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[1984] SLR (HC) 6High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

INTERIM EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE APOSTOLIC DIVINE CHURCH OF GHANA vs. INTERIM EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 175

13 April 1984 · ASARE-KWAPONG J · ≈ 8 min read

Cite as[1984] SLR (HC) 6
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OSCOLAINTERIM EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE APOSTOLIC DIVINE CHURCH OF GHANA v INTERIM EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 175 [1984] SLR (HC) 6
APAINTERIM EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE APOSTOLIC DIVINE CHURCH OF GHANA v INTERIM EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 175, [1984] SLR (HC) 6 (Ghana).
BluebookINTERIM EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE APOSTOLIC DIVINE CHURCH OF GHANA v INTERIM EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 175, [1984] SLR (HC) 6 (Ghana High Ct. 1984).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) London County Council v South Metropolitan Gas Co Ltd [1904] 1 ChD 76; 89 LT 618; 20 TLR 83, CA.

(2) Mackenzie v Yeboah, Court of Appeal, 2 February 1970; digested in (1970) CC 103, CA.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

MOTION for an interim injunction to restrain the defendants from carrying out any functions and undertaking to administer and manage the affairs of the Apostolic Divine Church of Ghana until final determination of suit. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.

COUNSEL

D Y Osei (with him Oppong-Adjei) for the plaintiff-applicants.

Asante Fosuhene for the defendant-respondents.

[p.177] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 175

JUDGMENT OF ASARE-KWAPONG J.

In this case, the plaintiff-applicants are claiming against the defendant-respondents a declaration that the purported revocation and dissolution or both of the interim executive committee of the Apostolic Divine Church of Ghana is null and void and of no effect. They further asked for a declaration, among other reliefs, that the emergency delegates’ conference held at Takorawase on 7 August 1982 was unauthorised and should be declared null and void. To establish the status quo ante, the plaintiff-applicants (hereinafter called and referred to as the plaintiffs) applied to this court for an interim injunction restraining the defendant-respondents (hereinafter called and referred to as the defendants), from carrying out any functions and/or undertaking to administer and manage the affairs of the Apostolic Divine Church and/or usurping the rights and functions of the plaintiffs, the supreme governing body of the church. The motion was accompanied by an affidavit sworn to by the secretary of the plaintiffs.

Paragraph 2 of the affidavit stated that on or about 30 January 1984 the plaintiffs filed a writ of summons against the defendants claiming as per the writ of summons. Paragraph 4 stated that some of the defendants defected from the plaintiff committee without assigning any reasons for their resignation to form the interim executive council to bring a split and/or division in the church. Paragraph 5 alleged that the action of the defendants had caused ill-feeling and dissatisfaction in the church and tempers have soared so high that if the defendants are not restrained their behaviour may result in a great conflict and breach of the peace.

The defendants resisted the plaintiffs’ claim and stated that the plaintiffs had no legal personality and therefore lacked the capacity to bring this action. In paragraph 5 of their statement of defence, the defendants stated that since the interim executive committee elected on 19 April 1980 was dissolved on 7 August 1982, there had not been any ill-feeling or dissatisfaction among the members of the church to justify an injunction being granted against the defendants. They claimed that on 4 March 1983 the High Court, Accra granted an interim injunction against Apostle Charles Duodu, spiritual head-chairman, his servants and agents from doing certain specified acts in suit No 73/82. It was further stated in paragraph 7 of their statement of defence that the injunction granted by the High Court, Accra had been religiously obeyed and that no new situation had arisen to justify the grant of a new injunction against the defendants who were agents and servants of the church.

Counsel for the plaintiffs in his argument told the court that on 19 April 1980 the plaintiff committee was appointed at an emergency delegates’ conference of the church under the chairmanship of Apostle Duodu. The plaintiff committee’s terms of reference were as follows:

[p.178] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 175

(a) to prepare agenda for general church meetings;

(b) to control all church finances and properties;

(c) to act in a general advisory capacity;

(d) to be responsible, when necessary, for interpreting decisions of the delegates’ conference to the protem secretary and giving him instructions as to the mode of carrying them out from time to time;

(e) to direct and or co-ordinate the activities of the various committees and movement of the church;

and

(f) to obtain the services of a solicitor for the church.

However, on 7 August 1982, the defendants convened another emergency delegates’ conference and in the absence of the spiritual head of the church and the plaintiff committee, appointed another nine-member interim executive council to be accountable to the spiritual head of the church. This according to counsel, is a flagrant abuse and usurpation of the powers of the plaintiff committee which was at the time not dissolved. Consequently, its deliberations are null and void and must be dissolved.

Counsel for the defendants opposed the motion on the grounds that the plaintiff committee lacked legal personality to be able to sue; and before any consideration was given to the application, the issue of capacity must be determined first by the court. He further argued that the plaintiffs were not the interim executive committee set up in 1980 and that if they were, their names should have appeared on the writ.

It appeared, however, that only two persons attended the meeting of 7 August 1982; nine persons were absent at the meeting.

Now in view of counsel’s argument, this court has to determine the question of legal capacity or the locus standi of the plaintiff committee which brought this action.

According to counsel for the defendants, the plaintiff committee lacked legal capacity, which only the church had, but in law was it only the person who had legal capacity who could act? The answer is emphatically No. A body invested with exclusive control over a field of capacity that is of public concern, as in the terms of reference of the plaintiff committee, may sue to obtain an injunction to restrain incursions into its province: see Judicial Review of Administrative Action by S A de Smith at p 349. See also London County Council v South Metropolitan Gas Co Ltd [1904] 1 ChD 76, CA. This is an English authority which has a very strong persuasive effect on Ghana law. Coming home, ie Ghana, on the same subject of capacity, Apaloo JA (as he then was) when reading the unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeal in Mackenzie v Yeboah, Civil Appeal No 95/95, 2 February 1970; digested in (1970) CC 103, CA (as per the headnote) said:

[p.179] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 175

“It is the endorsement in the writ and not the title of the suit or an averment in the statement of claim that determines whether or not an action has been brought by a person clothed with legal capacity under the statutes . . . The fact that the respondent wrongly described himself as a personal representative in the statement of claim does not affect the matter.”

The Court of Appeal was then dealing with legal capacity to sue under the Civil Liability Act, 1963 (Act 176), but the principle can be applied to this case. The plaintiffs and members of the Apostolic Divine Church of Ghana are complaining that the defendants and their agents are breaking the law of the church, which right they have to complain. Again a person has locus standi to prohibit an administrative body such as the defendant council in this case if a decision taken is tainted with invalidity. I hold therefore, that the plaintiff committee can bring the present action and that they have locus standi or legal capacity to bring it.

The plaintiff committee was elected to perform the duty as contained in the terms of reference at the delegates’ conference held at Takorawase on 19 April 1980. There is nothing in the minutes of the subsequent meeting to show that the plaintiff committee was invited to any other meeting to account for their stewardship so that if they are performing badly the committee would be dissolved. When counsel for the defendants was pressed by the court to confirm whether or not they were invited to attend such meetings he answered in the affirmative that they were invited but they failed to attend and that others came. Those others were later found to be only two. The invitation according to him was oral. However, another meeting was held and a nine-member council was elected. Why were they not invited? This brings into sharp focus the legal principle of audi alteram partem – (right to prior notice and opportunity to be heard.) Where the giving of prior notice of impending action or proceedings is required by the rules of a voluntary association, failure to serve notice on the party immediately affected, as the plaintiff committee in this case, will enable him to successfully impugn the validity of the proceedings. The plaintiff committee is accordingly challenging the validity of the delegates’ meeting held on 7 August 1982 at which by implication they were removed without being heard.

In reading through the minutes of the meeting held on 7 August 1982, the sole purpose of dissolving the plaintiff committee was the dispute between Apostle Pastor John Quansah and Elder D O Amoafo; because of this quarrel, the painstaking work of drafting a constitution

[p.180] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 175

for the church was rejected by one person, the apostle, as not being acceptable to God. I find through the minutes that the alleged delegates’ conference showed nothing constructive but vindictiveness towards the plaintiff committee because the apostle alone did not appreciate their work. After all it was the plaintiff committee which should have called the meeting. Who then called the meeting of 7 August 1982? It was called by a person not authorised to call it. Its deliberations are therefore of no effect. Consequently, any decisions taken on 7 August 1982, and the appointment of the council are null and void. Any letters issued by the so-called secretary at the meeting or after the meeting are also of no effect. Any letters issued after 7 August 1982 up to date are of no effect.

Lastly, by paragraph 7 of the affidavit in opposition the defendant council admitted that an injunction has been granted against them and restraining them from carrying on the functions of the plaintiff committee by the High Court, Accra. The ruling in that case was not tendered in evidence for the court to see, and that case was not before me.

Be that as it may, I take no cognisance of that order. In view of the reasons given above, I would grant the motion as prayed for. The defendant council, their agents, servants and assigns are hereby restrained and prohibited from carrying out any functions or undertaking to administer and manage the affairs of the Apostolic Divine Church of Ghana.

DECISION

Application granted.

L K A

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