) can be questioned, I think the final conclusion arrived at by the learned trial judge is the right one. To limit the determination of this case on the legal validity of exhibit E, on the facts of this case, would be narrowing the issues to be resolved and this would result in injustice.

I am of the view that whatever may be the legal effect of exhibit E, on the assumption that the defendant’s case is made out (and I have advisedly avoided the odious task of attempting to construe the various statutes relied on by the defendant) I think the question to ask here is whether it would be just and fair to permit the defendant, who already had taken the benefit and advantage under exhibit E and obtained a collosal sum of £1,400 from Kwasi Addae, to raise and rely on the provisions of the above statutes to avoid his own obligations under the same exhibit E? A positive answer to the above question would mean that the defendant can unjustly enrich himself at the expense of Kwasi Addae. Kwasi Addae’s obligation under the transaction culminating in exhibit E was to offer the money which he did. The obligation of the defendant under the transaction was to offer effectively his house as

[p.4] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 1

“(4) The mortgage deed being void ab initio for want of registration with the urban council, the mortgagee had no legal title in the property to transfer same by sale to the purchaser.

(5) The only interest the mortgagee has under the mortgage transaction being only equitable, the mortgagee could not sell the property without obtaining an order of foreclosure from the court.

(6) The learned trial judge erred in holding that a mortgage transaction made in English form is nevertheless governed by customary law of land tenure even though the land is held under a lease.”

It is worth mentioning here that learned counsel for the defendant’s submissions on the above grounds were nothing more than a repetition of his submissions in the court below which were rejected.

The pith of his arguments in this court sought to annul the legal effect of exhibit E and consequently to nullify the sale under which the plaintiff’s claims were founded. Reliance was placed on three legal propositions, namely: First, non-concurrence to the execution of exhibit R by the Sunyani Local Council, a condition which according to learned counsel was a sine qua non to the validity of exhibit E under the Local Government Ordinance, Cap. 64 (1951 Rev.), s. 75 (1) which is in the following language:

“75. (1) Any disposal of any interest or right in land which involves the payment of any valuable consideration or which could, by reason of its being to a person not entitled by customary law to the free use of land, involve the payment of any such consideration, which is made— (a) by a Stool; or (b) by any person who, by reason of his being so entitled under customary law, has acquired possession of such land either without payment of any consideration or in exchange for a nominal consideration;

shall be subject to the concurrence of the Urban or Local Council, as the case may be, for the area concerned, and shall be of no effect unless and until such concurrence has been obtained and certified in writing under the hand of the chairman or clerk of the council.”

Secondly, non-compliance with section 24 (1) of the State Councils (Ashanti) Ordinance, 1962 (No. 4 of 1952) which is also in the following language:

[p.5] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 1

“24. (1) It shall not be lawful, without the consent of the State Council concerned, to alienate or pledge any stool property, and any instrument, and any transaction or agreement (whether in writing or not), which purports to effect any such alienation or pledge shall, in the absence of such consent, for all purposes be null and void.”

And finally, reference was made to the case of Establissement Maurel et Prom v. The Legal Adviser of the Gambia (1938) 4 W.A.C.A. 47 at 54 where Coote’s Law of mortgage, Vol 1 at p. 170 was quoted verbatim as: “Where a lease contains a covenant not to assign or sublet without licence, no mortgage either by assignment or demise, will be valid unless the licence is obtained.”

Learned counsel for the defendant attacked the judgment appealed from as being wrong. He argued that the provisions of the above statutes and the case referred to above were wrongly interpreted and applied. He submitted that the correct construction and application of the above had the effect of rendering exhibit E null and void ab initio thus nullifying its legal effect and passing no legal title to whoever claimed a legal right under it.

I have carefully read the record of proceedings in this appeal and the judgment appealed from. I have also carefully studied the provisions of the various statutes and the case relied on by the defendant but whilst I share the view of learned counsel for the defendant that certain portions of the judgment appealed from, on the view taken by the learned trial judge on the interpretation of section 75 (1) of Cap. 64 and the applicability of the Establissement case (supra) can be questioned, I think the final conclusion arrived at by the learned trial judge is the right one. To limit the determination of this case on the legal validity of exhibit E, on the facts of this case, would be narrowing the issues to be resolved and this would result in injustice.

I am of the view that whatever may be the legal effect of exhibit E, on the assumption that the defendant’s case is made out (and I have advisedly avoided the odious task of attempting to construe the various statutes relied on by the defendant) I think the question to ask here is whether it would be just and fair to permit the defendant, who already had taken the benefit and advantage under exhibit E and obtained a collosal sum of £1,400 from Kwasi Addae, to raise and rely on the provisions of the above statutes to avoid his own obligations under the same exhibit E? A positive answer to the above question would mean that the defendant can unjustly enrich himself at the expense of Kwasi Addae. Kwasi Addae’s obligation under the transaction culminating in exhibit E was to offer the money which he did. The obligation of the defendant under the transaction was to offer effectively his house as

[p.6] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 1

security for the sum and to make it possible for Kwasi Addae to exercise his power of sale over the property thus offered. It is my considered view that the duty was on the defendant to have provided and sought for all the necessary consents and concurrences to enable him competently to execute exhibit E in favour of Kwasi Addae. To permit the defendant to succeed in this appeal on the ground raised would amount to the court condoning the conduct of the defendant in using the provisions of the above statutes as instruments of fraud to enrich himself unjustly.

I am fortified in this view by the case of Djomoa v. Amargyei [1961] G.L.R. 170 at 173, S.C. where it was held that:

“. . . for a vendor or other grantor of land for valuable consideration to be permitted to plead the Concessions Ordinance so as to defeat or annul his grant to the benefit of himself and to the detriment of the other party is little short of a plea tantamount to fraud, and . . . the court must not lend its support to any form of fraudulent practice. . .”

On the principle of law enunciated in the Amargyei’s case (supra), I think the defendant must be held estopped from pleading and relying on the provisions of Cap. 64 and the State Councils (Ashanti) Ordinance, 1952 to annul his own grant. For this reason the appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed.

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A. I also agree.

DECISION Appeal dismissed.

M. C. N. – N.

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