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[1985] SLR (CA) 6Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

AMUA-SEKYI AND ANOTHER vs. SASU AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 2 GLR 479

12 August 1985 · FRANCOIS JSC · ≈ 16 min read

Cite as[1985] SLR (CA) 6
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OSCOLAAMUA-SEKYI AND ANOTHER v SASU AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 2 GLR 479 [1985] SLR (CA) 6
APAAMUA-SEKYI AND ANOTHER v SASU AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 2 GLR 479, [1985] SLR (CA) 6 (Ghana).
BluebookAMUA-SEKYI AND ANOTHER v SASU AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 2 GLR 479, [1985] SLR (CA) 6 (Ghana Ct. App. 1985).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Ghana Commercial Bank v. Kofie [1963] 2 G.L.R. 235, S.C.

(2) Moubarak v. Japour (1944) 10 W.A.C.A. 102.

(3) Ussher v. Darko [1977] 1 G.L.R. 476, C.A.

(4) Boateng v. Dwinfuor [1979] 1 G.L.R. 360, C.A.

(5) Amefinu v. Odametey [1977] 2 G.L.R. 135, C.A.

(6) Hockman v. Arkhurst (1920) F.C. ‘20-’21, 103.

(7) Akyaa v. Amanfo, Court of Appeal, Cyclostyled Judgments, January – June 1958, 148, unreported. (8) Fori v. Ayirebi [1966] G.L.R. 627, S.C.

(9) Ntem v. Ankwandah [1977] 2 G.L.R. 452, C.A.

(10) Ayitey v. Mantey, [1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 552, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL by the plaintiffs from the decision of the High Court, Accra in favour of the defendants in an action for declaration of title to a piece of land. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Francois J.S.C.

COUNSEL

Ohene Ampofo (with him Tabi Amponsah) for the appellants.

E. D. Kom (with him Bob Anane) for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.S.C.

The area in controversy between the parties to this suit lies at South Odorkor. It is part of Akumajay stool lands, and at different dates representatives of the stool have granted interests in the land to the protagonists herein. Accordingly the plaintiffs plead that by a deed of gift excuted in 1959 and stamped with the No. A.C 6790/59, the second plaintiff acquired the land from Nii Ayikai II, the then reigning Akumajay Mantse. They further aver that this document got burnt in an accident in 1966 and a confirmatory deed was obtained in March 1977 which was later registered in the Deeds Registry and numbered 1490/77 (exhibit B). It is this land the first plaintiff purchased from the second plaintiff in 1967 and registered as No.1491/77 (exhibit G)

The first defendant claims the same land by virtue of a deed of purchase from the second defendant, then acting Akumajay Mantse

[p.482] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 479

(now deceased). This document is dated 23 August 1974 and its registered number is No. 2668/1975 (exhibit 1). Although there was an earlier challenge to the second defendant’s capacity to alienate Akumajay stool lands, that aspect of protest died without a whimper when the second plaintiff capitulated with the admission, “It is correct that the second defendant had power to dispose of Akumajay stool lands with the consent of the elders of the stool.”

As the competing titles are derived from the same stool, the issues for trial are consequently considerably narrowed to two, namely priority of title and the identity of the land. This latter issue arises because of the first defendant’s contention that the plaintiffs’ grant could not have fallen precisely on his land.

By a notice filed on 23 June 1977, the plaintiffs sought leave to amend their claim by adding a prior oral customary grant to which the document of 1959 was subsequent. This customary grant was allegedly evidenced by a receipt (exhibit A) issued on 24 October 1959.

The amendment does not appear to have been dealt with. There is no record of a response from the defendants. The docket is silent and does not resolve the matter. In my view it was the duty of the trial court to have taken notice of the application to amend and dealt with it. When a similar omission occurred in Ghana Commercial Bank v. Kofie [1963] 2 G.L.R. 235 at 236, S.C., the Supreme Court declared:

“… since the plaintiffs’ notice of amendment was before the court at the time it delivered the judgment the court should have considered it and amended the claim accordingly in the exercise of its powers under Order 28, r. 12 of the Supreme (High) Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A).”

Nevertheless the matter proceeded on the basis that an amendment had been regularly obtained. Among the agreed issues settled by the court for trial on 15 December 1977 was issue (lb), which is as follows, “Whether or not the customary gift made to the second plaintiff by Nii Ayikai II, operated to divest the rights, title and interest of the Akumajay stool in the land in dispute.”

Even if an unfortunate ambivalence shrouds the formulation of this issue since the customary gift might allude to the 1959 deed of gift that was burnt, or the prior oral customary grant, the parties seem to have been ad idem on its true import when they settled it and allowed in evidence to prove the prior grant. The foray into establishing this grant was unimpeded by any legal objection. By the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 323), s. 6 thereof, the judge is obliged to consider such evidence. It was when the receipt (exhibit A) acknowledging customary

[p.483] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 479 consideration for the grant was tendered, that an objection was raised as to the vagueness of the identity of the land. The receipt records that the second plaintiff, H.G. Addy, gave five pounds, ten shillings as customary drink (ohadu) to Akumajay stool in respect of plot of land granted to him at Akumajay stool (sic).” I shall deal later with the objection as to the uncertainty of the land and the issue whether it was regular practice to issue receipts for such payments. For the present, then, it cannot be denied that in considering the competing titles the question of a prior oral customary grant must receive the most critical consideration. For it is settled law that priority of title does not depend on registration alone.

One of the earliest cases that sought to preserve the validity of customary grants against the inroads of a registered title is Moubarak v. Japour (1944) 10 W.A.C.A. 102. It was held in that case that the Land Registry Ordinance (Cap. 112) does not give to a registered deed any priority over an earlier grant by native customary law. In that case due emphasis was laid on section 23 of Cap. 112, which denies a registered document “any effect or validity which it would not otherwise have had.” Section 23 is repeated in section 24 of Cap. 133 (1951 Rev). Section 24 (2) of the Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122), states; “Nothing in this Act shall operate to prevent any instrument which, by virtue of any enactment, takes effect from a particular date from so taking effect.” By parity of reasoning, the section provides that registration does not confer absolute title. For instance such registered title would be postponed to a title confirmed by a judgment. Thus in Ussher v. Darko [1977] 1 G.L.R. 476 at 494, Apaloo J.A. (as he then was) stated:

“Indeed if the plaintiff registered his title subsequent to the judgment of the court below, he would then have acquired his legal title with actual knowledge of … an equitable interest. This will in no way avail him.”

Again in Boateng v. Dwinfuor [1979] G.L.R. 360 at 367-369, C.A. this court, with respect, exhibited a wealth of learning on the validity of prior oral grants. The court also expressed the view that Act 122 does not abolish the equitable doctrines of notice and fraud. In the words of Anin J.A. (as he then was) at 369, “Registration does not create [an] absolute title …”

An effective prior customary grant divests the grantor of any further interest in the subject matter of the grant. Consequently, he cannot make a valid legal grant of the same land. Such a second grant gains no priority even if earlier registered. Thus it was that Amefinu v. Odametey [1977] 2 G.L.R. 135, C.A. affirmed the well-known principle

[p.484] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 479 of nemo dat quod non habet as applied in the old case of Hochman v. Arkhurst (1920) F.C. ‘20-’21, 103, where at 105 the court had held that if the stool had sold earlier to the plaintiff then “a subsequent conveyance by the same stool of the same piece of land to another party, i.e., the Defendant, would clearly not avail the latter.”

In the Amefinu case (supra) at 142, the court was careful to point out that:

“The correct application of the principle however depends on the plaintiff making her case that title had validly been transferred to her before the subsequent conveyance and to do that the plaintiff may rely on a customary grant or a conveyance.”

It is with this caveat that I turn to examine the evidence led to establish the prior customary grant. The second plaintiff gave evidence of this customary gift as follows:

“I originally acquired the land as a customary gift by grant from the Akumajay stool. I am myself a citizen of the Akumajay stool. The grant was customarily (made) and I performed all the necessary rites. I hold in my hand a receipt showing the customary drinks that I gave to the stool when the grant was made.”

On a critical perusal of the record, there does not appear to be any serious cross-examination of the evidence proffered of a prior customary grant. The very few questions asked related solely to the receipt, exhibit A. The following answer of the second plaintiff in authentication of exhibit A, in my opinion was reasonable and did not seem to be contrary to customary practice. He said, “since my association with the stool any subject who is given land is given a receipt for the customary drink he pays.” How else would the stool keep track of moneys coming in from customary grants? In 1967 when the confirming deed, exhibit B, was being executed ante litem motam, this sum of five pounds, ten shillings was duly recorded. Exhibit A is indeed vague as to the actual location of the plot granted. It was however issued in 1959 and that parcel of land was actually plotted in the official books of the Lands Registry. On the evidence I have no doubt that the plot was actually demarcated in situ. The question whether the receipt, exhibit A, was supportive of a customary grant can be answered in the affirmative and it is, in fact, separate and distinct from the question of the location or identity of the land. I must reiterate that with the overwhelming evidence that there was a document in 1959, duly stamped with No. 6790/59 add noted in the search office of

[p.485] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 479 the Lands Registry, of a parcel of land gifted to the second plaintiff, that challenge to the customary grant so late in the day cannot succeed with any degree of optimism. It is my view that the defendants accepted this position and rested their challenge on the two prongs of priority of registration and identity of the land. It is unfortunate that the learned trial judge failed to give sufficient consideration to the existence vel non of a prior customary grant. The learned judge expressed himself as follows:

“I find on the evidence that the land in the possession of the first defendant on which he has his structures was not incumbered at the time of the grant to him by the Akumajay stool and the plaintiffs have not been able to satisfy me that they had a prior grant of that land which would entitle them to succeed in this action.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

With regard to the emphasised passage, it is clear even from the records of the Lands Department, to which we shall return later, that the area was incumbered prior to the sale to the first defendant. No reasons are given for the further observation that the prior grant had not been made out. Neither the plaintiffs’ evidence on the matter and the failure of the defendants to cross-examine on that evidence was discussed by the learned judge. The evidential value of exhibit A was given no consideration at all. It is obvious the judge’s consideration of the plaintiffs’ case was only in the realm of priority by registered document. He said, “even if I have found a prior registered grant and a concurrence in favour of the first plaintiff I think the first defendant is to be protected.” The learned judge had earlier said, “The plaintiff’s claim founded on exhibits B and C cannot succeed.” Nowhere was the prior oral customary grant discussed. Consequently the real foundation of the plaintiffs’ claim was ignored.

As observed earlier the second plaintiff ‘s evidence of a prior customary grant was not challenged. There was therefore no onus on the plaintiffs to adduce strict evidence of it. Thus in Akyaa v. Amanfo, Court of Appeal, Cyclostyled Judgments, January-June 1958, at 148-150, where the validity of an arbitration had not been raised in the court of first instance, the Court of Appeal held that:

“Since there was no controversy that these proceedings constitute a valid arbitration according to native custom, there was no necessity for detailed evidence proving compliance with the native customary pre-requisites of a valid arbitration; what is admitted or not disputed is not in issue and need not be proved.”

[p.486] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 479

See also Fori v. Ayirebi [1966] G.L.R. 627 at 647, S.C.

On the issue of priority then, it is my view that the plaintiffs’ title cannot be impeached or postponed to the defendants’. There is, however, another reason why this must be so. When the first defendant submitted his document for registration, he was warned of a prior incumbrance. The notification was exhibit D. It requested the parties to meet at the Lands Department to clear up the difficulty. The second plaintiff claimed he received that summons late but when he attended the next day, the file had disappeared. He went to the Lands Department “eight times but the file could not be traced.” The first plaintiff also undertook a number of fruitless treks to the Lands Department. The first defendant admits that it was explained to him that “there appeared to be a conflict between (his) land and that of the plaintiff.” It seems curious then, that before the conflict of titles had been resolved, the first defendant had been able to procure registration of his document. An issue therefore arises whether on the authorities previously referred to, registration with actual notice of a prior encumbrance can be regarded as valid. It is to be noted that evidence from the representative of the Chief Lands Officer, was to the effect that the second plaintiff’s document had passed through his office and been plotted with a property No. B 2333. More importantly, the plotting in the official books was as far back as 31 March 1967.

The Lands Registry is an important office. By Act 122, a serious attempt has been embarked upon to regulate titles to land. Important powers are given to the registrar under sections 20-22 of Act 122 to control registration. Section 20 empowers the Registrar of Lands to refuse registration if:

“(a) he is satisfied that the instrument deals with the land or part of it in a manner inconsistent with an instrument previously executed whether by the same grantor or some predecessor in title or by any other person; or (b) on the face of the records the grantor does not appear to him to be entitled to deal with the land as the instrument purports to do.”

In Ntem v. Ankwandah [1977] 2 G.L.R. 452, C.A. this court held that section 20 (a) and (b) of Act 122, reproduced above, are not operative since the minister’s fiat had been withheld. But Amefinu v. Odametey (supra) also by this court had no such doubts. The statement appears at 143 of the report as follows, “There is also no dispute that the Registrar is empowered by the Act to refuse registration of a document presented for registration (section 20).” That conflict need not detain us

[p.487] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 479 long for there are no disabling impediments to the exercise of the registrar’s powers under sections 21 and 22.

Section 21 requires him to serve a notice of his objection to register on the grantor and grantee. Section 22 requires, where there is an issue involving incumbrances on the same land, that Gazette notices be issued to all interested parties for a determination of the issue. It is clear on the evidence that there were serious obstacles to the registration of the defendants’ document. It is my firm view that unless the procedures laid down by statute for resolving the impasse were followed, no resulting registration would be valid. Otherwise Act 122 would be turned into an instrument of fraud. This court should resist being embroiled in acts that erode the force of a statute. A court’s duty is to insist on due compliance with statutes. In my view the defendants had actual notice of the plaintiffs’ incumbrance. This was explicitly pointed out in exhibit D. The search certificate recorded it, and any inquiry would have revealed it if he did not believe the statement in exhibit D. It is, however, perfectly clear that the issue was not settled as required by sections 20-22 of Act 122. No Gazette notice was issued and the matter remained unresolved; consequently the first defendant’s registered document tells a lie and cannot be an instrument capable of postponing the plaintiffs’ customary grant. Exhibit D further states that the plaintiffs’ document “had been noted in our records concurred in” Whatever the expression means, it is this official concurrence or recognition that compelled the invitation in exhibit D but which was not resolved as ordained by sections 21 and 22 of Act 122.

There remains the last substantial issue of identity. If the lands are not identical then the parties take exactly what was granted them and the matter ends there. When the appeal was before a previous bench of’ the Court of Appeal, it was discovered that the plan used in the High Court and which the learned judge relied heavily upon (H.C.I.) was full of errors. The surveyor confessed as much and the court ordered a new plan. That created its own pitfall. This court differently constituted after the abortive appeal, has endorsed the previous view and acceded to an application to recall the surveyor and officers of the Deeds Registry to provide further evidence to enable the disputed land to be located with a degree of accuracy.

This course has cleared up the error that pillar SGE 31/61/6 created. This pillar should read SGE 31/61/3. According to the surveyor, “if one took the bearing from pillar 3 it would coincide with the plaintiffs’ land. The plans shown in the documents of the parties refer to the same land.” Since pillar 31/61/6 was some distance removed from the

[p.488] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 479 area in dispute, over a mile to be exact, it was quite clear the figure 6 had been erroneously substituted for 3. The representative of the Chief Lands Officer also concurred in the view that the pillar in the plaintiffs’ document had been wrongly numbered. He was positive an error had occurred because the plan was drawn to scale “and if you scale down you would arrive at the same thing.” This had been done “since the original document which had been plotted in our own sheet indicated the lay out. The document already plotted was exhibit B. But exhibit B was not the first document we had.” An obvious reference to the 1959 document.

It is easy to see how this mistake occurred. The area is all built up and the actual pillar 3 is covered by an existing building. To designate that pillar 6 from an obscure site plan is an error easy to make. The exercise of superimposition of site plans on master plans for composite plans easily perpetuated the mistake. It is my view that the land is the same and in this view, I am in the good company of the experts.

Finally can the Land Development (Protection of Purchasers) Act, 1960 (Act 2) be pressed into service on the defendants behalf? It seems to me the first defendant continued his building on the disputed land knowing of the enormous risk he took. He had taken a lease of the first plaintiff ‘s property which he was running as “The Eno Hotel.” He had been warned by the Lands Department of his landlord’s interest in the disputed land which was close by the hotel. An injunction had been sought, at first granted; it showed that the battle lines were clearly drawn. Yet he proceeded unperturbed. First, by getting the injunction discharged and building apace; placing his faith in his document however registered and trusting it would see him through. This is reckless conduct. It is the conduct condemned in such cases as Ntem v. Ankwandah (supra), Ayitey v. Mantey [1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 552, C.A. and a host of similar cases which are lately becoming too frequent. The Act was not designed to aid such gamblers.

I shall consequently allow the appeal and give judgment for the plaintiffs for the reliefs claimed on their writ with costs. I shall dismiss the defendant’s claim for protection under Act 2.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

I concur, and have nothing useful to add.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.

I also concur.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

D. R. K. S.

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