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[1985] SLR (CA) 33Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

MERAH vs. OKRAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 400

30 January 1985 · ADADE JSC · ≈ 20 min read

Cite as[1985] SLR (CA) 33
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OSCOLAMERAH v OKRAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 400 [1985] SLR (CA) 33
APAMERAH v OKRAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 400, [1985] SLR (CA) 33 (Ghana).
BluebookMERAH v OKRAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 400, [1985] SLR (CA) 33 (Ghana Ct. App. 1985).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Pon (Kojo) v. Atta Fua [1927] A.C. 693; (1927) P.C. 74 ‘28, 95, P.C.

(2) Moore v. Taye (1932) 2 W.A.C.A. 242.

(3) Moore v. Tayee (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 43, P.C.

(4) Dickinson, In re; Ex parte Rosenthal (1882) 20 Ch. D. 315.

(5) Ogunmola v. Igbo (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 137.

(6) Botchway v. Nassar (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 23.

(7) Kudiabor v. Kudanu (1932) 6 W.A.C.A. 14.

(8) Oloto v. LEDB (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 57.

(9) Anoje v. Ukweje (1955) 15 W.A.C.A. 41.

(10) Odey v. Edim (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 63.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION by the appellant to have an appeal which had been struck out for want of prosecution relisted for hearing. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling of the court.

COUNSEL

E. D. Kom for the appellant.

Respondent in person.

JUDGMENT OF ADADE J.S.C.

Adade J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the court. Section 10 (7) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372) stipulates that:

“7. The Court of Appeal shall not entertain any appeal unless the appellant has fulfilled all the conditions [of appeal] prescribed by the Rules of Court.”

(The emphasis is ours.) The said conditions of appeal require, inter alia, that the appellant shall file a notice of appeal within the prescribed

[p.403] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 400 time as provided by rule 10 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218), and, in addition, fulfil the conditions imposed by the registrar of the trial court at the time of settling the record of appeal, viz:

“(a) that the appellant shall as provided by L.I. 218, r. 12 (4) ‘deposit … a sum … to cover the estimated expense of making up and forwarding the record of appeal …’and in addition,

(b) in compliance with L.I. 218, r. 13 deposit such sum . . . or give security therefore by signing a bond . .

. for the due prosecution of the appeal and for the payment of any costs which may be ordered to be paid by the appellant.”

The registrar normally sets a time limit within which the conditions imposed by him pursuant to rules 12 (4) and 13 are to be fulfilled, usually one month.

The question posed for resolution in this ruling is: what happens if the appellant fails to fulfil the conditions imposed by the registrar under rules 12 (4) and 13 of L.I. 218, either at all or within the correct time?

In this case the Circuit Court, Tarkwa gave judgment against the defendant-appellant on 6 January 1983. She duly filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal on 18 January 1983, and on the same day filed an application at Tarkwa to stay execution of the judgment. The application was dismissed on 18 February 1983. The record of appeal was settled on 6 May 1983, at which the appellant was enjoined to deposit. ¢400 cash to cover the cost of preparing the record as required by rule 12 (4) of L.I. 218 and a further sum of ¢300 or sign a bond in lieu, for the due prosecution of the appeal as required under rule 13 of L.I. 218. The appellant was given one month, effective 6 May 1983, to fulfil these conditions. The appellant’s counsel was present at the settlement. Neither the respondent nor his counsel was present. As is permitted by the rules, the appellant repeated her application for stay in the Court of Appeal. It seems that she failed to appear in the said court, which on 13 June 1983 struck it out for want of prosecution.

Barely a month afterwards, on 27 July 1983, the appellant applied to the court to relist and hear the motion which had been struck out on 13 June 1983. The application for relistment was heard on 28 November 1983. The appellant was represented by counsel but the respondent appeared in person. Opposing the application to relist, the respondent by himself took the point that there was no appeal pending, and therefore it was futile to relist the motion for stay. He took this position on the basis of the results of two searches conducted by him in the registry of the Tarkwa court on 13 October 1983 and 24 November 1983 respectively, both of which searches had yielded the result that

[p.404] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 400 the appellant had “not fulfilled all the conditions of appeal yet.” This was because by 24 November 1983 the appellant had not deposited the ¢400 for the preparation of the record of appeal, and it was even doubtful whether she had executed the bond for the ¢300.

The objection by the respondent necessitated an inquiry, and therefore a pronouncement, by the Court of Appeal on whether or not as at 28 November 1983 when the motion was being heard, there was an appeal pending as a precondition for the exercise of its discretion to relist and hear the motion for stay.

After listening to counsel and carefully examining the files, the court (coram Apaloo C.J., Francois and Abban JJ.A.) found that:

“The official record shown to us shows that the applicant has not yet fulfilled all the conditions of appeal.

That would mean that as at present no appeal is pending before us. In all the circumstances we do not feel disposed to exercise our discretion in the applicant’s favour. We accordingly refuse this motion with ¢200 costs to the respondent”

The ruling states unequivocally that as at 28 November 1983 there was no appeal pending. As stated earlier, the application was argued by counsel for the appellant, and the ruling was given in his presence. He therefore knew why the court ruled the way it did, namely that all the conditions of appeal had not then been fulfilled. The one month too had long expired.

It seems that the result of the proceedings of 28 November 1983 was in theory at least carelessly and wrongly communicated to the appellant, but in circumstances which strongly suggest that the registry may not be alone to blame for what appears on the face of it to be a strategy of disinformation. However, as the appellant’s counsel was present in court, it cannot be seriously contended that either he or his client could have been misled by whatever might have been sent out from the registry. And this no doubt, explains why the appellant, notwithstanding the erroneous communication, rushed to pay the deposit in December 1983, five months before the correct version of the order was sent by the Registrar, Court of Appeal in May 1984. We therefore reject any contention that the false notification from the Court of Appeal misled the appellant in anyway.

If on 28 November 1983, as the Court of Appeal observed, there was no proper appeal pending, how came the same appeal to be listed before us for hearing? This is the substance of the objection taken in limine by the plaintiff-respondent. He invites the court to dismiss the appeal because, he says, as far as he knows the position now is the same as it was on 28 November 1983. This may well be so, except that

[p.405] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 400 on 24 December 1983 the appellant had paid the ¢400 to the Tarkwa court without formally asking for an extension of the one month originally given her to do this. In July 1983, Mr. A.B. Sam, counsel for the appellant, had by a letter, urged the registrar to receive from his client the ¢400. Later events show that no such money was sent; the letter was misleading.

Then there is the question of the bond. There are some papers on file which the registrar of the Tarkwa court says in evidence before us that he regarded and accepted as the bond ordered by him. The said document is dated 2 March 1983, two months before the record was settled and the conditions imposed. It was originally executed in the sum of ¢4,000, but inelegantly and crudely linked and altered to read ¢300. There is nothing about this document to convince us that it is genuine. We do not believe that the registrar even knew of its existence until he was summoned to appear before us. The registrar, however, says that since he imposed the conditions on 6 May 1983, no bond has been executed that he knows of; that the bond he asked to be executed has not been executed. This represents the truth. The position seems to be that the bond, a necessary condition for the prosecution of the appeal, has not, even now, been executed.

Even if we charitably go with the registrar and accept the document of March 1983 as satisfying one of the conditions imposed by him in May 1983, thus bending over to breaking point just to accommodate the appellant, there is still the issue of the payment in December 1983 of the deposit of ¢400.

Mr. Kom, counsel for the appellant, argues in answer to the respondent’s objection in limine that the default is a mere technicality; the money has been paid and the court should exercise its inherent powers to grant an appropriate extension of time to cover the date of payment. Counsel further seeks refuge under rule 64 of L.I. 218 which reads:

“64 Non-compliance on the part of an appellant with these Rules or with any rule of practice for the time being in force shall not prevent the further prosecution of his appeal if the Court consider that such non-compliance was not wilful, and that in the interests of justice that non-compliance be waived . . .

“

(The emphasis is ours.)

In this case all the circumstances seem to point to the fact that non-fulfilment of the conditions of appeal was not involuntary. As stated earlier, applicant’s counsel, Mr. A. B. Sam, settled the record before the registrar and he knew the conditions imposed. Nowhere did he draw the registrar’s attention to an allegedly already executed and

[p.406] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 400 existing bond with a request that it be accepted by the registrar in satisfaction of one of the two conditions. And counsel made no effort to have one executed after the settlement. When counsel wrote his letter on 9 July 1983 to the registrar urging him to accept ¢400 from his client, he knew that the client had no such money on her and she was sending no such money. Even if on that occasion counsel might wish to claim that he was misled by his client (a state of affairs which, if true, will definitely conclude the matter against the client for deceiving her counsel), there is evidence that counsel’s attention must have been called to the state of his appeal when he argued the application for relistment before this court on 28 November 1983; for in what was obviously a reaction to the challenge that the appellant had not fulfilled all the conditions of appeal, he answered: “We have fulfilled the conditions [of appeal].”

It turns out that this statement of counsel was, to his knowledge, not correct. The records and the evidence of the registrar show that the ¢400 deposit was paid a month afterwards, on 24 December 1983, when counsel knew or ought to have known that the payment could not be regular without an extension of time, particularly so as the non-payment had been raised and made the principal ground for the court’s refusal to exercise its discretion in favour of relisting the application for stay, i.e. the relevant conditions of appeal had not been fulfilled.

In the circumstances, the failure to comply with the rules was deliberate, wilful, and even spiteful of the rules, and of the court. It is wrong for litigants and their counsel to assume that they can break the rules ad lib, and then seek refuge under the discretionary or inherent powers of the court.

But where do we go from here? In Pon (Kojo) v. Atta Fua [1927] A.C. 693, P.C., conditional leave to appeal had been granted, but a bond which had been ordered to be given as one of the conditions of appeal had turned out not to be properly signed. On an objection being taken, the West African Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in limine. The Privy Council reversed the decision and remitted the case to be heard on the merits, opportunity being given to the appellant to regularise his position. The council was of the opinion at 697 that:

Under these conditions … to refuse to hear the appeal merely on ground of what might have been a mere technicality about the bond was to fail to do justice as between the parties, and … the case must be remitted to the Court below to deal with it again, hear it, and, if necessary, get some formal proof of Kwabena’s authority.”

[p.407] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 400

In Moore v. Taye (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 242, section 77 (2) of the Native Administration Ordinance, Cap 111 (1928 Rev.) had provided that:

“(2) Leave to appeal from a Paramount Chief ‘s Tribunal shall not be granted unless and until the Appellant shall either have paid the costs in such Tribunal or shall have deposited [in the Tribunal] or in the [Provincial Commissioner’s] court . . . a sum of money sufficient to satisfy such costs…”

The appellant was granted leave even though he had not paid the costs of £21 2s 6d. He had been misled by the native tribunal itself, which imposed the condition that the appellant, instead of depositing the money should sign a bond for £21 2s 6d. At the provincial commissioner’s court the respondent objected that the appeal was not properly before that court. The commissioner, treating the non-payment of the costs, in all the circumstances, as a technicality, ordered the money to be paid forthwith and proceeded to hear and allow the appeal. The West African Court of Appeal (coram: Deane C.J. and Webber J. (Howes J. dissenting)) held that the provincial commissioner was in error. As the statutory conditions had not been fulfilled, there was no appeal properly before him. On appeal (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 43, the Privy Council supporting the West African Court of Appeal in this said at 45:

“The other grounds which are referred to by the learned Judge relate to powers which are given to an Appellate Court to adopt certain procedure, to waive rules, and to try and do substantial justice—all very important powers, but which can only be brought into play once the Appellate Court is seised of the appeal and has jurisdiction to entertain it.

But the objection lies in limine, in that the Provincial Commissioner had no jurisdiction at all; and therefore the reference to these powers unfortunately is irrelevant to the question of the Provincial Commissioner being able to give relief. It is quite true that their Lordships, as every other Court, attempt to do substantial justice and to avoid technicalities; but their Lordships, like any other court, are bound by the statute law, and if the statute law says there shall be no jurisdiction in a certain event, and that event has occurred, then it is impossible for their Lordships or for any other Court to have jurisdiction.”

In their ruling, the West African Court of Appeal per Deane C.J. who delivered the leading judgment explained and distinguished Pon (Kojo) v. Atta Fua (supra), concluding at 245 that in the Moore case (supra) then before the court:

[p.408] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 400

“ . . . there is no means of getting round the technicality which the law has set up—the payment of the costs is a statutory condition precedent to the granting of leave to appeal, application for which must first be made to the Tribunal and only on its refusal can the Commissioner grant leave to appeal.

That is altogether a different matter from a mere failure to comply with a rule of procedure, provision for circumventing which has been provided by law. Failure to comply with the provisions of section 77 (1) of the Native Administration Ordinance in my opinion had this effect, that it went to the very existence of the appeal; there was in fact nothing before the Court which the Commissioner could put into order, since by law leave to appeal could not be granted before the condition had been complied with.

Had the appeal been properly before the Court any defect with regard to the conditions attendant on it might have been got round—but it was not, and in my opinion the only proper course for the Commissioner to take was to strike out the appeal and allow the appellant to obtain proper leave and then to hear it.”

The court bolstered its position by reference to In re Dickinson; Ex parte Rosenthal (1882) 20 Ch.D. 315, where failure to pay money “at or before” an appeal was entered as required by statute was held to be fatal and the appeal was dismissed in limine.

In Ogunmola v. Igbo (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 137, the appellant was given leave to appeal and one of the conditions was that he should furnish a bond for 25 guineas to secure the costs of the appeal. He executed a bond for £25, instead of 25 guineas (i.e. £26 5s). The West African Court of Appeal held at 138 that the appeal was not properly before it and struck it out, but “without prejudice to any action [which] the appellant may desire to take to perfect the appeal.” It will be noted that the appeal was not dismissed; the court’s ruling was tantamount to deferring the hearing until the position had been regularised. Reference was made in that ruling to the Privy Council decision in Pon (Kojo) v. Atta Fua (supra).

Lastly, we shall refer to Botchway v. Nassar (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 23. The appellant had been granted leave to appeal but she had failed as a result of illness, to fulfil the conditions within the one month given her to do this. The court extended the time to enable her satisfy the conditions. In the words of Baker Acting C.J. at 25:

“The would-be appellant obtained her conditional leave to appeal and no doubt would have fulfilled the conditions imposed, but for the fact of illness. After her recovery she might have

[p.409] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 400 applied to the lower Court for an extension of time to enable her to fulfil the conditions which the Court has a discretion to allow. Instead of doing this, however, she, through her counsel, inadvertently made an application under rule 16 for special leave to appeal which we have held she was not able to do. She, therefore, in our opinion cannot be considered to have been dilatory, but pursued her application in an ill advised manner. For these reasons we are of opinion that it would be unjust to dismiss the appeal and would result in a failure to do justice and that this is a case where the Court should exercise its powers under section 8 [of the West African Court of Appeal Ordinance]. We therefore grant her a further month from the date of this judgment to fulfil the conditions imposed by the Order of the lower Court of the 28th September, 1945.”

The respondents were given their costs.

A study of the cases shows that there are two classes of breaches. In one the default is fundamental; it goes to the root of the appeal, and therefore leaves the court with no discretion but to dismiss the appeal in limine: see Moore v. Taye (supra) and Ex parte Rosenthal (supra). In the other class, the default is not so fundamental; it affects the prosecution of a properly filed appeal and in this regard may be referred to, for convenience, as procedural: see Ogunmola v. Igbo (supra) and Botchway v. Nassar (supra).

Section 10 (7) of Act 372 orders that: “7. The Court of Appeal shall not entertain any appeal unless the appellant has fulfilled all the conditions prescribed in that behalf by the Rules of Court.” L.I. 218 (the rules of court), as has been explained, prescribed two sets of rules: one leading to and concerning the filing of the appeal: rule 10; the other regulating the bringing of the appeal thus filed, to a hearing: rules 12 and 13. Rule 10 (3) of L.I. 218 says that: “‘An appeal shall be deemed to have been brought when the notice of appeal has been filed in the registry of the Court below.” The above rule implies that as soon as the notice is filed, within the proper time and, where applicable, with the requisite leave, there is a properly filed appeal pending. Everything else that the appellant is required to do thereafter does not affect the pendency of the appeal; it only relates to the procedure or mechanics for bringing the appeal to a hearing. The authorities will seem to show that defaults in connection with the first stage are fatal. They affect the notice itself, invalidate it, and render the “appeal void. They affect, not The “conditions of appeal as fixed [by the registrar] but …the very existence of the appeal”: see Kudiabor v. Kudanu (1932) 6 W.A.C.A. 14

[p.410] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 400 at 16 per Deane C.J. Defaults at the second stage, the procedural or “mechanical” ones, only render the appeal voidable. Concerning the first, the court has no discretion but to strike down the appeal as invalid: there is no appeal before the court. The court’s discretion can only be invoked in connection with the procedural defaults, when rules 19 or 64 of L.I. 218 as appropriate, may be prayed in aid.

Commenting on the Kudiabor case (supra), Lewey J.A. observed in Oloto v. LEDB (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 57 at 61:

“This decision [of Kudiabor] clearly illustrates the distinction between those minor or technical imperfections in any existing appeal which the Courts have power to cure, and those more serious defects which are incurable . . . with the result that there is no appeal to come before the court . . .”

Rule 19 of L.I. 218 reads:

“19. (1) If the appellant has complied with none of the requirements of rules 12 (4) and 13 the Registrar of the Court below shall certify such facts to the Court, which may thereupon order that the appeal be dismissed with or without costs.

(2) If the respondent alleges that the appellant has failed to comply with a part of the requirements of rules 8, 12 (4) or 13 the Court, if satisfied that the applicant has so failed, may dismiss the appeal for want of due prosecution or make such other order as the justice of the case may require.

(3) An appellant whose appeal has been dismissed under this rule may apply by motion on notice that his appeal be restored, and the Court may in its discretion for good and sufficient cause order that such appeal be restored upon such terms as it may think fit.” (Not applicable.)

Rule 8, mentioned in rule 19 (2), deals with the details to be stated in the notice of appeal. In this case the notice of appeal was properly and timeously filed on 18 January 1983. An appeal was therefore brought into existence on that date. This court’s holding on 28 November 1983 that there was “no appeal … pending before [it]” must be understood to mean that the appeal properly filed was not in a fit state to be heard; it had not matured. But there was an appeal pending. The defaults complained of as offending against rules 12 (4) and 13 do not go to the root of the appeal; they are merely procedural, and leave the court with a discretion to decide the fate of the appeal: see, e.g. Anoje v. Ukweje (1955) 15 W.A.C.A. 41 at 42.

As in our assessment the non-compliance was wilful, we are unable to grant relief under rule 64. But we can make orders under

[p.411] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 400 rule 19 (2) “…as the justice of the case may require”, being “satisfied that the appellant has failed to comply with a part of the requirements of rules . . . 12 (4) or 13 …” of L.I. 218. The justice of the case requires that the appellant be given opportunity to be heard on the merits, on terms that she pays a price for her misconduct. The respondent will be compensated in costs.

In the result, we shall extend by two weeks from the date of this ruling the time given by the registrar, to enable the appellant to fulfil the conditions of appeal. This may now be limited to the bond only, since we notice that the deposit has already been paid. We reject the bond on file: a proper one may be executed.

The respondent will have his costs which in the circumstances we fix at ¢2,000, in any event, independently of the fate of the appeal. We exercise our discretion under rule 19 (2) of L.I. 218 to order, as a condition for the further prosecution of the appeal, that these costs be paid within one month, failing which the respondent be at liberty to apply to this court to dismiss the appeal “for want of due prosecution.”

In making this order we take support from Odey v. Edim (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 63 at 64. Subject to the above, the preliminary objection is overruled. The substantive appeal will be adjourned sine die.

Before we are done we wish to take this opportunity to make a few observations on some matters which have come to our notice. First, the bond. Rule 13 of L.I. 218 requires that the appellant deposit a sum of money, or else give security by bond for the said sum to, inter alia, pay the costs that may be awarded against him. Our registries have invariably taken bonds instead of physical cash, and yet we have hardly known successful respondents to recover their costs otherwise than in the conventional way, without recourse to the bond. Indeed, the bond does not seem to serve any useful purpose. It is a waste of paper and of office hours. Our registries have tended to regard it, not without some justification, as another of those worthless pieces of forms with which our courts are cluttered. The attitude of the Tarkwa registry to the bond in this case bears ample testimony to this observation. We wish to recommend that rule 13 be amended to exclude the bond, so that only hard cash is deposited, to ease the woes of successful respondents after the appeal; or else the said rule be scrapped altogether. The Rules Committee may wish to look into this matter.

Secondly, we notice that although the deposit of ¢400 was made in December 1983, about six months out of time, the Tarkwa registry in February 1984 despatched civil Form 6 certifying that the appellant had “duly and punctually complied with the conditions of appeal imposed on him . . . “ (The emphasis is ours.) This was an obvious misstatement, and goodness knows how many such misstatements our courts are daily being treated to by our registries. It seems that some

[p.412] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 400 registrars do not know or appreciate the significance of these forms and returns. Some education on the interpretation and application of the rules is called for. In the process, a drastic simplification and reduction in the number of forms may not be out of place. This is a matter which again the Rules Committee may wish to consider.

DECISION

Application granted.

L.K.A.

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