SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1985] SLR (SC) 2Supreme Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

DARKE IX vs. DARKE IV [1984-86] 1 GLR 481

30 July 1985 · ADADE JSC · ≈ 52 min read

Cite as[1985] SLR (SC) 2
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLADARKE IX v DARKE IV [1984-86] 1 GLR 481 [1985] SLR (SC) 2
APADARKE IX v DARKE IV [1984-86] 1 GLR 481, [1985] SLR (SC) 2 (Ghana).
BluebookDARKE IX v DARKE IV [1984-86] 1 GLR 481, [1985] SLR (SC) 2 (Ghana Sup. Ct. 1985).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Patu-Styles v. Amoo-Lamptey [1984-86] 2 G.L.R. 644, S.C.

(2) Kudiabor v. Kudanu (1932) 6 W.A.C.A. 14.

(3) Oloto (Chief) v. Chairman, L.E.D.B. (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 57.

(4) Merah v. Okrah [1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 400, C.A.

(5) Moore v. Aye (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 242.

(6) Practice Direction [1973] 2 G.L.R. 39.

(7) Cropper v. Smith (1884) 26 Ch.D. 700, C.A.

(8) Mattison v. Hart (1854) 14 C.B. 357; 139 E.R. 147; 23 L.J.C.P. 108.

(9) Grey v. Pearson (1857) 6 H.L. Cas 61; 10 E.R. 1216.

(10) Brett v. Brett (1826) 3 Add 210; 162 E.R. 456.

(11) Barnard v. Gorman [1941] A.C. 378; [1941] 3 All E.R. 45; 165 L.T. 308, H.L.

(12) Zei v. Seidu, Supreme Court, 9 February 1987, unreported.

(13) Furness, Withy & Co. v. Yang-Tsze Insurance Association 242 US 430; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141. (14) Eaton v. Price 360 US 246; 3 Led. 2d. 1200; 79 Sct 978.

(15) Annous v. Appoh [1980] G.L.R. 883, C.A.

(16) R. v. Welham [1960] 2 Q.B. 445; [1960] 2 W.L.R. 333; [1960] 1 All E.R. 260, C.C.A. (17) Bordor v. Aryebbir, Full Court, 20 November 1883, unreported.

(18) C.F.A.O. v. Zacca [1972] 1 G.L.R. 366, C.A.

(19) Armah v. Naawu [1975] 2 G.L.R. 201, C.A.

(20) Lartey v. Baku II [1980] G.L.R. 257, C.A.

(21) Bedaabour v. Duro, Court of Appeal, 18 March 1974, unreported; Court of Appeal (full bench), 5 July 1976, unreported.

[p.485] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decisions of the court of Appeal delivered (after the commencement of the Constitution, 1979) wherein it granted an amendment to and allowed an application for leave to apply for a review under section 3 (2) (a) and (b) of N.R.C.D. 101. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgments of Adade and Taylor JJ.S.C.

COUNSEL

Joe Reindorf (with S. Kwame Tetteh and N. Kuenyehia) for the appellants.

E. D. Kom (with him Akyea Djamson, Dr. Eric Djamson and Frank Adeeku) for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ADADE J.S.C.

On 1 March 1982 this court made an order returning to the Court of Appeal a case which had been put before us as an appeal but which we declined to hear. The said order was in the following terms:

“We consider that the issue as to the competence of the application is a matter that is governed by section 4 of the First Schedule of the Constitution, 1979. This provides that:

‘4. All proceedings pending before any court immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution may be proceeded with and completed in that court notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution.’

We would want to stress the importance and significance of the words ‘notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Constitution.’ They make section 4 cut across article 137, as indeed it cuts across article 114 (5) of the Constitution, 1979. It seems to us that the operation of those provisions would require that the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal as it existed immediately before 24 September 1979 would be competent to deal with the application now before this court. We would therefore order that the application be heard by that court, that is to say the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal, being the court before which the application was pending immediately before the Constitution, 1979 came into force.”

For a proper appreciation of this order, and in view of certain arguments advanced before us in this appeal by Mr. E. D. Kom, leading counsel for the plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to simply as the plaintiff) some background information is requisite.

The case itself began in 1957. For the purposes of this opinion, however, the obvious starting point is 30 July 1979. On that date, the Court of Appeal delivering a judgment in open court allowed the appeal

[p.486] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481 brought by the defendants; set aside the judgment of the High Court, Ho delivered by Francois J. (as he then was); dismissed the plaintiff’s claim; gave judgment for the defendants on their counterclaim; and made certain consequential orders. The decision of the Court of Appeal as well as the consequential orders were recorded in the record book. The transcript of the opinions read by the three justices took some time to be ready, a fact which to me is irrelevant to the issues for determination here.

At the time, i.e. July 1979, there was no Supreme Court. The court system terminated with the Court of Appeal at its apex, having an ordinary bench, and a full bench with a review jurisdiction, a situation which is already familiar to the practising fraternity.

Seeking to take advantage of the review jurisdiction of the full bench, the plaintiff on 15 August 1979 filed in the Court of Appeal an application for leave to apply for review on grounds of law, under section 3 (2) (a) of the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101). The application was a document of 24 close-typed foolscap paper making a well-argued case for a review, and ending with the prayer; “In view of the above reasons I pray for leave for review to be granted plaintiff-respondent-applicant.” (The emphasis is mine.) And the application was not by way of a motion; it was just a”… . statement [of case] filed on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent by Enoch D. Kom, Solicitor, Accra.” A matter which could not fail to attract the attention of Mr Joe Reindorf, leading counsel for the defendant-appellants.

The plaintiff’s application for leave was obviously pending before the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal—it could not pend anywhere else—that bench being the division of the Court of Appeal which gave the judgment sought to be reviewed under section 3 (2) (a) of N.R.C.D. 101. The application had not been heard when on 24 September 1979 the new Ghana Constitution came upon the scene. This instituted the Supreme Court as the final appellate court, abolished the full bench of the Court of Appeal, but made adequate provision for cases then pending before that bench, transferring all of them to the Supreme Court as appeals: see section 5 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979. No provision was made for applications for leave which were at the time pending before the ordinary bench of the former Court of Appeal.

In early 1982 the proceedings before the ordinary bench were put before the Supreme Court as a substantive appeal. After hearing arguments this court, in a reserved ruling, ordered that the matter be sent back to the Court of Appeal to be “proceeded with and completed in that court” in accordance with the provisions of section 4 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979.

[p.487] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481

By making this order this court, by necessary implication, held that the plaintiff’s application was not pending before the full bench as at 24 September 1979 to be taken over by the Supreme Court under section 5 of the transitional provisions and accordingly this court had no jurisdiction to entertain it under the said section 5. That is why it was sent back, in obedience to section 4 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, to the court before which it was pending “… to be proceeded with and completed in that court.”

“That court” could only mean the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal. The matter accordingly went back, and it was determined by the Court of Appeal on 17 May 1982 (per Jiagge, Mensa Boison and Coussey JJ.A). In their ruling, the Court of Appeal (Coussey J.A. dissenting), rejected preliminary objections raised by the defendants and held that:

(a) the application for leave, filed on 15 August 1979 was not out of time; and (b) it was not necessary that the application be accompanied by a formal motion (Form 2), in view of the

Practice Direction issued by the Chief Justice and reported in [1973] 2 G.L.R. 39.

These findings were summed up by Jiagge J.A. as follows, “I find no merit in the preliminary objection that this application for leave is incompetent, out of time and bad for want of form and I reject it.”

During the hearing the plaintiff applied to the Court of Appeal to amend the application for leave by adding section 3 (2) (b) of N.R.C.D. 101 to section 3 (2) (a) of N.R.C.D. 101. By this amendment the plaintiff must be understood to be applying to the full bench for a review, not only on grounds of law as specified in section 3 (2) (a), but also on grounds of a miscarriage of justice under section 3 (2) (b). The application was purportedly made under rule 13 (11) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13) and the record shows that it was made orally on 12 February 1982. Mr Kom, for the plaintiff, is recorded as submitting, “Written judgment was available only a month ago and it was only then that the Miscarriage of justice become apparent.” To which Mr Joe Reindorf replied, “This court (i.e., Court of Appeal, ordinary bench) has no jurisdiction to grant an amendment.” The court, however, decided per Jiagge J.A. to “exercise its discretion and allow (the) amendment seeking to raise miscarriage of justice as a ground in the application for leave for review.” (The emphasis is mine.) It is from these pronouncements by the Court of Appeal, as detailed above that the present appeal has been lodged.

Let me first deal with the amendment. By granting the amendment the Court of Appeal would seem to grant the plaintiff leave to apply to

[p.488] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481 the full bench for a review on grounds of miscarriage of justice. Section 3 (2) (b) of N.R.C.D. 101 gave the full bench jurisdiction:

“(b) to review and determine any other decision of the Court of Appeal or any Justice or Division thereof, where it appears to a full bench of such Court that there has been a miscarriage of justice…”

The section shows clearly that the ordinary bench has nothing to do with reviews on grounds of miscarriage of justice. No leave is required, either from the ordinary bench or from the full bench. The application goes direct to the full bench which proceeds to hear it. Under section 3 (2) (b) the ordinary bench has no function to perform and as such no jurisdiction to do anything. The application for amendment was wrongly made and equally wrongly allowed. In this, I agree entirely with Coussey J.A. when he said that the application was “totally misconceived.”

The main objection raised by the defendants, however, was that the application for leave filed on 15 August 1979 was out of time, and therefore the court had no jurisdiction to entertain it. It was contended that the time limit is fourteen days and that this cannot be extended. Admittedly, the application was filed two days outside the fourteen days’ deadline. But Mr. Kom contended that the time limit is not fourteen days but three months, and that if the court should hold that it is fourteen days, it could pardon the default by applying rule 66 of C.I. 13. The three learned justices came to three different conclusions on this issue. The president of the court, Jiagge J.A., was of the opinion that the time limit is three months, and that the application was well within time. Mensa Boison J.A. agreed with the fourteen days time limit, but was prepared to apply rule 66 to cure the defect and hear the application on the merits. Coussey J.A. held that the application was out of time, the time limit being fourteen days, which cannot be extended. Accordingly, in his view the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application.

It is unnecessary in this opinion to examine the law on this point in detail. The same issue arose, in identical circumstances, in Patu-Styles v. Amoo-Lamptey [1984-86] 2 G.L.R. 644, S.C. After some painstaking study of the law on the subject I came to the conclusion that applications for leave for review under section 3 (2) (a) of N.R.C.D. 101 are governed by rule 7 (1) of C.I. 13 and that the time limit is fourteen days from the date of the decision. If this limit is exceeded the Court of Appeal has no Jurisdiction to extend it. Nothing has been urged in this appeal to influence me to change my views on the matter. Accordingly, I hold that the plaintiff’s application of 15 August, 1979 filed in relation

[p.489] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481 to the judgment of 20 July 1979 was out of time. The Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to entertain it.

In this court Mr. Kom, counsel for the plaintiff, has taken a preliminary point that that appeal is not properly before us, on the ground that although the appeal was filed in time, the statement of case, required by rule 13 (1) of C.I. 13 to be filed within three weeks of being notified that the record is ready, was, in fact, filed outside this time limit on 13 July 1983. The registrar’s notice is dated 17 May 1983. Mr. Joe Reindorf realising eventually that he was indeed out of time, prayed the court to waive the default by extending the time to cover the date of filing. He relied on rule 66 of C.I. 13. We deferred our ruling on Mr Kom’s objection.

Rule 66 of C.I. 13 reads as follows:

“(1) Where a party to an action before the Court fails to comply with any provisions of these Rules or with the terms of any orders or directions given or with any rule of practice or procedure directed or determined by the Court, the failure to so comply shall be a bar to the further prosecution of the action unless the Court considers that the non-compliance was not wilful and that in the interests of justice the non-compliance should be waived.”

Case law on the interpretation and application of this rule has crystallised along the lines that the court’s discretion under rule 66 is to be exercised when the appeal itself can be said to be properly pending before the court and the court has jurisdiction to deal with it. This means that the appeal must have been filed timeously, and, where applicable, the requisite leave had been obtained. But where the appeal is filed out of time, or otherwise suffers from a fundamental and radical defect, a defect that goes to the very roots of the appeal, then notionally there is nothing before the court with respect to which the court may exercise any discretion at all. The court’s jurisdiction is to be invoked to handle appeals; it is not to be invoked to handle nothing. So if there is no appeal pending, properly so-called, then the court has no jurisdiction to do anything: see Kudiabor v. Kudanu (1932) 6 W.A.C.A. 14 at 16, and Oloto v. L.E.D.B. (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 57 at 61. The issue was extensively discussed by the Court of Appeal in Merah v. Okrah [1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 400, C.A. dealing with rule 64 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218); the Court of Appeal’s equivalent of rule 66 of C.I. 13). We turn to this decision for persuasive support.

In the instant case, as, on our finding, the application for leave was out of time, the court (per Mensa Boison J.A.) was, respectfully, not entitled to apply rule 66 (even if it were applicable in that court) to

[p.490] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481 regularise the position. In the words of Deane C.J. in Moore v. Taye (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 242 at 245, “. . . there was in fact nothing before the Court which the [Commissioner could] put into order.”

On the other hand the defendants’ appeal to this court was filed within time, and by rule 10 of C.I. 13 an appeal came into being and became pending on the filing of the notice of appeal. The default complained of by Mr. Kom concerning the filing of the statement of case, is no more than a default in a step required to be taken to bring a properly filed appeal to a hearing. Such a default can, on appropriate situations, be corrected or waived by invoking rule 66 of C.I. 13. We consider this an appropriate case in which to exercise our discretion under rule 66 in favour of the defendants. Accordingly, we extend the time limited by rule 13 of C.I. 13 to cover and include the date on which Mr. Reindorf filed his clients’ statement of case.

In the circumstances of this case this extension of time becomes a mere formality, for even without it, this court ought suo motu, to declare the proceedings before the Court of Appeal null and void for want of jurisdiction, this being clearly apparent on the face of the record.

In view of the conclusion I have arrived at on the issue of time limits it is unnecessary to deal with any of the other grounds of appeal. In the result, I am of the opinion that the appeal succeeds and ought to be allowed, with costs.

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C.

I am in entire agreement with the reasoning and conclusion of my brother Adade J.S.C. in the judgment he has just delivered which I have had the advantage of reading beforehand. The Court of Appeal decision we are thus setting aside is a two to one majority decision and I am also therefore anxious to examine the vaunted legal reasons which informed the judgment of the majority. Furthermore, I consider every case that ascends to the Supreme Court except the simplest to be so important as to disable me from having my views drowned in concurrence, particularly when as in this case, the Court of Appeal has not succeeded in achieving unanimity. However, there are some features of this case that, speaking for myself, I find so disturbing that I do not think it will be right for me to gloss over them and merely concur in the leading judgment merely because I am in full agreement with it without articulating what precisely has given me so much anxiety and uneasiness.

This is the third time this case has found its way to this Supreme Court. It is consequently of some importance to consider in my view two matters: first, how and why it came before us previously as well as [p.491] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481 the manner in which we dealt with it on the two previous occasions. Secondly, it is necessary also to find out how and why it has once again come before us in the present proceedings.

The facts for the purpose of a decision in this case are quite straightforward. The respondent (hereafter called the plaintiff) at the High Court, Ho claimed against the appellants (hereafter called the defendants) damages for trespass and perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from further acts of trespass in respect of a large tract of land. The defendants counterclaimed for a declaration of title and possession of the said land.

It will serve no useful purpose to set down here the evidence led by the parties in proof of their respective claims. It is sufficient for the purpose of this case that at the trial court Francois J. (as he then was) gave judgment on 17 November 1975 in favour of the plaintiff. This judgment was on appeal, unanimously set aside on 30 July 1979 by the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal and judgment was at the same time entered in favour of the defendants on their counterclaim for the said declaration of title and possession.

On the date of the judgment of the ordinary bench, the legal rights of the parties to have the said judgment reconsidered at the instance of an aggrieved party had crystallised and were very clear indeed having regard to the provisions of the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101), the then prevailing enactment which provided for a further consideration by way of review by the full bench of the Court of Appeal if certain statutory conditions were satisfied. Under the said N.R.C.D. 101, the plaintiff had a right if dissatisfied with the judgment to seek leave of the ordinary bench to apply to the full bench for review on grounds of error of law. Additionally and in the alternative he also had a right to apply direct to the said full bench for review on grounds of miscarriage of justice. The defendants on the other hand had a judgment of the ordinary bench in their favour which was final and must be satisfied if the plaintiff made no application or if his application under the said Decree was incompetent or was dismissed by either the ordinary bench or the full bench, depending on where he directed his application.

From the judgment of the ordinary bench so given on 30 July 1979, the plaintiff elected to exercise his right of applying to the said ordinary bench for leave to apply to the full bench for a review on grounds of errors of law. He apparently applied by motion to the Court of Appeal on 2 November 1979 for the said leave under the provisions of section 3 (2) (a) of N.R.C.D. 101. He had previously on 15 August 1979 filed an application at the ordinary bench in ostensible compliance with the Chief Justice’s Practice Direction of 15 May 1973 reported in [1973]

[p.492] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481

2 G.L.R. 39 with apparently no motion paper, praying that similar leave for review be granted to him under the same provisions of the Decree.

I must remark here that I am unable to appreciate what can meaningfully be achieved by filing two applications. I suspect though that probably his legal advisers on belated reflection must have thought that the absence of a motion paper in the prior application of 15 August 1979 rendered that application defective. It seems to me that, in fact, having regard to the specific provisions of rule 7 (1) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), which mandatorily enjoins that such applications should be by motion, the application would seem indeed to be defective. The said application, however, is so exhaustive in its contents and so explicit in its tenor that I am prepared to hold that in the interest of justice, it is merely a defect in form and the application can be assumed to be a competent motion in spite of the objection naturally taken by the defendants in respect of the defective form. In my opinion, as a general rule, departures from form amounting to variations in form not affecting substance and not wilfully or fraudulently indulged in or calculated to overreach an opponent can be waived by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in the interest of justice, in the case of the Court of Appeal by virtue of rule 64 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218), and in regard to the Supreme Court in view of rule 66 of C.I. 13 respectively; a contrary approach will cause the incompetence of a solicitor or legal adviser to damage a party not learned in the intricate technicalities of the law. That is how I view the application of 15 August 1979. The dictum of Bowen L.J. in Cropper v. Smith (1884) 26 Ch.D. 700 at 710-711, C.A. quoted by Jiagge J.A. and to be referred to later in this judgment to the effect that mistakes of parties if not fraudulent or intended to overreach can be corrected by the courts, lends support to my view that the defect in form is not fatal to the legal validity of the application of 15 August, if it was in all other respects properly made in accordance with the statutory provisions which permit the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to be lawfully invoked in the circumstances of the case.

With regard to the application made on 2 November 1979, it is note-worthy that the Constitution, 1979 which was generally prospective in its operation and did not affect accrued rights or prior liabilities incurred, unless so affected specifically or by necessary implication, came into force on 24 September 1979 and it clearly abolished both the ordinary bench and the full bench of the Court of Appeal and consequentially repealed N.R.C.D. 101. After the promulgation of the said Constitution therefore, there can be no question of an application to either of the benches after 24 September 1979. The 2 November 1979 application disguised as a notice of amendment but in reality a substantive application to a court that

[p.493] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481 ceased to exist and for a relief which had been constitutionally abolished is so glaringly and so obviously misconceived and incompetent that I have not succeeded in understanding the arguments advanced to save the application nor the majority reasoning of the Court of Appeal justifying its validity in view of the fact that it was specifically brought under the provisions of N.R.C.D. 101, a statute which was on the date of the application legally not in force.

In my view the only application which the Court of Appeal could have probable jurisdiction to look at for the purpose of finding out whether it indeed invoked its jurisdiction to consider if it had power to grant the relief requested, is the application of 15 August 1979. The reason for this is that since the application was not dealt with by the ordinary bench before that court was abolished, the application was on the date of the abolition pending in the registry of the ordinary bench. Now section 4 of the transitional provisions provides:

“4. All proceedings pending before any court immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution may be proceeded with and completed in that court notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

I have heard some specious arguments pressed on this court that in the circumstances of this case the phrase “in that court” (appearing in section 4 of the transitional provisions) is referable to the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal and not the new Court of Appeal created by the Constitution. This argument, attractive and superficially plausible though it be, appears to me to be preposterous for it means that although the old Court of Appeal was abolished, it must nonetheless be considered as a subsisting court capable of actually sitting in respect of old cases filed at its registry. The effect of this is that although on the demise of the old court a successor Court of Appeal was constitutionally substituted, the old court must nevertheless be resuscitated for the purpose of dealing with old cases then pending before it at its registry at the time of its abolition. Surely this absurd argument would have been sustainable if a successor court had not been established. I do not see as a matter of commonsense, how a successor court and the court to which it succeeded can both exist at the same time pari passu as this hardly logical argument would seem to suggest. Having regard to the totality of the structural changes in the court system effected by the Constitution 1979, “any court” in section 4 refers in my view to any court in the whole corpus of the court system as it existed before the Constitution, “that court” therein therefore, unless the context contradicts it or a specific provision is made by the said Constitution, refers individually first to any of the

[p.494] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481 said courts which has not been abolished, instances of which will cover the district and circuit courts; secondly, to any court abolished with no successor court established in its place to take up its jurisdiction, an example of which is the full bench; and thirdly, to any successor court substituted for an abolished court, examples of which are the High Court and ordinary bench. The expression “that court” is a compendious way of embracing all the instances. Of course if only section 4 of the transitional provisions is looked at in isolation without considering the whole Constitution and article 137 (2) thereof in particular, then the literal and primary meaning of “that court” is obvious: The old court must continue to deal with cases previously before it although it has ceased to exist and its outstanding function consequentially transferred to a successor court. This absurdity can be avoided by considering the whole Constitution and praying in aid what Jervis C.J. called the golden rule in Mattison v. Hart (1854) 14 C.B. 357 at 389, a classical formulation of which is to be found in the well-known dictum of Lord Wensleydale in Grey v. Pearson (1857) 6 H.L. Cas 61 at 106:

“. . . in construing wills and indeed statutes, and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther.”

Even if there is no absurdity the modern rule of construction is to have regard to the tenor of the whole context. As Sir John Nicholl put it long ago in Brett v. Brett (1826) 3 Add 210 at 216:

“. . . to arrive at the true meaning of any particular phrase in a statute, that particular phrase is not to be viewed detached from its context in the statute; it is to be viewed in connexion with its whole context.”

And the reason for this was succinctly stated by Lord Reid in Barnard v. Gorman [1941] A.C. 378 at 396, H.L.:

“. . . the context in which a word is found may be, and very often is, strong enough to show that it is intended to bear other than its ordinary meaning . . .”

I think the argument in this case that “that court” must be considered to be, inter alia, a reference to the abolished ordinary bench is untenable. The very clear wording of article 137 (2) of the Constitution, 1979 would seem to give the quietus to the argument. It provides:

[p.495] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481

“(2) The Court of Appeal established under … this Constitution shall be the successor to the Court of

Appeal in being immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution.”

It seems to me that the new Court of Appeal because it is a successor of the ordinary bench of the old Court of Appeal has power to exercise jurisdiction in respect of the matters pending before the registry of the said old court for that is what succession means. And when it does so, it does so in its capacity as the new court and not the old court, the only proviso is that it must as regards the said pending matters exercise the powers which the old court would have exercised in respect of the said matters and not the powers of the new court if there are differences.

Be that as it may, the two applications which the plaintiff made to the relevant Court of Appeal on 15 August and 2 November 1979 respectively were neither dealt with by the old Court of Appeal before its abolition nor heard by the new Court of Appeal after it had been established, and yet on 21 December 1981, virtually out of the blues, so to speak, and for inexplicable reasons we found the case listed before us in this Supreme Court as civil appeal No. 1/81, and we inadvertently, if I may say so, assumed jurisdiction and subsequently made a ruling and an order on it on 1 March 1982.

The case so put before us on 21 December 1981 was extravagant. As my brother Adade J.S.C. has so aptly put it just now at 489, ante:

“… notionally there is nothing before the court with respect to which the court may exercise any discretion at all. The court’s jurisdiction is to be invoked to handle appeals; it is not to be invoked to handle nothing. So if there is no appeal pending, properly so-called, then the court has no jurisdiction to do anything.”

The plaintiff had not in any way whatsoever invoked the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and there is no provision of any sort whatsoever in the Constitution which can remotely be construed as converting the 15 August 1979 defective application lodged at the ordinary bench into an appeal to the Supreme Court. The matter was to all intents and purposes pending at the registry of the old ordinary bench and the successor court, the new Court of Appeal, has power to take it over by virtue of the said article 137 (2) of the Constitution and the said section 4 of the transitional provisions. I have no doubt now that our best course of action was to decline to have anything to do with it. There was, in fact, nothing before us in respect of which we could competently adjudicate and make a legal order.

[p.496] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481

I have ever since the case was put before us this third time tried very hard by toying with one ingenious argument after another to justify our assumption of jurisdiction when the case first came before us, but I must confess that I have not been successful in praying in aid any plausible argument that can legally validate our usurpation of the said case on 1 March 1982.

I suppose the novelty and euphoria of a final appellate court in its supreme infancy taking its first hesitant toddler steps must have unduly inhibited our giving adequate and proper consideration to the obvious fact that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, like that of all the other courts in our judicial hierarchy, is hermetically circumscribed by law and therefore we ought not to overreach ourselves by obsequiously handing down Supreme Court decisions merely because there is no other learned judicial organ specifically designed to superintend its jurisdiction. I think though that article 116 (3) of the Constitution, 1979 enjoining the Supreme Court to depart from its previous decision when to do so is right is an in-built and face-saving corrective mechanism in such a situation and I am prepared to seek refuge in it in the circumstances. I regret, of course, and humbly admit that I did not study the case more carefully than I did at the time. Although it is no excuse I recall that I did not think deeply about the problem because we declined to adjudicate and were unanimous that the case should in any event go back to the court that ought to have lawfully dealt with it.

I am now firmly of the opinion that we were wrong to entertain the application in the first place. As it is, although the matter was not legally before us, we nevertheless dealt with it as if it was properly before us and we proceeded to make some unfortunate pronouncements on it without indicating our constitutional or any other legal or statutory authority sanctioning such assumption of jurisdiction. I regret to say with respect that our decision with our pronouncement or ruling in the matter is in the circumstances per incuriam. It is wrong and must per force be denuded of any binding authority as a precedent. We should have boldly declined jurisdiction peremptorily or referred the matter administratively to the registry for listing if necessary before the appropriate court, namely the Court of Appeal. The decision we gave on 1 March 1982 is, however, as follows:

“It is hereby ordered that the application be remitted to the Court of Appeal to proceed in accordance with section 4 of the transitional provisions of Constitution, 1979.”

I fear our ruling is misconceived and our “order” is null and void and cannot be taken as the basis of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to deal with the matter. Their jurisdiction must be founded if at all, on the application made to the ordinary bench on 15 August 1979.

[p.497] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481

Subsequently, on 28 June 1982 the case was once again put before us for a second time although we had unanimously given an order apparently binding on all persons and authority unless countermanded by us, declining to entertain it and had referred it to the Court of Appeal and nothing whatsoever had happened in the interim to necessitate our assumption of jurisdiction. Why in spite of our clear stance it was put before us on this second occasion is incomprehensible and cannot be justified on any legal or rational basis. I recall, however, that five of us empanelled to deal with it firmly refused to sit on it this time. Three of us, Anin J.S.C. presiding, Adade J.S.C. and I, used the face-saving device of adjourning it sine die. We just ignored it in a manner I am tempted to describe as “contemptuous.” And now it is once again before us, this time I hope legally.

The case, however, illustrates an apparent lacuna and unquestionable defect in the administrative machinery of the Supreme Court and highlights and poses a poignant question that cannot continue to be overlooked if expeditious justice is to be dispensed to the citizens of this country by this Supreme Court. The question is: for the expeditious dispatch of its business, how and by whom is a case on appeal legally and administratively listed before the Supreme Court? I am afraid, I must confess that as of now although I am a Supreme Court judge I have sadly no sure knowledge as to the current process by which such a case is listed before this Supreme Court. Such indefinite knowledge as I have is based on speculation and it is therefore unreliable and deceptive. I do not know who has been exercising the power of putting appeal cases before us although I know that by law the entire members of the Supreme Court have constitutional authority to do so.

Under article 117 of the Constitution, 1979 it is the Supreme Court that has been given power to hear appeals from the Court of Appeal and to hear and determine any matter which has been determined by the national chieftaincy tribunal. It has also been given power, under the said article, to the exclusion of the Court of Appeal to hear and determine any matter relating to the conviction of any person for treason by the High Court.

Now under article 215 (c) of the Constitution it is provided:

“215. In this Constitution and in any other law,…

(c) where a power is given to any person or authority to do or enforce the doing of an act or a thing, all such powers shall be deemed to be also given as are necessary to enable that person or authority to do or enforce the doing of the act or thing.”

[p.498] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481

Furthermore, section 10 (2) of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4) which applied to the Constitution, 1979 by virtue of section 1 (a) thereof and article 4 (4) and (6) of the said Constitution is also as follows:

“(2) Where an enactment confers a power, or imposes a duty, to do any act or thing all such powers shall be deemed to be also given as are reasonably necessary to enable that act or thing to be done or are incidental to the doing thereof.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

It seems to me that article 215 (c) of the Constitution, 1979 was without doubt promulgated out of abundance of caution. The combined effect of the said article and section 10 (2) of C.A. 4 is to repose in the Supreme Court the power of fixing dates at which appeal cases are to commence before it since this is plainly a power incidental to the constitutional functions in appeals which it had been empowered to undertake. Admittedly, under article 120 of the Constitution a single justice of the Supreme Court may exercise a power vested in the Supreme Court not involving the decision of the cause or matter before the Supreme Court, provided that in civil matters, any order, direction or decision made by a single justice in pursuance of this power may be varied, discharged or reversed by the Supreme Court constituted by three justices thereof.

At first blush it would appear that this provision permits a procedure by which a single justice of the court suo motu ferrets a case out of the Supreme Court registry and without much ado gets it fixed for hearing before the Supreme Court. The suggested procedure needs only to be stated for its hollowness to be exposed. Surely this is so chaotic and unreasonable a view as to be a clear indication that it cannot possibly be correct. Until a case is actually fixed by being listed and thus put before the Supreme Court the cause or matter cannot be said to be before the Supreme Court for one of its members unilaterally to exercise the power vested in the court not involving the decision in the cause or matter then before the court.

I am really unhappy about the manner in which cases burrow their way to the Supreme Court as would seem to have happened in this case previously when it was twice dumped on us on 21 December 1981 and 28 June 1982 respectively. It is not clear who wields this power which embarrassed us on both occasions. The actual dates on which cases are to commence look like routine matters to be handled administratively but in my respectful view they are not. They are indeed a very important and essential part of the work of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court and only the Supreme Court can exercise this incidental jurisdiction regarding these dates and with respect the jurisdiction to

[p.499] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481 list cases must be exercised by the Supreme Court in plenary session in chambers at private conference. Leaving the choice of the date for a case to be heard in the Supreme Court to the arbitrary discretion of one person (no matter his status) is with respect unsatisfactory and disturbing; the matter becomes dangerous and clearly unacceptable when the person exercising this arbitrary jurisdiction with no supervision by the Supreme Court is a member of the registry manned as these registries are by persons not learned in the law. Without meaning any disrespect, it is clear that if the person chooses to just ignore a case that case will never be heard as long as the person wielding this tremendous discretionary power is in office, and this will subvert the proper administration of justice.

It seems to me with respect that this is clearly intolerable and obviously invidious and should be deprecated without any reservation whatsoever. It is bad: it contradicts the practice in the United States to be discussed presently as was unravelled to me in Washington some time in September 1981 by the Chief Justice of the United States, the Hon. Mr Justice Warren R. Burger.

The US Supreme Court, because like our Supreme Court it has the judicial power with the final appellate jurisdiction of the State vested in it, exercises the power in chambers at conference in plenary session. Mr Justice Brennan in an informative article “State Court decisions and the Supreme Court” (1960) 31 Penn Bar Assn Q 393, 400-406 described the American practice as quoted in the American Supreme Court Practice (5th ed.) (1978) at p. 342:

“Each Justice passes on each petition, each item, no matter how drawn, in longhand, by typewriter, or on a press. Our Constitution vests the judicial power in only one Supreme Court. This does not permit Supreme Court action by committees, panels, or sections.”

The thrust of the practice in jurisdictions influenced by the jurisprudence of the common law is, it seems, well settled and it accords with the position I have indicated in this judgment.

I have said enough to show that in my view the present uncertain and undefined practice will not enable us to dispense justice promptly and properly in this Supreme Court. It would seem, in fact, that even as of now, there are many cases lurking in the registry since 1979 and before the 31 December 1981 Revolution and which for inexplicable reasons have not been put before us by whoever wields the said discretionary power. Quite recently on 3 June 1985 we heard arguments in the case of Azani Zei v. Yakubu Seidu, Civil Appeal No. 4/83 in which all relevant papers had been filed since the latter part of 1983. Why the case took almost two years before it was fixed before us for

[p.500] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481 hearing is inexplicable. Judgment in this case was delivered by the Supreme Court on 9 February 1987 unreported.

I think, it is about time the Supreme Court devise and adopt a strategy to evolve a practice that would enable it to exercise the power of supervising the early fixing of cases before it as soon as all the necessary steps have been taken by the parties.

The practice in the United States in respect of petitions for certiorari which is the same with regard to appeals, is as stated by the US Supreme Court in Furness, Withy Co. v. Yang-Tsze Insurance Association, 242 US 430:

“. . . petitions go first to every member of the court for examination, and are then separately considered in conference. This duty must be promptly discharged.”

With regard to appeals Mr. Justice Brennan in Eaton v. Price, 360 US 246 said:

“The Court’s practice when considering a jurisdictional statement whereby a litigant attempts to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction on appeal, is quite similar to its well known one on application for writs of certiorari.”

And at 246-247 he went further to reveal the rule which applied to both as well as to all matters which go before the Supreme Court for adjudication as follows:

“. . . if four Justices or more are of opinion that the questions presented by the appeal should be fully briefed and argued orally, an order noting probable jurisdiction or postponing further consideration of the jurisdictional questions to a hearing on the merits is entered. Even though this action is taken on the votes of only a minority of four of the Justices, the Court then approaches plenary consideration of the case anew as a Court; votes previously cast in Conference that the judgment of the court appealed from be summarily affirmed, or that the appeal be dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, do not conclude the Justices casting them, and every member of the Court brings to the ultimate disposition of the case his judgment based on the full briefs and the oral arguments.”

I think we will do well to give due consideration to same such practice in this court, if we are to avoid a repetition of the vacillating situation created by the attempt to manoeuvre the Supreme Court to willy nilly consider the jurisdictional point in this case. In any case the proper practice in the Supreme Court which has statutory sanction but which

[p.501] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481 has been consistently ignored, can be found in rule 53 (1) of C.I. 13, which is as follows:

“53. (1) The Court may, after considering the statement of the plaintiff’s case and of the defendant’s case, the memorandum of agreed issues and any arguments of law, decide to determine the action and give judgment in Court on a fixed date without argument or may appoint a time at which the parties shall appear before the Court for further hearing of the action.”

(The emphasis is mine)

After we had declined jurisdiction and apparently remitted the case to where we were convinced it was pending, the plaintiff filed a notice at the Court of Appeal on 26 March 1982 under rule 13 (11) of C.I. 13 seeking leave to amend his application in order to raise miscarriage of justice as a ground for review. Apart from the fact that such an application under the said rule 13 (11) can only be competently made to the full bench and only the full bench by virtue of rule 70 of C.I. 13 it is clear that under section 3 (2) (b) of N.R.C.D. 101 there is no need to seek leave of any court for review on grounds of miscarriage of justice. All questions and applications relating to miscarriage of justice under N.R.C.D. 101 are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the erstwhile full bench for under section 3 (3) it is provided as follows: “(3) jurisdiction conferred by this section on a full bench of the Court of Appeal shall not be exercisable other than by a full bench.”

In any case after 24 September 1979 any application under N.R.C.D. 101 is incompetent as was held in Annous v. Appoh [1980] G.L.R. 883, C.A., which was binding on the Court of Appeal but which was ignored in the majority judgment delivered on 17 May 1982. This circumstance must make any decision allowing the amendment to be per incuriam. I think the application for amendment made by the plaintiff on 26 March 1982 was clearly invalid and should have been ignored completely. The Court of Appeal, however, per Jiagge and Mensa Boison JJ.A. (with Coussey J.A. dissenting) granted the application. I hold and agree with the dissenting opinion of Coussey J.A. that the grant is unnecessary and incompetent, and I would set it aside.

I now turn to the jurisdictional issue in this appeal. I have, of course, done the first of what I set out to do at the commencement of this judgment, namely to examine how and why this case was on two previous occasions put before us and how we dealt with it on those occasions. It remains now for me to find out why and how it has once again found its way to this court and how we should in my judgment dispose of it

[p.502] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481

From what I have so far pointed out, it is obvious that the present Court of Appeal established under the Constitution, 1979 (coram: Jiagge, Mensa Boison and Coussey JJ.A.) dealt with the two applications which were filed before it and the old court on 2 November 1979 and 15 August 1979 respectively and gave judgment on 17 May 1982. Both Mensa Boison and Coussey JJ.A. were not members of the old court before the Constitution, 1979 came into force and they could not therefore have been empanelled after 24 September 1979 as Court of Appeal judges for a court that had ceased to exist. In any case under the Constitution, 1979 no one has any power under any of its provisions to resuscitate the old Court of Appeal for any purpose and so the court that dealt with the applications is the new Court of Appeal.

Clearly under article 117 (1) (a) of the Constitution, 1979 an appeal lies as of right from such judgment of the new Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court and so on 25 May 1982 the appellants, i.e. the defendants, filed their notice of appeal under the provisions of rule 8 (1) of C.I. 13 which provides for fourteen days within which to lodge an appeal against an interlocutory decision and three months within which to lodge such an appeal in the case of a final decision unless in the case of a final decision the Supreme Court extends the time within which an appeal is to be lodged. In the instant appeal, the defendants lodged their appeal to this court within eight days of the decision of the Court of Appeal and so the appeal whether considered to be in respect of an interlocutory or final decision is decidedly properly before this court.

I have already set down in this judgment in considerable detail the procedural history of this case. I have done so because the point for decision is the legal validity of the procedural steps indulged in by the plaintiff-respondent. In this respect his central relevant act is that to a decision given against him on 30 July 1979 by the ordinary bench, he filed an application on 15 August 1979 for leave to apply to the full bench for review. The question is whether by C.I. 13 the application thus filed within sixteen days of the decision, is in accordance with law.

On 16 January 1984 this Supreme Court decided the case of Patu-Styles v. Amoo-Lamptey [1984-86] 2 G.L.R. 644, S.C. I have since filed my reasons for concurring the unanimous decision of the court in that case. A similar point arose in an application filed on 13 July 1979 in respect of a decision of the ordinary bench delivered on 11 April, 1979 and my brother Adade J.S.C. and I decided that under rule 7 (1) of C.I. 13, the relevant provision applicable, at the time the respondent lodged his application at the ordinary bench for leave, the mandatory time limit within which an application for leave is permissible is fourteen days with the ordinary bench apparently having

[p.503] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481 no jurisdiction to extend time. By the same parity of reasoning and on the strength of our said views in the Amoo-Lamptey case I hold and agree with the view in the judgment of my brother Adade J.S.C. that the application of the plaintiff-respondent filed on 15 August 1979 is outside the time limit within which an application of that nature could be legally made. The application thus filed is incompetent and the proper decision and the only one which the ordinary bench could have given and which the new Court of Appeal as a successor to the old Court of Appeal ought to have given was to have dismissed the application in limine as incompetent for breach of rule 7 (1).

I appreciate though that under rule 64 of L.I. 218, which applied to the ordinary bench, a feeble argument can be plausibly advanced that the ordinary bench had power which the new court as successor also has, to extend time for application for leave by waiving the time limit. Such an argument must come to terms with the wording of the said rule 64 which only permits such waiver in cases of “an appellant” and the argument must therefore canvass the reason, if any, which should persuade the court to equate “an appellant” with “a person seeking leave to be an appellant.” The argument must also show how the court below given power to waive compliance with its own rules can waive compliance with the rules of a higher court in pretended reliance on that power. In any case the plaintiff-respondent did not make any application at any time at all for extension of time and so even this tendentious argument can hardly be countenanced. I hold and agree with my brother Adade J.S.C. that the application should have been simply dismissed in limine.

The Court of Appeal, however, coram: Jiagge and Mensa Boison JJ.A. (with Coussey J.A. dissenting) granted the application for leave although the relief the plaintiff wanted had been extinguished by the Constitution and the court to which he seeks leave to go to has also been abolished by the said Constitution. It is necessary with respect to examine the reasons for this clearly illogical decision.

I have devoted considerable time to canvass the meaning of “in that court” ‘in section 4 of the transitional provisions because when counsel for the plaintiff-respondent in the course of the argument before this court was asked to what court he would go on being granted leave, he conceded quite honourably that he could not come to the Supreme Court but without any qualms whatsoever he put forward the incredible submission that notwithstanding its abolition a full bench of the Court of Appeal would have to be apparently empanelled to deal specifically with his case. This is contrary to the judgment apparently given in his favour which is that on leave being granted for a review which the court then proceeded to grant, there would then metamorphose an appeal pending before this Supreme Court.

[p.504] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481 As I have just pointed out this is not how counsel for the plaintiff-respondent conceived or understood the legal position. Indeed, about eleven months after the judgment of the Court of Appeal and almost one year after the defendants-appellants had filed their notice of appeal, counsel for the plaintiff in spite of our ruling over a year earlier declining jurisdiction and remitting the case to the Court of Appeal wrote to the registrar of the Court of Appeal on 5 April 1983, inter alia, as follows:

“I shall be grateful if you would consult His Lordship the Chief Justice to have a date fixed for the review by the full bench as ordered by the Supreme Court.

You will no doubt remember that leave for review has already been granted by the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

The Supreme Court did not at any time order a review in this case and the ordinary bench at no time granted leave for review. Counsel’s statements are with respect misleading. The majority decision of the Court of Appeal is of course not as stated by counsel. The Court of Appeal decision is that: on their grant of leave for review the case becomes retrospectively pending before a reincarnated full bench before the transfiguration of its review nature to a full-fledged appeal before the Supreme Court; all this with the respondent playing no part at all in this immaculate conception, which then stultifies and makes otiose rule 7 (3) of C.I. 13 with its following mandatory provision, “Where leave to appeal is granted, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal . . .” Clearly without meaning any disrespect it appears to me so romantic a mode of reposing jurisdiction in a court of law can hardly be on the instructions of a responsible law giver or the handiwork of a serious legal draftsman.

Perhaps it is necessary to examine the ratio decidendi which informed the majority decision of the Court of Appeal to grant this peculiar leave with its amazing legal consequences. Jiagge J.A. who gave the leading judgment held that rule 7 (1) of C.I. 13 which specifies a time limit of fourteen days within which to apply to the ordinary bench for leave if an applicant alleges error of law, having regard to the provisions of sections 3 (2) (a) and 6 of N.R.C.D. 101 is inapplicable in respect of the application which the respondent made to the ordinary bench asking for leave to apply for review on grounds of error of law. In her view rule 8 of C.I. 13 which applies quite obviously to applications for review made pursuant to the provisions of section 3 (2) (b) of N.R.C.D. 101 as of right in cases where miscarriage of justice is alleged and where the time limit for the application is three months is

[p.505] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481 the applicable rule although the 15 August application was not concerned with miscarriage of justice. Of course, it is difficult to accept this contention which seems incongruously to equate an “application for leave” with an “application as of right.” Be that as it may, she held further that the Chief Justice’s Practice Direction of 15 May 1973 reported in [1973] 2 G.L.R. 39 specifically giving directions as to the manner in which the review jurisdiction of the full bench should be invoked apply equally to the application for leave made to the ordinary bench. This is surprising since as my brother Adade J.S.C. has clearly demonstrated in the Amoo-Lamptey case the Practice Direction has nothing whatsoever to do with the ordinary bench for they dealt specifically with the full bench. The legal reason which converted an application for leave to an application as of right was, with respect, not indicated, but she had recourse to sections 4 and 5 of the transitional provisions and said that by virtue of these provisions:

“This application for leave for review on being granted immediately becomes a review pending before the full bench of the Court of Appeal immediately before the coming into force of the Constitution. This means that as soon as this application is granted, there is an appeal in this matter pending before the Supreme Court.”

I have already deprecated this metamorphosis. Moreover I do not, with the greatest respect, think the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to order any case “to pend”, if I may say so, in this Supreme Court. A case is pending when it is actually before us de facto or de jure. If it is before us de jure, we are the competent authority to so decide. If it is before us de facto it will be so obvious there will be little or no need to decide it by any subtle recourse to so complex a process of interpretation as is attempted here.

I think the short answer to this is that a review or appeal is a creature of statute and it is trite learning that the terms of the enabling statute must be satisfied if a review or appeal jurisdiction is to be exercised.

Jiagge J.A. also granted the invalid and incompetent application for amendment which was ill-advisedly made on 26 March 1982. She was apparently impressed and impelled by the general guidelines preferred by Bowen L.J. in Cropper v. Smith (supra) at 710 to the effect that “the object of Courts is to decide the rights of the parties, and not to punish them for mistakes …”

Mensa Boison J.A. canvassed at length the legal meaning of “pending” in sections 4 and 5 of the transitional provisions. With regard to our order of 1 March 1982 under the said section 4 he held:

[p.506] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481

“The reference meant no more than that the application ought properly to be heard by the Court of Appeal (ordinary bench) where the application was filed and never heard. Following from the above conclusion I would rule that the application was a proceeding pending before the Court of Appeal and is still pending.”

It is of some importance to note very well this very relevant and significant ruling of Mensa Boison J.A. in view of another ruling which also fell from him in the course of his judgment. Now section 5 of the transitional provisions provides:

“5. Any review pending before the full bench of the Court of Appeal immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution shall . . . be deemed to be an appeal pending before the Supreme Court.”

The word “pending” in the context was also elaborately considered. He referred to the English case of R. v. Welham [1960] 2 W.L.R. 333, C.A. and was persuaded by that case and a holding in C.F.A.O. v. Zacca [1972] 1 G.L.R. 366, C.A. at 396 where Sowah J.A. (as he then was) in reading the majority judgment of the ordinary bench in construing section 13 (2) of the transitional provisions of the defunct Constitution, 1969, a provision similar to section 5, had said:

“It seems to me that section 13 (2) of the transitional provisions must be read to include all pending applications for review before the full bench, whether actually filed or not.”

On the strength, inter alia, of this opinion of Sowah J.A. (as he then was) he held:

“I am prepared to hold that the actual application may be deemed legally to have been pending before the full bench within the meaning of section 5 of the First Schedule immediately before the coming into force of the Constitution.”

Having regard to Mensa Boison J.A.’s earlier holding and view that the application was pending before the Court of Appeal, we thus have the curious situation of one application pending simultaneously before the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal and the full bench respectively, a classical case of a well-known Ghanaian aphorism centred around the concept of an indivisible entity dividing itself into “twice.”

Mensa Boison J.A. also considered whether rule 7 (1) of C.I. 13 applied to the application for leave which the plaintiff made to the ordinary bench. He held apparently quite rightly that the plaintiff was out of time but he resorted to rule 66 of C.I. 13 to waive the [p.507] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481 non-compliance with the said rule 7. I am afraid the jurisdiction to waive any of the provisions of C.I. 13 by recourse to the said rule 66 is by the provisions of rule 70 completely outside the purview of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal as my brother Adade J.S.C. has so ably shown. It is a jurisdiction exclusively exercisable by the Supreme Court. Since it is by thus usurping the jurisdiction of this court that leave was given to the plaintiff, the said leave must per force be null and void. The line of reasoning pursued by the majority judgment leads me to fall back again on the dictum and caveat of Hector Macleod J. in Bordoh v. Aryebbir, Full Court, 20 November 1883, unreported which I referred to in my judgment in Amoo-Lamptey v. Patu-Styles (supra) where he said:

“The great difficulty in such cases as the present is to free one’s mind from the influence exercised upon it by a knowledge that a party is suffering from a hardship arising from a fault not perhaps his own. Yet it is a most dangerous thing to stretch the law to cover individual hardship.”

I have studied this case very closely. In Amoo-Lamptey v. Patu-Styles (supra) I subjected all the local authorities I could lay hands on to scrutiny and I came to the same conclusion as my brother Adade J.S.C, that an application to the ordinary bench for leave to apply for a review to the full bench is caught by the fourteen days’ time limit imposed by rule 7 (1) of C.I. 13 exactly as Coussey J.A. had to hold in his dissenting opinion in this case. I held also and gave elaborate reasons for it, that the cases of C.F.A.O. v. Zacca (supra); Armah v. Naawu [1975] 2 G.L.R. 201, C.A; Bedaabuor v. Duro, Court of Appeal (full bench), 5 July 1976, unreported and Lartey v. Baku [1980] G.L.R. 257, C.A. and a few others, in most of which applications in circumstances analogous to this case were entertained were either unsatisfactory in their ratios or were plainly decided per incuriam.

I think the application which the plaintiff made to the Court of Appeal is the type of application we canvassed in the Amoo-Lamptey case and it should have been dismissed in limine. In Bedaabuor v. Duro, Court of Appeal, 18 March 1974, unreported a somewhat analogous application was made to the Court of Appeal when the Supreme Court was abolished and a full bench was established. The Court of Appeal: coram Apaloo, Lassey and Archer JJ.A. (as they then were) dismissed the application and in Armah v. Naawu (supra) at 220, Archer J.A. (as he then was) in his dissenting opinion gave the reasons for dismissing the application:

“There is now no court to which we can grant the applicant leave to appeal. We therefore cannot stultify ourselves by granting this

[p.508] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481 motion even if we had been satisfied of its merits which we are not.”

In the result, I would allow the appeal with costs and declare the leave given to the plaintiff as invalid since there is now no court to which the plaintiff can be granted leave to apply for a review.

JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.

I have had the advantage of reading in advance the well-reasoned judgment of my brother Adade J.S.C., and have nothing useful to add. I agree that the appeal be allowed with costs in favour of the defendants-appellants against the plaintiff-respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.

I have also had the opportunity of reading beforehand the learned judgment just read by my brother Adade J.S.C. and I am in entire agreement with the reasons and the conclusions. Consequently, I favour the appeal being allowed with costs.

JUDGMENT OF SOWAH J.S.C.

It is sad that an important litigation involving the chiefs and peoples of two distinct communities be finally resolved by reliance on technicalities, namely that the plaintiff was out of time by 48 hours and that under rule 7 (1) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), the application for leave for review should have been made within fourteen days from the date of the decision.

The whole policy justification for the establishment of a second appellate court, namely the Supreme Court was to enable appellants to have the merits of their cases looked at by a second court and a panel of five judges to pronounce thereon, especially in a case such as the present when the appellants had won in the court of first instance and lost on appeal in the first appellate court.

To decide a substantial and important litigation on technicalities is in my view the very negation of the justification of the Supreme Court’s existence. It has been well said that the very first charge of a judge should be the discovery of truth and justice “not legalism, formalism and technical perfectionism”, what Lord Denning has described as “costly nonsense.” I would add “monumental” to that noun.

But to return to the subject matter of this appeal, a careful study of the statement of the plaintiff-respondent’s case filed with his application on 15 August 1979 reveals that the respondents, then appellants, were making the application under two heads of N.R.C.D. 101, namely section 3 (2) (a) and (b) which provided that:

“(2) A full bench of the Court of Appeal shall have jurisdiction—

[p.509] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 481

(a) to review and determine a decision of the Court of Appeal or any Justice or Division thereof upon a question of law, where such Justice or Division gives leave for such review and determination;

(b) to review and determine any other decision of the Court of Appeal or any Justice or Division thereof, where it appears to a full bench of such Court that there has been a miscarriage of justice.”

Unfortunately the heading of his application was limited to 2 (a) instead of (a) and (b) and the applicant also ended the affidavit with these words, “That in the circumstances I swear to this affidavit praying for leave for review under N.R.C.D. 101, s. 3 (2) (a).”

It is being held that having indicated the relevant provisions of the Decree under which the applicant was bringing his application, he was forever barred from amending that mistake.

It is said that there ought to be finality to the process of litigation and that if a technical ground can be found to give such finality it also serves the ends of justice. I do not with great respect share that view and disassociate myself from such tendentious legal reasoning. I agree there must be rules governing the progress of litigation and that litigants must be enjoined to observe them but to put this court in a straight-jacket without room for manoeuvre by reason of this is in my view wrong and unjust.

These rules mainly copied from the English rules need a fresh looking at and be tailored to meet the aspirations of this community and to avoid injustice. There is absolutely no other reason why this court should not have the power to extend time in interlocutory appeals as prevails in appeals from final judgments even if the period allowed be shorter except that an old English rule copied word for word in our own rules say so.

The majority in this court thinks differently, and so be it. I would most certainly have dismissed this interlocutory appeal and heard the main appeal on its merits.

DECISION Appeal allowed.

M. C. N. –N.

Scroll to Top