SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1986] SLR (CA) 13Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

MONTERO AND ANOTHER vs. REDCO LTD. AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 1 GLR 710

19 June 1986 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 13 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (CA) 13
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAMONTERO AND ANOTHER v REDCO LTD. AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 1 GLR 710 [1986] SLR (CA) 13
APAMONTERO AND ANOTHER v REDCO LTD. AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 1 GLR 710, [1986] SLR (CA) 13 (Ghana).
BluebookMONTERO AND ANOTHER v REDCO LTD. AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 1 GLR 710, [1986] SLR (CA) 13 (Ghana Ct. App. 1986).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Pearce v. Foster (1886) 17 Q.B.D 536, C.A.

(2) In re West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd., Adams v. Tandoh [1984-86] 2 G.L.R 561, C.A. (3) Aegis Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Volta Lines Ltd. [1973] 1 G.L.R. 438.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the ruling of the. High Court, Accra refusing an application for interim injunction to restrain the defendants from suspending the first plaintiff as the managing director of a limited liability company. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Abban J.A.

COUNSEL

Annancy (with him Miss Danquah) for the appellants.

Osei-Bonsu (with him Ababio) for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J. A.

This is an interlocutory appeal from the ruling of the High Court, Accra dated 2 July 1985. In that ruling the learned High Court judge refused to grant the appellants (hereafter called the plaintiffs) an interim injunction restraining the respondents (hereafter called the defendants) from suspending the first plaintiff as the managing director pending the determination of the suit.

The plaintiffs had sued for the following reliefs:

(1) an order to restrain the defendants from taking decisions which are contrary to the regulations of Redco Ltd., a limited liability company registered under the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179); and (2) an order of the court to declare the decision contained in the first defendant’s letters dated 8 and 22 May 1985 void and of no effect.”

The two plaintiffs in the court below were Mr Montero and a Spanish group of companies with a long name. For the sake of brevity they will hereinafter be referred to as the Spanish group. The defendant’s were also two, namely Redco Ltd and Mr Duncan, chairman of the board of directors of Redco Ltd. Redco Ltd is registered in Ghana as a limited liability company under the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179) of Ghana. The shareholders of Redco Ltd are the Spanish group, holding 40 per cent of the shares and Bank for Housing and Construction which holds the remaining 60 per cent.

The first plaintiff, Mr Montero, was the managing director of Redco Ltd. and at the same time the executive chairman of the Spanish group . In May 1985 the board of directors of Redco Ltd. “in the supreme interest of, Redco Ltd. instructed the first plaintiff to hand over the management of Redco Ltd. to his deputy, one Mr. D. B. Pabi, and the latter was to be -the acting managing director of Redco Ltd. until [p.713] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 710 further notice. In other words, the first plaintiff was suspended as the managing director of Redco Ltd. It may be observed that the decision to suspend the first plaintiff as the managing director of Redco Ltd. and to appoint Mr Pabi as the acting managing director was taken by the board of directors of Redco Ltd. at a meeting and the same was later communicated to the first plaintiff by letters referred to in the writ of summons.

The first plaintiff and the Spanish group, the second plaintiff herein, contended that the board of directors which took the said decision did not form a quorum, and therefore the decision was unlawful and the court should declare the same null and void.

After filing the writ and the statement of claim, the plaintiffs filed their application for the interim injunction. The affidavit in support of the application ran into several paragraphs; but I would refer to only about four of them which are most relevant to the decision in this case. They read as follows:

“8 That by a letter dated 8 May 1985, the chairman of the board, Mr S. Q. Duncan, caused the secretary to inform me of his directive that I should hand over my office as managing director to my deputy Mr D. B. Pabi. A copy of the letter is hereto attached and marked exhibit TM 3.

9 That contrary to regulation 70 (b) of the regulations of Redco Ltd. which requires fifteen days’ prior notice in writing for a directors’ meeting the secretary invited me on 21 May 1985 for a board meeting on 22 May 1985, exhibit TM 4 is a copy of the notice.

10 That as I was indisposed, I indicated to all the members prior to the meeting that I was not in a position to attend.

11 That it is a stipulation in the regulations that for there to be a quorum at least one of the Spanish group should be present.

12 When the meeting convened, it was discovered that there was no quorum and therefore the members of the board present constituted themselves into a committee of the board.”

The first plaintiff was here contending that those members of the board present at that meeting could not constitute themselves into a committee and the board of directors had no power under the regulations of Redco Ltd. to appoint anybody to the office of the managing director without reference to the Spanish group and that the interest of the Spanish group would be jeopardized if the decision of the board of directors of Redco Ltd as contained in the letters referred to in the writ was allowed to stand.

The application was opposed by the defendants. In their affidavit in opposition, they set out in detail the reasons for suspending the first

[p.714] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 710

plaintiff. The main reasons of the defendants for suspending the first plaintiff were two-fold. First, the first plaintiff had become involved in criminal activities with certain companies which the defendants had no interest in with the result that he was incarcerated at the James Fort Prison for weeks. He was granted bail in the sum of ¢15 million; and that things were becoming more and more difficult for the first plaintiff to attend to the business of Redco Ltd as required of a managing director of such an important establishment; and that the first plaintiff was still under intensive investigation by the law enforcement agencies in the country and could be picked up again at any moment. The second reason was that the first plaintiff had been running businesses of his own. They were the Coin Restaurant, the Coin Farms, Pace Construction, B.C.D and other enterprises whose operations were in direct competition with the operations of Redco Ltd. and that the first plaintiff’s conduct was in breach of his duties to Redco Ltd. On these facts the learned High Court judge refused to accede to the request of the plaintiffs.

Learned counsel for the plaintiffs argued several grounds of appeal and I do not think it is necessary to discuss the various arguments advanced by both counsel, bearing in mind that this is not a final appeal. It is an interlocutory appeal and the substantive case is still pending before the High Court. In fact, it does not appear that summons for directions has even been taken. It is therefore undesirable in a situation like this, to go into detail. This would avoid the temptation of pronouncing on essential issues in the case when the case has not gone to trial. Thus, to my mind, the only important issue to be decided in this appeal is whether or not the learned High Court judge was right in refusing to grant the injunction having regard to the facts presented to him in the various affidavits.

An interim injunction, like all equitable remedies, is discretionary and normally where there is a legal right which can be asserted either at law or in equity, the court has a discretion to grant an injunction in protection of that right. Indeed, the court’s jurisdiction to grant an injunction is practically unlimited and would be exercised in any case in which it is right or just to do so, having regard to settled legal reasons or principles.

However, in the present case, I do not think it would have been just and reasonable for the learned High Court judge to grant the injunction. It was not denied that the first plaintiff, the managing director of Redco Ltd., had involved himself in activities likely to “jeopardize” the interest of the shareholders of Redco Ltd. In fact, he had been between February and April 1985 in prison for his alleged illegal activities. There was every possibility that he might be called upon again and there was no guarantee that he might not again be incarcerated as

[p.715] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 710

investigations were still going on and he had only been granted temporary bail. In a case like this, and to safeguard the proper operations of the company, was it not reasonable for the directors of Redco Ltd to act in the way they did? The learned High Court judge put the matter in the manner as follows:

“Must the directors or for that matter any of the shareholders, stand aloof when it finds that the company’s interest is being jeopardized? It is my opinion that it would be a breach of commonsense not to act immediately. If the directors find the position of the managing director to be such that it is not possible for him to act in the interest of the company, they have a duty to have him removed. But before then it would be naive on their part to stand by and see to the happening of the damage before they act.”

I agree entirely with these sentiments. In fact, during the incarceration in February to April 1985 of the first plaintiff, someone was appointed to act for him as the managing director; and it is interesting to note that the first plaintiff did not complain of this and indeed he was not adversely affected by the defendants appointing another person to so act. What then will be the adverse effect on him this time, if his deputy is asked to hold the fort while he, the first plaintiff, had peace of mind to sort out his affairs with the law enforcement agencies? I think none. He would not suffer any hardship if he is not allowed to manage Redco Ltd. while he faces possible criminal charges.

On the other hand, the shareholders of Redco Ltd would rather suffer extreme, if not untold, hardship if a person under such a physical and mental strain was allowed to operate the affairs of the company. In these circumstances, it would be oppressive to Redco. Ltd. and, for that matter, to its shareholders to grant an injunction. The first plaintiff’s suspension, from the facts available, was not done maliciously with intent to injure him. It was done in an emergency situation with the ultimate aim of safeguarding the interests of the shareholders.

The defendants conceded that the meeting, at which the decision to suspend the first plaintiff was taken, did not form a quorum but they contended that it was a case of emergency and that there had been previous occasions that this had happened, and the learned trial judge found this to be so when he said:

“There is evidence that meetings of such a nature have been held previously and that all the directors had acquiesced in such meetings. I hold that in appropriate circumstances the stipulated period of fifteen days could be waived. It is however necessary

[p.716] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 710

that the Spanish group have some notice of the necessity. In fact, notice was given to the first plaintiff who said because of ill-health he could not attend.”

I think under such circumstances, it would be contrary to reason for the board of directors to throw up their arms in the air in a state of helplessness and see the situation go from bad to worse. Commonsense dictated that steps should be taken by them to save the reputation of the company, and also the interests of the shareholders. Assuming that the plaintiffs were able to establish that their rights were being infringed as contended by their learned counsel, the special circumstances of this case, as stated above, would militate against the granting of the injunction. In the event of the first plaintiff succeeding, he could adequately be compensated in damages: whereas the granting of the injunction could, as I have said, cause hardship and irreparable damage to the shareholders. The damage to the shareholders would be a material one and one which could not adequately be remedied by damages. The learned judge was therefore right when he said:

“If the shareholders are to be saved from such consequences I think it is only fair that they should act promptly. After all it is in the interest of the company as a whole that the directors and the managing director act. If in the long run the act of the respondents is found to have been harshly exercised and therefore had caused damage to the first plaintiff, the latter could be compensated in monetary terms. If on the other hand the position is not checked and there is great damage caused to the first defendant company, not only would the company itself suffer irreparable damage, but all the shareholders and those who have invested in the company would have suffered irreparable damage.”

Furthermore, it was not denied by the plaintiffs that the first plaintiff had set up various private enterprises, the Coin Farm, the Coin Restaurant, Pace Construction, B.C.D and others without the knowledge of the board of directors of Redco Ltd. and that those enterprises were in direct competition with the operations of Redco Ltd. This conduct of the first plaintiff in setting up rival enterprises constituted a breach of duty towards his employers—Redco Ltd.—and was also incompatible with due and faithful discharge of his duty to his employers. Indeed, it could be tantamount to a very grave misconduct which could justify instant or immediate dismissal: see Pearce v. Foster (1886) 17 Q.B.D 536, C.A; see also In re West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd, Adams v. Tandoh [1984-86] 2 G.L.R 561, C.A. where in delivering the main judgment in support of the unanimous decision of the court, I said at 581-582:

[p.717] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 710

“ . . . the appellant had been guilty of immoral and untrustworthy conduct that it would have been highly prejudicial to the interests of the West Coast Group of Companies to keep him. Prompt and swift action was therefore absolutely necessary to safeguard the interest of the four sister companies. Immediate summary dismissal was the right answer and that was justified under the common law.”

It can therefore be seen that even though the plaintiffs may have a good fighting case, the defendants also have equally good defences to the action. Thus it would not be right in view of the facts and the special circumstances of the case to grant an injunction the consequence of which was not only likely to prove disastrous but also oppressive to the defendants. The preponderance of inconvenience was in favour of the defendants, and the trial High Court judge rightly refused the injunction.

It was also submitted by learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the order made by the learned judge in joining the Bank for Housing and Construction as a defendant was wrong. Counsel contended that Order 16, r.11 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N 140A), was inapplicable in the circumstances of this case and that the learned judge should have rather adverted to the venture agreement and section 23(1) of the regulations and then made an order referring the parties to an arbitration instead of making an order for joinder.

Order 16, r.11 gives the judge discretion in any given case to join any person whose presence before the court is necessary in order to enable the court to dispose of effectually and completely, all matters in controversy in the cause or matter: see Aegis Shipping Co. Ltd v. Volta Lines Ltd. [1973] 1 G.L.R 438.

The venture agreement and the regulations referred to by learned counsel could not be a fetter on the judge’s discretion when he decided to apply the provisions of Order 16, r. 11. Those regulations were of no relevance when considering who should be the necessary party in the suit. From the plaintiffs’ own affidavit, the bank for Housing and Construction has a considerable interest in Redco Ltd. The bank owns 60 per cent shares in the company while the Spanish group, the second plaintiff, owns 40 per cent. If the Spanish group with lesser interest than the bank considered itself as a necessary party to join in the suit, I do not see the justification in denying the bank the opportunity of being joined since its presence would enable the court to “effectually and completely” decide the issues between the parties in the cause. I therefore hold that the learned High Court judge was right in making the said order for joinder.

[p.718] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 710

However, the order of the learned judge to the effect that “the secretary give the requisite notice to the directors to meet to solve the impasse within fifteen days” is hereby expunged as there was no basis for that order. Subject to this and for the reasons given above, I am of the opinion that the appeal has no merit and the same should be dismissed.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J. A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J. A.

I also agree.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

M.C.N-N

Scroll to Top