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[1985] SLR (CA) 17Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

EKEM vs. WISEWAY CLEANERS LTD [1984-86] 1 GLR 61

29 May 1985 · FRANCOIS JSC · ≈ 20 min read

Cite as[1985] SLR (CA) 17
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OSCOLAEKEM v WISEWAY CLEANERS LTD [1984-86] 1 GLR 61 [1985] SLR (CA) 17
APAEKEM v WISEWAY CLEANERS LTD [1984-86] 1 GLR 61, [1985] SLR (CA) 17 (Ghana).
BluebookEKEM v WISEWAY CLEANERS LTD [1984-86] 1 GLR 61, [1985] SLR (CA) 17 (Ghana Ct. App. 1985).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Fibre Bag Manufacturing Co v Sarpong [1967] GLR 657, CA

(2) Dawson v Murex Ltd [1942] 1 All ER 483.

(3) Jones v Great Western Railway Co (1930) 47 TLR 39; 144 LT 194.

(4) Callow (FE) (Engineers) Ltd v Johnson [1971] AC 335; [1970] 3 WLR 982; [1970] 3 All ER 639, HL, affirming [1970] 2 QB 1.

(5) Galashiels Gas Co Ltd v O’Donnell (or Millar) [1949] AC 275, [1949] 1 All ER 319; [1949] LJR 540.

(6) Vella v Llanberis Steamship Co Ltd (1950) 84 LI L Rep 140.

(7) Close v. Steel Co of Wales [1962] AC 367; [1961] 3 WLR 319, [1961] 2 All ER 953, HL. (8) Mitchell v North British Rubber Co (1945) SC (J) 69.

(9) Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co v English [1938] AC 57.

(10) Riverstone Meat Co Pty Ltd v Lancashire Shipping Co Ltd [1961] AC 807; [196] 2 WLR 269;

[1961] 1 All ER 495, HL.

(11) Wearing v Perilli [1977] 1 WLR 48, [1977] 1 All ER 339; [1977] 1 IRLR 36, HL. (12) Billings (AC) & Sons v Riden [1958] AC 240; [1957] 3 WLR 496; [1957] 3 All ER 1, HL. (13) Chasteney v Michael Nairn & Co Ltd [1937] 1 All ER 376; 81 SJ 238, DC.

(14) Smith v Chesterfield and District Co-operative Society [1953] 11 WLR 370; [1953] 1 All ER 447, CA.

(15) Latimer v AEC Ltd [1953] AC 643; [1953] 3 WLR 259; [1953] 2 All ER 449.

(16) Neil v Harland and Wolff (1949) 82 LI L Rep 515, CA.

(17) Norris v Syndic Manufacturing Co [1952] 2 QB 135.

(18) Machray v Stewarts and Lloyds Ltd [1964] 3 All ER 716.

(19) Ross v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd, [1964] 1 WLR 768; [1964] 2 All ER 452. (20) Cavanagh v Ulster Weaving Co [1960] AC 145; [1959] 3 WLR 262; [1959] 2 All ER 745, HL.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL by the plaintiff, the administrator of the estate of a deceased employee, from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his action for, inter alia, damages for negligence against the respondent company in whose factory the employee lost his life as a result of an industrial accident. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Francois JSC.

COUNSEL

Amegatcher for the plaintiff-appellant.

Bentsi-Enchill (with him Carson) for the defendant-respondents.

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS JSC

On 12 January 1979 a fatal accident occurred at the respondents’ dry-cleaning establishment at Takoradi. An employee, Isaac Ekem, who the respondent claimed to have acquired requisite experience in the working of the respondent-company’s laundry equipment, sustained fatal injuries while operating an extractor machine. An action for negligence and breach of statutory duty was brought by the personal representative of the deceased in the High Court, Sekondi. It failed. The present appeal is the sequel of that lack of success.

It is necessary to state briefly the working of the machine the deceased was operating, as far as can be gleaned from the record, to enable a proper assessment of the viability of the appellant’s claim to

[p.65] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 61 be made. The machine was a hydro-extractor which, as the name implies, extracts water from wet clothing by its high velocity revolutions. It functions this way: Wet garments are fed into a basket attached to the machine. When sufficient material has been piled into the basket it is closed firmly with its metal lid. Electric power is then switched on setting it in motion. The basket then revolves at very high speed. It seems the high velocity revolution sucks up and induces air currents to dry up the clothing in the basket. When the garments are sufficiently dry they are removed and replaced by a new set.

To this end, there is fitted to the machine an interlocking safety device and a foot-brake whose combined effect brings the machine to a stop. This is the simple process the deceased was engaged in for his livelihood and in the course of which he met his untimely end. A factory inspector, the first plaintiff witness, who inspected the machinery after the accident found “the interlocking safety device was ineffective and the foot-brake was also not working at all.”

The evidence of what actually occurred at the machine site that fateful day was given by the respondent’s own electrical supervisor (the first defendant witness). The appellant being a stranger to the establishment could hardly summon any worker to testify on his behalf as that would jeopardise that worker’s prospects of continued service with the respondent-company. I have no doubt such a worker would be an unwilling witness if not a hostile one. The threat of dismissal is not an empty one: see Fibre Bag Manufacturing Co v Sarpong [1967] GLR 65 at 666, CA. In any case, the evidence of the electrical supervisor is to the effect that he was the only living eye-witness to the incident. Consequently, no blame can possibly attach to the appellant’s inability to produce an eye-witness. But it was this failure to proffer evidence on the cause of the accident that led the trial judge to take a dim view of the plaintiff-appellant’s discharge of proof. He said in Ekem v Wiseway Cleaners Ltd [1981] GLR 801 at 805-807.

“[T]he plaintiff’s prospects of success in proving all the imposing array of defaults appeared rather saturnine right at the outset. And the reason is not far to seek. He was faced with an initial handicap in the fact that his son, a would be eye-witness of the accident, had died. Worse still, he was literally beset with centrifugal forces in the sense that while he stood at the centre, all potential witnesses to the accident tended to run away from him. He had not a single witness from the factory to give evidence on his behalf as to how the accident occurred; nor could he call evidence to prove that the deceased was not given any warning of any inherent danger in the machine, nor to prove that he was not given any training and supervision. He could only rely, rather perilously, on the tenuous account by an independent factory

[p.66] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 61 inspector from the Factory Inspectorate Division of the Labour Department … [I]n civil cases, the plaintiff, whose pleading on a material fact is denied, bears the onus of proving the allegation and cannot close his case without the required proof and cannot expect the defence to send him the proof on a silver platter.”

Later the learned judge added at 809: “How did the plaintiff discharge this vital onus of proof. He never adduced evidence of how the accident occurred.”

In my view the learned judge fell into unpardonable error when he failed to recognise that it is the preponderance of evidence in favour of one party at the highest, and the balance of probability at the lowest, that is important and not from which side of the contesting divide evidence emanates: see Dawson v Murex Ltd [1942] 1 All ER 483. Consequently, he disabled himself from assessing properly the weight of evidence that was available. It is only in land cases that reliance cannot be placed on the weakness of the defendant. Even there, the evidential burden sometimes shifts. Again, inferences that are logical and conclusive deductions from reconstructed facts are cogent elements in the evaluation of proof. If this were not so, many hit and run drivers would escape liability on the theory that the facts were solely buried in his bosom and dead men do not talk: see Jones v Great Western Rail Co (1930) 144 LT 194.

The issue that should always be borne in mind is whether it was reasonably foreseeable that such an accident could happen and not whether it could be established exactly how it happened: per Lord Hailsham LC in Callow (FE) (Engineers) v Johnson [1970] 3 All ER 639 at 647-648, HL.

A pertinent piece of evidence in the record of appeal which the trial judge overlooked may be cited in illustration. It was given on oath by the respondent’s electrician and supervisor:

“I am an electrician working with Wiseway Cleaners Ltd. I am in charge of supervision of the machines. I have been with the defendants for twenty years. I knew Isaac Ekem (deceased). I remember on 12 January 1979, at about 4.15 to 4.20 pm I was going round. When I got near where the deceased’s machine was I saw that the deceased stepped on the paddle of the machine, and then put off the power switch of the machine and took a sack and attempted to use the sack in stopping the rolling basket. I shouted at him: `Ekem stop. If you do that you will injure yourself.’ But before I could end what I was saying he had fallen down. The method adopted by the deceased was not the proper way of stopping the machine.”

[p.67] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 61

(The emphasis is mine.)

When grammatical errors are excised, that testimony is plain enough. Moreover, since there was no other version of the facts which were not challenged but, indeed, adopted by the appellant, they constitute the facts of the case, and this appeal falls to be decided upon those facts. The witness was asked: “Was it the brake paddle on which the deceased stepped?” And he replied in the affirmative. Conceding also that in spite of the deceased’s attempts to bring the machine to a halt by stepping on the “paddle”, the rolling basket kept rolling along. There is no dispute that the deceased’s injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. The challenge was solely related to the respondents liability, it being urged that the deceased used unorthodox and unauthorised means to stop the revolving basket which was travelling at great speed. From the cross-examination of the appellant the respondent-company staked its case on the machine not being faulty. That was its manager’s stand also. But on the facts, as related by the respondents’ supervisor, clearly a faulty machine was being operated. The respondents’ version of the facts also demonstrated that the deceased had done all he could to brake the system unavailingly. Indeed when the respondents called evidence from a neutral launderer, this expert, the second defendant witness, said: “In the case of Wiseway … if you want to stop it you put off the starter and the main switch before you open the lid.” The next resort which was predictable of an employee was to employ a thick sacking, a cocoa bag, which, incredible as it may seem, was fortuitously at hand to stop the machine. In Galashiels Gas Co Ltd v O’Donnell (or Millar) [1949] 1 All ER 319, a brake failure in a lift caused the lift carriage to come to rest above a landing stage thus creating a gap through which an employee fell. The House of Lords held there had been a breach of absolute duty.

In my view, the circumstances clearly fix the respondent-company with knowledge that their employee was using unorthodox methods to stop the machine because of its faulty mechanism. They should therefore have foreseen danger erupting from the circumstance: see Vella v Llanberis SS Co Ltd (1950) 84 LI I Rep 140. Apposite is the learned trial judge’s finding at 806 on the issue of fault. He said when the factory inspector pointed out the defective braking and interlocking device to the respondents’ manager:

“The latter told him that the Company had no spare parts to repair those faults. This part of the evidence of the expert was vehemently denied, but upon a meticulous examination of the evidence given by the witnesses on either side, I arrived at the conclusion that the expert spoke the truth and found that those two parts of the defendants’ machine were faulty. Consequently, I

[p.68] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 61 found that the defendants had breached their common law duty. Under the common law, an employer has an inescapable duty, not only to provide proper machinery or plant for his factory, but also to remedy any defect in the machine or plant that has come to his notice.”

The correct test for whether the accident to the deceased was foreseeable is that laid down in Close v Steel and Co of Wales Ltd [1962] AC 366 where Lord Guest said at 412, HL, that there must be:

“a reasonably foreseeable cause of injury to anybody acting in a way in which a human being may be reasonably expected to act in circumstances which may reasonably be expected to occur.”

This test was expanded by Lord Hailsham in Callow (FE) (Engineers) Ltd v Johnson (supra) at 647-648 where, following Mitchell v North British Rubber Co (1945) SC (J) 69 at 73, the Lord Chancellor said:

“the danger to be foreseen includes danger not only to workmen who are prudent, alert and skilled and intent on their task but also danger to the careless, inattentive worker whose inadvertent or indolent conduct may expose him to risk of injury or death from the unguarded part.”

The fact that a warning tag has now been placed on the machine, directing all operators to wait till the rolling basket has come to a complete halt before proceeding with any further laundry process, is clear vindication of the factory inspector’s conclusion and the learned judge’s finding that the machine was defective. In my view, the management’s protest of ignorance of the defect contains not the slightest vestige of truth. Clearly the accident was causally associated with a breach of the respondents’ statutory duty, in its failure to repair a known dangerous machinery and keeping workmen on it.

Now to the legal issues. A rotating basket moving at high velocity on electrical power is a dangerous piece of machinery which must be securely fenced. The law requires it. The machine must be made safe for all who work with it or near it: see Wilson and Clyde Coal Co v English [1938] AC 57. The legislature in its wisdom provided for it in the Factories, Offices and Shops Act, 1970 (Act 328). Section 36 of Act 328 also imposes a burden on the management to instruct an employee in the use of dangerous machinery. This burden is absolute and cannot be shifted on to the appellant as the trial judge attempted to do. Section 38 also enjoins management to securely fence dangerous machinery. It would be otiose to examine in detail these sections as the judge eventually found that the respondent-company had breached its

[p.69] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 61 statutory duty. Unfortunately the learned judge failed to recognise the necessary result flowing from this finding, that is the respondents’ liability being inescapable since the default was not remedied but business continued as usual.

Commercial and industrial exigencies may make strict compliance with some of the provisions of the Act 328 impossible in certain cases. In those rare cases, an escape device has been fashioned where an appeal to a minister or secretary for exemption could be made to allow the business to function. There is no evidence that the respondent-company has availed itself of the exemption provided under section 81 of Act 328. On the evidence we cannot countenance the suggestion of the respondents’ counsel that the revolving basket was safely housed. This runs counter to the learned judge’s finding that “the rolling basket was a dangerous part which requires fencing.”

Irrespective of status, the common law also requires that an employer must provide for his employee a proper or safe equipment and safe system of work. That is his duty of care to his employee: see Fibre Bag Manufacturing Co v Sarpong (supra) and Riverstone Meat Co Pty Ltd v Lancashire Shipping Co Ltd [1961] AC 807, HL (E). Both under the common law and statute the respondents’ liability for breach of duty in this case was established on the evidence. The learned trial judge arrived at the same opinion. It was irrational for the judge thereafter to hold that the plaintiff-appellant had failed to discharge the onus of proof. It is indeed difficult to reconcile the opinion the judge formed with the facts which he found. I have observed before that any lacuna that existed in the evidence was adequately supplied by the respondents’ witness. In my view, the learned judge’s conclusion is indefensible. To affirm such a decision would be a wholly unmeritorious course.

The House of Lords case of Wearing v Pirelli Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 339, HL is of considerable assistance in this matter. There, the injury was sustained by a worker who operated an electric powered machine which produced tyres. There also, the baleful element was a drum which rotated at high speed. This drum was encased in a rubber cover extending a little beyond the end of the drum to form a skirt. The tyre making process required this skirt, projecting as it did at each side of the drum, to be turned back over a rubber and metal band called the beading. The machine had been designed to do this automatically but owing to a fault, the process had to be completed manually with a hand tool. While the plaintiff was performing this task, part of the skirt came into contact with the hand tool he employed. His hand was violently jerked down, and came in collision with the beading, thus breaking his wrist. The employer’s liability was not in doubt.

[p.70] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 61

It may be argued that the Wearing v Pirelli case illustrates an unorthodox operation of machinery which had the approval of management and therefore distinguishable from the present case where the respondents protest their ignorance of any breach of Act 328. I see no essential difference on the issue of liability between that case and the present, the denials of the respondents notwithstanding. The learned judge made a finding of fact which has not been challenged and which in my view cannot be controverted. On the evidence, the interlocking and braking devices were faulty. If they were faulty and the management kept operating the machine it could mean they tacitly approved unorthodox methods of bringing the revolving basket to a halt so that there would be no stoppage in the company’s commercial activity. The presence of a cocoa bag in the area, which the deceased was said to have utilised to bring the machine to a stop, is only explicable on the basis that it was regularly employed for that purpose. This is not guesswork, it is a hypothesis with a strong leaning to the truth. That is what the concatenation of the events of a failure of the braking and interlocking systems and the presence of the bag implies.

Three questions may be asked: Why place temptations in the way of workers to induce them to take dangerous short cuts if the management was denying the regular use of the cocoa bag for stopping the machine? If the bag had been brought in surreptitiously by a worker to facilitate the stoppage of the machinery, then what sort of supervision did the management boast of that could not discover it? Thirdly, would the bag be used if a sound and effective braking device was in operation?

The respondents’ common law duty requires the reasonable exercise of care and skill to guard against dangers which an employer must anticipate. Where an employer operates a defective machine with no effective stopping device, the employer must anticipate that attempts would be made to stop the machine by some means other than orthodox to keep the work going and the hub of business throbbing. It is no excuse to urge that an unorthodox mode had been employed since the employee has no choice.

In those circumstances there would be a clear nexus between an accident involving injury to such an employee on the defective machine and the employer’s liability therefor. The binding cement is negligence and the failure to repair dangerous machinery.

The management obviously appreciated this, hence the respondent-company’s strenuous attempts to negate the charge of defect in the interlocking and braking systems. Unfortunately for them, the evidence on this aspect of the matter is overwhelming. The warning tag they subsequently affixed to the machine to spell out a new mode of operation implicitly accepts that the machinery was faulty. Clearly

[p.71] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 61 then, any injuries to an employee arising from the operation of that machine and exemplifying that defect would in my view be direct, consequential and not remote. That constitutes the damnosa hereditas which is fatal to the respondents’ case.

Finally I must touch on the issue of contributory negligence which was pleaded by the respondent-company in partial answer to the appellants’ case. We have been denied any assistance the respondents might have given on this issue, since in his belated argument in arrest of judgment counsel refused to contemplate sharing fault. His thesis was that all the blame was on the deceased. Consequently, the appellant was entitled to no redress. Nevertheless this court must address itself to the issue of contributory fault.

The test had been whether in every case the plaintiff acted reasonably in taking a risk: see A C Billings & Sons Ltd v Riden [1957] 3 All ER 1, HL. In that case the respondent fell into a basement area following the destruction of the normal safe means of passage through the building operations of the appellants. The respondent was held entitled to recover, though on account of her specific acts of negligence her damages were reduced by half.

In Chesteney v Michael Nairn & Co Ltd [1937] 1 All ER 376, the respondents had failed to secure their machinery safely. The defence that warning notices had been exhibited did not excuse them from liability for exposing their workmen to danger. Lord Hewart LCJ said at 378:

“It is found that the pinions were generally stopped for the purpose of greasing, but occasionally were allowed to remain in motion. In other words, it is precisely one of those cases where a workman, to save himself time or trouble, and to prevent waiting, as he might have waited, for a moment of safety, put his hand in, not in order to do something capricious, or to do something which would justify a critic using the word ‘lunatics’ but in order to do the thing which he was employed to do, namely, to grease … but he was not doing it at an appropriate moment. In my opinion, that is the very sort of thing which this section of the Factory Acts was designed to meet.”

That passage is as relevant to the circumstances of this case as it was to the Chesteney case almost 50 years ago, and supplies the perfect answer to the respondent counsel’s charge that the deceased’s acts were capricious.

In Smith v Chesterfield & District Co-operative Society Ltd [1953] 1 All ER 447, CA, the plaintiff was injured when in contravention of instructions and while operating a pastry making

[p.72] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 61 machine she put her hand under a protective guard to press back in place pieces of dough of [1984-86] 1 GLR 61-73 which had escaped the rollers of the machine. Her fingers came into contact with the rollers and were injured. Lord Goddard CJ said at 448 that “Fencing is intended to protect the careless and the ignorant as well as the careful and the well-instructed.”

In that case, since the plaintiff had defied instructions, she was found guilty of contributing to her misfortunes to the extent of 40 per cent. The present case is clearly to be distinguished from the above cases. The warning tag in the instant case came after the event, when the horses had bolted. The deceased was compelled to manage and operate a defective machine. It was not his risk. It was essentially the respondent’s. It may well have been necessary to put the machine out of use altogether as was suggested in Latimer v AEC Ltd [1952] 1 All ER 1302 at 1303 until the defects were remedied. That would be in performance of the employer’s duty.

If an employer knew of a defect or ought to have known and did nothing about it, he was clearly liable for any injuries that a worker sustained therefrom. In Munkman’s Employer’s Liability (6th ed) at 112 the learned author states:

“If then, it is proved that there is a defect of a dangerous character, so conspicuous that no one could fail to see it, the employer may be held negligent if he delays in remedying it, at least where there is a known remedy.”

It is useful to recall briefly the factory inspector’s statement that the management were aware of the defect in the machinery but pleaded that spares were unobtainable. Had the respondent-company not changed its stance to deny knowledge altogether of the defect, an issue may well have arisen on this. But the learned trial judge found the credibility of the respondent-company wanting. It follows in my view irresistibly that the management well knew the defect. An onus was thus cast on the respondents to show why the defect was not remedied. This burden was not discharged.

There is also a long line of decisions which show that where the plaintiff takes risks in the employer’s interest, the employer cannot turn round after taking the benefit to urge contributory negligence. I shall refer to a few of these cases.

In Neil v Harland and Wolff Ltd [1949] 82 LI L Rep 515, CA where a man worked on cables without removing the fuses, because removal of the fuses would have stopped the factory operating, the whole fault was laid on the employer. So also in Norris v Syndic Manufacturing Co Ltd [1952] 2 QB 135, where a machine was tested without guard to avoid a waste of time, and injury resulted, and in

[p.73] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 61

Machray v Stewarts and Lloyds Ltd [1964] 3 All ER 716, where a rigger used makeshift tackle for an urgent job, because a proper tackle was not available.

It is important to bear in mind also Lord Reid’s test formulated in a passage in Ross v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd [1964] 2 All ER 452 at 455, HL:

“The question really is whose conduct caused the accident, because it is now well established that a breach of statutory duty does not give rise to civil liability unless there is proved a causal connexion between the breach and the plaintiff’s injury.”

The present case is not one of disobedience to instructions. Plainly there had been no instructions on the use of the faulty machine because the respondent-company even denied knowledge of its defect. It is a simple case of a workman working with what was available and doing the best in the circumstances. I am consequently of the firm opinion that no fault can be laid at the deceased’s door. He cannot be said to have contributed to the accident in the legal sense. In my view liability must fall wholly on the respondent-company which failed in its duty of providing a safe system of work. If there is any doubt that this is what is of paramount concern one must turn to the wise words of Lord Keith of Avonholm in Cavanagh v Ulster Weaving Co Ltd [1959] 2 All ER 745 at 750. HL: “The ruling principle is that an employer is bound to take reasonable care for the safety of his workmen and all other rules or formulas must be taken subject to this principle.”

The appeal in my opinion accordingly succeeds. I would reverse the decision of the High Court, Sekondi delivered on 10 August 1981.

In its place, I would enter judgment for the plaintiff-appellant with costs. The trial court did not assess damages which would have obviated the need for further trial on quantum. It is unfortunate, as this court cannot do so. Regrettable though it is, the matter should be remitted to the High Court, Sekondi for damages to be assessed by a different judge.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN JA.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE JA.

I also agree.

DECISION

Appeal allowed

D R K S

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