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[1986] SLR (CA) 14Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

OTSIBAH vs. THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 394

26 February 1986 · FRANCOIS JSC · ≈ 19 min read

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OSCOLAOTSIBAH v THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 394 [1986] SLR (CA) 14
APAOTSIBAH v THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 394, [1986] SLR (CA) 14 (Ghana).
BluebookOTSIBAH v THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 394, [1986] SLR (CA) 14 (Ghana Ct. App. 1986).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Ratten v. R [1972] A.C. 378; [1971] 3 W.L.R. 130; [1971] 3 All E.R. 801, P.C.

(2) R. v. Onufrejczyk [1955] 1 Q.B. 388; [1955] 2 W.L.R. 273, [1955] 1 All E.R. 247; (1956) 39 Cr.

App. R. 1.

(3) Enweonye v. R. ( 1955) 15 W.A.C.A. 1.

(4) State v. Fiadzo (Anani) [1961] G.L.R. 416, S.C.

(5) Serechi v. The State [1963] 2 G.L.R. 53 1, S.C.

(6) Holmes v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1946] A.C. 558; [1946] 2 All E.R. 124; (1946) 31 Cr.

App R. 123, H.L; affirming sub nom R. v. Holmes [1946] 1 All E.R. 524, C.C.A.

(7) R. v. Hopper [1915] 2 KB 431; 11 Cr. App. R. 136, C.C.A.

(8) Mancini v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1942] A.C. 1; [1941] 3 All E.R. 272; 28 Cr. App. R.

65, H.L.

(9) Bullard v. R. [1957] A.C. 635; [1957] 3 W.L.R. 656; 42 Cr. App. R. 1, P.C.

(10) R. v. Porrit [1961] 1 W.L.R. 1372; [1961] 3 All E.R. 463; 45 Cr. App. R. 348, C.C.A. (11) Mensah (Kwaku) v. R. (1945) 11 W.A.C.A. 2, P.C.

(12) Akorful v. The State [1963 ] 2 G.L.R. 371, S.C.

(13) State v. Tsiba [1962] 2 G.L.R. 109, S.C.

(14) ldrisu Gonja v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 573, S.C.

(15) Boateng v. The Republic [1974] 1 G.L.R. 214, C.A.

(16) Yirenkyi v. The State [1963] 1 G.L.R. 66.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against conviction for manslaughter after in jury trial for murder in the High Court, Accra. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court delivered by Francois J.S.C.

COUNSEL

Kwame Tetteh (with him N. Kuenyehia) for the appellant.

Osafo Sampong, Principal State Attorney, for the Republic.

[p.397] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 394

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.SC.

Francois J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the court. The appellant appeals against his conviction for manslaughter and the sentence of ten years’ imprisonment with hard labour passed thereon by the High Court, Accra on 30 July 1985. Two grounds of appeal were filed in respect of his conviction:

(1) that the conviction cannot be supported having regard to the weight of evidence adduced before the court; and

(2) that the learned trial judge erred in law in not directing the jury to acquit and discharge the appellant.

It is a matter of regret that counsel’s able arguments were not matched by similar industry to set out the actual areas of criticism of the verdict. However, having allowed counsel to argue on unrestricted terrain, we must set out what we gather were the areas of controversy upon which his attacks were launched. They may be summed up as follows:

(a) that the learned judge misdirected the jury by failing to direct them on the offence of manslaughter;

(b) that the prosecution failed to connect the appellant with the deceased’s death in that the evidence did not sufficiently link the appellant with the harm the deceased sustained;

(c) that there was doubt whether there was a dead body, to warrant the appellant standing trial for murder, and

(d) that the medical evidence was at variance with the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.

As the last three grounds can be dealt with shortly, they will be taken in inverse order, but before doing so, a brief recapitulation of the facts is necessary.

It was 19 June 1983. The time was about 2.30 pm. Around Darkuman the air reverberated with shots fired by jubilating men in celebration of victory over a foiled coup. The appellant and his party had just arrived at the Darkuman Police Station and were active participants in this revelry; shooting in the air and even into the ceiling of the police charge office. A remand prisoner, naturally curious at the commotion, peeped through the window of the cell opening into the charge office. His curiousity quickly evanesced when he received the gruff warning that if he failed to remove his visage out of sight he would be shot. He had scarcely done so when a bullet raced through the cell window fatally wounding one of the remand prisoners there.

Eyewitnesses to the tragic event identified the appellant as the person who discharged that fatal shot. As a result, the appellant was charged with murder but was convicted of the lesser offence of manslaughter by the jury. The appellant admitted participating in the

[p.398] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 394 jubilation that day, but strenuously denied shooting at the window of the cell. His version of the facts did not admit of entry into the charge office. The furthest he got was the steps of the building where he slipped and narrowly missed being shot when his own gun accidentally went off.

Essentially then, the issues involved identity, credibility and intent. On the questions of identity and credibility it was for the jury as judges of fact, to form their own opinion as to the perpetrator of the deed, basing their conclusions on the acceptance or rejection of the evidence led. The jury had the task then setting the prosecution evidence against the appellant’s own stout denial, to come to a conclusion on the facts.

In his summing up, the judge explained to the jury the essential ingredients to be proved by the prosecution on a charge of murder. He devoted considerable time to the explanation of intent as an ingredient in murder. But nowhere did he deal specifically with the offence of manslaughter. The best the learned judge did, according to his notes, was to explain section 46 and 47 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). Sections 46 and 47 deal with murder. Section 47 further provides for the reduction of murder to manslaughter by reason of extreme provocation or other matter of partial excuse, as mentioned in section 52. These sections do not specifically treat manslaughter as an alternative verdict. There is therefore much force in the criticism that the learned judge dealt with manslaughter in a woefully inadequate manner if he did at all. The learned judge’s cavalier treatment of a very important aspect of the law is the nettle which counsel has firmly grasped in a bid to overturn the verdict. The burden of his argument is that the non-direction on manslaughter was a fatal lapse on the part of the judge which must be resolved by an acquittal. We shall return to this later.

Despite this well-founded criticism of the judge’s summing up, the jury returned a verdict of manslaughter rather than murder. This suggests that they found lacking that essential requisite of an intention to kill upon which a murder conviction can be sustained. By their verdict the jury also rejected the appellant’s denial of complicity in the crime; indeed the presumption is that they were in no doubt of the identity of the one who fired the fatal shot.

We turn then to the arguments of counsel and deal in inverse order with ground (d) on the conflict in the medical evidence. It was suggested that the doctor who examined the deceased had seen two gun shot wounds in the body whereas the oral evidence indicated that only one shot had been fired into the cell. The conflict is however one of polemics. The doctor was tracing the bullet’s point of entry and its

[p.399] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 394 point of exit in the deceased’s body. He said, “the right upper part of the abdomen was the entry wound with the exit on the left middle part of the abdomen.” When questioned by counsel, the doctor volunteered the further information, “There were two wounds. The entry wound was circular and the edges diluged and the edges had inverted. This was sufficient to tell me it was gun shot wound.” There was sufficient evidence of a single shot fired into the cell. At that time, the deceased was lying on a parapet or dwarf wall in the cell, clearly in the line of trajectory of the bullet. Consequently, a bullet fired through the apperture of the cell window would hit the deceased’s abdomen. The first prosecution witness described where the deceased lay on the wall. The second prosecution witness, Sergeant Darko, saw the appellant fire the only shot into the cell; he saw the result of this misguided enterprise. The facts were confirmed in every material particular by another eyewitness, the third prosecution witness, Comfort Boatemah. After the shot, they all saw the deceased’s blood-spattered body, and were witnesses to the agony of his death pangs. In our view the medical evidence and the testimony of the witnesses were in complete harmony. We find this ground of appeal entirely devoid of merit.

The next two grounds of appeal question the existence of a dead body, the corpus delicti, and its link with the appellant. Many fine threads were spun in an intricate weave to fashion this argument but the material was intractable. A strand urged that there was nothing to connect the person the doctor examined with the remand prisoner the appellant allegedly wounded in the cell. The basis of this submission was that identification of the person to the doctor which he repeated in court was sheer hearsay and consequently inadmissible. Further, since no corpse was identified as that of the person shot in the Darkuman cells and none retrieved from the mortuary for burial by the family of the deceased, there was no positive proof of death. It was whimsically suggested that the deceased might well be alive trudging the earth in a state of amnesia! It was further urged that since a number of bodies was buried en masse, it being difficult to identify the corpses individually from the large number of deceased persons who had been deposited in the mortuary following the spate of killings after the foiled coup, there was no “body” to support the charge of murder.

But these submissions gloss over the chain of circumstances, attested to by eyewitnesses, commencing from the shooting at the cell window by the appellant and culminating in the fatal wounds the deceased sustained. Moreover there was the identification of the deceased to the doctor to whom the injured person had been sent for medical treatment by the Darkuman Police. This was followed by the doctor’s certification of that person’s death. The doctor only followed

[p.400] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 394 regular practice which has not been questioned before. The medical officer has to be given some information for his records before he commences his examination. He thereafter identifies the subject of his examination, the deceased, from the information received from the police (which he relates to the court as a matter of routine). In Ratten v. R. [1972] A.C. 378 at 387, Lord Wilberforce, delivering the opinion of the Privy Council said:

“The mere fact that evidence of a witness includes as to words spoken by another person who is not called, is no objection to its admissibility. Words spoken are facts just as much as any other action by a human being.

If the speaking of the words is a relevant fact, a witness may give evidence that they were spoken. A question of hearsay only arises when the words spoken are relied on ‘testimony,’ i.e., as establishing some fact narrated by the words. Authority is hardly needed for this proposition, but their Lordships will restate what was said in the judgment of the Board in Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 W.L.R. 965, 970:

‘Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement’ but the fact that it was made.”

In this case then, the medical evidence demonstrated an identification of the deceased to the doctor by a Darkuman policeman. This was a question of fact that could be attested to without infringing hearsay rules. It went further to supply links in the chain connecting the deceased with and identifying him as the person who sustained a fatal wound at the Darkuman Police cell and who was subsequently examined by the doctor. If these facts were rejected on grounds of hearsay no medical identification would be possible, nor would medical evidence of an autopsy be receivable : see Archibold (41st ed.) at 822 and sections 125 and 126 of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 323).

In our view there was an unbroken chain linking the appellant with the sequence of events commencing with his opening shot (which was significant, literally as well as figuratively) and culminating in the death of the deceased. The medical examination and certification of death came before the corpse was mixed up with others. Courts do not physically examine dead bodies before accepting proof of death.

[p.401] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 394

Provided the medical evidence and other proof of death is satisfactory, that is enough. Moreover there was no cross- examination of the doctor on this aspect of identification which has now been transformed into a matter of such high importance.

In view of the medical evidence certifying the death of the deceased, the absence of the body for burial is in our view entirely irrelevant. Provided there is overwhelming evidence of a killing, the absence of the body is not fatal to a conviction: see R. v. Onufrejczyk (1956) 39 Cr. App. R. 1; Enweonye v. R. (1955) 15 W.A.C.A. 1 and State v. Fiadzo (Anani) [1961] G.L.R. 416, S.C. We are consequently not impressed with the arguments on these grounds.

We turn now to the last and more serious ground of misdirection. Manslaughter is defined and treated under Act 29, in sections 51 to 56. These sections were not mentioned at all in the summing up. Even though the learned judge directed the jury on section 12 of Act 29 which deals with negligence, this could hardly be an adequate summation of the law of manslaughter.

The judge’s duty in circumstances such as those protrayed in this case has been expressed in Serechi v.

The State [1963] 2 G.L.R. 531 at 534-535, S.C. It is to that admirable exposition of the law that we now turn:

“When a man is charged with murder the prosecution, to succeed, must prove each of the essential elements thereof without reasonable doubt, and must go further to prove that there are no circumstances which could reduce the murder to manslaughter. If the prosecution only succeeds in proving that the death was caused by an unlawful harm, but is unable to prove that there was intent that the unlawful harm should cause death, the case of murder must fail, but then the case of manslaughter will have to be considered by virtue of section 154 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960; and where evidence leaves reasonable doubt as to whether or not the unlawful harm was inflicted with intent that it should cause death, the court will be bound to consider section 154 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960, namely, whether a lesser offence has been proved.

Therefore where the intent to cause death is not proved, it is the duty of the court to direct the jury that they should act under the said section 154 (1) and return a verdict of guilty of manslaughter only if they find unlawful harm proved. And where the evidence is such that intent to kill might or might not be inferred, it is the duty of the judge to direct the jury that it was open to them to consider the alternative verdict of guilty of manslaughter. The duty of the judge in this

[p.402] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 394 regard is as obligatory as his duty to direct the jury to return a verdict of manslaughter where there is positive evidence of provocation which can bring the case within sections 52 and 53 of the Criminal Code, 1960, and to direct them to consider the alternative verdict of guilty of manslaughter only where there is some evidence which may amount to provocation as under sections 52 and 53 of the Criminal Code. Therefore a person charged with murder may be convicted not of murder, but of manslaughter which is homicide caused intentionally through extreme provocation or other extenuating circumstances, or of manslaughter simplicter, i.e., homicide caused by unlawful harm not intended to cause death.” The trial judge then has always a duty to direct the jury on manslaughter where on the evidence upon a murder charge, there appears a defence that might reduce the charge to manslaughter even though such defence has not been put forward. To leave out entirely a direction on the alternative verdict of manslaughter, can only be justified if there was a total absence of evidence on record to support such a verdict. A long line of cases has established that where the evidence exists to sustain a verdict of murder or manslaughter, the issue becomes a question of fact for the jury to decide: see Holmes v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1946) 31 Cr. App. R. 123, H.L; R. v. Hopper [1915] 2 K.B. 431, C.C.A; Mancini v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1942] A.C. 1, H.L.; Bullard v. R.

[1957] A.C. 635, P.C. and R. v. Porrit [1961] 1 WLR 1372, C.C.A. In the local case of Mensah (Kwaku) v.

R. (1945) 11 W.A.C.A. 2 at 6 the Privy Council explained the legal position as follows:

“The reason for the rule is that on an indictment for murder it is open to a jury to find a verdict of either murder or manslaughter, but the onus is always on the prosecution to prove that the offence amounts to murder if that verdict is sought. If on the whole of the evidence there is nothing which could entitle a jury to return the lesser verdict the Judge is not bound to leave it to them to find murder or manslaughter. But if there is any such evidence then whether the defence have relied on it or not the Judge must bring it to the attention of the jury, because if they accept it or are left in doubt about it the prosecution have not proved affirmatively a case of murder.”

Though the learned judge devoted some time to explain to the jury the meaning of intent as an essential ingredient in murder, he failed to discuss the alternatives that a lack of this particular intent could

[p.403] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 394 present. As was said in Akorful v. The State [1963] 2 G.L.R. 371 at 375, S.C.

“Before a prisoner can be convicted of murder he must be found to have had a real or wicked intention to kill or it must be found that the circumstances were such that he was aware that the result of his act would be death.”

Only a deliberate, conscious act, with a necessary end result of death, would satisfy the test of intention to murder. In the Serechi case (supra) the four kinds of homicide under our Criminal Code were set out as follows at 534:

“… (1) murder, which is homicide caused intentionally, as defined in section 47 of the Criminal Code, 1960, (2) manslaughter which would have been murder but for the existence of certain circumstances, as defined in section 52 of the Criminal Code, (3) manslaughter which is homicide caused simply by unlawful harm not intended to cause death, as defined in section 51 of the Criminal Code, and (4) manslaughter which is homicide by negligence which is of a nature of reckless disregard for human life, as defined in section 51 of the Criminal Code.”

With this legal criterion in mind, we now examine the utterances and conduct of the appellant when he threatened to shoot an inmate of the cell peeping at the cell-window. The appellant ordered the remand prisoner to leave the cell-window. The appellant ordered the remand prisoner to leave the cell-window on pain of being shot, we recall. This was followed by the shot which fatally wounded the deceased. Certainly, the charged atmosphere could not be excluded from consideration. Was there then a wicked threat to kill which must exist to found murder as defined in the Akorful case ? Alternatively, was it an act of sheer bravado borne of exuberance, and aimed at frightening or demonstrating the power of the gun?

Death resulting from the said events could fit the categories of homicide listed as (3) and (4) as well as (1) in the Serechi case. That is death arising from the infliction of unlawful harm without the intent to kill as in (3), or reckless conduct in the use of a firearm in circumstances that showed utter disregard for human life as in (4): see State v. Tsiba [1962] 2 G.L.R. 109, S.C. or wilful murder with the necessary proven intents as in (1) in the Serechi case. Since all these possibilities existed on the facts, it was incumbent on the trial judge not only to address the jury on the appropriate and applicable forms of homicide under our Code, in the context of the evidence, but also on the different intents as indicated above and in language that could be readily understood.

[p.404] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 394

Akorful’s case (supra) is authority for considering the hackneyed presumption that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts in a framework of the totality of the evidence, always remembering that the burden rests on the prosecution to prove the specie of intent required to establish the offence charged. This is further illustrated in Idrisu Gonja v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 573 at 579, S.C. where this important caution is given:

“…[I]t is most important in a murder case that in order that confusion should not be caused in the minds of the jury, the judge should direct the jury clearly on two intents, namely, (i) intent to cause harm which if it is found to exist will make the harm unlawful, and (ii) intent that the unlawful harm so caused should also cause death.”

In the context of this case the jury could not fail to take account of the jubilation of the appellant and his galumphing at the successful foiling of a coup. The evidence of shots fired all around in a spree of wild rejoicing would also be part of the equation. Balancing the result of this demonstration of enthusiasm against an intent to kill, was the function of the jury and the court could not withdraw that duty from them without erring.

Learned counsel for the appellant in an ingenious argument urges that where directions to the jury admit of only one verdict, it is no business of the jury to return an alternative verdict. Put differently, the trial judge having directed on murder vel non, the jury’s task was simply to return a verdict of guilty or not guilty of murder.

On that simplistic view of the law, the inquiry of the court whether the jury found the accused “guilty of the offence charged or any other offence”, at the close of the case would count as naught. Perhaps in equal measure, evidence suggesting an alternative offence would be relegated to the otiose and receive no consideration at all.

The argument that failure of the trial judge to direct the jury adequately on the defence is fatal to conviction is clearly scotched in Boateng II v. The Republic [1974] 1 G.L.R. 214, C.A. where Azu Crabbe C.J. said at 222:

“With respect, we do not agree that this is necessarily so; each case must depend upon its own facts and special circumstances. But we wish to state quite clearly that this court will apply the proviso to section 26 (12) of the Courts Act, 1971, where (1) the evidence against the appellant is overwhelming, and (2) it (the court) is satisfied that on the whole of the facts and with a correct direction the only proper verdict would have seen one of guilty.”

[p.405] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 394

The learned Chief Justice went on to say at 223, “Where there is evidence to support the verdict, and it is one which a reasonable jury could arrive at, it is not for us to interfere. . .”

In Yirenkyi v. The State [1963] 1 G.L.R. 66 at 75, S.C. Akufo-Addo J.S.C. (as he then was) explained the law as follows:

“The law, as we understand it, is that whatever the nature of the misdirection complained of (whether it be an omission by the judge to put the defence adequately to the jury or a misdirection on a point of law) if it can be predicted that properly directed the jury must have returned the same verdict, then, there being in that case no substantial miscarriage of justice, the appeal fails. See per Lord Atkin in Lawrence v. The King [1933] A.C. 699 at p. 707, H.L.”

We ourselves are in no doubt that in the light of the evidence adduced and considering all other relevant circumstances, properly directed, the jury would have returned no other verdict than that of manslaughter which was the verdict they arrived at unaided by informed analysis. Thus by an unorthodox route the jury reached a correct verdict. The misdirection by non-direction occasioned no miscarriage of justice let alone a substantial one. We regard this as a triumph of commonsense over all odds and affirm the verdict. In the result, the conviction of the appellant must stand, and the appeal is accordingly dismissed. As to sentence, we do not consider a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment with hard labour in the circumstances of this case excessive. That appeal also must be dismissed.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

J. A. A.

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