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[1985] SLR (CA) 42Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

SEATEC LTD. vs. PENTON HOOK FARMS LTD. AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 449

29 July 1985 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 20 min read

Cite as[1985] SLR (CA) 42
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OSCOLASEATEC LTD. v PENTON HOOK FARMS LTD. AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 449 [1985] SLR (CA) 42
APASEATEC LTD. v PENTON HOOK FARMS LTD. AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 449, [1985] SLR (CA) 42 (Ghana).
BluebookSEATEC LTD. v PENTON HOOK FARMS LTD. AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 449, [1985] SLR (CA) 42 (Ghana Ct. App. 1985).

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CASE REFERRED TO

Vanderpuye v. Nartey [1977] 1 G.L.R. 428,C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from a ruling of Ampiah J. dismissing an application to discharge an interim order for protection of the res litigosa pending the hearing of the substantive claim wherein he varied a previous order and thereby released a grader to the co-defendant. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Miss Phillips for the appellant.

B.J. da Rocha for the respondents.

J.K. Agyeman for the co-respondent.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

Apaloo C.J. delivered the judgment of the court. This appeal was extremely well argued by counsel on both sides. However, on the conclusion of arguments last Friday, each member of this court independently came to the same conclusion. Although the issues canvassed and the arguments presented to us strayed a little, it is clear to us that on this interlocutory appeal, the only issue of substance is whether on the pleadings and affidavits placed before the court, there is

[p.452] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 449 the need to preserve the motor grader in dispute in status quo so that irreparable damage may not be caused to the applicant-appellant. There is also the correlative issue: which of the parties would suffer the greater hardship if this application were refused?

In this area of property preservation pending suit, judicial pronouncements have not been wholly consistent. But in Vanderpuye v. Nartey [1977] 1 G.L.R. 428, C.A. this court took the trouble to lay down what it considered to be the guiding principle. Having done that, it felt obliged to differ from the court below which had refused to make, so to speak, an interim preservation order. In that case, this court said at 432:

“The governing principle should be whether on the face of the affidavits there is need to preserve the status quo in order to avoid irreparable damage to the applicant and provided his claim is not frivolous or vexatious.”

The applicant prayed in aid, that case. The learned judge to whom the preservation request was made, namely Ansah-Twum J., accepted that Vanderpuye v. Nartey (supra) properly governed the matter but came to the conclusion that it did not assist the applicant. A second judge, that is Ampiah J., was asked to look at that matter again and grant the preservation order. He also declined to do so and in so far as he considered this matter on its merits, he founded his refusal to grant the interim relief on the same ground that his brother Ansah-Twum J. did. The appellant says, both judges were wrong and we should put them right by granting the order which they declined to grant.

Before considering the merits of this case, it is necessary to dispose of two issues on which a lot of argument was addressed to us with apparent depth of feeling by both counsel. The first is whether the request to Ampiah J. to vary the order of Ansah-Twum J. was entertainable by him since it was in the nature of review under Order 39 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), and secondly, whether since the co-defendant failed to renew his registration in accordance with the Registration of Business Names Act, 1962 (Act 151), as amended by the Registration of Business Names (Amendment) Decree, 1974 (N.R.C.D. 293), he was entitled to be accorded the relief which he sought and successfully obtained.

This order has a little history. When the appellant issued his writ in June 1984, he claimed against the defendants an order for the specific performance of an oral agreement to sell certain equipment including the grader in dispute to himself. All these pieces of equipment were in the farm of the defendants at a place called Anyasi and in their apparent possession. The appellant was apparently apprehensive that

[p.453] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 449 the defendants might dispose of or otherwise tamper with the equipment. So he moved the court for an injunction and for an interim order preserving the equipment in status quo. This application came before the court on July 1984. Both counsel and parties agreed that this was a proper order to make. So the court, then presided over by Ansah-Twum J. noted as follows:

“Both counsel and the parties have agreed that, the machinery in possession of the second defendant shall remain in their status quo on the first defendant’s farm as they are at the moment. No further dismantling or otherwise disposal of the same shall take place without an order of this court.”

At that time, although it must have been within their knowledge, the defendants did not say that any third party had acquired rights in the machinery and that in those circumstances, their rights were likely to be adversely affected. But it is this fact which was asserted by the co-defendant before the self-same judge on 28 August 1984. The codefendant then invited the judge to vary his order of 6 July and to release to him the grader in dispute because he said he had bought it from the defendants and fully paid the purchase price on 6 June 1984 and obtained a document of transfer five days later, that is on 11 June. He produced the alleged receipt and the instrument of transfer. As was to be expected, this application was resisted by the appellant. But Ansah-Twum J. proceeded to vary his order and in the result, released the grader unconditionally to the co-defendant. In so far as it is possible to discern the ratio from his ruling, it was expressed in these words, “Being satisfied that the co-defendant has shown sufficient evidence that he has valid title thereto and he had legal possession thereof, he must not be deprived of his title therein at this stage.” The judge having released the grader to the co-defendant, then curiously said he was preserving the status quo on the authority of Vanderpuye v. Nartey (supra).

The appellant could hardly be expected to be satisfied with this result. So on 13 November 1984, he filed an application praying the court to discharge the order of 28 August which vacated the interim preservation order. He did not ask for it to be placed before any particular judge. Ordinarily, and under the normal administrative arrangement of the court, this application should have been placed before Ansah-Twum J. who had vacated the order. But as at that date he was unavailable, being on vacation leave, it was placed before Ampiah J. The latter heard the application and thought that as in part the complaints raised against Ansah-Twum J’s order attacked his exercise of judicial discretion, he could not properly entertain it as it

[p.454] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 449 appeared to him to be an appeal from his brother of co-ordinate jurisdiction. He felt a review was the proper course. He foresaw the likelihood of his being held wrong in this view. So he delivered himself on the merits. He felt that as on the affidavit evidence the co-defendant had fully paid for the machine from a loan he had raised and had title transferred to him by the defendants, he was the better person to stand possessed of the machine which he needed for the purpose of his business. He did not accept that it needed to be preserved pendente litem.

The upshot of this is that on the merits, Ampiah J. based himself on the same ground that Ansah-Twum J. did, namely that the co-defendant had fully paid for the grader and had title vested in himself and this was not the position with regard to the appellant. The judge was pressed with Act 151 as amended by N.R.C.D. 293 and it was submitted to him that as the co-defendant had defaulted with the renewal of his registration he could not enforce any legal rights he purportedly acquired in that name. The judge held that that view was wrong and that as a defendant, he was entitled to defend an action and, indeed, prosecute a counterclaim, his default notwithstanding.

Quite apart from the merits, the judge’s holdings that: (1) he lacked jurisdiction because the matter was more properly a review and that it should have been brought before Ansah-Twum J; and (2) that Act 151 as amended did not disentitle the co-defendant from pursuing a counterclaim, were seriously questioned before us. On these two questions, very detailed and interesting submissions were made to us by counsel on both sides. It is no want of appreciation of the scholarly argument presented to us, that we think that in the context of this case, these are peripheral matters. They do not determine the main issue, which was whether on the affidavit evidence before the court, a preservation order should have been made. In the circumstances, we abstain from delivering ourselves on them.

As we see it, the only real question which both Ansah-Twum and Ampiah JJ. were asked to determine was whether on the affidavit evidence and on the other matters pleaded it was just and convenient that the res litigosa should be preserved pendente litem to avoid irreparable damage to the appellant. As we said, both learned judges answered that question in the negative and founded themselves on the same reason. Were they right? Under the authority of Vanderpuye v. Nartey (supra) the appellant should first show that his suit was neither frivolous nor vexatious. There is a large area of disagreement between the appellant and the defendants on the facts. It was against them that the appellant sought the relief of specific performance and it was against them that he obtained, initially, the preservation order.

[p.455] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 449

Put briefly, the appellant’s case was that between May and June 1984 he entered into an oral contract with the defendants to purchase three species of machinery including the grader in dispute. The second defendant who was acting for the first defendant-company, took him to view the machinery. He agreed to buy them and the purchase price was agreed at ¢800,000. He issued a cash cheque to the defendants on 6 June 1984. This payment was received and delivery of the machinery was promised for 11 June. On that day, the appellant said he hired transport and called on the second defendant who had previously agreed to go with him to the farm to enable him take delivery. He did not meet the latter at home but she left word that the delivery was to be put off for a week. At the end of this period, the defendants changed their minds and declined to proceed with the sale.

It was this breach that provoked this action, As a motor grader is, at least in this country, a rare commodity in the market, the appellant sought the court’s aid to have this contract specifically performed. Under section 58 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1962 (Act 137), the court could competently award him that remedy. Nobody could seriously suggest that on these facts, the appellant’s suit was frivolous or vexatious. If after an examination and valuation of the defendants’ contrary evidence, the court accepted the appellant’s version to be the truth, then he was practically home and dry.

The defendants’ version was rather different. They say no firm agreement was reached to sell the grader or indeed any equipment to the appellant. They admit they took the appellant to Anyasi to view the machinery but they did so on the appellant’s insistence. They said they could not have made a firm offer to the appellant because a previous offer had been made to another person and that offer was to remain open to him till 11 June. If he failed to accept it at that date, the defendants would be prepared to consider the appellant’s offer to purchase but not before then. They say although they made this position clear to him, the appellant insisted on leaving by cheque, a deposit of ¢800,000. According to the defendants, the asking price for the grader alone was ¢1.25 million. On 6 June the person to whom the original offer was made, turned up, paid fully for the grader and was issued with a receipt of that date. On 11 June the defendants issued him a document of transfer, and thereby vested legal title in him. That other person turned out to be the co-defendant, a Samuel Kofi Addison, doing business under the name and style of Afedzi Construction Works.

The latter sought to join and was admitted to join the action as co-defendant. He then practically reiterated in his defence, the facts averred in the defendants’ statement of defence. For his part, he counterclaimed and averred in substance, that as he fully paid for the

[p.456] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 449 grader and obtained from the defendants both a receipt and document of transfer, he had acquired legal title to the grader and as between him and the appellant, had a better right to the possession of the machine. So he asked the court for an order for delivery to him of the grader and damages. He said he had obtained a bank loan to finance the purchase and that that loan was attracting and accumulating interest. The appellant for his part, disputed the co-defendant’s version of the facts and averred that he had “a better title to the disputed equipment and to its possession and use of the co-defendant.”

If either the defendants or the co-defendant’s version of the fact turned out to be true and was so found by the court, the appellant would be entirely out of court. This case was not heard, neither of the judges who dealt with the interlocutory application listened to the conflicting stones put up by the parties. None of them was able to pronounce on the truth or falsity of either of the stories. What emerged from the way the facts were pleaded, was that both the defendants and co-defendant were ranged for battle on one side against the appellant. Although the case was not heard in the sense in which we understand it in our adversary system, both judges felt able to hold that the co-defendant had bought and paid in full for the grader and acquired legal title and practically granted the co-defendant the relief which he sought in his counterclaim.

Neither judge professed to be hearing the case on its merits. They were only dealing with the appellant’s application for interim relief, the preservation of the machine pending the hearing of the action. What seems to have impressed them both were two documents produced to them by the co-defendant the first was the receipt of 6 June, purportedly issued to the co-defendant by the first defendant company and the “letter of transfer of 11 June.”

That these two documents truly came into existence on the dates they bore, rested on the untested affidavit of the defendants and the co-defendant. But there were certain things curious about both documents. The receipt was produced to show the full payment of the purchase price which counsel told the court in argument was ¢1.25 million. Under section 1 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1962 (Act 137), “A contract of sale of goods is a contract whereby the seller agrees to transfer the property in the goods to the buyer for a consideration called price, consisting wholly or partly of money.” So the price is an essential element of a sale contract and it would ordinarily be expected that where a seller acknowledges receipt for the payment of the goods, he would state and acknowledge receipt of the price. The so-called “receipt for full payment” issued to the co-defendant and apparently accepted by him, reads as follows, “Receipt for full payment This is a

[p.457] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 449 receipt for full payment of 1 (one) unit of Kumatsu grader with the following description.” The machine was then described.

One must assume that the defendant-company which appears to be a limited liability one apparently carrying on genuine business, keeps books of account and would have to make an entry of large cash receipt in its books. What monetary value would it put in its books as consideration for the sale? And if the co-defendant paid them ¢1.25 million, why did it apparently wish to suppress this figure? The co-defendant is alleged to have raised a large overdraft to finance this purchase. He was content to accept a receipt which acknowledges no money payment by him. Yet it is this curious receipt that the learned judge accepted as payment in a matter that was hotly contested. And it is this “full payment” that is said to tilt the balance of hardship in the co-defendant’s favour. It is probable that if the matter had gone to trial in the ordinary way, both the defendants and the co-defendant may have had an acceptable explanation for this curious document. But the case did not reach the trial stage and no explanation was offered for the oddity of the receipt.

Yet it was submitted to the judge below and to us that whereas the co-defendant fully paid the purchase price of the machine, the appellant did not pay a pesewa and therefore the equities were weighed in his favour. To put it mildly, that receipt seems to us suspect. If in truth the co-defendant made this large payment in cash and the defendant-company for its part accepted that mode of payment, then they both committed an offence against section 1 of the Settlement of Trade Debts Law, 1982 (P.N.D.C.L. 13). This is because that Law provides in sum, that a trade debt incurred in respect of the purchase of goods or services, can only lawfully be settled by crossed cheque or banker’s draft if that debt exceeds ¢1,000. The sum supposed to be paid in this case is ¢1.25 million. It would, indeed, be strange if a court were to allow a party to resist an equitable remedy sought against him by proffering and relying on his own criminal conduct. At the stage at which the suit reached, we think both judges were in error in their uncritical acceptance of that suspect document as full payment of the purchase price of the disputed machine.

If the receipt can properly bear the tag of a suspect document, the “letter of transfer” is no less so. Both documents were on the defendant-company’s letter-heads and apparently, to give them official colour, the reference number of the documents were given as well as the dates the documents were ex facie prepared. The earlier document, that is the receipt which bore the date 6 June 1984, has as its reference number 12/PIHF/Vol. 2/28. Yet the later document whose reference number suggests that it is from the same file, has as its reference

[p.458] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 449 number 12/PHF/Vol. 2/26. One does not need to be an expert in secretarial practice to notice that if these were genuine reference numbers, then the letter of transfer ante-dated the receipt. Yet the letter bore the date 11 June, while the former bore the date 6 June. It is this odd reference numbering that drew the light-hearted comment from the bench that this must be an arabic sort of referencing. The learned judges did not apparently notice this curious discrepancy. If they had, they would no doubt, have called for an explanation of these patently odd reference numbers. As we said of the receipt, perhaps, if this matter had gone for trial, the defendant-company may have proffered a perfectly acceptable explanation. We hope that nothing we say at this stage, would foreclose a considered decision on this matter at the trial. But, as at present advised, these two documents struck us as questionable ones.

It was submitted for the co-defendant that while he paid the purchase price in full, the appellant failed to pay a pesewa. That is anything but an accurate statement of the facts as we understand them. The appellant pleaded that he paid the defendant-company, at their request, cash cheque for the sum of ¢800,000, that being the method of payment the latter demanded. And that this sum was in full payment of the agreed purchase price of the machines. Having demanded and obtained payment by that method, it sounds ill in the mouth of the company to say that the appellant did not pay a pesewa because the company chose, for reasons which are now obvious, not to present that cheque for payment. The further contention raised on behalf of the co-defendant that tender of cheque is not legal payment, is answered by section 1 of P.N.D.C.L. 13 which prescribes, on pain of criminal sanction, that as the only lawful method of payment of a trade debt like the present, which exceeded ¢1,000. The only legal flaw in the appellant’s method of paying for the machine was that he issued cash instead of a crossed cheque which the relevant Law prescribed. The defendant-company admits that the appellant left with them a cheque for ¢800,000 which they claimed to be a deposit against the purchase price of the machine. Whether it was a deposit or full payment of the purchase price, it simply did not square with the co-defendant’s contention that he had better justice because he made full payment of the asking price and the appellant paid nothing.

One other curious coincidence of this suit is that both the appellant and the co-defendant, on the defendant-company’s showing, made their respective payments on the same day. But the co-defendant volunteered affidavit evidence from which it is legitimate to draw the inference that though payments were made on 6 June, the appellant’s payment was earlier in point of time. This is because the co-defendant swore in his affidavit that after he made his alleged full payment of the undisclosed

[p.459] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 449 purchase price at the defendants’ office, the second defendant volunteered to him information that a prospective buyer sought to deposit a cheque on account of the self-same machine but she had asked him to hold on until 11 June. On the facts of this case, that prospective purchaser could only have been the appellant. On the defendants’ own pleading, that cheque was not refused. It was accepted, allegedly, as a deposit on June 6.

The interim relief which the appellant sought was an equitable one. At least one of the principles on which that jurisdiction is exercised is that if the equities are equal, the first in time prevails. If the appellant’s pleading and affidavit reflect the true state of affairs, then it is reasonable to hold that property in the grader passed to him when he made his payment on 6 June although delivery was promised for 11 June. So unless the codefendant shows that he truly paid for the grader and took delivery of it in good faith and without notice of the previous sale to the appellant, then he acquired no title which he can assert against the appellant: see on this, section 31 of Act 137. Whether the co-defendant so received the goods, is only determinable on the evidence and none was led in this interlocutory matter.

It was also pressed on us, as it was pressed on the judge below, that the co-defendant was in urgent need of the grader to fulfil urgent contractual commitments and a default on his part would rebound to the discredit of his business reputation, but that the appellant did not show or appear to be in any such need and that on this score, the balance of hardship tilted in the co-defendant’s favour. That argument does not weigh with us. Apparently, both the appellant and co-defendant were businessmen who travelled from Sekondi to negotiate with the defendants for the purchase of the machine. Unless the evidence is that the appellant merely speculates in machines for profit, it hardly makes sense for him to travel from Sekondi to Accra to propose a purchase of the machines and to proceed thereafter to what seems an outlandish village to view them and thereafter incur the trouble and expense of hiring a low loader and other vehicles for the purpose of conveying them if he had no urgent need for the use of the machines.

It is manifest to us that on the affidavit evidence and pleadings, the appellant’s claim was neither frivolous nor vexatious. Would he suffer loss if the grader were not kept in status quo but released for the unconditional use of either of the contestants? We think he would. Indeed, there is uncontested affidavit evidence by the appellant attesting to his information that the grader had since suffered a breakdown requiring replacement of its main clutch plate, discs and hydraulic cylinder for blade shift. And would that loss be substantial? We think that it would. That being so, we asked ourselves, would it be just and convenient that the res litigosa be kept intact and committed to the care of a neutral [p.460] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 449 third party? We answer that question positively in the affirmative. We were unimpressed by the argument that as the appellant also made an alternative claim for damages, he should be content with that. It is no business of a defendant to tell an aggrieved plaintiff what remedy should satisfy him. The equitable remedy of specific performance is, by the clear provision of section 58 of our Act 137, awardable by a court.

In the circumstances, and exercising, as we hope we are, the jurisdiction of a court of equity, we conceive it our duty to grant to the appellant the order for interim preservation which he sought. It follows that in our judgment, both judges below were in error in denying him that relief.

Although we make no imputation of any sort on either of the two experienced and respected judges who dealt with this matter, we think as they have already concluded in their minds as is apparent from their rulings, that the co-defendant fully paid for the grader and acquired legal title which entitled him to possession of the machine, this being one of the main issues settled to be decided in the action, we think it undesirable that either of them should determine the substantive suit. We accordingly propose to direct that the suit should be commenced and heard afresh by a judge whose mind is uninfluenced by what happened before. If this is mutually acceptable to the parties, we propose by administrative action, to request the vacation judge to hear and dispose of this case in the vacation and before the commencement of the new legal year in October.

We were informed by counsel for the co-defendant that the grader is functional. We understood this to mean that it is capable of self-propulsion. Unless the parties agree that the grader be driven to and committed to the charge of a person or institution mutually acceptable to them at Takoradi, and this agreement is communicated to us in chambers before the close of business today, we propose to order that the grader be brought to Accra within seven days from today and lodged with Messrs Mechanical Lloyd until the hearing and determination of this action.

The appellant succeeds in this matter and is entitled to costs against the codefendant-respondent. We fix this at ¢5,000.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

J.A.A.

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