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[1986] SLR (CA) 11Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

LARYEA vs. OFORIWAH [1984-86] 2 GLR 410

11 December 1986 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 32 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (CA) 11
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OSCOLALARYEA v OFORIWAH [1984-86] 2 GLR 410 [1986] SLR (CA) 11
APALARYEA v OFORIWAH [1984-86] 2 GLR 410, [1986] SLR (CA) 11 (Ghana).
BluebookLARYEA v OFORIWAH [1984-86] 2 GLR 410, [1986] SLR (CA) 11 (Ghana Ct. App. 1986).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Yeboa v Bofour [1971] 2 GLR 199, CA.

(2) Australian Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Smith & Sons (1889) 14 App Cas 318, PC.

(3) Atuahene v Commissioner of Police [1963] 1 GLR 448

(4) Dunne v English (1874) LR 18 Eq 524; 31 LT 75.

(5) Bingley v Marshall (1862) 6 LT 682.

(6) Shea v Green (1886) 2 TLR 533.

(7) Mansah v Nimo [1961] GLR 511.

(8) Bedu v Agbi [1972] 2 GLR 238, CA.

(9) Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] AC 993; [1964] 2 WLR 150; [1964] 1 All ER 300, PC.

(10) Quarm v Yankah II (1930) 1 WACA 80.

(11) Attah v Aidoo [1968] GLR 362.

(12) Agbo Kofi v Addo Kofi (1933) 1 WACA 284.

(13) Abude v Onano V (1946) 12 WACA 102.

(14) Mosi v Bagyina [1963] 1 GLR 337, SC.

(15) Ntem v Ankwandah [1977] 2 GLR 452, CA.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decision of the High Court, Accra giving judgment for the plaintiff in an action for declaration of title and damages for [p.415] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 410 trespass. The facts are, sufficiently set out in the judgment of Abban JA.

COUNSEL

Peter A Adjetey for the defendant-appellant.

R Agodzo for the plaintiff-respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J. A.

The dispute related to a piece of land at Lartebiokorshie in Accra which land formed part and parcel of Sempe stool land, a fact which both parties acknowledged. Indeed the respondent (hereafter called the plaintiff) claimed to have bought the land from the Sempe stool through its occupant Nii Tetteh Kpeshie II and his elders; while the appellant (hereafter called the defendant) averred that the same piece of land was granted to him by Kpakpo Moffat, Dzasetse of the Sempe stool.

The plaintiff sought a declaration of title to the said land. She also claimed damages for trespass and an order for injunction. I refer to the relevant portions of the amended statement of claim which read as follows:

“(1) The plaintiff is the owner of all that piece of land as per plan attached.

(2) The plaintiff was granted that land by the Sempe stool by a sale in 1950.

(2A) In September 1976, a deed registered as No 4179/1977 was executed by the Sempe stool to evidence the said sale.

(3) The plaintiff was put in possession and has remained in possession undisturbed till recently disturbed by the defendant.

(4) The defendant has trespassed on the said land by trying to build on it.”

In his amended statement of defence, the defendant denied the plaintiff’s claim and in paragraph (2) of the said amended statement of defence, the defendant averred:

“(2) The defendant does not admit paragraph (2) of the statement of claim and says that if the grant referred to in the said paragraph was made, which is not admitted, the same conferred no title to the land in dispute on the plaintiff since by the judgment of the Native Court B dated 11 September 1948, in the case of Nii Kpakpo Moffat and Others v Nii Tetteh Kpeshie II, the Sempe Mantse was not competent to make a valid alienation of Sempe stool lands without the consent of the said Nii Kpakpo Moffat which consent was neither sought nor given in the case of the plaintiff’s alleged grant.

[p.416] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 410

(3) The defendant denies that the deed No 4179/1977 was executed by the Sempe stool to evidence an alleged sale of the land in dispute to the plaintiff or at all.”

In the remaining paragraphs of the amended statement of defence, the defendant contended that he had obtained his grant from the same Sempe stool through Nii Kpakpo Moffat, Dzasetse of the stool, over 30 years ago.

At the trial, the plaintiff gave evidence to the effect that the disputed plot was purchased by her from Nii Tetteh Kpeshie II the late Sempe Mantse and his elders in or about 1950. The purchase price was £25. She made a down payment of £15 a week after the sale. She was not given any receipt at that time, but the land was demarcated for her and she accordingly went into possession and occupation thereof. She erected corner pillars. Later she paid the balance of £10. But still she was not given any document. However, in 1976 the stool, through its acting Mantse, executed in her favour a deed of conveyance, dated 27 September 1976 with the registration No 4179/1977. The said conveyance was tendered in evidence as (exhibit A), and its recitals included the following:

“And whereas in or about the year 1950, Nii Tetteh Kpeshie II, the late Sempe Mantse of Accra, granted the land and the hereditaments hereinafter described unto the purchaser free from all incumbrances but no document was executed to perpetuate the said grant. AND whereas the purchaser has now found it expedient that the said grant be evidenced by a deed and has approached the vendor herein for a such title deed which he has agreed to execute, the vendor such as beneficial owner of the land and hereditaments hereinafter described hereby grant the purchaser the said land forever in consideration of ¢50 paid by the purchaser to the vendor.”

In short, the deed of conveyance, exhibit A, showed that there had been an earlier sale of the land to the plaintiff and the document was executed to evidence the said earlier sale. The plaintiff relied on this (exhibit A) and on the evidence of her four witnesses, including Okyeame Kwao.

The defendant’s case was that the land was granted to him as a subject of the Sempe stool by Nii Kpakpo Moffat about 34 years ago. He gave his evidence on 22 July 1980 and calculating 34 years back, the date of his said grant would fall in 1946. According to the defendant when he was granted the land in 1946 he did not pay or give anything as customary drink to acknowledge the grant until twelve

[p.417] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 410 years later, that is in 1958 when he went and paid £25 and was given a receipt dated 6 January 1958. The receipt was tendered as (exhibit 1), which reads as follows:

“Receipt.

Received from Okyeame Laryea Quaye (defendant herein) £25 (twenty-five pounds) being customary drink in respect of one plot of land situate lying at Sukula-Accra, and bounded on the north by Sempe stool land measuring 70 feet more or less on the south by Sempe stool land measuring 80 feet more or less on the east by Sempe stool land measuring 80 feet more or less on the west by Sempe stool land measuring 80 feet more or less which covers an area of approximately 0.128 acre.

Dated at Accra this 6 day of January 1958.

(Sgd) Kpakpo Moffat, Sempe Dzasetse.”

It is to be noted that exhibit 1 did not make mention of an earlier grant of this land in or about 1946. Nevertheless, the defendant firmly relied on this exhibit 1. His only witness, Joseph Codjoe, after giving his evidence-in-chief, was partly cross-examined. But after the adjourned date Codjoe never turned up for further cross-examination, even though counsel for the plaintiff had not completed his cross-examination. Then on 12 July 1983 the following was recorded by the learned trial judge:

“Mingle for the plaintiff.

Asante for the defendant states that the last witness is not available for cross-examination and he has no other witness to call and that he closes the case for defendant.

Per curiam: Case for defence closed. Counsel to file written address on or before 26 July 1983.”

On 26 July 1983, the following was again recorded, “Parties present. S M Asante for the defendant. Adjourned to 14 October for judgment.” Judgment was eventually delivered on 4 November 1983. The judgment granted all the reliefs which the plaintiff had asked for.

It was against this judgment that the appeal was launched. It may be remarked that during the examination-in-chief of the defendant’s only witness-Codjoe, objection was raised against the evidence being given by that witness as regards the capacity of Kpakpo Moffat to make grants of Sempe stool lands. The defence had earlier on pleaded that Sempe stool lands could be granted by the Sempe Mantse but with the consent of Kpakpo Moffat; and it was not pleaded that Moffat himself had the right to make grants. Nevertheless, the learned judge

[p.418] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 410 admitted the evidence “for what it was worth.” Then again an attempt was made to lead evidence through the same witness, Codjoe, to show a grant made in 1939 by Kpakpo Moffat to the Government of the Gold Coast and also to tender an indenture made in respect of that grant.

Counsel for the plaintiff objected and the ruling on the objection was reserved. This was on 11 August 1980. But in the meantime the defendant on 24 October 1980 filed a notice of amendment to amend his amended statement of defence. The intended amendment if it had been granted would have made the ruling on the objection unnecessary as it would have enabled the defendant’s witness, Codjoe, to tender the document in respect of which the objection had been raised. The learned trial judge, however, in a considered ruling on 1 March 1982 refused the application to amend.

In this appeal, several grounds of appeal were filed. The first ground argued was that the learned trial judge erred in refusing to exercise his discretion to grant the amendment. It was submitted by learned counsel for the defendant that the amendment sought was not inconsistent with the previous pleading and the amendment was trying to show that when there was a dispute and there was no occupant of the Sempe stool, the Dzasetse, Kpakpo Moffat, could make grants and that the amendment indicated that the Dzasetse had in fact made one such grant as evidenced in the indenture No 5443A/39; and which said indenture was tendered in evidence in the Nii Duade Crabbe’s case.

It appears to me that the refusal to grant the said amendment could not be justified in the particular circumstances of the case. The reasons given by the learned trial judge as his basis for the refusal cannot bear any examination. One of his reasons was that there was an undue delay in making the application for amendment which “was abundantly apparent months ago, and not asked for.” With great respect to the learned trial judge, the amendment became apparent and necessary not “months” ago, but only when the defendant’s witness, Codjoe, was giving evidence. Moreover, the amendment sought was more or less an elaboration of paragraph (5) of the defendant’s amended statement of defence and could not in that respect be said to be setting up a new case or changing the nature of the defence the defendant had put forward. In any case, the so-called delay could not be said to be inordinate either. The notice of the application to amend was filed on 24 October 1980 while the defendant’s witness Codjoe was still giving his evidence-in-chief. But it was not considered by the court until 1 March 1982. The delay in moving the application could not therefore be laid at the door of the defendant.

Again the fact that the plaintiff had then closed her case at the time leave to amend was sought was no good ground for refusing the

[p.419] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 410 amendment. For it was a bona fide amendment which could not in any way prejudice the plaintiff ‘s case. In fact it was in line with the evidence already given by the defendant. So that if it had been granted there would have been no necessity to recall the plaintiff or any of her witnesses except to tender through the defendant’s witness, Codjoe, the indenture dated 18 November 1939 made between Dzasetse Kpakpo Moffat and the Governor of the Gold Coast and registered as No 5443A/39. It seems to me that whatever inconvenience or hardship which the plaintiff might have suffered as a result of the granting of the said amendment, could easily have been compensated for by reasonable costs. In my view this is one of the cases where the court should be disposed to granting leave to amend under Order 28 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A): see Yeboa v Bofour [1971] 2 GLR 199 at 220, CA where the Court of Appeal took time to discuss the scope of Order 28. And in Australian Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Smith & Sons (1889) 14 App Cas 318 at 320, PC Lord Bramwell delivering the judgment of the Privy Council observed:

“Their Lordships are strong advocates for amendment whenever it can be done without injustice to the other side, and even where they have been put to certain expense and delay, yet if they can be compensated for that in any way it seems to their Lordships that an amendment ought to be allowed for the purpose of raising the real question between the parties.”

In my opinion the learned trial judge erred in not exercising his discretion in favour of granting the amendment; and his refusal could have worked manifest injustice to the defendant. This appellate court can therefore even at this stage admit the said indenture which is on the record of appeal.

It was further submitted by learned counsel for the defendant that the learned trial judge erred in law in rejecting a portion of the evidence proffered by the said witness, Codjoe. It may be recalled that after the refusal to grant the amendment the witness, Codjoe, continued his evidence-in-chief, and in the course of it he said:

“During the time when there is no chief on the Sempe stool, the Dzasetse and his elders make alienation of Sempe stool lands. There had been an occasion when this had been done-that was in September 1939 after the earthquake-the Dzasetse and other elders represented the Sempe stool and made a grant of land to the then Governor of the Gold Coast.”

The above piece of evidence was objected to by counsel for the plaintiff; and the learned trial judge ruled on it in the manner as follows:

[p.420] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 410

“I therefore cannot admit this evidence [the above piece of evidence] the subject-matter of the objection by counsel for the plaintiff which seeks to establish that in the absence of a Sempe Mantse the said Moffat does act as the Sempe Mantse for the purpose of granting lands of the Sempe stool. The objection is hereby, upheld and the evidence emphasised treated as expunged from the record.”

I agree with learned counsel for the defendant that it was wrong for the learned trial judge to have expunged that evidence from the record. But the question is, did the expunging of that piece of evidence from the evidence of Codjoe work any injustice to the defendant in view of the fact that the whole evidence given by Codjoe (including the portion expunged) eventually turned out to be unworthy of consideration? The reason being that Codjoe could not make himself available for further cross-examination. Cross-examination by counsel for the plaintiff started, but Codjoe could not turn up in court for counsel for the plaintiff to complete the cross-examination.

As matters were, the evidence of Codjoe, the defendant’s only witness, stood untested. The absence of the cross-examination made the evidence of Codjoe incomplete and the incomplete evidence of a witness ought to be expunged from the record of proceedings. A party is entitled to test, under cross-examination, the veracity and the accuracy of the evidence-in-chief given by a witness produced by the opponent; and if through no fault of his, he is denied the opportunity of cross-examining on the evidence-in-chief of his opponent’s witness, then the whole of the evidence given by that witness ought to be expunged from the record: see Atuahene v Commissioner of Police [1963] 1 GLR 448. In Dunne v English (1874) LR 18 Eq 524, the plaintiff filed an affidavit in support of his case. The defendant had earlier on given notice to the court that he would cross-examine that witness on the affidavit he had sworn to. But the witness for some reason was not produced for cross-examination. When counsel for the plaintiff attempted to read the affidavit the defendant’s counsel objected and it was upheld by Jessel MR saying, “The evidence must be rejected. The witness ought to have been here for cross-examination.” A similar situation arose in Bingley v Marshall (1862) 6 LT 682, where Wood VC held that the affidavit of the witness should not be used as evidence. In Shea v Green (1886) 2 TLR 533, Field J refused to act upon an affidavit on the ground that it had been made by a person, who having absconded, could not be cross-examined. The case of Mansah v Nimoh [1961] GLR 511 may be of some interest. In that case the trial local court, after the first defendant and the second co-defendant had each given evidence-in-chief, did not invite the

[p.421] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 410 appellant to cross-examine them. On appeal to the High Court, Adumua-Bossman J (as he then was) held that the evidence not having been subjected to cross-examination were “improper evidences” and a judgment based on such “improper evidences” could not stand. So that even though the learned trial judge was wrong in expunging that portion of Codjoe’s evidence, yet that error did not, in, fact, have any adverse effect on the case of the defendant; because as already stated, the whole of Codjoe’s evidence turned out to be worthless.

The next ground which was forcefully argued by learned counsel for the defendant was that the judgment was against the weight of evidence. Several submissions were made under this ground. It was first submitted by learned counsel that the plaintiff’s pleadings were defective and failed to describe with particularity as to the dimensions of the area in dispute; that the statement of claim was very sketchy and vague as to the type of grant; and that the evidence of the plaintiff’s witnesses did not support the contention of the plaintiff, for example, her witness, Okyeame Kwao, said the land was granted to her by way of gift. Learned counsel next submitted that the evidence of Okyeame Kwao woefully lacked the ingredients necessary to convey the land in a proper customary manner; that the plaintiff failed to establish purchase and that (exhibit A), the plaintiff’s indenture, was prepared just for the purpose of this case.

The submissions as regards the insufficient particulars about the dimensions of the disputed land and the failure of the plaintiff to prove her purchase of the land, with the greatest respect to counsel, are not well grounded. The plaintiff’s amended statement of claim which I set out earlier on in this judgment, showed that the writ or the claim was accompanied by a plan which graphically described the disputed plot. Furthermore, the amended statement of claim specifically pleaded that the plaintiff came by the piece of land by purchase from the stool of Sempe in 1950, and she was put into possession and was still in possession when the land was trespassed upon by the defendant.

Truly, the onus of proof in an action for a declaration of title to land rests on the plaintiff and he cannot succeed if he is unable to satisfy the court as to the limits of the land he claims: see Bedu v Agbi [1972] 2 GLR 238, CA. But I think in the present case the dimensions were clearly given. Thus before the trial began the necessary dimensions of the plot being claimed had been brought to the notice and attention of the court and the defendant through the pleadings. So that the plaintiff and the defendant were ad idem as to the exact plot of land which was the subject-matter of the dispute.

The plaintiff gave evidence to show how she came to purchase the land from Nii Tetteh Kpeshie II, the late Sempe Mantse in 1950. She

[p.422] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 410 also gave details as to the elders and linguists of the Sempe stool who were present at the time of the sale. The evidence of the plaintiff’s fourth witness, Okyeame Kwao, who was present at the time of the sale in 1950, supported the dimensions of the plot as given by the plaintiff. Indeed, this witness was with the surveyor and the elders who went to demarcate the plot for the plaintiff. Here I will quote a portion of his evidence:

“I went with Okyeame Kwabena, the surveyor Agyedu and his labourers to an area called Lartebiokorshie, but now known as Sempe New Town. The plaintiff was then with us. There the surveyor demarcated an area of 70 feet by 100 feet. She said she liked it … After the demarcation the labourers of the surveyor placed pegs to mark the four comers of the plot.”

Okyeame Kwao’s evidence only differed from that of the plaintiff as to the type of grant. The plaintiff called the transaction a sale, while the witness termed it a gift. But this apparent conflict was resolved by the learned trial judge who held that the transaction was a sale and was evidenced in writing, vide exhibit A. At the time Okyeame Kwao was giving his evidence, that is on 11 June 1980, the transaction had been over 30 years old and it is not surprising that he could not remember every detail of the transaction. But his evidence did show clearly that the plaintiff was a subject of the Sempe stool and as such she was granted the disputed land which was then vacant. Incidentally until this dispute arose in or about 1977, nobody or no elder of the Sempe stool had disputed the grant made to the plaintiff. In my view, Okyeame Kwao by calling the transaction a gift could not necessarily mean that no grant or sale of the land was ever made to the plaintiff by the said stool.

There was sufficient evidence on record for the learned trial judge to hold that the grant made to the plaintiff was by way of purchase. The plaintiff’s oral evidence indicated that it was a sale and this was not at variance with the contents of the indenture, exhibit A, which was tendered and accepted without objection. As I have said, the conflict as to the designation of the transaction could not in any way prove that the Sempe stool did not sell the land to the plaintiff. Again the fact that exhibit A was executed just before the action was instituted was neither here nor there. That document did only confirm an earlier sale which sale took place in 1950.

Learned counsel for the defendant further submitted that at the time exhibit A was executed there was no Sempe Mantse and the person who signed the document, one Allotey, described himself as the acting Sempe Mantse; and it was therefore incumbent upon the plaintiff to [p.423] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 410 prove that that Allotey had authority to convey Sempe stool lands when there was a period of interregnum. In the first place, as already pointed out, the indenture was tendered without objection; and most importantly, there was no such onus on the plaintiff, because the indenture did not convey the disputed land to the plaintiff on the date on which it was executed. The land was demarcated and conveyed to the plaintiff by the late Sempe Mantse and his elders in 1950 and the plaintiff had been in effective occupation since that time. In other words, the indenture, exhibit A, did no more than to evidence a sale and a conveyance which had taken place in 1950. The conveyance of the land could not therefore be said to have been made by the said acting Sempe Mantse and his elders in September 1976. In any event, the status of those who signed exhibit A was not in issue before the learned trial judge and it was not therefore necessary for the plaintiff to call witnesses to establish it.

Learned counsel for the defendant seriously contended that the learned judge erred in ignoring completely exhibit 3, the default judgment of the Ga Native Court B, which was obtained against the late Tetteh Kpeshie II. Counsel submitted that if that exhibit 3 had been considered it could have been found that the late Sempe Mantse could not have granted the land to the plaintiff without the consent of the Dzasetse. For the sake of clarity, I will set out the most important portions of the said judgment of the Ga Native Court B (exhibit 3).

They are:

“(1) The Sempe Mantse Nii Tetteh Kpeshie and the co-defendant J A Quaye should not sell Sempe stool lands without the knowledge, consent and approval of the plaintiffs herein.

(2) A perpetual injunction restraining the defendants their agents, servants, workmen from further alienating or granting Sempe stool land.

(3) The defendant to submit a statement of account to the plaintiffs showing all lands alienated by them since the Sempe Mantse Nii Tetteh Kpeshie occupied the stool; the names of persons to whom such alienations have been made and consideration paid to him (the Nii Tetteh Kpeshie).”

The emphasis is mine.

It ought to be observed that exhibit 3 was a default judgment of an inferior court. Secondly, the present plaintiff, who was not a party to it, had never been aware of its existence at the time she approached the Sempe Mantse, Nii Tetteh Kpeshie II, for the land. Thirdly, the present defendant was also not a party to that suit. There is no doubt that a default judgment is capable of giving rise to an estoppel, but it should always be critically examined and scrutinised with extreme particularity

[p.424] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 410 for the purpose of ascertaining the bare essence of what it must necessarily have decided: see Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] AC 993, PC.

Careful examination of the first order in exhibit 3, would reveal that the Sempe Mantse with the consent of his elders-the plaintiffs in that suit-could grant Sempe stool lands. If the defendant’s contention was that the alienation of the disputed land to the plaintiff by Nii Tetteh Kpeshie II was not concurred in by the plaintiffs in that suit (exhibit 3), then the onus was on the defendant to establish lack of the said concurrence. The burden is on the person impeaching to prove lack of consent: see Quarm v Yankah II (1930) 1 WACA 80 and Attah v Aidoo [1968] GLR 362. Thus it was rather the defendant who ought to have called evidence to establish that those who sued as plaintiffs in exhibit 3 did not, in fact, consent to the sale of the land to the plaintiff. But the defendant utterly failed to discharge that burden. The plaintiff, according to the evidence, went into possession and occupation and fixed her corner pillars. She had been in such occupation since 1950 and none of the plaintiffs in exhibit 3 including the said Dzasetse Kpakpo Moffat, ever impeached the plaintiff ‘s occupation for all those years. Indeed, the evidence indicated that Nii Tetteh Kpeshie II and his elders including linguists, sold the land to the plaintiff, and so on the face of it, there was nothing wrong with the transaction and as such the sale was valid until it is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. In his book, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana, Ollennu states at p 128:

“An alienation of stool or family land which on the face of it purports to have been made by the occupant of the stool or the head of the family acting with the consent and concurrence of the principal elders, and with that consent and concurrence evidenced by at least one principal member of the family (eg. a holder of traditional office like a linguist) is not void, but it is voidable; that is to say, it is valid until it is declared void by a court of competent jurisdiction, at the suit of the family.”

Still on the default judgment (exhibit 3), it seems to me that it suffered from certain defects which made it almost worthless. In the first place, the orders were contradictory in their terms. The first order implied that the Sempe Mantse, Nii Tetteh Kpeshie II, with the consent of the plaintiffs in that suit could grant or alienate Sempe stool lands. But the second order, on the other hand, forever barred him from alienating or granting Sempe stool lands either with or without the consent of those plaintiffs. It could therefore be seen that the default judgment contained contradictions and these made it difficult for the terms of the judgment to be ascertained with complete precision. A

[p.425] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 410 judgment which is uncertain to every intent cannot give rise to, estoppel by record: see Agbo Kofi v Addo Kofi (1933) 1 WACA 284 at 285.

What was worse, the third order called upon the Sempe Mantse, an occupant of a stool, for account. This particular order too was bad in law because the state of the law in 1948 was that a stool occupant, like the Sempe Mantse, could not be sued for account of stool funds: see Abude v Onano V (1946) 12 WACA 102. In that case the West African Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that it was an accepted principle of native customary law that neither a chief nor the head of family could be sued for account either of state or family funds. In the course of its judgment the court said at 104:

“There is evidence on record which proves that whenever a member of the Council is of the opinion that either the chief and/or some of his elders have misappropriated State funds, the proper course is to bring the matter before the local Council or the Ga State Council which alone has jurisdiction to enquire into such matters; if as a result of the enquiry the chief and/or some of the elders so charged are found to have misappropriated public funds they are as a rule deposed or removed from the positions they held in the State.

No individual member or even a section of the community is entitled to institute an action for account.”

It was therefore obvious that the action for account itself was not maintainable in law at that time; and so the order made thereon against Nii Tetteh Kpeshie II by the Ga Native Court B was of no legal consequence whatsoever, notwithstanding the fact that it was not appealed against. The order was not warranted by law at the time it was made. It was incurably bad and so it was automatically null and void: see Mosi v Bagyina [1963] 1 GLR 337, SC. Consequently, although the learned trial judge did not give any reason for not considering the said exhibit 3, there was ample legal justification for ignoring it. It could not have advanced the defendant’s case one way or the other.

Learned counsel for the defendant also contended that the case of the defendant was contained in the intended amendment and that if the learned judge had accepted the said intended amendment there would have been sufficient evidence to support the case of the defence. Counsel argued that the defendant put up a credible case but the learned trial judge did not give adequate consideration to it. I have already held that the intended amendment was wrongly refused. However, looking at the said intended amendment, together with all the other pleadings as well as the evidence proffered by the defendant, could it be said that he put forward a credible case?

[p.426] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 410

It should be observed that the evidence of the defendant was well rehearsed by the learned trial judge in his judgment at great length; and I think due consideration was given to it before the learned trial judge made the following positive findings:

“At the close of the evidence for the defence I find unhesitatingly that the story of the defendant that he acquired the plot by a grant to him by Nii Kpakpo Moffat 34 years ago is false because exhibit 1 dated 6 January 1958 is not in proof. Also, the defendant goes on to say that about twelve years after the alleged grant he paid £25 and was given the receipt (exhibit 1) and that for the purpose of the grant Nii Kpakpo Moffat deputed a surveyor to demarcate the land for him. How can there be two grants by the grantor of the same land to the same grantee? And why was there no evidence on the face of exhibit 1 dated 6 January 1958 that an earlier grant had been made to him twelve years before that date? This story of the defendant that Nii Kpakpo Moffat granted him the land 34 years ago was put up by him to try to prove to the court that he was on the land before the plaintiff came on it.”

With this finding, the learned trial judge held that at the time the defendant came by the land and it was demarcated for him:

“the plaintiff had already been planted on the land by an earlier grant and demarcation in her favour by Nii Tetteh Kpeshie II and she had marked the corners with corner pillars as stated by her. The grant to the plaintiff I find to be a valid grant as evidenced by the conveyance (exhibit A).”

The learned trial judge then concluded as follows:

“the alleged grant of the land in dispute to the defendant by Nii Moffat was invalid as not made by the Sempe stool, with Nii Tetteh Kpeshie II not having made the grant.”

It should be borne in mind that if the defendant’s contention that Nii Kpakpo Moffat granted him the land in or about 1946 was true, then at the time of his grant Nii Tetteh Kpeshie II was the occupant of Sempe stool. In fact the defendant did say so expressly in his evidence under cross-examination where he stated, “It is true that from 1940 to 1970 Nii Tetteh Kpeshie II was the Sempe Mantse.” If that was the case, and going by the defendant’s own contention that Nii Kpakpo Moffat could grant and alienate Sempe stool lands or deal with it whenever there was a period of interregnum, then since there was no such interregnum in 1946, the grant made by Kpakpo Moffat when Nii Tetteh Kpeshie II was the occupant of the Sempe stool was uncustomary

[p.427] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 410 and invalid. By customary law, no valid alienation of a stool land could be made except by the occupant of the stool, acting with the consent of the principal elders; and so in 1946 Kpakpo Moffat could not make any valid grant of Sempe stool land to the defendant. Consequently, the findings made by the learned trial judge and referred to above, were fully supported by the evidence in record.

Where there were conflicts in the evidence, the learned trial judge sifted them carefully and came to a definite conclusion as to which of the conflicting stories was more probable. The defendant did not impress the learned trial judge as a truthful witness and, in the circumstances, the learned trial judge was obliged to reject his evidence. In my opinion, the learned trial judge was justified in so doing.

Learned counsel submitted that the trial was unsatisfactory for the learned trial judge closed the case for the defence when the cross-examination of the defendant’s witness had not been completed. I think this is not a fair criticism of the learned trial judge for the record clearly indicated that it was the defence counsel who announced to the court that he was not calling further evidence and was closing his case. In the circumstances, the court could not do otherwise but to accede to the request of learned counsel and close the case for the defence. Counsel for the defendant contended that, in any case, it was wrong on the part of the counsel who appeared in the court below to have closed the case of the defendant at that stage, simply because the witness was not available for further cross-examination. But it seems to me that learned counsel in the court below acted wisely and in the best interest of his client and that any counsel placed in the situation in which that counsel found himself would have acted in the same manner.

It was strongly urged that the learned trial judge should have given consideration to the application of the Lands Development (Protection of Purchasers) Act, 1960 (Act 2). Counsel submitted that all the requirements necessary for the application of Act 2 were present. The question is, could the defendant claim relief under Act 2? The provisions of the Act vested a discretion in the court in any given case to determine whether or not the provisions of the Act should be applied. It appears the first and foremost factor for the trial court to consider when determining the question of the purchaser’s protection under the Act is the bona fides, that is good faith, of the purchaser. It is after this has been determined that the balance of hardships and injustices to the parties might also be considered. How then did the learned trial judge treat the issue? The learned trial judge’s findings on the issue seemed to have support from the evidence which showed that the foundations of the building were dug in the teeth of strong opposition from the plaintiff. The defendant even said he commenced the erection of the

[p.428] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 410 building without any building plans. This is what he himself stated in his evidence-in-chief and I quote:

“When I had some money I decided to build on the land-this was about four years ago. I did not prepare any plan. But for a period of six months that is six months running I was having a building erected on the land.”

That is because the defendant had got money to build, he rushed to build without even conforming to the building regulations of the Accra City Council. Indeed, when the defendant was warned off the land at the time he was digging the foundations, he said the foundations were being dug on behalf of a Makola woman who claimed to be the owner of the land and that he, the defendant, was acting as the agent of that woman. At the time the writ was issued no building had yet been erected. After the defendant had been sued and an order for an interim injunction had been obtained restraining him from continuing the building operations on the land, the defendant defied the said order. So an application for contempt had to be brought against him. I think the plaintiff did what was legally possible to preserve that land in statuo quo. The findings of the learned trial judge on the matter were very crucial and I here quote them in extenso.

“When the first and second plaintiff witnesses finally saw the defendant he admitted that the labourers were there on his instructions after the work had been entrusted to him by a Makola woman. When, the second plaintiff witness told the defendant to tell that Makola woman that the owner of the plot had arrived and had seen the building operations going on and therefore the labourers should step on the land no more, the defendant agreed to do so. If the claim of the defendant to the land was genuine why should he claim the land for a Mokola woman whose name he did not reveal to the first and second plaintiff witnesses? I find that the defendant took advantage of the plaintiff’s absence and lay false claim to the land and hurriedly built on it”

The learned trial judge then concluded:

“I have found from the facts, as evidenced by the conduct of the defendant relative to his entering on the land during the absence of the plaintiff, that he carried on the building operations thereon to forestall the plaintiff’s right to the land, and that no valid grant had been made to him. In the result I find that the defendant built his house surreptitiously and in bad faith-he could have stopped the foundation operations when he was warned by the first and second plaintiff witnesses on three occasions.”

[p.429] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 410

In view of these findings, I cannot help but to agree with the learned trial judge that the defendant, failed to establish good faith to entitle him to the protection under the Act. The defendant, because he had money, intended to steal a march over the plaintiff and rushed through the construction of the building fully conscious of the adverse claim of the plaintiff and of the risk he was taking. In my considered view, the plaintiff would suffer not only injustice but also greater hardship if the provisions of the Act were to be applied for the benefit of the defendant.

In Ntem v Ankwandah [1977] 2 GLR 452, CA the Court of Appeal faced with a similar situation refused to apply the Act in favour of the defendant and Apaloo CJ who read the judgment of the court had this to say at 465-466:

“If this Act had not been passed, a possession order would clearly be made against the defendant as indeed it was made. Will it cause hardship and injustice to him? That can only arise from the fact that he will lose his ‘two-storey building with eight bedrooms and boys’ quarters and a big terrace.’ But whose fault is it? The plaintiff did everything that was humanly possible to prevent this eventuality … Far from causing any injustice to the defendant, it is the plaintiff who would suffer incalculable hardship and injustice if the order were made. She will be deprived of her land because she was less well off financially than the defendant. In the circumstances, the least the court can do is to set its face firmly against any use of the Act which will make it a weapon in the hand of the rich for the exploitation of the poor.”

The defendant herein, as I have said, should not be permitted in the circumstances of the case to seek solace under Act 2.

The damages awarded also came under an attack. It was argued that the award of ¢20,000 for trespass was excessive. I have no hesitation in upholding that submission. In awarding damages for trespass to land, regard should be had to the acreage of the land on which the trespass was committed, the period of wrongful occupation and the damage caused. In the present case, there was no evidence that the defendant caused any damage to anything on the land and there was nothing to show that apart from bare trespass, the defendant derived any benefit from the trespass he committed. The basis of awarding that high figure was not indicated by the learned trial judge. I think the amount awarded was out of proportion. It was an erroneous estimate of what the plaintiff lost as a result of the trespass and it ought to be reduced. In that respect it appears ¢5,000 should have been sufficient compensation for the trespass.

[p.430] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 410

Learned counsel for the defendant finally contended that the costs of ¢10,000 awarded against the defendant were not reasonable. I am inclined to disagree with that contention. Having regard to the length of trial, the papers filed and the work put in by counsel, the award of ¢10,000 as costs, inclusive of out-of-pocket expenses and a fee to counsel, was not unreasonable.

Subject to the variation as to the damages awarded for trespass, it seems to me that the decision arrived at by the learned trial judge was correct and should be affirmed. In the circumstances, I would dismiss the appeal.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE JA

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH JA I also agree.

DECISION Appeal dismissed subject to variation of judgment. L. K. A.

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