WILLIAMS vs. THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 1 GLR 565
9 May 1984 · MENSA BOISON JA · ≈ 28 min read
[1984] SLR (CA) 33Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) State v. Amoh [1961] G.L.R. (Pt II) 637, S.C.
(2) Serechi v. The State [1963] 2 G.L.R. 531.
(3) Gonja (Idrisu) v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 573.
(4) R v. Gyamfi [1960] G.L.R. 45, C.A.
(5) R v. Wunuah (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 303, C.A.
(6) R v. Semini [1949] 1 K.B. 405; [1949] 1 All E.R. 233; Cr. App. R. 51, C.C.A.
(7) Mensah (Kwaku) v. R (1945) 11 W.A.C.A. 2.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the decision of the High Court, Sekondi convicting and sentencing the appellant for murder. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of the court.
COUNSEL
Yorke for the appellant.
Osafo Sampong, Principal State Attorney, for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.
Mensah Boison J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. This is an appeal by Mariama Williams against her conviction and sentence for the murder of her husband J.B. Lari. The trial was before Gogo J., sitting with a jury at the High Court, Sekondi on 3 January 1981.
The deceased, Lari, was a superintendent in the Special Branch of the Ghana Police Service, and at the time of these events had been posted on transfer from Sekondi to Kumasi since January 1979. The appellant, as wife, and the rest of Lari’s household, however, were still at the deceased’s official bungalow at Palm Line Estates, Sekondi awaiting final removal to Kumasi.
The couple, both from Bawku in the Upper East Region, had been married for about twelve years by then; the appellant having risen to the grade of nursing officer within the period, and was at the time working at Effia Nkwanta Hospital. Besides the three young sons of the marriage, there was Narki, a pre-marital daughter of the appellant. She was seventeen and still in school, and had come from Accra to live with the couple for a year by then. Other relatives of the deceased made up the complement of the household. One such relative was Vincent Daminie, who happened to have arrived home from his studies at Legon, on 2 March 1979, to be the star prosecution witness, the first prosecution witness, at the trial. The facts relied on by the prosecution were that on 2 March 1979 when the first prosecution witness arrived from Accra at about noon, he noticed the personal belongings of the appellant packed in the hall. When the appellant returned from work in the afternoon and the first [p.569] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 565 prosecution witness inquired whether the family were moving out of the bungalow, the appellant confided to him that she alone was going away since she had decided to leave the deceased for good. As the appellant would not tell the reason for her decision, the first prosecution witness was obliged to telephone the deceased at Kumasi that same evening, and eventually spoke at about 9 p.m. with the deceased. He informed him of the appellant’s intentions and urged the deceased to come down to Sekondi the next day. When the deceased tried to get some explanation from the appellant directly the appellant curtly told him to come and collect his children and relatives from the bungalow.
By 9 am the next day 3 March 1979, the deceased had arrived at the bungalow. The appellant was away to the market, but when she returned at about 10 am, she would not have anything to do with the deceased. She took herself away from the house and did not return till dusk. Their pastor of the Baptist Church was in, at the request of the deceased, to appease the appellant. He had to take the appellant to their chapel for prayers and exhortations at reconciliation, and return at about 9 p.m. with very little success. He promised to meet the two together, the following afternoon.
But that was never to be. The night of 3 March 1979 proved disastrous and fateful. The couple must have retired after the rest of the household had slept. A violent quarrel erupted, and some minutes before midnight Lari’s bedroom was seen ablaze, with dense smoke, and with the appellant screaming frantically for help and rescue. The second prosecution witness, a neighbour, was aroused from sleep by the noise and sight, and went instantly to the scene and met the appellant outside already. Next he also saw the deceased badly charred and burnt all over the body, whom he hastily drove to Effia Nkwanta Hospital.
There was immediate and anxious attendance to Lari, the appellant having also telephoned to doctor friends of hers to help. On 4 March 1979 Lari was transferred from Effia Nkwanta Hospital to Police Hospital, Accra where, in spite of intensive therapy, he died on 6 March 1979. The medical director of that hospital described the case as one of “severe burns of over seventy per cent body surface” and put the cause of death as due to “pulmonary oedema as a result of inhaled fumes, severe dehydration and toxaemia due to extensive burns.”
The appellant had been arrested on 4 March 1979, and had given a statement, exhibit D, in answer to the offence of causing harm. On 6 March 1979 she was cautioned with regard to the offence of murder, for which she was formally charged on 7 March 1979. She made further statements, exhibits E and F respectively, on those dates.
So far the appellant would not disclose the cause of the quarrel except to say that there was a long standing trouble between them.
[p.570] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 565
On 27 June 1979, however, when the appellant was put before the committal magistrate, she unfolded in her statutory statement, exhibit G, the facts of what she regarded as a disgraceful and perfidious infidelity on the part of the deceased: the family skeleton which had provoked estrangement and the quarrel.
On three occasions during the past one year, the appellant made painful discoveries of the deceased’s sexual affairs with the appellant’s daughter, Narki, the second defence witness. The first was from a letter the second defence witness had addressed to a girl-friend at Accra; but which had been dropped in the house. In it Narki had complained of her unhappiness in her Sekondi home because her stepfather had been pestering her with sexual overtures. The second was on an occasion when the appellant, in the dead of night, found that the deceased was not in his bed; only to be traced into Narki’s room and lying by the girl. Lastly, after the deceased had been transferred to Kumasi he had visited the family once at the end of January 1979. Later the appellant had found in his shirt, left behind for the laundry, a letter that Narki had written to the deceased at Kumasi, asking for money.
For the first two occurrences, the second defence witness had confessed only to importunities by the deceased to have sex with her. The appellant had consoled and advised the second defence witness against any such act; but she had privately rebuked the deceased. Each such incident had resulted in several weeks of estrangement between the couple, and the appellant had seriously considered sending Narki back to Accra, and to end the marriage too. But in time, the deceased had apologised with fervent promises of good behaviour. The deceased had particularly advised against sending Narki away, for fear that the girl might talk and so disgrace him.
After the deceased had been transferred to Kumasi and before the last discovery, the appellant had detected early pregnancy in the second defence witness, who was quite unaware of it. Somehow it had aborted. But it had agitated her mind, and the last discovery of the laundry letter made her question the second defence witness more closely. The second defence witness confessed to her sex affairs with the deceased over some period of months by then. To be doubly sure the appellant contrived to get the second defence witness to talk to the deceased at Kumasi by telephone, while she tapped in. This confirmed her fears that the deceased was responsible for the pregnancy. It was this last straw that cast the dice for her in deciding that she would end the marriage, and about which the first prosecution witness telephoned to bring the deceased to Sekondi, to end in the fateful quarrel of 3 March 1979.
Now the appellant’s version of the quarrel was that when the two had retired to the bedroom, the deceased suggested that he was going to
[p.571] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 565 arrange for the two to have a custom of purification performed because of his fornication with the second defence witness. She flatly told him she was not going to marry him any longer. The deceased then flared up and cursed; and with his pistol in hand threatened and warned that he would shoot her dead and kill himself rather than be disgraced by a dissolution of their marriage before their two families. In time the appellant was cowed into bed, but later woke up from her sleep as a result of intense burning heat in the room. The conflagration had horrified her into screaming for help. At the trial she denied setting fire to Lari, as she had stated in a police statement of hers, by means of what she had thought was kerosene. Otherwise her real defence was insanity and automatism. She gave evidence of the history for her type of mental troubles; but the medical witness who had attended to her did not in substance support a case of insanity.
After what, from the notes, appears to have been a lengthy summing up, it took the jury 35 minutes to return a verdict of guilty. Before this court, learned counsel for the appellant as a first ground, dwelt on what he described to be misdirections in the summing up with regard to the appellant’s defence of insanity and automatism. We do not find it necessary to set down in detail the criticism of counsel. It is sufficient to state that the essence of a defence of insanity is that at the material time of the act complained of the accused was suffering from such disease of the mind that she could not be said to have known the nature and consequence of the act committed by her. This state of mind, apart from evidence of history, is often discovered by the contemporaneous acts and behaviour of the accused, that is conduct of the accused immediately before or at the time or immediately thereafter of the acts complained of. There was no evidence here of any abnormal behaviour by the appellant in that respect from the first prosecution witness or the second prosecution witness, the two witnesses who saw and spoke with the appellant instantly at the spot just after the alarm. The appellant’s earliest conduct of screaming for help and ringing up doctor friends to help and her account in exhibit D, dated 4 March 1979, appeared perfectly normal and intelligible. Professor Adomako, who gave evidence of the appellant’s mental history, and of his opinion on his observation of the appellant when she was referred to him by the court for purposes of the trial, in short negatived any claim to any disease of the mind. We think the learned trial judge adequately put the defence to the jury, and rightly instructed them on the burden of proof.
The defence of automatism was also in our view, adequately dealt with by the learned judge. And even though Professor Adomako’s evidence did not support the appellant, the learned judge rightly left it to the jury as to whether or not the appellant’s conduct of setting the fire, if they so found, was voluntary or involuntary.
[p.572] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 565
The second ground that the summing up was weighted against the appellant, finds no support with us. It is enough to say that although the learned judge expressed his opinion on the facts somewhat enthusiastically, he was always quick to warn the jury that his view of the facts could be disregarded , as the decision on the issue of facts rested entirely with them.
We now pass to two aspects of the summing up which we have been obliged to take up on behalf of the appellant. At the beginning of his summing up the learned judge drew the attention of the jury to the following as the ingredients of the offence of murder to be proved by the prosecution; (1) that J.B. Lari is dead; (2) that death was due to harm; (3) that the harm was unlawful; (4) that the unlawful harm was caused intentionally; and (5) that the accused was the one who caused the unlawful harm.
The list appears to conform with the Practice Note dated 6 November 1961 as arising from the State v. Amoh [1961] G.L.R. (Pt II) 637, S.C.
As it will become clear later, the fourth ingredient above-mentioned is not complete, unless it is understood and explained to the jury to mean that the unlawful harm “should not only be inflicted intentionally, but that it must be intended to cause the death of the victim.” For a killing that amounts to murder differs from manslaughter in only one respect, i.e. that in murder the accused inflicts the unlawful harm aware that the harm is likely to cause death. As explained in Serechi v. The State [1963] 2 G.L.R. 531 at 534, S.C:
“When a man is charged with murder . . . If the prosecution only succeeds in proving that the death was caused by an unlawful harm, but is unable to prove that there was intent that the unlawful harm should cause death, the case of murder must fail, but then the case of manslaughter will have to be considered…”
It is for this reason that, in a trial for murder, the judge is bound generally to distinguish the offence of murder from manslaughter simpliciter, quite apart from manslaughter as a result of provocation or other extenuating circumstances: see Gonja (Idrisu) v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 573, S.C.
It seems to us that the summing up on the elements of “unlawful harm” and “causing it intentionally” was confused “with intent to cause death” and failed in the end to instruct the jury on the requirement of “intention to cause death.” It proceeded thus:
“ . . . was the harm unlawful? . . . Is there any doubt that the harm was unlawful? . . . If you come to the conclusion that the fire which burnt the deceased was deliberately set then the harm would be unlawful: see section 76 of Act 29 [read and explained].
[p.573] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 565
Therefore you will agree with me that without certain aids in proving intention almost no crime can be proved. Therefore the law says that every normal person intends the natural consequences that flow from his own voluntary acts. Therefore if a person tells you that he set fire to the deceased, he must be presumed that he intentionally set fire to the deceased . . . But don’t forget that such presumption is rebuttable . . .”
Now “setting fire to the deceased” was the actus reus of the crime. That happens to be a physical voluntary act; which by itself spells intentional act. The harm resulting becomes unlawful, unless justified. The provisions of section 11 were meant to discover the “intent” which accompanied the actus reus of setting fire, and it was for the learned judge to direct the jury to apply its provisions to the actions of the appellant in that respect. But having thus, as it were, exhausted himself of the provisions of section 11, the learned judge had to be content with a review of what the prosecution alleged to be the preparation and planning by the appellant. The evidence of preparation consisted of three matters. First, that the appellant had packed her personal belongings from the couple’s bedroom out to the hall by the morning of 2 March 1979. Secondly, that the appellant, on the same morning of 2 March 1979 had ordered a gallon each of petrol and kerosene. Thirdly, that the appellant had decided by 2 March 1979 that she was leaving the deceased; that is divorcing him, without any reason. These matters the appellant had explained, viz that her belongings, contrary to the assertion of the first prosecution witness, were still in the bedroom then; that she had told the third prosecution witness that the petrol was intended to be used in dissolving some substance she was collecting from Takoradi Harbour; and lastly, that she had decided to divorce the deceased because of conduct she would not want any one else other than the deceased to know.
The summing up made a great deal out of the purchase of petrol; but only to show that the act of setting fire to the deceased was “unlawful and deliberate.” Unfortunately the summing up put the onus on the appellant. It was also speculative in parts hereon:
“The second point I want you to note is that when the third prosecution witness asked her why she was buying petrol, she said she was taking delivery of certain things from the harbour and that she needed the petrol to dissolve them. This was on 2 March 1979. It was on 3 March 1979 that the deceased came down from Kumasi, i.e. the next day after buying the petrol. I shall bring to your attention whether the accused really wanted the
[p.574] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 565 deceased down at Sekondi because she had prepared for him . . .You will remember the fourth prosecution witness was the first to arrive at the scene . . . He did not see the gallon in the room.”
But the fact is there was no evidence that the appellant or anyone else knew on the morning of 2 March 1979 when she ordered the petrol that the deceased was to come to Sekondi on 3 March 1979. Again when dealing with her defence that she was taking delivery of certain things from the harbour for which she needed the petrol, the learned judge fell into further error as to the onus of proof when he said:
“Is there any evidence at all that she really took delivery of those things and that she used the petrol in the way she said? . . . If she did not, then where is the petrol? No evidence as to where it went. The prosecution are saying that she used it in burning the deceased. She says she did not use it. What do you say?”
In putting the matter as he did we think the learned judge wrongly put the onus on the appellant. It was the duty of the prosecution to bring forth positive or circumstantial evidence to show that the petrol had been used in committing the crime. For where the conduct of an accused is capable of innocent interpretation, as with the use of the petrol, she has no burden to prove the innocent use of it.
Not even the empty gallon was tendered, although the third prosecution witness said he identified it at the police station; and the summing up had to concede that the fourth prosecution witness, the first policeman to have gone to the scene, did not see any such empty gallon.
The importance of the prejudicial effect of wrongly putting the onus on the appellant was this, that the appellant in her statements, exhibits C and D, only spoke of setting fire. In her evidence in court she just said she was asleep when she felt the heat in the room. The only indication of her having used any fuel was in her police statement, exhibit E, in which she mentioned having got up at night and collected from the kitchen what she believed to be the gallon in which she kept kerosene and poured out the contents on the deceased. The first prosecution witness had, however, given evidence that the appellant had told him, the next day after the incident, that she had used petrol.
The summing up above quoted was obviously meant to assist the jury whether or not the appellant had used petrol or kerosene, or any fuel at all. It appears the judge was mindful as to whether the inflammatory action of petrol and kerosene was the same. But unfortunately he did not find it necessary to leave it to the jury as an aid to their finding “intent to cause death.” That is whether, if the jury
[p.575] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 565 rejected her denial, the appellant had used petrol or kerosene. We think this was a serious error. For as it is, the summing up stopped at the jury finding only whether or not the harm was “intentionally caused and therefore unlawful.”
The learned judge made liberal use of the police statements of the appellant but only to the effect that the unlawful harm had been caused by the appellant by setting fire to the deceased deliberately. The jury might well have found that the unlawful harm was intentionally caused. The learned judge for some reason never directed the jury at any time to find whether or not the appellant by those acts “intended to cause death.”
As it is when the learned judge directed the jury that “if on consideration of the whole case you are satisfied that the accused is guilty then your verdict will be guilty of murder”, the jury were only to be satisfied that “the unlawful harm was intentionally caused.” In that case their verdict of guilty was properly for manslaughter only.
The case of R v. Gyamfi [1960] G.L.R. 45, C.A. illustrates the principle that death resulting from “unlawful harm intentionally caused” is not necessarily murder. In that case Gyamfi, while leading a group of his political party supporters towards a crowd of a rival political party at Badu in Brong-Ahafo, threw a stone which struck Oppong of the rival party, at his right side. Oppong fell down and was carried to a house nearby. The next morning the police took him to a doctor at Wenchi where he died. Post-mortem examination disclosed “externally bruising just below the nipple line. Internally a large quantity of blood was found in the abdominal cavity and the liver was ruptured.” In the opinion of the doctor death was due to “‘internal haemorrhage from a ruptured liver.” At the trial the stone that struck Oppong was not tendered, but a witness described it as being “slightly larger than a fist.” Scott J. after a direction to the assessors, convicted Gyamfi of murder. On appeal, quashing the conviction and substituting manslaughter instead, the court said at 51:
“There can be no doubt that the appellant caused the death of Oppong by unlawful harm; but the question arising for further consideration was, ‘Was the act done in the consciousness that it was likely to cause death?’ It was for the learned judge to give this question more careful consideration than he in fact did.”
See also Gonja (Idrisu) v. The State (supra).
In the instant case, the jury were never directed to find if the appellant realised that setting fire to the deceased, if the jury so found, was likely to cause death. The jury nonetheless returned a verdict of murder, although their direction stopped at manslaughter. We have now to consider whether on a proper direction the verdict of the jury would
[p.576] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 565 have been the same, and whether on a consideration of the evidence as a whole we find it appropriate to apply the proviso to section 26 (12) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372). This is because of our final conclusion on the issue of provocation, with which we deal now.
But learned counsel for the prosecution, however, contended that indeed, the trial judge was not obliged to have directed on provocation as there was no such evidence. We do well to take this point first. We agree with learned counsel in that submission only with respect to provocation arising from “adultery,” but we are unable to accept that view as regards “assault.” Learned counsel’s contention turns on the meaning of “assault and battery” as used in section 53 (a) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29) namely:
“53. The following matters may amount to extreme provocation to one person to cause the death of another person namely (a) an unlawful assault and battery committed upon the accused person by the other person, either in an unlawful fight or otherwise, which is of such a kind, . . . as to be likely to deprive a person, being of ordinary character, and being in the circumstances in which the accused person was, of the power of self-control.”
Learned counsel’s submission was that “assault and battery” are conjunctive; unless the case is one where the “assault” involves violence to the person. In other words “assault” in the technical sense is excluded. By that restriction one might envisage a “battery” to a person without an assault, e.g. a blow from behind. But that surely is not outside the intent of section 53 (a).
Now from the relevant provisions, i.e. sections 249, 251 and 252 in the Criminal Code, Cap 9 (1951 Rev.), we find the words of the provisions relating to provocation were the same as in Act 29. And in R v. Wunuah (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 303, C.A. a case specifically dealing with these self-same provisions, decided on 19 December 1957, the court at 305 quoted with approval the dictum of Lord Goddard C.J. in R v. Semini (1949) 33, Cr.App.R. 51 at 57 as follows: “No one doubts that blows and probably threatening gestures if near enough and serious enough to cause loss of control may justify and indeed require the killing to be regarded as manslaughter only.”
Again in Kwaku Mensah v R (1945) 11 W.A.C.A. 2 at 5, Lord Goddard reading the opinion of the board said:
“On this point their Lordships are in agreement with the learned trial Judge and disagree with the view taken by the Court of Appeal. Pointing a gun at a person is an assault unless done in
[p.577] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 565 protection of person or property. If it is pointed at a person without legal excuse, and there was none here as the dead man was running away, it is an unlawful act.”
That was a case where these very provisions were considered, and of which we shall have more to say. These statements of the law persuade us to disagree with the learned counsel for the State that the words “assault and battery” under section 53 are necessarily conjunctive. But be it as may be, by the nature of the evidence we do not find it necessary to decide the point now.
The evidence on which the learned judge relied was that of the appellant’s story of the quarrel, which she repeated in court:
“He then told me that if I insisted that I was not going to marry him, then we would all die. He said he would kill me and kill himself, rather than allow this disgraceful affair to reach our families at home. He then went into the wardrobe and brought out his brown briefcase. He then placed it on the table and opened it. He then pulled out a pistol, cocked it and pointed it at me and said he would kill me and kill himself. I became frightened and so I tried to run out of the room; but he quickly crossed and stopped me from going out. He said either this issue was dead and buried that night or all of us would be buried with it. He then told me that I was being unnecessarily fussy about the whole thing. That he had not spoiled my daughter and that my daughter was already a spoiled girl and that when he got to know her for the first time she was not a virgin.
He swore and cursed. He said that night was the end of both of us. I was trembling. He then ordered me to get into bed and stop my nonsense. He then put back the pistol into the briefcase and put it by his bed; but he did not lock it. Then he repeated that that night was the end of both of us. I was really nervous. I knew he meant every word; he said that he would kill me and kill himself. Cold fear was really with me and my head ached badly. Yes I knew the end was near and that I would be dead any moment. I then went and sat on my bed. I later laid down and after some time I slept.”
This version had been given in one of her police statements and in her statutory statement before the committal magistrate. The police investigator admitted collecting the said briefcase, but handed it over to the Special Branch without opening it. The briefcase was never tendered in evidence nor was a list of its contents. A prosecution witness admitted that officers of the Special Branch, like the deceased, kept their pistols with them. The suppression of the briefcase and its
[p.578] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 565 contents was never explained by the prosecution. There was the addition of insulting words as to the chastity of the daughter. That was an account, the jury if properly directed, might have found likely to be true.
The learned judge saw the manner in which the appellant gave her evidence and his view of the mode in which the appellant was stopped from going out of the room might have satisfied him that the account amounted to a matter of provocation, to make him think it proper to direct the jury thereon. That view deserves our respect.
The fact is there is no degree of what “assault and battery” was required under section 53 of Act 29, except the requirement that it should be “such a kind . . . as to be likely to deprive a person . . . of the power of self-control.”
The odd thing is that, although the above quoted story might well weigh with a jury to justify a killing on ground of self-defence, it cannot, on the contention of learned counsel for the State, suffice as a matter of provocation. We think the learned judge rightly thought it his duty to regard the episode as a matter of “assault and battery” and so directed the jury. We only cross swords with the learned judge on the manner of his summing up of the issue. This is how he went about it: “Of course, the law says that certain cases of harm can be justified. Or in certain cases it can reduce murder to manslaughter.” Then after dealing with self-defence he continued:
“Again I shall invite you to look at section 52 of Act 29 [read and explained]. Here intentional homicide is reduced to manslaughter if, among other matters of extenuation, it is established that the accused person was deprived of the power of self-control by such extreme provocation given by the deceased as is mentioned in section 53. Among the matters which may amount to extreme provocation is unlawful assault of such a kind as to be likely to deprive a person being of ordinary character and in the circumstances in which he was, of the power of self-control.”
Then the trial judge dealt with section 54 which excludes the benefit, if the accused was not, in fact, deprived of her power of self-control or where after the provocation such a time had elapsed or such circumstances occurred that a person of ordinary character might have recovered his power of self-control.
After referring to the attempt of the priest, the first defence witness, at reconciliation the learned judge continued.
“He had gone away with the idea that all was well. Gentlemen of the jury don’t you think that time enough had elapsed for the accused to cool down whatever the provocation? Even if we take the accused’s account of what happened in the room that fateful
[p.579] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 565 night as the truth, whatever the provocation, the deceased had gone to sleep. She the accused too had gone to sleep. Why get up and set fire to the deceased again?”
But with respect to the learned judge, the question as to whether the loss of self-control still persisted, even at that time after sleep had intervened, was a matter for the jury. The judge may comment, but such comments should not amount to a withdrawal of the issue.
In the Privy Council case of Kwaku Mensah v. R (supra) at 7 Lord Goddard delivering the opinion of the board stated the law thus:
“In their Lordships’ opinion however the question whether in the circumstances the provocation was such as to deprive an ordinary person of self-control and whether sufficient time had elapsed to enable control to be regained are questions for the jury. There may no doubt be cases where the facts were such that they could not be made the subject of extenuation; for instance a blow or wounding one day, and a killing after a night had elapsed . . . The tests have to be applied to the ordinary West African villager and it is on just such questions as these that the knowledge and commonsense of a local jury are invaluable. In both R.v. Hayward, 6 C, & P. 157, and R. v. Thomas, 7 C. & P. 817, some time had elapsed between the provocation and the fatal act, but in both cases it was left to the jury to say whether in the circumstances the crime amounted to murder or only manslaughter.”
We think that by the concluding sentences of the preceding passage of the summing up in the instant case, the learned judge withdrew from the jury the issue whether or not the appellant was, in fact, deprived of self-control and the further issue of whether or not sufficient time had elapsed to have regained her control. It therefore resulted in a failure to take the opinion of the jury on a matter which had they found that she, in fact, lost her self-control and that the provocation still persisted, might have avoided a conviction for murder. That apart we note an omission, which trial judges in this country often ignore, and, which in the instant case, we consider greatly diminished any benefit a direction on provocation was meant to confer on an accused. As such we note that the learned judge failed to guide the jury as to the test of the “appellant’s community.” It is not sufficient to recite, as in section 53, that the assault must be of such a kind “as to be likely to deprive a person being of ordinary character . . .” What is essential is to have invited the jury to think of the appellant “as an ordinary person of the community to which the appellant belongs.” It is only against that background that the exclusion of the benefit of provocation under section 54 (1) should be considered.
[p.580] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 565
There was evidence that the appellant was educated; having attained the grade of a nursing officer in her work at the hospital. Like the deceased, she was a Kusasi from Bawku in the Upper East Region where she had attended school and also trained as a nurse. In her part of the country, a husband having sexual affair with his stepdaughter was in her own words, “an abomination”; although there was no ban on the number of wives the deceased could take by their custom. The evidence also showed that in the appellant’s great distress for the deceased seducing the stepdaughter, the deceased had attempted to placate her by passing on the advice of the first prosecution witness, that there was a custom they could perform as purification. To revile at the virginity of the second defence witness must have been a matter of grief to the appellant. Lastly, if the jury accepted the story of the appellant, the deceased would rather have himself and the appellant dead rather than face disgrace for his conduct. That is the background of the appellant, and no jury could do their duty on an issue of provocation without being instructed on the background and community to which the appellant belongs.
Again R v. Wunuah (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 303 illustrates the principle that where provocation is in issue, it is important to consider the standards and way of life of the type of community to which the accused belongs as a background to the question as to whether the conduct of the deceased which is relied upon was such as to be likely to deprive the accused of his power of self-control. And indeed did so. At 305 van Lare Ag. C.J. reading the judgment of the Court of Appeal said:
“We think that, had the learned trial judge considered whether the provocation was one likely to deprive the prisoner of the power of self-control in the circumstances in which he then was, especially having regard to his character and the community to which he belonged, he might fairly have proceeded to find further that the provocation was such as did in fact deprive the appellant of the power of self-control”.
We think the failure to direct, for the consideration of the jury, on the background and the community to which the appellant belongs was a very grave misdirection, and one that denied the appellant, had the jury accepted her evidence, a chance of avoiding a conviction for a capital offence.
It is impossible to say what verdict the jury would have returned had the learned trial judge left that issue to the jury with a proper direction. In accordance with principles on which this court acts we would substitute for the jury’s verdict one for the lesser offence. We
[p.581] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 565 therefore quash the sentence of death, set aside the verdict that the appellant is guilty of murder, and substitute a verdict of guilty of manslaughter; the appellant is to serve a sentence of twelve years’ imprisonment with hard labour.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
Verdict of murder set aside and verdict of manslaughter substituted.
J.A.A.
