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[1985] SLR (CA) 5Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

AHIABLEY vs. DOGAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 537

24 June 1985 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 13 min read

Cite as[1985] SLR (CA) 5
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OSCOLAAHIABLEY v DOGAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 537 [1985] SLR (CA) 5
APAAHIABLEY v DOGAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 537, [1985] SLR (CA) 5 (Ghana).
BluebookAHIABLEY v DOGAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 537, [1985] SLR (CA) 5 (Ghana Ct. App. 1985).

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CASE REFERRED TO

Khoury v Choitel [1964] GLR 100, SC.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL by the appellant from the decision of the High Court, Ho giving judgment in favour of the respondent in an action for declaration of title to two corn grinding machines. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court.

COUNSEL

Kudjawu for the appellant.

The respondent in person.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

He delivered the judgment of the court. The dispute in this case involves the ownership of a Lister engine and grinding mill which were installed at a village called Livegah near Akatsi in the Volta Region. These machines were used in grinding corn as a commercial enterprise. The evidence shows that since these machines were brought to the village, a woman by name Tornyebu Afedo was in actual control of their operations and physically received the moneys accruing from their operations. She died in or about 1969 and the machines are now in the possession and apparent enjoyment of her son, the respondent to this appeal.

It appears that upon Tornyebu’s death, her family met to consider her assets and liabilities and it was at this meeting that the machines were delivered to the respondent, as one of his mother’s customary

[p.539] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 537 successors. But the respondent was enjoined to utilise the profits accruing from their operations for the benefit of himself and his mother’s children. That meeting was presided over by the head of family, a man going by the name of Adzika Bedzo Agbadai. He himself testified before the trial judge in the court below. At the time of Tornyebu’s death, the appellant who is her uterine brother was away in Togo. He was in ill-health and was receiving treatment at the hospital there. On his return, he learnt that the machines were in the possession and enjoyment of his nephew, the respondent. He asserted ownership to them and asked for accounts. The respondent for his part, asserted his late mother’s ownership and disputed the appellant’s right to call upon him to account.

It is this that provoked this litigation in which the appellant sued in the High Court, Ho for a declaration of his title to the machines and other ancillary reliefs. In order to establish his ownership of these machines, the appellant produced two receipts as being purchase prices he paid when he bought the machines. One was from Union Trading Co. Ltd. dated 11 September 1963 and was in respect of the Lister engine and the other dated 20 September 1963 in respect of the grinding mill from Tonato Works. Both receipts bore his name. As the mere receipts were per se, inconclusive of ownership in view of the respondent’s stand, the appellant also testified and called evidence to show that he was in receipt of the proceeds from the machine from his late sister who rendered accounts to him in acknowledgment of his ownership.

The respondent’s position was that the actual purchase of the machines was financed by his mother who provided the money with which the appellant paid the purchase price. He swore that his sister was present when the money was handed to the appellant and that she indeed travelled with the appellant and was present when the machines were bought. That sister, by name Awlekpedzo, was put in the witness-box and testified before the trial judge. On the issue of accounts, the respondent denied that his late mother rendered accounts to the appellant. He implied that his mother enjoyed the income in her own right as the owner of the machines until her death.

So the receipt notwithstanding, the trial judge was invited to decide whether or not the late Tornyebu in fact provided the purchase price and was, in fact, and in law the owner of the machines. If in truth, the respondent’s story is true, then the appellant was merely taking advantage both of his physical possession of the receipts and his sister’s death to lay false claim to the machines. If on the other hand, the appellant’s version was the truth, then the respondent, for his part, was taking advantage of his uncle’s temporary absence from home at the date of his mother’s death and also his mother’s apparent

[p.540] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 537 possession of the machines to bolster up a false claim to the machines. Whichever version of [1984-86] 1 GLR 537-544 the story is true, reflects discredit on the other side.

It is manifest that the issues thus posed were ones of fact depending, for the most part, on the credibility of the witnesses produced before the trial judge. Neither story can be said to be inherently incredible. So our law in its wisdom consigned the choosing of the rival stories to the trial judge who saw and heard the witnesses. He was the best judge of their credibility. It was not the appellant’s case that because the two receipts bore his name, that concluded the matter. If indeed his late sister sent him to buy the machines, the receipts which were given to him as the payer do not by themselves establish his ownership, the more so as his sister Tornyebu appeared to have had physical control of the machines all her life and appeared to be in receipt of the income derived from the operation of the machines as well. That was apparently the reason why the appellant produced oral witnesses to show that the deceased accounted to him. Unfortunately for him, that evidence was disbelieved by the judge.

It is clear that of the oral witnesses, the one who most impressed the judge was Tornyebu’s married daughter Awlekpedzo. The evidence shows that although married, she lived with her mother at the time the machines were purchased and quite apart from accompanying her uncle, the appellant, to purchase these machines, she was in a position to have a personal knowledge of these matters. The appellant’s suggestion that she could not because she was married and lived away from her mother was denied. The judge said of her:

“The second defendant struck me as a truthful witness and I believed her evidence that she was present when her mother paid £300 to the plaintiff for the purchase of the cornmill and also accompanied the plaintiff to Accra where the cornmill was purchased.

The learned judge also expressed belief in the evidence of Bedzo, the head of the family. While the late Tornyebu and the appellant are uterine brother and sister, Bedzo is the paternal half-brother only of the deceased. His late half-sister informed him that she had sent the appellant to buy her a cornmill and he had done so. Bedzo swore that when the machines were brought, he asked the appellant if this was so. The appellant agreed that it was. On this account, he gave him drink “for assistance he had given to my sister.”

The appellant for his part, produced witnesses to show that the cornmill was installed on land which he himself obtained and he secured, at least at the beginning, the services of the cornmill operators

[p.541] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 537

The clear object of this evidence, was to show that the appellant was more than a mere messenger for his sister in the purchase and transportation home of the machines. Apparently, the evidence of these three witnesses did not weigh with the judge. He found grounds for disbelieving all of them.

The learned judge then proceeded to make a critical analysis of the appellant’s case and expressed general disbelief in it and did not mince words about his preference for the respondent’s case. Having done that, he felt himself persuaded that the respondent’s version of the facts represented the truth. He accordingly dismissed the suit and entered judgment for the respondent.

It is this judgment that the appellant contests by this appeal. The only ground of appeal shown in the notice of appeal is the omnibus one that: “The decision of the High Court is against the weight of evidence.” Before us, counsel for the appellant sought and obtained leave to argue two additional grounds, namely:

“1. The learned judge erred in law in that he placed undue and unjustifiable reliance on the evidence of the defendant and his witnesses which evidence was full of inaccuracies and contradictions.

2. The learned judge misdirected himself by making wrong and far-fetched inferences from irrelevant facts and thereby arrived at wrong conclusions.”

In a fair and full argument, Mr Kudjawu, counsel for the appellant, drew our attention to various bits and pieces of evidence on which he founded his two additional grounds. He submitted therefore, that the judge’s finding should have been the other way round, and invited us to reverse it in the appellant’s favour. In the view that we take of this case, we do not think it desirable to deliver ourselves on whether or not from those pieces of evidence the judge’s inferences were faulty, or that they justify a reversal of what is essentially a finding of fact.

On the really serious issue that was joined, the two vital witnesses were the appellant himself and the deceased’s daughter Awlekpedzo. Other witnesses’ testimony related to what can properly be described as collateral matters which may aid or detract from the oral testimony of the two vital witnesses.

The appellant’s position was that he bought the machines with his own funds and from his own resources and installed them at Livegah. He put his late sister Apedo in charge and that was the explanation he put forward for her six-year old possession. He denied that Awlekpedzo accompanied him to Accra to purchase the machines. The latter for her part not only asserted that the purchase price of the machines was

[p.542] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 537 handed to the appellant by her mother in her own presence, but travelled with the appellant and was present when the two machines were purchased. When her testimony was tested in cross-examination on this aspect of the case, she said:

“I went with the plaintiff to purchase the cornmill. We purchased the cornmill and the engine at the same store. We bought one in the morning and the other in the afternoon of the same day.”

It seems plain that neither the appellant nor Awlekpedzo can be said to be a disinterested witness. Just as the appellant stood to gain if a finding were made in his favour, in like manner, Awlekpedzo stood to benefit from a favourable verdict in her brother’s favour if the machines were adjudged to belong to her mother since she is one of the beneficiaries of her mother’s estate. In those circumstances, perhaps, the only neutral evidence and the safest indicator of the truth, were the documents which were made contemporaneously with the purchase. These are, of course, the two receipts.

They show plainly that the machines were not bought in the same store. The Lister engine was purchased from Union Trading Co. while the corn grinding machine was bought from a firm called “Tonato Works.” The receipts also show that both machines were not bought on the same day. There was a time lag of nine days between the dates of purchase. The Lister engine was bought on 11 September 1963, while the grinding mill was purchased on 20 September of the same year. On this question, the judge’s finding was expressed by him as follows:

“The second defendant witness (meaning Awlekpedzo) struck me as a truthful witness and I believed her evidence that she was present when her mother paid £300 to the plaintiff for the purchase of the cornmill and that she even accompanied the plaintiff to Accra where the cornmill was purchased.”

We think this finding was inadequate and oversimplified the issue. In a sense, it is even misleading. The machines purchased were two. These two make up the cornmill. There is the Lister engine and the grinding mill. There is no dispute that both machines were purchased in Accra. The factual matters on which there was conflict of evidence were two, first, were these two machines bought in the same store? And secondly, were they purchased on the same day?

As the appellant was supported on these and Awlekpedzo was contradicted, the further questions which arose were (1) was Awlekpedzo an untruthful witness; or (2) was she an honest witness but that on these two questions her recollection was faulty? These are questions which, on the facts of this case, the judge came under a duty to determine. It is manifest from his judgment that he did not direct his mind to

[p.543] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 537 these fairly crucial issues and appears to have been wholly unmindful of them. Had he done so, it is a matter for speculation whether he would have regarded Awlekpedzo as a witness on whose every word he could rely or whether he would have considered her unworthy of credit. His whole conclusion in favour of the respondent was based on a wholesale acceptance of her evidence. As clearly the judge omitted a consideration of this seemingly crucial conflict, we think his conclusion was unsatisfactory.

Under rule 8 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (LI 218), all appeals are by way of rehearing. We have given consideration to the question whether we should rehear the appeal in whole and make our own findings of fact, or whether we should exercise our power under rule 31 of the Supreme Court Rules and remit this case to the court below for hearing de novo.

The problem with which we were confronted arose in similar circumstances but on dissimilar facts before the Supreme Court in Khoury v Choitel [1964] GLR 100, SC. That was a motor accident case which resulted in a loss of life. The respondent claimed damages on the ground that the appellant was negligent inasmuch as he left a disabled vehicle in the middle of the road in a dark night without light or warning of any sort. As a result, the respondent’s vehicle ran into it and sustained serious damage with a resultant loss of life. The appellant denied negligence and for his part claimed that the accident occurred through the respondent’s own negligence in driving at great speed in a dark night and ignored all warnings. According to the appellant, a lit lantern was placed atop a disabled vehicle. This illuminated the area for a distance of twelve yards and enabled vehicles to pass to and fro without any incident. In addition, a watchman sat in the vehicle to warn approaching traffic.

Without any proper analysis and evaluation of the appellant’s story, the trial judge simply said he did not believe it. The Supreme Court on appeal, held that the blanket rejection of the whole of the appellant’s evidence was unreasonable since not everything the watchman said in evidence could possibly be false. Some parts of his evidence were inherently credible. The court thought the judge had a duty to decide what parts were false and what were true.

The Supreme Court could not decide what conclusion the judge would have reached, if he had severed the obviously truthful parts from the part he found false. Although pressed to make its own factual finding, it declined to speculate since the issue was essentially one of fact for the resolution of the trial court. In rejecting the invitation to make its own findings of fact, the court said per Apaloo J. (as he then was) at 100:

[p.544] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 537

“… it would not be right … to attempt to form a conclusion on the rival stories by a mere perusal of the colourless, impersonal and may well be, misleading transcript of the evidence.”

Instead, it exercised its powers under rule 31 and remitted the case for trial de novo by the High Court.

We think, this is eminently a case in which we should follow the course adopted by the Supreme Court in the Khoury case (supra). In a large measure, the issues posed for determination here were issues of fact which in the main, depended on the credibility of the oral witnesses. The consideration, evaluation, acceptance or rejection of those witnesses are for the trial court. Although, the two receipts tendered in evidence have a bearing in testing their reliability or otherwise, it is not impossible that their apparent conflict with the verbal testimony may be explained to the satisfaction of the tribunal of fact. In those circumstances, we ought to resist any temptation of resolving the factual conflict, to borrow the words of the Supreme Court, “by a mere perusal of the colourless, impersonal and may well be, misleading transcript of the evidence.”

That being the course that seems right for us to take, we think it would be undesirable to express any opinion on the merit or otherwise of the appellant’s complaint that the trial judge placed an unjustifiable reliance on the evidence of the respondent and his witnesses or that he made wrong and far-fetched inferences from irrelevant facts. On those matters, this case must go back untrammelled by any observations from us.

Accordingly, we propose to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment appealed from and remit the case to the court below for retrial.

DECISION

Appeal allowed and case remitted for retrial.

L. K. A

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