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[1986] SLR (CA) 1Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

AMANING ALIAS ANGU vs. ANGU II [1984-86] 1 GLR 309

13 March 1986 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 29 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (CA) 1
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OSCOLAAMANING ALIAS ANGU v ANGU II [1984-86] 1 GLR 309 [1986] SLR (CA) 1
APAAMANING ALIAS ANGU v ANGU II [1984-86] 1 GLR 309, [1986] SLR (CA) 1 (Ghana).
BluebookAMANING ALIAS ANGU v ANGU II [1984-86] 1 GLR 309, [1986] SLR (CA) 1 (Ghana Ct. App. 1986).

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CASE REFERRED TO

Fiscian v. Nelson (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 21.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against the judgment of the High Court, Sekondi giving judgment for the defendant in an action for, inter alia, a declaration of headship of a stool family. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Abban J.A.

COUNSEL

E. D. Kom for the appellant

Akainyah for the respondent.

Ocran for the co-respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.

The action was commenced in the High Court, Sekondi by one J. W. Essien alias Kwesi Baidu. But before judgment was delivered on 15 December 1963, he had passed away. One Opanyin Armoo joined the suit as a co-defendant. But alas, he suffered the same fate as Essien. Opanyin Armoo, after he had given his evidence, also died. Kojo Korantsin Amaning and Kwamena Benyah were substituted for Essien and Opanyin Armoo, respectively. The nature of the case was such that the trial High Court allowed the substitution of those two persons not because they had the capacity in which they made their respective applications, but they were allowed to come in as nominal parties, so to speak, in order that the action would not become abated. Thus the judgment determined only the rights of the original parties—J. W. Essien, Nana Kobina Angu II, and Opanyin Armoo. In this appeal the expressions “plaintiff” and “co-defendant” have been used in reference to J. W. Essien and Opanyin Armoo, both deceased.

The Kokodo Ebiradzi stool family of Fijai is the family from which chiefs of Fijai are elected. The plaintiff claiming to be the head of that stool family sued the defendant asking for the following declarations:

[p.312] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 309 (a) that the Kokodo Ebiradzi stool family of Fijai possessed only one stool;

(b) that the said family had no second or any other stool at a place called Ntangofu;

(c) that the only stool of the family was the one being occupied by the defendant and that the defendant was not occupying any other stool at Ntangofu; and lastly

(d) an order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from holding himself out as odikro of Fijai or performing any functions as such so long as the defendant claimed to occupy a stool at Ntangofu.

The defendant, Nana Kobina Angu II, as admitted by all the parties, was and still is the occupant of the said family stool, and in the circumstances he has been and still is the recognised chief of Fijai. The defendant was sued in his capacity as the chief of Fijai and in a case like this, there is a customary obligation that the chief must bring the court action to the attention or notice of all the principal members or elders of the stool who, together with the chief, would ultimately have to find money to defend the action. The defendant did exactly this when he was served with the plaintiff’s writ of summons.

The Kokodo Ebiradzi stool family is made up of about nine branches, each branch having its own sub-head and the plaintiff claimed to be the overall head of the family. When the principal members and elders of the stool family became aware of the nature of the plaintiff’s claim, they were greatly appalled by the plaintiff’s conduct. They felt the conduct of the plaintiff, as the overall head of family, in launching what they considered as frivolous litigations against members of the family, was not proper and left a lot to be desired. So the family decided that the time had come to call upon the plaintiff as the head, to answer not only allegations of being litigious but also of his failure to render account of various sums of money and compensations which the plaintiff had collected and received in the name of and on behalf of the family from the Lands Department and certain individuals.

All these matters, together with other allegations of general mismanagement of family affairs, which will be detailed in due course, were set down in writing and in the form of charges and sent to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was called upon to appear before a family meeting to be held at Fijai on 8 February 1981 at 10 a.m., to answer those charges and with a warning that if he failed to attend the meeting without reasonable cause, “the family will proceed to take a decision on the matters” in his absence.

[p.313] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 309

The plaintiff in his evidence admitted receiving the charges and the notification of the family meeting, but he said he refused to attend. The family, on the appointed day and time, proceeded to deliberate on the charges and having found against the plaintiff, removed the plaintiff as the overall head and appointed Opanyin Armoo in his place. Opanyin Amoo then applied and was joined as a co-defendant. In his defence, the co-defendant averred that he was now the overall head of the Kokodo Ebiradzi stool family and he put in a counterclaim for a declaration to that effect.

The plaintiff’s case was that there had been all sorts of litigations in the family. Factions had sprung up in the family and they litigated against each other in various courts and in all those litigations his faction won against the defendant’s faction. It should be noted that the court proceedings tendered as exhibits in the cases bore eloquent testimony that the family seemed to have made litigation their past-time and the plaintiff had undoubtedly been the moving force in most of those litigations. For the present appeal, there is no need to recount the history of those litigations. It is sufficient to state that the litigations were either about the headship of the family, the occupancy of the stool or who had the right to dispose of family lands.

However, at long last the factions of the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to bury their differences and the Omanhene of Sekondi whose stool was paramount to the Fijai stool effected a reconciliation. Henceforth all the members accepted the plaintiff as the overall head and the defendant is the occupant of the Kokodo Ebiradzi stool and therefore the chief of Fijai.

What sparked off the present litigation can best be narrated in the plaintiff’s own words and I quote:

“In our family we have a shrine. We also have a family stool . . . The stool is in Kuma’s house at Sekondi . . .

It is at the Second Street, Sekondi, house No 11/6. Kuma was dead long ago. We perform customary ceremonies on the stool annually. The odikro of Fijai has a part to play in these ceremonies. While the litigation was proceeding Nana Kobina Angu [the defendant] was not performing the ceremonies. And after the litigation and reconciliation he never came to play his part. That is why I have brought him to court.”

The defendant and the co-defendant contended that the stool of the family which the defendant occupied and the family shrine were all at the ahenfie at Fijai and not at house No. 11/6, Second Street, Sekondi; and that the defendant had, in fact, been performing all the required

[p.314] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 309 customary ceremonies or rites in respect of the stool at the said Fijai ahenfie and that the defendant would never go to someone else’s house to perform any custom. The defendant continued:

“The ‘shrine’ where sheep is slaughtered is at Fijai. The stool which I occupy is at Fijai . . . It was in this court that I heard that the Kokodo Ebiradze family stool is at Second Street, Sekondi. The stool which I occupy is called Nana Fijai Ba. It is owned by the Kokodo Ebiradze family. I have never heard that the Kokodo Ebiradzi family’s stool is called Egyir Mansa stool. About 1980 during the Kundum festival the plaintiff told me that I should go to Sekondi for the purification rites. I declined and told him that my ancestors never told me to perform any custom at Sekondi. At that juncture the plaintiff warned me and Kojo Dua, the state fetish priest, against performing purification ceremony during the festival at Fijai. We told him that we would have to put the matter before the whole family. A family meeting was convened. The matter was put before the family. The family raised objection. A delegation of the family was sent to tell the plaintiff at Kweikuma that so long as our ancestors had been performing purification ceremony at Fijai the family would not go to Sekondi.”

So in brief the bone of contention was whether the stool of the family was at house No. 11/6, Second Street, Sekondi, and not at the chief’s palace at Fijai; and whether the purification ceremony known as “apatwa”, or “apa” for short, in connection with the said stool was performed at Sekondi and not at Fijai during the Kundum festival.

The plaintiff called one witness and tendered previous court proceedings. The witnesses called by the defendant and co-defendant included the Omanhene of Sekondi who had been doing his best to reconcile the parties and to let the family know that litigation was not profitable occupation. At the end of the day, the learned High Court judge accepted the contentions of the defendant and the co-defendant. He also found that the plaintiff, Essien, had been properly removed as the overall head and that the co-defendant had been customarily and properly appointed the new overall head of the Kokodo Ebiradzi stool family of Fijai. In consequence of those findings, the learned trial judge dismissed the plaintiff’s claim and entered judgment for the defendant and the co-defendant.

It is against this judgment that the plaintiff appealed to this court. In this appeal, the judgment was attacked on many grounds as can be seen from the copious and detailed grounds of appeal filed on behalf of

[p.315] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 309 the plaintiff-appellant. However, learned counsel for the plaintiff confined himself to only a few of those grounds.

A number of grounds were argued together, namely grounds 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13. Those grounds complained, among other things, that the learned trial judge erred in law in holding that the purported deposition of the plaintiff as head of family and the appointment of the co-defendant as the new head of family by a hostile section of the family was valid when notice for that purpose had not been served on all the members of the family and when there was an obvious split in the family. It was argued that the deposition was at the instigation of and with the involvement of the defendant and at a time an action was pending against the defendant and that some of the charges which were alleged to have been brought against the plaintiff were matters which were to be gone into by the court. Learned counsel further submitted that the allegations in the charges, for example, that the plaintiff was litigious could not be true as the only action the plaintiff brought against a member of the family was the one as contained in exhibits A and B. The suit was heard by the High Court, Sekondi. The plaintiff won and on appeal to the Court of Appeal, he again won. Counsel therefore submitted that the plaintiff could not, in the circumstances, be described as litigious.

A careful examination of the charges which were levelled against the plaintiff as contained in exhibit 9 could not bear out the submissions of learned counsel. The charges accused the plaintiff of being litigious, of failing to perform the funeral of deceased members of the family, of preventing the defendant from performing his function as a chief, of seizing the chief’s gong gong thereby making it difficult for the defendant to make announcements to the inhabitants of Fijai to undertake communal labour. Some of the charges referred to the behaviour of the plaintiff in organising people from the neighbouring villages to undertake the weeding of the Fijai cemetery. He was also accused of collecting several thousand of cedis from contractors operating quarries on the land of the family, from individuals to whom plots of family lands had been allocated and from the Lands Department. All these moneys the plaintiff was supposed to have collected in the name of and on behalf of the family and in his capacity as the head of family. But, according to the family, he had refused to render account.

In the suit before the High Court none of the charges listed above formed part of the issues to be tried as contended by learned counsel for the appellant. This is so plain if reference is made to the reliefs the plaintiff himself sought and the summons for directions filed by the parties. Furthermore, the plaintiff and his only witness did not lead evidence to show that it was the defendant who engineered or organised

[p.316] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 309 the deposition of the plaintiff as head. A writ of summons having been served on the defendant in his capacity as the chief, the defendant, as I have already said, was under a customary duty to inform the elders and the principal members of the family about it and this conduct of the defendant could not in any way amount to instigating the family to depose the plaintiff. It is clear from the evidence that it was the family that took an independent decision to invite the plaintiff to answer the various charges levelled against him.

Surely the family was legally entitled to take steps at any time to protect its interest and the fact that there was an action pending before the court between the plaintiff and the defendant could not debar the family from exercising its right of calling upon the plaintiff to give account of his stewardship. Again, the fact that the plaintiff ‘s failure to defend himself against those charges would result in his deposition as head and thereby deprive him of the legal standing to maintain his action before the High Court was of no moment. It would be a sad day if the courts were to hold that once the head of a family is engaged in a litigation before the court, the family which made him the head in the first place should have no right to call upon him to render account of the family’s funds which are in his hands or to answer charges of mismanagement of the affairs of the family.

The other contention of learned counsel for the plaintiff that the allegation in the charges were not true could not avail the plaintiff. The plaintiff refused to attend the family meeting even though he was given proper and adequate notice thereof as was found by the learned trial judge. The learned judge stated:

“But there is evidence from Sofokra, the second co-defendant witness, which I accept that the plaintiff was served with notice for a family meeting and that he was told to attend it, but he refused to attend it. In my view even if the defendant engineered the family meeting the plaintiff had no justification to refuse to attend . . .”

It was at that meeting that the plaintiff was expected to clear himself. In any case, the family at that meeting having found the charges proved against him, it is too late in the day for the plaintiff to contend the contrary.

The evidence that the plaintiff had once won a litigation could not necessarily mean that he was not litigious. As will be shown presently, the present case portrayed clearly the litigious nature of the plaintiff. Here was a head of family who had approached the Omanhene of his area and complained to the Omanhene about the conduct of his family chief. The Omanhene agreed to settle the matter. Before the settlement

[p.317] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 309 could come on, a letter was received by the Omanhene from the head of family withdrawing from the intended settlement. Then without consulting the elders and the principal members of his family (as there was no evidence that the plaintiff did) the head banged in a writ against his family chief, knowing very well that the litigation would cause financial embarrassment to the family. I think members of the family, at least the elders and the principal members, must know and give their consent to litigation which the head embarks upon in his capacity as the head, and ostensibly, on behalf of the family.

Looking at the reliefs the plaintiff sought and the evidence which he himself subsequently gave at the trial, one begins to wonder whether the suit the plaintiff launched at the High Court was not a useless piece of litigation which could only be indulged in by a person who had a very good appetite for litigation. It may be observed that by his own writ the plaintiff was all along aware that the name of the stool family was simply Kokodo Ebiradzi and had always been known by that name only. Yet he added the word “Abantwoa” to the inscription he caused to be put on the palace at Fijai and at the trial he kept on adding that “Abantwoa” to the name of the family, contrary to the title of his own writ. Is this not an obvious attempt on the part of the plaintiff to create confusion in the family and in the process prepare the grounds for future litigation. In my view the plaintiff was properly described as litigious.

It was also argued by learned counsel for the plaintiff that the finding that the plaintiff was deposed by the majority of the members of the family was not borne out by the evidence and that only four out of the nine branches took part and that could not be a majority. The passage in the judgment which learned counsel seized upon and used as the basis of his submission reads as follows:

“When I counted all the branches on the defence side I got nine. I then counted those branches mentioned by the plaintiff and got nine but four of the branches, namely Fijai, Mpintsin, Nkoful, Whindo and Ntangofo took part in the meeting which deposed him and substituted the co-defendant for him. I find therefore that a majority of the branches took part in the deposition of the plaintiff and appointment of the co-defendant.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

It is clear that the branches which the learned judge mentioned in the above quoted passage (and going by the plaintiff’s own evidence) numbered five and not four. That is Fijai, Mpintsin, Nkoful, Whindo and Ntangofo. This becomes clearer if the passage is read together with an earlier finding of the learned trial judge where he stated:

[p.318] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 309

“I find it difficult to understand why the plaintiff accepted the defendant as the chief of Fijai and as such a member of the royal family but rejected the defendant’s followers as members of the family. The plaintiff however admitted in cross examination that Fijai, Whindo, Ntangofo were branches of the family . . .”

It is therefore obvious that there was a counting mistake. The case of the defendant and the co-defendant was that all the nine branches of the family were represented by their various branch heads at the said family meeting. Out of the said nine the plaintiff in his evidence acknowledged and accepted five. Thus the learned trial judge was saying that if that was the situation, then on the showing of the plaintiff, at least five constituted a majority all the same; and they could still depose him. That, of course, did not in that only five out of the nine branches were present. The notice of the intended meeting (exhibit 9) which was tendered without objection stated, inter alia:

“We the undersigned/marked sub-heads of the above-named stool family [Kokodo Ebiradzi stool family] are requesting you by this notice to attend a family meeting to be held at Fijai on 8 February 1981 at 10 a.m. to answer the following charges preferred against you by the family.”

The notice was signed by not less than nine sub-heads of the branches and the plaintiff acknowledge at least five of them. But the learned trial judge did not accept the plaintiff’s rejection of the members of the family who were the followers of the defendant and who constituted those branches which the plaintiff refused to admit as forming part of the nine branches. The learned judge said:

“But it is sad to reflect that the plaintiff demonstrated his utter rejection of the defendant and co-defendant as well as their followers and categorically stated that they were not members of the family and that only those following him were his family. At the same time he endeavoured to take advantage of the Court of Appeal decision which declared him head over the whole family including the defendant, co-defendant and their faction of the family. In my judgment it did not lie in the mouth of the plaintiff to reject the defendants and their followers . . .”

After enumerating all the branches that constituted the Kokodo Ebiradzi stool family, the learned judge continued:

“The principal heads of all these branches were called into court and I saw each of them. None of them however gave evidence. It was the co-defendant’s witness Koomson, linguist of the stool family, who testified that all the principal elders named in

[p.319] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 309 annexures 1 and 2 attended the family meeting to destool the plaintiff and substituted the co-defendant for him . . . In this regard I was satisfied with the evidence of Koomson that the family meeting at which the persons mentioned annexures 1 and 2 attended took place at Fijai and deposed the plaintiff and substituted the co-defendant for him . . . I find that the defendant’s and co-defendant’s followers are all members of the stool family and that the family does not consist of only the plaintiff’s branch. I find that the plaintiff’s deposition was justified.”

Incidentally, annexure 1 referred to in the judgment was the same as exhibit 9 which contained the charges and notice of the family meeting; and annexure 2 was the notice which was later sent to the plaintiff informing him of his removal as head. The persons who signed the two documents were the same. From those findings it is crystal clear that not only five out of nine branches deposed the plaintiff. All the nine branches were present and they all took part in deposing the plaintiff and appointing the co-defendant as the overall head of the family.

The other grounds argued by learned counsel for the plaintiff dealt with the merits of the case. In the main, those grounds complained that the conclusions arrived at by the learned trial judge were faulty and that he did not fail to resolve the issue before him but also ignored the evidence that was adduced and went out of his way to indulge in irrelevancies. In other words, the judgment was wholly against the weight of evidence. In support of these grounds learned counsel contended that in resolving the issue as to the location of the stool, the name which either party gave to the stool family itself was irrelevant. Counsel submitted that there was one stool family and the learned trial judge failed to appreciate that one party was claiming that the stool of the family was at Sekondi while the other claimed that there was another stool at Fijai. So that the issue as to which was the proper stool was very crucial and not the name each party gave to the family. Learned counsel further contended that the evidence given by the defendant’s elder in the previous proceedings before the Sekondi State Council as contained in the exhibits tendered, showed that the stool at Sekondi was the proper stool. It was therefore unnecessary for the plaintiff to call any witness from the Sekondi house, as the trial judge had wished, to say that there was, in fact, a stool in that house. Counsel submitted that the learned judge ought to have found that the stool was at Sekondi and with that finding he could only have concluded that the “apa” custom was being performed at Sekondi and not at Fijai.

I think the question which ought to be answered is whether the findings made by the learned trial judge were based on the evidence that was adduced before him and whether the relevant issue were properly

[p.320] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 309 resolved. As already stated, the plaintiff asked for three main declarations, namely that Kokodo Ebiradzi family of Fijai has only one stool and that the defendant was the occupant of that particular stool and that the said stool was kept at Sekondi. The plaintiff also asked for perpetual injunction to restrain the defendant from holding himself out as a chief so long as the defendant claimed to occupy a stool other than that of the Kokodo Ebiradzi stool family. The learned trial judge found that the defendant was the occupant of the stool and which stool was kept at Fijai and not at Sekondi. The evidence of Kwesi Potiasie in the previous suit before the state council did not admit that the stool was at Sekondi. On the contrary, it showed that years ago the “apa” custom used to be performed at Sekondi but was later performed at Fijai. I here quote the evidence in question.

“The elders of both sides make one mind before enstoolment of a chief. There is only one stool at Fijai. At first the Kundum libation ‘apa’ was performed only in one place but at present it is performed separately by the plaintiff and his people at Fijai and defendant and his people at Sekondi. At first it was performed at Sekondi and later on removed to Fijai.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

It would be recalled that the evidence showed that the family had moved from place to place. It once settled at Sekondi and then moved finally to settle at Fijai. It was therefore natural to perform their custom of “apa” at Sekondi while the family was at that place. The evidence of Potiasie, quoted above, was given on 6 February 1948 and Potiasie was positive that as at the date on which he gave that evidence the family stool was at Fijai and the “apa” custom was also being performed at Fijai. Thus the evidence of Potiasie in those earlier proceedings rather made the case of the plaintiff worse.

There were other pieces of evidence which clearly showed that the plaintiff’s contentions were untenable. The plaintiff, according to him, was appointed head of family in 1958. Under cross-examination he agreed that the defendant had been chief of Fijai since 1942. This is what the plaintiff said:

“Q. I put it to you that Nana Kobina Angu II [the defendant] became chief in 1942.

A. I agree to that.

Q. He has not been destooled.

A. He had never been destooled . . .

Q. Kojo Kum was head of family who installed the defendant as chief of Fijai.

A. Yes.”

[p.321] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 309

So that the defendant became a chief for some sixteen years before the plaintiff was made head of family and again, the plaintiff agreed that since 1942 up to date the defendant had never performed the “apa” custom at Sekondi. I again quote the plaintiff’s evidence under cross-examination:

“Q. Throughout the time of litigation and in fact ever since the defendant became chief he has performed the custom at Fijai.

A. He never came to Sekondi . . .

Q. The stool house or ahenfie is at Fijai.

A. Yes.”

All important principal elders and members of the family who died were buried at Fijai and the funeral rites in connection with them were performed at Fijai. The ahenfie was and still is at Fijai. The plaintiff’s only witness admitted that the family shrine is also at Fijai. This witness made a startling disclosure to the effect that after all strangers, and not members of the family, have been living in the house No 11/6, Second Street, Sekondi. Under cross-examination, Kojo Koranteng, the first plaintiff witness said:

“Q. Kokodo Ebiradzi family shrine is at Fijai.

A. Yes.

Q. Let us come to house No 11/6 at Sekondi. Who built it ?

A. Barima Kuma.

Q. When was that house built ?

A. I do not know. It was built long ago before I was born.

Q. There are tenants in the house.

A. Yes.

Q. Who collects rents ?

A. The plaintiff has an agent who collects rents.”

Before I comment on this evidence I will refer to a portion of the plaintiff’s evidence under cross-examination:

“Q. The stool house or ahenfie is at Fijai.

A. Yes.

Q. By custom among the Akans a stool should always be kept at the ahenfie.

A. Yes.

Q. You said yesterday that the ahenfie of Fijai is at Fijai.

A. Yes.”

The question then is, why should this particular stool family which is Akan, in the absence of any explanation whatsoever, choose to keep their stool, one of the most treasured and sacred possessions of any Akan family, in a house in Sekondi occupied by strangers of all sorts;

[p.322] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 309 while all members of the family, including the plaintiff, the defendant and the co-defendant, lived in another town some miles away from Sekondi? The plaintiff himself lived at Kweikuma which is part of Fijai and the defendant and co-defendant lived at Fijai. Did the plaintiff want the learned trial judge to believe that the plaintiff preferred to keep his sacred stool, a thing which should not ordinarily be seen by strangers, in charge of those strangers at house No 11/6 Second Street, Sekondi instead of keeping it at the ahenfie where the plaintiff himself acknowledged [that it] should be the resting place of the said stool?

In the case, of the “apa” custom, the evidence of the plaintiff himself settled where it should be performed. He was asked, “Q. The apatwa custom ought to be performed at the ahenfie. A. Yes.” The question again is, if the plaintiff knew that the apa custom should be performed at the ahenfie and the ahenfie was and still is at Fijai, was it reasonable on his part to insist that the defendant should go and perform the said custom at Sekondi and in a house occupied by total strangers? I am of the view that the evidence adduced before the learned trial judge and the admissions made by the plaintiff himself conclusively proved that the only stool of the family and which is being occupied by the defendant, is being kept at the ahenfie at Fijai and at no other place; and that the apa custom of that stool family has always been performed at Fijai. The learned trial judge was therefore right in making findings to that effect.

Learned counsel for the plaintiff further contended that the learned trial judge having held that the plaintiff had capacity to sue could not turn round and in the same breath hold that the plaintiff had been removed as head of family. It is true that at the time the plaintiff issued his writ on 4 December 1980, he was the head of the family. But by the time the defendant filed his defence—23 February 1981, the plaintiff had been removed. The evidence showed that the plaintiff was removed on 9 February 1981. The learned trial judge was therefore making a finding of fact as to the position of the plaintiff as at a certain date. The trial court was called upon, according to the issues settled by the parties, to decide whether the plaintiff had been removed as head and the learned judge did no more than to pronounce on that issue in accordance with the evidence before him.

Another point of interest taken by learned counsel for the plaintiff was that the learned judge erred in applying equitable principles to a customary office instead of customary law. It was submitted that since the plaintiff held a customary office of head of family, only customary law and not equitable principles should govern his conduct. The portion of the judgment which provoked this argument reads: “I think a court of quality would not allow the plaintiff to enjoy the property without being responsible and answerable to all the branches of the family.”

[p.323] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 309

The plaintiff as head of family had collected, in the name of the family, several thousands of cedis belonging to the family from certain persons and from the Lands Department and had bluntly refused to render account thereof to the family. That conduct was among the complaints the family brought against the plaintiff. Was the learned judge not entitled to view the conduct of the plaintiff in the light of equitable principles? In my opinion the equitable and customary law principles governing the accountability of the head of a family as regards family properties under his charge are not in conflict. The head of family may be equated to a trustee. Just as the trust property is vested in the trustee for the benefit of the cestui que trust, so is the family property held by the head of family for the benefit of the members of the family; and in equity and under customary law the head of family is accountable to the family in respect of his administration of family properties.

Since 1876 the courts of this country have consistently been applying principles of both equity and customary law where the two principles are not in conflict. The Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1954 Rev.), ss. 83 and 87 provided that the courts should apply the common law, the doctrines of equity and the statutes of general application which were in force in England on 24 July 1874 and were also empowered to give effect to any native law or custom “such law or custom not being repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience.” It is interesting to observe that these provisions have over the years enabled the courts to do substantial justice, especially in the adjudication of land cases. Typical example can be found where the head of family sells family land without the knowledge and consent of the principal members of the family. In those circumstances the sale is voidable. But inordinate delay by members of the family in repudiating the transaction will give security to the purchaser by the application of the equitable doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence despite the fact that prescription is not known to customary law. This has been illustrated in a number of cases such as Fiscian v. Nelson (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 21. In that case it was held that the trial judge had rightly exercised the equitable jurisdiction conferred on him by section 74 of the Gold Coast Courts Ordinance and had rightly held that the respondents had proved a possessory title. Reading the judgment of the court, M’Carthy Ag. C.J. said at 21-22:

“The equitable jurisdiction exercised by him in refusing to grant relief to the plaintiff-appellant is based on section 74 of the Courts Ordinance which provides in effect that native customary law will not be recognised by the Courts where to do so would be contrary to equity and good conscience. On the strength of this the view was expressed by the Full Court in the Bokitsi

[p.324] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 309

Concession Enquiry (1902, Renner, 239) that a former owner would not be allowed to claim land where he had stood by for a long time while someone else acquired the land and incurred pecuniary commitments under the impression that he was entitled to the land, notwithstanding that prescription is unknown to native customary law and that no statutory limitation applies to the case.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

Here both customary law and equitable principles were applied in respect of the same subject matter to the ascertainment of the respective rights of the vendor and purchaser. However, the matter has received recent legislative sanction in the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), s. 49 (1), r. 6 which states:

“6. In determining any issue to which the foregoing Rules do not apply, the Court shall apply such principles of the common law, or customary law, or both, as will do substantial justice between the parties, having regard to equity and good conscience.”

There is therefore no doubt whatsoever that equitable principles can always be invoked in any given situation where the occasion calls for, no matter whether the subject matter in question is family property or the person whose conduct is called in question holds customary office, like the head of family. It is only where the customary law is in conflict with equity that the latter would prevail.

It was further argued that so far as the counterclaim was concerned the onus was on the co-defendant to establish that the plaintiff had been removed as head and the learned judge by holding that the plaintiff failed to produce his queenmother amounted to shifting the burden of proving the counterclaim on to the plaintiff. The submission was misconceived because the statement which the learned judge made with regard to the queenmother was not made in connection with the counterclaim. Under cross-examination, the plaintiff tried to disown some of the members of his family who were present in court during the hearing; and those members included a woman whom the defendant and co-defendant contended was the queenmother of the stool of Fijai. The learned trial judge in the course of his judgment commented on the failure of the plaintiff to call as his witness the person whom the plaintiff contended was the queenmother to testify to that effect. He never by implication or otherwise put the burden of proving the counterclaim on the plaintiff.

[p.325] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 309 Learned counsel submitted that in any case the summons for directions filed by the parties did not bring out the triable issues clearly and the counterclaim put in by the co-defendant clouded the reasoning of the parties, with the result that the parties could not assist the trial judge to appreciate the issues he was called upon to resolve; and so the whole trial ought to be declared unsatisfactory and the case remitted for retrial. Here too, the submission was ill-founded. To my mind the issues were clearly set out in the summons for directions filed by the parties and the learned trial judge, as can been seen from the judgment as a whole, was well aware of the issues at stake. Apart from the issues agreed upon by the parties, the learned trial judge also dealt with all other issues as appearing on the pleadings. There was no confusion anywhere and the trial could not be described as unsatisfactory.

In my opinion, the issues raised by the grounds of appeal which were argued before this court were all issues of fact, determinable upon the evidence before the learned trial judge; and on all those material issues the learned judge found against the plaintiff on the facts as he was entitled to do; and I am unable to say that he was wrong in his findings on any of the issues. Indeed, upon the evidence, he could hardly have found otherwise.

In the result, I am of the view that the appeal should be dismissed.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH J.A.

I also agree.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

L. K. A.

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