ARTHUR AND OTHERS vs. THE REPUBLIC [1987-88] 1 GLR 739
11 December 1985 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 62 min read
[1985] SLR (CA) 43Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Poku v. The State [1966] G.L.R. 262, S.C.
(2) Nyame v. The Republic [1971] 2 G.L.R. 140, C.A.
(3) Teper v. R [1952] A.C. 480; [1952] 2 All E.R. 447; [1952] 2 T.L.R. 162, P.C.
(4) State v. Fiadzo (Anani) [1961] G.L.R. 416, S.C.
(5) Kwesi v. The Republic [1977] 1 G.L.R. 448, C.A.
(6) R v. Cohen and Bateman (1909) 2 Cr. App. R. 197, C.C.A.
(7) Commissioner of Police v. Antwi [1961] G.L.R. 408, S.C.
(8) Sasu v. White Cross Insurance Co. Ltd. [1960] G.L.R. 4, C.A.
(9) R v. Oledima (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 202.
(10) R v. Harris (1927) 20 Cr. App. R. 144, C.C.A.
(11) State v. Otchere [1963] 2 G.L.R. 463, S.C.
(12) Bissah v. The State [1967] G.L.R. 310, C.A.
(13) R v. Golder; R v. Jones; R v. Porritt [1960] 1 W.L.R. 1169; [1960] 3 All E.R. 457; 45 Cr. App. R.
5, C.C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by the appellants against their conviction and sentence for murder. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgments of Abban J.A. and Amua-Sekyi J.
COUNSEL
J. Spio for the appellants.
S. G. Baddoo, Chief State Attorney, for the Republic.
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.
The first and third appellants were charged with conspiracy to murder and murder of one Kwasi Itu at a village called Daber near Elmina on or about 14 May 1981. The second appellant was charged with conspiracy to murder and abetment of the said murder. They were tried at the criminal session held at the High Court, Cape Coast. All of them were found guilty and convicted. The first and third appellants were sentenced to death while the second appellant was given a prison sentence of twelve years with hard labour.
The facts of the case are that the deceased, an old man of about 75 years, was found dead in his room on the morning of 14 May 1981 at Daber village. One Madam Ode who was living in the house was the first person to find the deceased dead. Members of the family of the deceased assembled and the third appellant, being one of the elders of that family and also the family linguist, was entrusted with the
[p.742] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739 responsibility for the burial arrangements which included the preparation of the dead body for burial.
Since there were no facilities for embalment, the third appellant had the body washed, cleaned and made it ready for burial. The deceased at the time of his death was the head of the royal family of the village and since there was no chief at that time, he was also the acting chief of the village. As a chief, custom demanded that burial should take place in the night. The family of the children of the deceased provided a coffin in accordance with custom. When the family realised that the body had began giving a bad smell a decision was taken to bury it that night and this was accordingly done.
The deceased had in his custody the stool paraphernalia. These things had been packed into a box and kept in the room of the deceased. A day or two after the burial, members of the family re-assembled to take stock of the said paraphernalia. At the gathering some members of the family were deputed to go to the room where the stool and the paraphernalia were kept and to take inventory. The delegation returned to report that they found the room very disorderly and that the stool and some of the paraphernalia were missing. The first reaction of some members of the family was to make contributions of ten cedis per member to be used in consulting a fetish as to who were responsible for the theft.
It is not clear from the evidence as to whether the fetish was able to find the culprit. In any case, before anything could be heard from the fetish, one Adwowa Anima, the fifth prosecution witness; the third appellant; and his brother Kwame we had reported the theft to the police at Elmina. But the third appellant and his brother were placed in custody. Later some of the stool jewels were discovered with Kweku Efum, the seventh prosecution witness, and he was also arrested and placed in the cells. Kweku Efum later turned out to be the star witness for the prosecution.
After further investigations some of the missing articles were found with the first and second appellants and they were also arrested. Then rumours started circulating that the deceased might not have died a natural death. This led to the exhumation of the body for post-mortem examination and also to the arrest by the police of other persons including Kwamina Nyarko, the fourth prosecution witness, and Nyame-Na Ose, the ninth prosecution witness. Thus from the beginning the suspects in connection with the death of the deceased were the appellants, Kwamina Nyarko, the fourth prosecution witness, Kweku Efum, the seventh prosecution witness, Nyame-Na Ose, the ninth prosecution witness, and Kwame Wi.
[p.743] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739
It should be observed that all those persons gave statements to the police denying their involvement in the alleged killing of the deceased. Kwaku Efum, the seventh prosecution witness, in his police statement never stated that he had any knowledge of the circumstances that led to the death of the deceased and did not also in that statement implicate any of the appellants in any manner whatsoever.
All the suspects were later transferred from the Elmina Police Station to the prisons at the Cape Coast Castle. For months they were all on a provisional charge of murdering Kwesi Itu. They were being sent to court weekly, sometimes fortnightly, even though there was no evidence or possible clue as to how the deceased met his death and as to who was responsible for the alleged killing, except that some of the stool paraphernalia had been found with Nyarko, the fourth prosecution witness, Kweku Efum, the seventh prosecution witness, and the first and second appellants.
So for all those months the appellants together with Kwame Nyarko, the fourth prosecution witness, Kweku Efum, the seventh prosecution witness, one Kwame Wi and Nyame-Na Ose, the ninth prosecution witness, were the accused persons in connection with the alleged killing of the deceased. Then one day, according to the prosecution, Kweku Efum, the seventh prosecution witness, expressed a desire to see the chief warder of the prisons to make a fresh statement. Detective Sergeant Korang, the twelfth prosecution witness, who was in charge of the case was summoned to the prisons by the prison authorities to take down the new statement of Kwaku Efum, the seventh prosecution witness. In this new statement Kwaku Efum exculpated himself, as well as Kwame Nyarko, the fourth prosecution witness, Nyame-Na Ose, the ninth prosecution witness, and Kwame Wi and then incriminated the appellants as the persons who killed the deceased.
The case then took a different turn. For after that statement Kwaku Efum, the seventh prosecution witness, and Kwame Wi were discharged. They were then made prosecution witnesses. It is to be mentioned that Kwame Wi was listed as a prosecution witness but he was not called. The explanation which was given by the prosecution was that he could not be traced. At the trial, the evidence of Kweku Efum based on the fresh statement turned out to be the only important evidence which connected the appellants with the crime.
Efum’s evidence was to the effect that in the evening of 13 May 1981 he went to the house of the deceased at about 8.00 p.m. In the compound of the house the local minstrel choir had gathered and were having their usual singing practice. The deceased used to be a patron of that choir. Efum said he passed by the members of the choir who were
[p.744] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739 sitting with their backs to the door of the room of the deceased. He knocked at the door. But there was no answer. Then he saw that the door handle was being turned. Then all of a sudden the door opened and someone held his hand and pulled him into the room. In the room he found that it was the third appellant who pulled him into the room. The third appellant made a sign to him to keep quiet. The third appellant then pointed a gun at him and took him into a chamber where he saw the first and the second appellants. The deceased was seated on the floor with his neck resting on the left arm of the first appellant. Efum said he realised that the deceased was already dead. According to Efum, the first appellant on seeing him (Efum) made the following remarks: “You refused to assist us kill this uncle of yours who had been killing people with juju. Here he is. We have killed him.” Efum said on the instructions of the first appellant, the second appellant collected some of the stool regalia and jewels and put them in a tray. Some were also put in his (Efum’s) pocket. The appellants then led him out of the room. By that time the choir had closed and the members had left. The appellants took him to a public well, then to two rivers in the bush. At each place he was made to swear an oath of secrecy that he would never reveal what he had seen otherwise if he drank from the waters of the well and that of the two rivers he should die.
Efum said because of the fear of death he did not tell anybody and kept everything to himself. He concluded his evidence-in-chief as follows: “I made two statements to the police, one at Elmina and the second after I had spoken to the chief warder. Of the two statements, the one made in prison at the castle is the true one.”
As already indicated, in his earlier statement to the police Efum never said any of these damaging things about any of the appellants. His evidence at the trial was a repetition of what he stated in his belated statement to the police at the prisons.
Efum also alleged that long before the death of the deceased the first and third appellants had approached him (Efum) and had asked him to assist them to kill the deceased and the appellant attempted to offer him ¢2,000 if he assisted in carrying out this diabolical deed. But he (Efum) refused. Efum said he revealed this to the deceased who told him not to mind the first and third appellants. Incidentally, the appellants were the maternal nephews and niece, respectively of the deceased, and Efum, the seventh prosecution witness, was a nephew to the appellants. So that Efum was a grandnephew to the deceased.
The defence of the appellants was a total denial of the charges preferred against them. This they did in their police statement and also at the trial. They contended that Efum, the seventh prosecution witness, had lied to the court and that Efum had conceived this belated story while in prison in order to save himself from further prosecution.
[p.745] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739
Furthermore, they maintained that they never went to the house of the deceased that night in question. The first appellant said throughout that day and in the night he was at Apewosika village which was about eight to nine miles away from the village of Daber. He gave details, in his evidence, of his movements that day up to the time he went to bed, at about 8.00 p.m. and he never got up until the next day. In accounting for how he came by some of the stool regalia, the first appellant said on the morning of 14 May his uncle one Kwesi Awotwe, who was the next elderly member of the family, came to him (the first appellant) at Apewosika and told him that he, Awotwe, was on his way to attend a funeral at Amisane. Apparently at that time the death of the deceased was not known.
The first appellant said after uncle Awotwe had left the first appellant’s wife also left for market. He was preparing to go to school to teach when his sister, the second appellant, arrived to inquire about the whereabouts of uncle Awotwe. Her mission was to hand over to uncle Awotwe certain stool regalia which had been dropped near the male public lavatory by Efum, the seventh prosecution witness, and Kwame Wi. These two persons were carrying the articles in a fertilizer bag. But when they found that they were being followed by one Boateng they dropped the bag and escaped. Boateng picked the bag. He found that the bag contained regalia and knowing the second appellant to be the niece of the head of the royal family called on the second appellant. Boateng gave the bag to the second appellant. The second appellant got the bag with the intention of sending it to uncle Awotwe, and since the latter was not in, the second appellant brought the articles to the first appellant to keep until uncle Awotwe came back. The first appellant said since he was going to school and there was nobody in the house at that time, he also took the bag to one Akem for safe-keeping. On the following day, 15 May, Kweku Sei, the sixth prosecution witness, arrived at Apewosika from Daber to inform him of the death and burial of the deceased and added that wake for the funeral would be kept on 20 May.
On 17 May the first appellant left for Komenda to inform one of his uncles and some members of the family about the death and about the items which the second appellant had brought to him. At Komenda he suggested that they should all go to Daber to check -up things. So early Sunday morning they (eleven of them) hired a pick-up and left Komenda for Daber village. On arrival, they were told that some members of the family had gone to the Elmina Police Station about the missing paraphernalia. The first appellant and his group drove to Elmina. The appellant said he later handed over to the police the contents of the parcel which the second appellant had brought to him at Apewosika, and the police arrested him.
[p.746] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739
Concerning the missing articles, the second appellant confirmed the evidence of the first appellant that it was she who sent the articles to the first appellant and narrated how she came by them. She said the articles came to her through one Boateng. Explaining why she sent the articles given to her by Boateng to the first appellant, she said she had first intended to send them to the head of family. But on her way to his house she met one Madam Ode who told her that the head of family had travelled.
What then happened can best be stated in the second appellant’s own words:
“On hearing that he (Kwesi Itu) had travelled, I brought the articles to Apewosika where uncle Awotwe had gone. I wanted to give them to uncle Awotwe to enable him go and check his house and take appropriate action against Wi and Efum. I met my brother, the first accused, at his house at Apewosika and inquired of uncle Awotwe. He told me uncle Awotwe had gone to a funeral. I told him all that happened in the morning about the parcel; Efum, the seventh prosecution witness; and Wi.”
The second appellant said she then left the parcel with the first appellant with instructions to hand it over to uncle Awotwe on the latter’s return. She went back to Daber and then went to her farm. She worked until about 6.00 p.m. latest when she set out for home. When she got to the outskirts of the town she met her aunt Katomedo who told her that the deceased was dead. She went to the house of the deceased where she found that a crowd had gathered. She stayed there for some time and went home. The second appellant then recounted the events and the circumstances that led to her arrest.
In the case of the third appellant he said on the morning of that Wednesday he and Efum, the seventh prosecution witness, accompanied the deceased to the bush to perform some sacrifice. One Gyepia had gone to the bush to beat up his sister. This was considered a taboo. So on that Wednesday morning sacrifice in the form of purification had to be performed in the bush by slaughtering a sheep. The third appellant said when they were returning from the bush the deceased intimated that he would be travelling early the next day. The third appellant said he did not go to the deceased’s house when they came from the bush. He rather went straight to his own house. He did not go anywhere that night, and that night he went to bed by 8.00 p.m.
The next day, Thursday, he left for his farm. While on the farm, he heard somebody hooting, trying to attract attention. Then he saw Kwame Wi coming towards him. It was about 12.00 noon. Kwame Wi then told him that his uncle Kwesi Itu was dead. The third appellant
[p.747] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739 expressed surprise at the news. He stopped work and returned home with Kwame Wi. When of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739-771he got home he went to the house of the deceased where he met a gathering. He went to the room of the deceased and he saw the corpse lying on a bed and covered with cloth. As a family linguist the third appellant said he took charge of the situation. He sent messengers to inform all those who mattered and so by 3.00 p.m. members of the family had assembled. He gave ¢100 to Osei, the sixth prosecution witness, to go to Elmina to see one Mr. Aboma, a scholar who hailed from Daber village to get a doctor to come down to embalm the deceased. Osei returned to tell the third appellant that the doctor said the embalment could not be done since the time of the death was unknown. The third appellant said he and Abonsam, the most senior member of the family present, sent to ask the family of the children of the deceased to bring a coffin as custom demanded.
At about 11.00 p.m. members of the family re-assembled at the palace. It was noticed that the corpse was bloating. The family and Abonsam decided that the corpse should be prepared for burial. The third appellant gave a list of members of the family and other personalities who were present. The corpse was washed and cleaned and made ready for burial. A coffin was brought and all those who had gathered there were informed that the deceased was going to be put into the coffin and that all those who wanted to bid him farewell should come forward. Many people came forward. Libation was poured before the corpse was put into the coffin. There were women in the yard and the third appellant said:
“Since the deceased was a chief, we didn’t want the women to see so we passed the coffin through the double window to the back of the house. Those of us in the room came out through the door. I carried an aladin lamp on my head, Osei, the sixth prosecution witness, also carried a sheep. Efum, the seventh prosecution witness, blew the short horn from the house to the burial ground—cemetery. Kwesi Ayi poured libation. Kwesi Atta cut the neck of the sheep and threw the head into the grave, the coffin then in the grave was covered nicely. We then went home . . .”
A day or two after the burial the family met in an attempt to take inventory of the stool paraphernalia which were in the custody of the deceased. Some of them were found missing. The matter was reported to the police. The third appellant said he was among those who reported the matter to the police but he was arrested together with others including Efum, the seventh prosecution witness, Nyame-Na
[p.748] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739
Ose, the ninth prosecution witness and Kwame Wi. The third appellant also denied having been in the room of the deceased with Efum, the seventh prosecution witness, and the other appellants on the night of that Wednesday.
The summing up started at 1.10 p.m. and ended at 4.10 p.m. and the jury retired; and within ten minutes they came back with a verdict of guilty on all the counts. The appellants were therefore convicted accordingly.
The grounds of appeal complained, among other things, that the judgment cannot be supported having regard to the evidence and that in the summing up the learned trial judge misdirected the jury. It was contended that the learned trial judge misdirected the jury on the evidence of Efum, the seventh prosecution witness, whose evidence conflicted with his statement to the police and the learned judge ought to have directed the jury to reject the evidence of Efum, as Efum’s explanation for telling the belated story was unsatisfactory. Learned counsel also submitted that the trial judge failed to put the defence adequately to the jury and that the misdirections and omissions on the part of the trial judge had occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice.
It must be borne in mind that the jury were to consider separately the case of each of the three appellants. Apart from the evidence of Efum, the seventh prosecution witness, there was the evidence of eleven other prosecution witnesses. On the defence side, the jury had the evidence of the three appellants and that of the three defence witnesses to consider.
In other words, altogether the jury were to consider carefully the evidence of eighteen witnesses and it was no wonder that the summing up covered not less than 25 pages and took not less than three solid hours. The learned trial judge after directing the jury on the burden of proof and on the evidence as a whole concluded his summing up by quoting verbatim and in extenso, other portions of the evidence of Efum, the seventh prosecution witness, and directed the jury in the manner as follows: “If you are satisfied with his expiration, fair enough. If not, you still have to consider his evidence as a whole and give it the weight you think it deserves.”
That was the way in which the case was finally left to the jury; and with due respect to the learned trial judge, this was a clear misdirection in law and the jury must have greatly been influenced by it. It was therefore not surprising that the jury did not waste time and came back to the court room within a matter of ten minutes with a verdict of guilty. The learned trial judge’s direction that “if you are satisfied with his (Efum’s) explanation, fair enough” could only mean and, indeed, could be understood by any reasonable jury to mean that they were to
[p.749] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739 find the appellants guilty if they accepted as satisfactory the explanation which Efum gave for his inordinate delay in coming out with the second conflicting and incriminating story about the appellants. That was most unsatisfactory; because if they were satisfied with the said explanation that would not be the end of the matter. They were still enjoined to consider whether or not they should believe the evidence itself. Any reasonable jury could, by this direction conclude that once the explanation given by Efum was satisfactory then Efum’s evidence should be taken as the truth of the matter, and they could therefore find the appellants guilty.
Efum’s evidence formed the pivot of the prosecution’s case and once that evidence was rejected for one reason or the other the case for the prosecution could hardly stand. This was appreciated and acknowledged by the learned trial judge when right at the beginning of his summing up he stated:
“Kweku Efum, the seventh prosecution witness. Evidence of Kweku Efum undoubtedly forms the foundation upon which the whole case of the prosecution hangs. All the other pieces of evidence merely go to buttress and build upon.”
In consequence of the view which he rightly took of the evidence of Efum, the learned trial judge dealt with Efum’s evidence in greater detail than the evidence of any other witness. In fact Efum’s evidence was referred to and commented upon by him at every stage of the summing up. With the result that out of the 25 pages utilised for the whole summing up, Efum’s evidence took about twelve pages. It was therefore a matter of great pity that the trial judge should have misdirected the jury on the evidence to which from all indications he attached such great importance.
Efum was provisionally charged with murder together with the appellants. It must be noted that he was also found in possession of some of the missing stool regalia, i.e. jewels. He had denied that he or any of the appellants was implicated in the murder of the deceased. Months after he had been charged, he made a fresh statement which saved himself from the crime and which implicated the appellants. His later story conflicted in all material particulars with the statement he earlier gave to the police and at the time the facts were supposed to be fresh in his mind. In such a situation the evidence of Efum was to be treated with a great deal of circumspection.
In fact the second portion of the passage in the summing up already referred to was even worse. For the learned judge directed the jury to consider and then give weight to the evidence of Efum, even if they were not satisfied with his explanation. This is what the learned judge said: “If not you still have
[p.750] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739 to consider his evidence as a whole and give it the weight you think it deserves.” That was also a misdirection in law, for if the explanation was found to be unsatisfactory the jury was to be directed to reject the whole of the evidence of Efum; and then consider the case on the rest of the evidence without regard whatsoever to any portion of Efum’s evidence. In other words, if the explanation was unsatisfactory, the learned trial judge was in law bound to direct the jury to reject not only the unsworn statement made earlier on to the police by the witness but also the whole of the evidence the witness gave at the trial.
In Poku v. The State [1966] G.L.R. 262, Akainyah J.S.C. reading the judgment of the then Supreme Court had this to say at 275, S.C.:
“If the witness is unable to explain satisfactorily the inconsistency then the weight of his testimony is negligible and the verdict is to be founded on the rest of the evidence. It follows, therefore, that any witness who is proved to have made two statements on a given subject which cannot be reconciled must be called to give evidence and be cross-examined . . . If the inconsistency is not satisfactorily explained, the court will direct the jury to accept neither the unsworn statement nor the evidence on oath.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
It was obvious that Efum gave different reasons for not coming out in time with the story he told at the trial and which incriminated the appellants. The first one was that he was afraid that he might be killed by the fetish if he broke the oath of secrecy. Then much later Efum said he did not come out in time because the first appellant had promised to arrange for his release from police custody. In the course of his cross-examination Efum said:
“Long afterwards when I was on bail, I met a man who asked why it took me so long to tell the truth. I told him the first accused had always promised to cause my release through Sam Baddoo on payment of ¢10,000.”
These two reasons were inconsistent with each other, and there was yet a third reason he gave for telling the belated story. He said he had to come out with the story otherwise the ghost of the deceased would kill him. In view of these inconsistent and convicting reasons for the extraordinary delay, it was quite clear that Efum’s explanation was very unsatisfactory and if the jury had been properly directed, they would in all probability have rejected Efum’s evidence.
With Efum’s evidence out, the rest of the evidence did not connect any of the appellants with the crime of murder. Indeed, the sum total of the evidence of the remaining witnesses could, at best, be described, as
[p.751] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739 circumstantial. None of those witnesses saw the first and second appellants in or near the house of the deceased on that fateful night.
Close examination of the evidence will make this clearer. Kobina Abaka, the first prosecution witness, and Nyame-Na Onyim, the second prosecution witness, said they saw the first appellant at Daber village between 6 p.m. and 7 p.m. and they were challenged under cross-examination. At best their evidence showed that the first appellant was seen in the village of Daber and not near or in the house of the deceased that night. The evidence of these two witnesses was greatly neutralised by the evidence of another prosecution witness, Kwesi Akom, the third prosecution witness. Under cross-examination Kwesi Akom said he was with the first appellant at Apewosika almost at the very time Kobina Abaka and Nyame-Na Onyim said they saw the first appellant at Daber village.
The evidence of Kwamina Nyarko, the fourth prosecution witness, only touched on how he himself came to be in possession of some of the missing jewels. He was at first charged together with the appellants. This witness never said anything about the first and third appellants. The evidence of Adwowa Anima, the fifth prosecution witness, mainly described the condition of the dead body, how it was cleansed by the third appellant with the assistance of other members of the family, before it was buried and the discovery of the missing regalia. Kweku Osei, the sixth prosecution witness, also described the condition of the dead body as he saw it, and alleged that the third appellant asked him not to discuss with anybody as to his observations otherwise he would be disgracing the dead and in that respect he, the third appellant, would get executioners (adumfo) to kill him (Osei). This was denied by the third appellant and there was no other witness who seemed to have overheard the third appellant giving such a warning to Osei. So it was oath against oath.
In any case, his evidence conflicted with the earlier statement he had given to the police. He never told the police what the third appellant was supposed to have said about executioners and about so many other things in respect of which he later gave evidence in court. He was therefore seriously challenged under cross-examination when he was asked:
“Q. All the omissions referred to are false. You have been coached to come and say them.
A. Nobody has coached me.”
It must be noted that Adwowa Anima, the fifth prosecution witness, in giving evidence to show that the deceased had been beaten said: “I held the hand and found blood all over the body as if he had been beaten.”
[p.752] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739
But Osei, the sixth prosecution witness, denied seeing any blood on the body of the deceased. This came out as a result of a question put to him by the jury and I quote:
“Q. Did you see, any blood on the corpse?
A. No.”
It is therefore clear that evidence as to the condition of the corpse as given by some of the witnesses contained a lot of exaggerations. Adwowa Anima, the fifth prosecution witness, and Osei the sixth prosecution witness, tried to point to third appellant as the person who monopolised the dead body and did not want any person to go near it and for some reasons the third appellant was rushing to bury the deceased. But it was clear from the evidence that quite apart from the third appellant there were other elders of the family present who also took part in preparing the body and in carrying it to the burial place. Abonsam was the most senior linguist present; and he directed that the burial should go ahead that night. Yet nobody queried Abonsam for taking part in the so-called hasty burial. One would have expected Adwowa, the fifth prosecution witness, for instance, who said she was not happy about the way things were going on, to complain to the most elderly member of family present. But she said she did not do so.
This is what she said:
“Q. In your place stool holders and elders are buried in the night.
A. Yes.
Q. Abonsam was the most elderly among the family at Daber where he lives?
A. Yes.
Q. When dissatisfied did you request to see Abonsam?
A. No.”
Augustina Wiah, the eighth prosecution witness, said she was a member of the choir which had singing practice on the compound of the deceased that night. She said she saw the third appellant in the house of the deceased even though the third appellant denied this. That evidence did not go further to indicate that the third appellant was engaged in any unlawful activity at that time. Her evidence at best amounted to nothing but suspicion. Nyame-Na Ose, the ninth prosecution witness, as already stated, was originally one of the accused persons and was attending court with the appellants. He was only discharged after Efum had made his belated statement. Nyame-Na Ose’s evidence did not in any way affect the case one way or the other. He only attempted to repeat parts of the story which Efum, the seventh prosecution witness, was supposed to have told the chief warder at the prisons in the castle. The evidence of Safohene Bediabaa, the tenth prosecution witness, was of no consequence.
[p.753] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739
Doctor Edwin Quaynor, the eleventh prosecution witness, who performed the post-mortem examination said:
“I opened the mouth. It looked as if the surface layers had been corroded. As if a corrosive agent, e.g. hot water, acid or any chemical had been passed through the mouth. In my opinion, death was due to shock caused by severe pains caused by damage to mouth tissues due to corrosive agent passed through the oral cavity.”
The prosecution was trying to say that it was the appellants who passed the alleged corrosive agent through the mouth of the deceased and killed him. But the circumstantial evidence which the prosecution relied upon, as I have analysed above, could not point to that conclusion. There were other persons living in the house of the deceased. They were in the house on the day in question. Osei, the sixth prosecution witness, gave the names of those persons as Osofo Ode (Maame Ode), Sompe (son of the deceased), Edua Annan, Nana Edua and Akosua Begyebea. In fact, Nana Edua’s room was next to the hall of the deceased, while the room of Akosua Begyebea was next to the chamber of the deceased where the deceased was supposed to have been killed. It was therefore very strange that all these persons never saw Efum or any of the appellants in the house in the evening or in the night of 13 May. It was even more startling that those whose rooms were attached to the chamber and hall, respectively, of the deceased never heard any unusual noise or any activities going on in the room of the deceased; and it is rather odd that Maame Ode who was the first to discover that Kwesi Itu was dead was not called to describe the condition in which she first saw the body. None of the residents of the house was called.
On these facts, it is very difficult to say that the chain of the circumstances on which the case for the prosecution was based could lead to one and only one conclusion, namely that it was the appellants who administered the alleged corrosive agent to the mouth of the deceased. Circumstantial evidence, especially in a serious case like murder, should be closely-examined and should not be acted upon unless the circumstances are such that the guilt of the accused must necessarily be inferred: see Nyame v. The Republic [1971] 2 G.L.R. 140, C.A.
In Teper v. R [1952] A.C. 480 at 489, P.C., Lord Normand said:
“Circumstantial evidence . . . must always be narrowly examined, if only because evidence of this kind may be fabricated to cast suspicion on another . . . It is also necessary before drawing the inference of the accused’s guilt from circumstantial evidence to be
[p.754] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739 sure that there are no other co-existing circumstances which would weaken or destroy the inference.”
In State v. Anani Fiadzo [1961] G.L.R. 416 at 418, S.C., the Supreme Court said:
“A presumption from circumstantial evidence should be drawn against the appellant only when that presumption follows irresistibly from the circumstances proved in evidence; and in order to justify the inference of guilt the inculpatory facts must incompatible with the innocence of the appellant, and incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt. A conviction must not be based on probabilities or mere suspicion.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
As I have already pointed out, there was a serious misdirection in law in respect of the evidence of Efum and that on proper direction a reasonable jury would have rejected the evidence of Efum. The evidence then left would be circumstantial on which no reasonable jury would have convicted.
I must make two observations about the summing up at this stage. First, the learned trial judge, probably through inadvertence, did not point out to the jury the various conflicts in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. But he carefully brought out all the minute conflicts in the evidence of the defence witnesses. Secondly, in dealing with the defence of alibi, he used certain expressions which clearly indicated that he was asking the jury to disbelieve the defence of alibi put up by the first appellant. A trial judge is entitled to comment on the evidence given before him at the jury trial. But in so doing it is important that caution should be exercised in order not to give the impression that he is usurping the function of the jury who are to decide as to which of the witnesses they should believe.
Still on the misdirection, I will refer to another passage where the learned judge said:
“It is their defence that none of these accused went to the house that evening. It was further seriously suggested in cross-examination that he Efum did not go to that house that evening. No attempt at proving this or disproving Efum’s claim was made.”
This is contrary to the evidence. Because the appellants put forward evidence which if believed could have established their contention. It was therefore wrong to tell the jury that the appellants never attempted to prove their alibi. In any case, it was wrong in law
[p.755] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739 for the learned trial judge to assume that because the appellants were setting up alibi as a defence that raised some burden on them to prove it. By that defence the appellants were doing no more than denying the charge: see Kwesi v. Republic [1977] 1 G.L.R. 448, C.A. In that case the Court of Appeal (constituted by Azu Crabbe C.J. Sowah J.A. (as he then was) and Annan J.A.) held that it was wrong for a trial judge to think that an alibi, because it was called a defence raised some burden on the defence to establish it. In reading the judgment of the court, Azu Crabbe C.J. said at 452, C.A.:
“It would appear that one of the grounds upon which the learned circuit judge convicted the appellant was that he did not prove his alibi. In the opinion of this court, it was wrong for the trial circuit court judge to think that an alibi, because it is called a defence, raises some burden on the defence to establish it: R v.
Johnson [1961] 1 W.L.R. (1478), C.C.A. In setting up an alibi the appellant was doing no more than denying that the prosecution had proved their case, and if he was able to do no more than to raise a reasonable doubt about his guilt, either through cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by his own story, he was entitled to be acquitted. Where an alibi defence is raised, the onus of proof lies on the prosecution on all issues . . . “
(The emphasis is mine.) It may be recalled that in the Kwesi case (supra), the appellant had failed to notice of his alibi as required by section 131 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30).
Again, the learned trial judge completely failed to direct the jury as to how to treat the evidence of those prosecution witnesses, apart from Efum, who had also made earlier statements which conflicted with their evidence at the trial. Apart from Dr. Quaynor, the eleventh prosecution witness, almost all the prosecution witnesses gave statements to the police. Some of these witnesses were suspects and in their said statements they had denied knowledge of the crime and did not in these statements incriminate any of the appellants. This was confirmed by Korang, the twelfth prosecution witness, the investigating officer when he said:
“Q. The statements you took at the police station all the suspects denied . . .
A. They all denied.”
The evidence which those witnesses eventually gave at the trial differed materially from their earlier statements and the learned trial judge made no effort, whatsoever, to point out to the jury that those
[p.756] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739 witnesses had failed to give any explanation for giving the testimony which conflicted with their earlier statements. Indeed, nowhere in the summing up did he direct the jury that in the absence of any satisfactory explanation the jury were duty bound to ignore the statements they made earlier on to the police as well as the testimony they gave in court. It can therefore be seen that with proper direction the jury could have also rejected most of the circumstantial evidence.
Nevertheless, there was yet another misdirection on the evidence. This time in respect of the evidence Akom, the third prosecution witness. The evidence of Akom under cross-examination supported the defence of alibi set up by the first appellant; and the learned trial judge severely criticised that evidence in his summing up and continued:
“Who is this man Kwesi Akom? He is the man who was placed in custody together with the accused and others in connection with this case. He knew the charge against Arthur. He gave a statement to the police.
But for a whole year he kept this important defence of Arthur secret to himself. In view of what I have told you, do you believe him about Arthur being at Apewosika, the whole evening of Wednesday, 13 May 1981 helping him to erect a canopy and settling a family dispute till 8.00 p.m.?”
This was a clear misdirection, because Akom was never arrested and placed in custody with the appellants and others in connection with this case. So it was wrong to tell the jury that by being in custody with the first appellant, Akom might have become aware of the charge against the first appellant. Those who were in custody with the appellants were Nyarko, the fourth prosecution witness; Efum, the seventh prosecution witness; Nyame-Na Ose, the ninth prosecution witness; and Kwame Wi. The misdirection must have definitely influenced the jury to disbelieve the defence of alibi.
Akom was rather arrested after he had given his evidence in court. It may be remarked that there was an unfortunate impression all along that the police were trying to build the case of the prosecution on intimidation. For quite apart from the statement which was improperly obtained from the third appellant through the use of force and assault, and which statement was rightly rejected by the learned trial judge on that ground after the mini trial, Akom, the third prosecution witness, was arrested immediately after he had given evidence favourable to the defence. He gave his evidence on 6 May 1982, and the police officer in charge of the case, Korang, the twelfth prosecution witness, immediately thereafter had him arrested just outside the precincts of the court. It is not clear on whose orders the said arrest was made. During cross-examination Korang, the twelfth prosecution witness, was asked:
[p.757] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739
“Q. On 6 May 1982 the third prosecution witness gave evidence.
A. Yes.
Q. On that day did you arrest the third prosecution witness?
A. Yes, in front of Standard Bank, Chapel Square Area. I detained him in cells over-night. Next day I took him to Regional Criminal Investigation Department for interrogation on the offence of dishonestly receiving.”
Why must a witness be treated in this manner when other witnesses for the prosecution were yet to be called? Was it done as a warning to the remaining prosecution witnesses as to what would happen to them if they gave evidence which would tend to favour the appellants? Or was it done to threaten the remaining prosecution witnesses to support the case of the prosecution by all means? This type of conduct was very intimidating and must be frowned upon. I certainly disapprove of it.
There was further misdirection. It concerned the second appellant. The learned trial judge told the jury that the second appellant’s “unexplained silence over the whereabouts of the regalia contributed towards procurement of a juju man to find the thief.” This could not be correct in view of the evidence on record. The second appellant said she told her uncle that she had the regalia with her and the uncle said they were after the stool. The following is what she said:
“When I was told about the missing stool, I told Banyin and Effirim about exhibits A1-7 and the fact that I had taken them to Apewosika. Banyin said those were not what he was looking for but the stool. I paid my ¢10 and went away.”
It was therefore wrong to direct the jury to the effect that the second appellant concealed the fact of her possession of those regalia and this was why a fetish had to be consulted.
The question then is, despite all these misdirections in law and on the evidence can it be said with confidence that a reasonable jury properly directed would have convicted the appellants all the same? The answer is certainly “No.” The misdirections on the part of the learned trial judge brought about the verdict complained of. On the whole of the evidence and with proper direction the jury could reasonably have found the appellants not guilty. In that respect, I hold the view that the miscarriage of justice was a substantial one.
In R v. Cohen and Bateman (1909) 2 Cr. App. R. 197 at 207-208 it was held as follows:
“There is such a miscarriage of justice not only where the Court comes to the conclusion that the verdict of guilty was wrong, but
[p.758] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739 also when it is of opinion that the mistake of fact or omission on the part of the judge may reasonably be considered to have brought about that verdict, and when, on the whole facts and with a correct direction, the jury might fairly and reasonably have found the appellant not guilty. Then there has been not only a miscarriage of justice but a substantial one, because the appellant has lost the chance which was fairly open to him of being acquitted, and therefore, as there is no power of this Court to grant a new trial, the conviction has to be quashed.”
In any case, there is a great deal of doubt as to whether or not on proper direction the same verdict would have been arrived at by the jury. Consequently this court can do no more than to quash the convictions. In Commissioner of Police v. Antwi [1961] G.L.R. 408 at 411, S.C. Korsah C.J. reading the judgment of the then Supreme Court said:
“Misdirection in law covers, inter alia, a wrong positive direction as to the law applicable to the, case, the facts of the particular case itself or the facts proved in evidence; and is by far the most frequent cause of convictions being quashed; and where the evidence leaves it in doubt as to whether or not the same verdict would have been arrived at, the conviction must be quashed since the Court of Appeal cannot substitute themselves for the jury or the trial court and find the facts which are necessary to support the conviction.”
Learned counsel for the respondent asked this court to apply the proviso to section, 26 (12) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372) and uphold the convictions. But I think it will not be fair and just to do so in the present case as there was a substantial miscarriage of justice. For, as I have said, a reasonable jury properly directed on the evidence could not have inevitably come to the same conclusion. In the result, I decline to apply the proviso. I would therefore allow the appeal and quash the convictions.
JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.
This is an appeal from the decision of the High Court, Cape Coast presided over by Kaleo Bio J. sitting with a jury. The first and third appellants, Joseph Arthur and Kweku Akani, were convicted on two counts of conspiracy to murder and murder, and the second appellant, Efua Awotwe, on two counts of conspiracy to murder and abetment of murder. Arthur and Akani were sentenced to death, and Efua Awotwe, to twelve years’ imprisonment with hard labour. The three appellants hail from Daber, near Elmina. They are related,
[p.759] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739 and the victim of the alleged crime, Kwesi Itu, was their head of family and keeper of gold ornaments and other property reserved for the use of the chief of Daber.
The facts as they emerged from the evidence were that in the evening of 13 May 1981 the local minstrel choir met at about 8 p.m. at the house of the deceased for their usual thrice-weekly singing practice. The deceased was one of their patrons and would sometimes come out of his room to listen to the choir. On this occasion, he did not, but since this was not unusual the choir had its practice and then the members dispersed. This was at about 11.30 p.m. It was the evidence of the eighth prosecution witness, Augustina Wiah, that while the choir was in session she saw Akani and his brother, Kwamena Wi, emerge from the room of the deceased.
Before this witness was called, one Kweku Efum had been called as the seventh prosecution witness. His evidence was extremely damaging to the appellants and clearly formed the pivot around which the case for the prosecution revolved. He had been challenged and told in no uncertain terms that he was a liar and that his evidence that he was in the room of the deceased in the night of 13 May, was untrue. When, therefore, Augustina concluded her evidence without mentioning Efum a serious gap had appeared in the case for the prosecution. The jury came to the rescue and put the following questions to her:
“Q. That Wednesday, did you see the seventh prosecution witness enter the deceased’s room?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it before or after or after Wi had gone away?
A. It was after Wi had left and the third accused had spoken to us and re-entered long after these before the seventh prosecution witness came.
Q. Did you see the seventh prosecution witness come out again?
A. No.”
It should be noted, however, that from 8 p.m. until 11.30 p.m. when Augustina left the house of the deceased she did not hear any unusual noise coming from the room of the deceased. Like the appellants she is related to him.
It was the evidence of Efum that he went to the house of the deceased after 8 p.m. but before 9 p.m. He knocked at the door. It was opened and Akani pulled him in, pointed a gun at him and motioned to him to keep quiet. He said he saw Arthur and Efua Awotwe in the room and that Kwesi Itu, who was also in the room, was already dead. Gold ornaments and other stool paraphernalia had been collected and put in a bowl. Some of the ornaments were taken from the bowl and made into a parcel. Efum was told the parcel was for him.
[p.760] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739
For the moment, it is enough to say that Efum left the house of the deceased in the early hours of 14 May. He went back again in the afternoon of that day and met Akani, Wi and the sixth prosecution witness, Kweku Osei. By then the body of the deceased had been moved to a different room. Efum later went back home. He too was a member of the family and one of his duties was to blow the chief’s short horn at the funeral of important personages. He went back to the house of the deceased and blew the horn. His evidence was that not long after, he saw Akani cutting off part of the wooden window to enlarge the opening. This, he said, was in the presence of other persons, including Wi. The coffin containing the mortal remains of Kwesi Itu was taken out through the window, apparently to the cemetery. According to Efum he decided to go to the cemetery, but when he got there he found no one there. Not to be outdone, he blew the short horn and then went back home.
Two days later, when the customary rites for the deceased were being performed, the fifth prosecution witness, Adwoa Anima, a family member, complained about the loss of the stool and gold ornaments. She, Efum, Wi and Akani went to report the matter to the police at Elmina. After they had told their story Wi and Akani were arrested and placed in the cells. The following day, the inhabitants of Daber arrested the fourth prosecution witness, Kwamina Nyarko, and Efua Awotwe. Adwoa Anima and Efum were asked to convey them to the police station. They did, and the two were put in the cells. Unfortunately for Efum, while he was at the police station, one of the missing gold ornaments fell from his pocket. The police questioned him as to how he came by it. When he prevaricated they set upon him, beat him up and placed him in the cells. Sometime afterwards, the ninth prosecution witness, Nyame-Na Ose, and Arthur, the first accused, were also arrested and placed in custody. Thus, in all there were seven suspects. They were later transferred to the prisons at Cape Coast. By then, most, if not all, of the stolen items had been recovered. The cautioned statements of Efua Awotwe and Akani show that by 20 May the police were investigating a case of murder.
On 3 July the body of Kwesi Itu was exhumed at the cemetery at Daber in the presence of Dr. Edwin Quaynor, pathologist of the Cape Coast Hospital, who examined it at the spot. In his evidence before the High Court he said:
“I opened the mouth, it was toothless; the oral cavity appeared pale, almost white—including the tongue to the throat. It looked as if the surface layers had been corroded; as if a corrosive agent, e.g. hot water, acid or any chemical had been passed through the mouth.”
[p.761] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739
He ascribed death to shock caused by severe pains arising from damage to mouth tissue due to corrosive agent passing through the oral cavity.
All the suspects, except Arthur who was released on bail on the orders of the High Court, remained in custody until on 15 September Efum made a confession. He told his keepers that he had lied all along and that he knew who killed Kwesi Itu. He named Arthur and Akani and said that two days before Itu died Arthur had offered him and Akani ¢2,000 to assist in killing Itu. He also said that when he found the three appellants in the room of the deceased Arthur told him that they had killed Itu. The police were called in. Akani was brutally assaulted and compelled to make a confession statement. It was rejected as inadmissible at the trial, but for reasons which I have been unable to discover it has been marked as exhibit D in the record of proceedings submitted to this court.
At the trial, Arthur pleaded alibi, claiming that at the material time he was at Apewosika where he had his home. The third prosecution witness, Kwesi Akom, supported this plea. This is what he said under cross-examination.
“Q. Were you at Apewosika on 13 May 1981?
A. Yes Q. Did you see the first accused at about 4 p.m. that day?
A. Yes. He came to my house to assist in erecting a canopy in connection with the funeral of my sister.
Q. When did you complete erecting the canopy?
A. At about 6 p.m.
Q. Was the first accused present there throughout?
A. Yes.
Q. After that what happened?
A. After that the first accused took part in settling a dispute between two members of my family.
Q. What are their names?
A. Kofi Itu and Kwesi Segu.
Q. Then?
A. The first accused went to his house. This was about 8 p.m. The first accused sat throughout the settlement.”
Arthur called three witnesses who also gave evidence in support of the plea.
There were two flaws in the summing up. The first was that the trial judge told the jury that as Dr. Quaynor was an expert they were bound to accept his opinion as to the cause of death . He put it thus:
[p.762] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739
“This is opinion evidence and it is for you to accept or reject it. But coming from an expert and without any other evidence to the contrary, you have to accept it.”
In so directing the jury the learned trial judge overlooked the passage in Taylor on Evidence (12th ed.) Vol. 1, para. 58 at p. 59, which found favour with this court in Sasu v. White Cross Insurance Co. Ltd. [1960] G.L.R. 4, C.A. It is that the evidence of experts ought not to be accepted without question, but should be examined with meticulous care in the light of all the available evidence. It is pertinent to observe that Dr. Quaynor did not carry out any tests on the internal organs of the deceased to confirm his initial findings. Surely, science in the twentieth century is capable of detecting acid in the human body even after death?
One is reminded of the case of R v. Oledima (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 202 where the question was whether the deceased died from an injection administered to him by the appellant. The doctor’s evidence was that an injection could cause the infection if the needle were dirty, or germs in the injection or on the skin were introduced into the body by the injection. It was held that this was not enough. The court said at 202:
“Now to establish a charge of murder or manslaughter it must be proved not merely that the act of the accused person could have caused the death of the deceased, but that it did. In this case the doctor’s evidence is merely to the effect that the act of the appellant could have caused Joseph Anyanwu’s death. The possibility that the gangrenous condition was due to causes other than the injection is not excluded.
Consequently the evidence is not sufficient to prove the cause of death or to support the conviction.”
In the instant case, the jury were entitled to reject the opinion of Dr. Quaynor, if they saw fit, and ought to have been told so. The fact that Adwoa Anima and Kweku Osei gave an alternative cause of death—physical violence—cast serious doubts on the doctor’s evidence.
The second error related to the direction on how to view the evidence of Efum. At the beginning of the summing up the judge directed them as follows:
“Evidence of Kweku Efum undoubtedly forms the foundation upon which the whole case of the prosecution hangs. All the other pieces of evidence merely go to buttress and build upon it. His evidence therefore must be weighed and his credibility examined with judicious care. If you come to a conclusion that he is a liar; that his evidence touching upon the approach made to him by the
[p.763] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739 first accused (J.B. Arthur) in the presence of the third accused (Akani) and what he saw in the room of the deceased are fabrications and that he is otherwise not to be believed, the case of the prosecution falls flat.”
Unfortunately, at the end of the summing up the trial judge changed his mind and redirected them thus: “If not, you still have to consider his evidence as a nation, fair enough. If not, you still have to consider his evidence as a whole and give it the weight you think it deserves.” I am of the opinion that the first direction was right and the second, wrong.
In Archibold, Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases (35th ed.), para. 1352, the law is summarised thus:
“The character of a witness for habitual veracity is an essential ingredient in his credibility; for a man who is capable of uttering a deliberate falsehood is in most cases capable of doing so under the solemn sanction of an oath. If therefore, it appears that he has formerly said or written the contrary of that which he has now sworn (unless the reason of his having done so is satisfactorily accounted for), his evidence should not have mush weight with a jury; and if he has formerly sworn the contrary, the fact (although no objection to his competency) is almost conclusive against his credibility: R v. Teal, 11 East 309; R. v. Harris, 20 Cr. App. R.
144.”
The proper direction to the jury, therefore, should have been that if they found the explanation of Efum of the inconsistency unreasonable, then the effect of the previous statement taken together with the sworn evidence was to render Efum a negligible witness, and that the jury must consider whether the case was otherwise and by others made out: per Hewart C.J. in R. v. Harris (1927) 20 Cr. App. R. 144, C.C.A.
There is nothing in any of our reported cases to show that our courts take a different view. In the well-known case of State v. Octhere [1963] 2 G.L.R. 463 at 510 an attempt to persuade the court that the evidence of the discredited witness could be accepted and acted upon if it was corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses was robustly rejected. Again, the statement of Akainyah J.S.C. in Poku v. The State [1966] G.L.R. 262 at 275, S.C. that: “If the witness is unable to explain satisfactorily the inconsistency then the weight of his testimony is negligible and the verdict is to be found on the rest of the evidence” is not one with which any English judge will quarrel.
The explanation given by Efum was that he had been sworn to silence and threatened with dire punishment if he told the truth. He said when he came upon the appellants in the room of the deceased they
[p.764] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739 detained him there until it was past midnight. Arthur and Akani then took him to a public well where he was made to take an oath in these terms: “If I tell anybody about what I saw in connection with the killing of Kwesi Itu and I drink from the well, let the water kill me.” From there, he was taken to a fetish called Bosom Efi and made to take a similar oath. Next, he was led to a stream called Akokyea for his third oath, and finally to a river called Eboa where, again, he swore not to reveal what he knew. He said that apart from fear of the consequences of the oaths he had taken, Arthur, who was on bail, had promised to secure his release.
It was for the jury to decide whether the explanation given by Efum was reasonable. If it was, his evidence could be considered along with that of other witnesses; but, if it was not, then it was to be excluded altogether. However, the direction given was that even if the explanation was unreasonable they could take his evidence into account. For all one knows that was what they did.
I am also of the opinion that the appeals ought to be allowed.
JUDGMENT OF SOWAH AG. C.J.
The three appellants, namely: J. B. Arthur, Efua Awotwe and Kweku Akani were charged with the following offences: conspiracy to commit murder; the second appellant, Efua Awotwe, alone with abetment of murder. The third count of murder was against the first and third appellants. They were tried and convicted of all the offences by the High Court, Cape Coast sitting with a jury. The first and third appellants were sentenced to death and the second appellant was given a term of twelve years.
It was from their convictions and sentences that all three appellants have appealed. There were several grounds of appeal filed but the burden of them was that the summing up by the learned judge had occasioned miscarriage of justice; first, because the evidence of the principal prosecution witness, Kweku Efum the seventh prosecution witness, was that of a retracted accomplice and that the judge failed to give the necessary caveat to the jury when summing up the evidence for consideration by the jury. Secondly, that the summing up of the judge was unduly prejudicial to the appellants, and almost indicated that they were guilty of the offences with which they had been charged.
For a proper appreciation of the submission of counsel, it is necessary to give a short resume of the case for the prosecution. These charges arose out of the unnatural death of one Kwesi Itu, the regent of a very small village called Daber. The village is said to be not far from Cape Coast. The citizens of the village are said to be closely interrelated. The three accused persons are cousins. The deceased was their granduncle within the meaning and context of the Ghanaian family
[p.765] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739 system; they may be cousins, uncles or grandfathers three or four degrees removed. And so it happens that most of the prosecution witnesses are cousins, nieces and nephews of the appellants and grandnephews and nieces of the deceased.
It appears that the stool holder of the village had died three years before the incident, and in the interregnum Kwesi Itu had been administering the affairs of the village. On Wednesday 13 May 1981 Kwesi Itu had a customary duty to perform. It was alleged that contrary to custom one Gyepia had beaten his sister in the bush; such conduct was frowned upon and regarded as a taboo. The head of the village had therefore to pacify the gods by the sacrifice of a sheep.
Amongst those who accompanied Kwesi Itu to the bush were the third appellant, Kwaku Akani, and Kweku Efum, the seventh prosecution witness. After the ceremony, Kwesi Itu (the deceased) informed the seventh prosecution witness that he would be leaving the village the succeeding day and would like to see him in the evening of that day. It was in response to the invitation that the seventh prosecution witness went to Kwesi Itu’s house.
There was also evidence that a week before, he, the seventh prosecution witness, had been approached by the first and third appellants with the suggestion that he should take part in the killing of Kwesi Itu, his great granduncle. They offered him ¢2,000 if he would collaborate in the murderous deed, but he declined. Efum informed Kwesi Itu about the plot. Apparently he never took it seriously; he only commented that the first appellant was only interested in the stool of the village.
When in the evening of Wednesday 13 May Efum arrived at Kwesi Itu’s house, he saw the village choir practising; he knocked at the door, the third appellant opened the door and forcibly hauled him into the room. He says that the third appellant who had a gun in his hand, warned him not to raise any alarm on pain of his shooting him. Kweku Efum says that he found the old man was dead, his head was resting on the arm of the first appellant; that the second appellant, Efua Awotwe, was standing by a basin in which there were stool regalia. When he got into the room the first appellant taunted him by saying that when he sought his assistance to kill the deceased he refused, now lay his granduncle Kweku Itu dead.
Reverting to the events of that Wednesday evening, Kweku Efum alleged that after the choir had finished its practice and its members had dispersed, the third appellant took him to three streams which supplied drinking water to the village and at each stream made him swear an oath of secrecy, if he violated his oath and drank water from any of them, he would die.
[p.766] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739
In the night of the Friday following the incident, the old man was buried with haste and in a most unceremonious manner with the third appellant playing the principal role in the burial. He was buried like a dog.
One of the nieces of the deceased, Adwoa Anima, the fifth prosecution witness, who had arrived following the discovery of the death of the old man had all along suspected foul play. She had inspected the deceased’s room and found it in a confused state, the stool regalia and cash were missing. She, and the seventh prosecution witness, eventually were instructed by the elders of the village to report the matter to the police.
When Kweku Efum was searched by the police after his report, a gold ring and pieces of ornaments were found in his pocket. He was accordingly arrested and a statement was taken from him. In his first statement he did not tell the police the revelations he subsequently made four months after being in custody. He gave an explanation for the first statement, i.e. of his silence for the period.
At this stage it is necessary to refer to the summing up of the evidence of Kweku Efum and the direction the judge gave:
“Kweku Efum, seventh prosecution witness:
Evidence of Kweku Efum undoubtedly forms the foundation upon which the whole case of the prosecution hangs. All the other pieces of evidence merely go to buttress and build upon it. His evidence therefore must be weighed and his credibility examined with judicious care. If you come to a conclusion that he is a liar, that his evidence touching upon the approach made to him by the first accused (J.B. Arthur) in the presence of the third accused (Akani) and what he saw in the room of the deceased are fabrications and that he is otherwise not to be believed, the case of the prosecution falls flat.
However, if you decide that he is a truthful witness, it does not mean the accused are guilty of the offences charged. You then have to consider all the other pieces of evidence to see whether each of the essential ingredients charged is proved beyond reasonable doubt before you arrive at your verdict on each count and in respect of each accused.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
At a later stage of his summing up the learned judge again rehearsed the whole of the evidence of Kweku Efum and continued:
“Again we go to the evidence of the seventh prosecution witness. By now you must have made up your minds to believe him or not. (a) Recount the story in the room of Kwesi Itu. (b) The loot of the regalia and money. (c) The oaths. (d) Akani’s threat on Efum; ‘if
[p.767] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739
I see you standing with anybody, I will shoot you and commit suicide’.”
He continued:
“Before I am done let me go back to Efum; on the question of credibility. You remember he kept the facts as he told this court for four months before he came out with it. He explained to you why he did that: (a) fear of the oaths; and (b) Arthur’s influence and promises of freedom.”
The learned judge continued to refresh the minds of the jury on the explanation and reasons for Kweku Efum’s long delay in making the second statement which formed the basis of his evidence in court. That explanation was the oath of silence or secrecy he took, the promises made by the first appellant that he would seek his release from prison by bribing the State prosecutor and also the realisation of the dilemma in which he was. While he feared death if he revealed the events on that Wednesday, he also feared the ghost of the old man Kwesi Itu. He decided, in his words: “ I chose to speak the truth and face the consequence.”
The learned judge finally said “if you are satisfied with his explanation fair enough. If not you still have consider his evidence as a whole and give it the weight you think it deserves.”
It is the second sentence which has given rise to the attack of misdirection against the learned judge’s summing up. The question which arises is one of law. Can it be said that the learned judge misdirected the jury? It will be recalled that throughout his summing up he had focused the jury’s attention onto the evidence of Kweku Efum. He had on no less than four occasions addressed the jury on that evidence and the explanation he gave in relation to his credibility.
In this regard it is convenient now to turn our attention to the law. In State v. Otchere [1963] 2 G.L.R. 463, S.C. where a witness, Adotei Addo, had made nearly five contradictory statements, the Supreme Court at 503 approved of the principle thus enunciated in R v. Harris (1927) 20 Cr. App. R. 144 at 147, C.C.A.
“It is well established in the familiar words which are to be found, for example, in Archbold, that ‘The character of a witness for habitual veracity is an essential ingredient in his credibility; for a man who is capable of uttering a deliberate falsehood is in most cases capable of doing so under the solemn sanction of an oath. If, therefore, it appears that he had formerly said or written the contrary of that which he has sworn (unless the reason his having done so is satisfactorily accounted for), his evidence should not have much weight with a jury….”
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The court then continued at 504:
“The principle as stated is to us not only a healthy principle of law; it is also sound common sense, and it accords with the common experience of humanity in the conduct of their day-to-day affairs in their ordinary lives. No reasonable human being in the conduct of his affairs will ever persuade himself to act on the testimony of a man whose word is proved to be wholly unreliable. The disinclination so to act is instinctive.”
The next case in line is Poku v. The State [1966] G.L.R. 262, S.C. The Court of Appeal was hesitant to embrace the principle in Harris (supra) in its full grandeur. It put a gloss on it. After referring to the principle enunciated in R v. Harris (supra) and to the one enunciated thus in R v. Golder (1961) 45 Cr. App. R. 5 at 9—10:
“It has undoubtedly sometimes been thought that where a witness is cross-examined upon a previous unsworn statement and admits that the statement was made, but says that the statement was untrue, that unsworn statement may sometimes be treated as if it could be accepted by the jury in preference to the sworn statement in the witness box … That, of course, is all wrong, as has been pointed out on various occasions by this court, and not least in the case of White (1922) 17 Cr. App. R. 59.” the court in Poku stated at 275:
“We agree with the above statement. What we are saying is that in this country it would expose the administration of criminal justice to ridicule if the testimony of a witness on oath were rejected outright because he is alleged to have made a previous unsworn statement which is in conflict with his evidence without carefully considering his account of the circumstances under which any such statement was made.”
Finally the court will refer to State v. Bissah [1967] G.L.R. 310, C.A. Of course in Bissah, the witnesses did not offer any explanation in respect of the delay in making the report and the conflicts in the police statement and the evidence on oath. On that score alone Bissah is clearly distinguishable and not of any help.
In the present case Kweku Efum gave a full explanation of the delay and what has been termed the conflict in his statement. Efum was cross-examined on the first statement as follows:
“Q. In that statement you said in the evening you decided to go and find out where the deceased was going.
A. That is not what I said.
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Q. All you said about what you saw in the deceased’s room are lies; imaginary.
A. You are rather lying.
Q. Your statement differs from your evidence here.
A. It’s the same.”
The statement being referred to was never tendered in evidence for the jury to grasp the alleged contradictions. Indeed, the learned judge kept reminding counsel of his responsibilities in cross-examining a witness on his statement. Notwithstanding this failure, the learned judge summed up in a manner favourable to the appellants, reminding the jury of the effect in law of the contradictions.
The issue of credibility is for the jury. The learned judge as he was duty bound indicated the test by which the jury could weigh the evidence. The assertions against the appellants are based on both direct and circumstantial evidence. The direct evidence was given by Kweku Efum which if it had stood by itself might carry little weight, but buttressed by little pieces of independent evidence made a whole world of difference.
Kweku Efum stated he visited Kwesi Itu, the deceased, on the night of 13 May when he, Kwesi Itu, was murdered. That evidence was supported by Augustina Wiah, the eighth prosecution witness. She said while they were at choir practice on the evening of that day in the deceased’s house she saw Kwamina Wi (her uncle) come out of the deceased’s room. The third appellant (another uncle) also came out and remonstrated with them to go home because it was late and there were school children in the choir.
She was cross-examined to show that her earlier statement to the police was different from her sworn testimony. She emphatically denied it and maintained that her evidence was the same as her statement. In answer to the jury she stated that she saw the seventh prosecution witness, Kweku Efum, enter the room after Kwamina Wi had left. She firmly established and supported the evidence of Kweku Efum that he was in the room with the third appellant. Augustina Wiah is the niece of the third appellant.
Kweku Efum in his evidence said that he was in the room with the first appellant and the second appellant. The first appellant denied being in the room or even at Daber on that Wednesday and put up the defence of alibi calling in the process two witnesses. He was at Apewosika nearly 20 miles away from Daber. But two persons gave evidence that he was at Daber on the evening of the day. Kobina Abakah, the first prosecution witness, stated that he spoke to him between the hours of six and seven in the evening, the subject matter being the first appellant’s child; apparently the first appellant had been
[p.770] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739 invited for discussion about his child but failed to turn up for the proposed meeting. The second person who saw him in Daber was Nyame-Na Ose. He gave the time he saw him to be 6.30 p.m.
All the appellants put up defences of alibi which by the verdict of the jury were rejected. Thus the evidence of Kweku Efum that the first appellant was in Daber on that night was confirmed by two other witnesses who saw him.
Nobody except Kweku Efum saw the first and second appellants in the room on that night, but Efum gave evidence that the first appellant gave instruction to the second appellant to send the stool regalia or ornaments to Apewosika where the first appellant lived. The distance between Apeswosika and Daber had variously been given between nine miles to 20 miles.
By 8.00 am on the next morning, i.e. 14 May, Thursday, part of the regalia had been sent to the first appellant by the second appellant. This conduct confirmed Kweku Efum’s evidence that the first appellant gave those instructions. The other portion of the jewellery was found with the second appellant. Her own boy or man friend or, as she herself described their relationship, concubine gave direct evidence as to how he came to be in possession of the stool regalia.
Though the second appellant was in possession of the jewellery she paid ten cedis into the fund which was to go to a fortune teller in Axim to find out who stole the ornaments. If she was honest and innocent she had her very first opportunity of showing where the missing regalia was.
It is perhaps not the function of an appellate court to dissect in detail, the evidence on record which had been accepted by the jury. But the analysis has become necessary so as to emphasise that there was overwhelming other pieces of evidence which gave the testimony of Kweku Efum a ring of truth.
Counsel sought to discredit the witnesses by merely suggesting to each and everyone of them that the statement he or she made to the police was different from his or her testimony on oath. As already observed the judge reminded counsel of his responsibility in cross-examination and invited him to tender the alleged conflicting statements so the jury could see how different materially were those statements from the evidence in court. Counsel however did not accept the invitation.
It is easy to defeat the ends of justice by counsel picking up isolated inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses which in the circumstances are bound to occur, especially when evidence was being led three or four years after the event; multiply those inconsistencies in the evidence which, of course, would come up to a huge mountain of inconsistencies, and for counsel to submit that by reason of them, the [p.771] of [1987-88] 1 GLR 739 witness or witnesses are not reliable, and not telling the truth. Society has as much interest in punishing the guilty as well as in acquitting the innocent.
Finally, it ought to be observed that this court is governed by principles of law. But where a principle would make a mockery of justice then the court should have a second look at it. The court must not be an indentured slave of principle; it is for this reason that throughout the ages, common law judges had endeavoured to distinguish the facts of one case from the other in order to avoid results which appear to be unjust and a negation of justice.
The summing up though perhaps unduly long cannot be faulted. Indeed, the comment of the Court of Appeal, namely in Poku v. The State (supra) on Harris (supra), should be a constant reminder to our courts that wholesale reception of principles of law bred, nurtured and enunciated in foreign countries, especially in criminal law would sometimes expose the administration of justice to ridicule.
I will dismiss the appeal.
DECISION
Appeal allowed and conviction quashed.
D.R.K.S.
