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[1986] SLR (CA) 17Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

QUARMYNE vs. AFEYESI AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 430

12 June 1986 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 10 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (CA) 17
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OSCOLAQUARMYNE v AFEYESI AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 430 [1986] SLR (CA) 17
APAQUARMYNE v AFEYESI AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 430, [1986] SLR (CA) 17 (Ghana).
BluebookQUARMYNE v AFEYESI AND OTHERS [1984-86] 2 GLR 430, [1986] SLR (CA) 17 (Ghana Ct. App. 1986).

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CASE REFERRED TO

Evans v. Bartlam [1937] A.C. 473; [1937] 2 All E.R. 646, H.L.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decision of the High Court, Accra refusing an application to set aside a judgment in default of appearance obtained against the defendant in an action for declaration of title to land. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Abban J.A.

COUNSEL

B. J. da Rocha for the appellant.

Narh for the respondents

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.

The respondents, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs, issued out a writ of summons in the High Court, Accra against the appellant, hereinafter referred to as the defendant. In the writ the

[p.432] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 430

plaintiffs asked for a declaration of title to land, damages for trespass and an order for perpetual injunction.

The writ was served on the defendant on 20 June 1984 and on 28 June 1984 the plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion asking for an order to enter judgment against the defendant default of appearance.

The High Court on 3 July 1984 granted the application. Default judgment was accordingly entered against the defendant and the assessment of damages was adjourned to 17 July 1984. But on 9 July 1984, the defendant filed motion on notice praying for an order for leave to enter appearance and an order to set aside the default judgment recovered by the plaintiffs on 3 July 1984. On 30 August 1984, the learned High Court judge after arguments ruled that the application was unmeritorious and accordingly dismissed same. It was against this ruling that the present appeal was brought.

Learned counsel for the defendant argued the two grounds of appeal together, namely it was wrong for the learned trial judge to refuse to set aside the judgment on the ground that the defendant had not made prior application to enter late appearance and, secondly, the learned trial judge erred in not acceding to the defendant’s request in view of the affidavit in support of the application which affidavit disclosed a genuine defence. Learned counsel submitted that the learned High Court judge was under the impression that once judgment had been regularly obtained it could not be set aside or that leave must necessarily be obtained to enter late appearance before the defendant could apply to have the default judgment set aside. Counsel contended that the two views held by the learned High Court judge which were the basis of his refusal were wrong.

Learned counsel further contended that in such a case what the learned judge had to do was to find out whether the affidavit filed disclosed a defence to the action and, if it did, then the trial judge could not deny the defendant the opportunity of having the case heard on the merits . Counsel submitted that the defendant’s affidavit showed that he had a defence and the learned judge therefore erred in refusing to set aside the judgment.

I think it will be of some help to refer to the specific reasons on which the learned High Court judge grounded his refusal. In the course of his ruling he stated his said reasons in the following manner:

“I am satisfied that the judgment was obtained regularly and in accordance with the well established rules of this court … He [the applicant] has not even moved the court for leave to enter appearance out of time and he has not on the face of his affidavit in support of the application… shown any good cause why the judgment regularly obtained against him should be set aside.

[p.433] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 430

Litigations must have an end at a certain stage and equity only comes to the aid of the vigilant and not the indolent one. I am therefore of the view that this application is unmeritorious and the same is, on reasons given supra, dismissed…”

(The emphasis is mine.) A careful look at these reasons would not fail to reveal that the learned High Court judge was clearly under some misapprehension. He thought an applicant before making the application to set aside a default judgment, ought to fulfil some condition precedent, namely he ought to have obtained leave to enter late appearance first. Obviously, this was a very wrong view of Order 13, r.11 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A) which governs applications to set aside default judgments, like the one in dispute, Order 13, r. 11 reads:

“11. Where judgment is entered pursuant to any of the preceding rules of this Order, it shall be lawful for

the Court or a Judge to set aside or vary such judgment upon such terms as may be just.”

The words of the rule are clear and they do not require any further interpretation, except to say that the rule gives wide discretionary powers to the court to set aside default judgments in appropriate cases. In exercising that discretion, it is not necessary for the court to consider whether or not the applicant before applying to set aside the default judgment had obtained leave to enter late appearance. The fact that an applicant, prior to bringing the application, did not obtain leave to enter late appearance could not be a ground for refusing to set aside a default judgment. The learned judge seemed to have fallen into an error. The learned judge found that the judgment was regularly obtained, and that finding cannot be faulted as there was sufficient evidence in support thereof. In view of that finding, the defendant was only required to produce an affidavit of merits before the discretion could be exercised in his favour. In Evans v. Bartlam [1937] A.C. 473, H.L. cited by the learned counsel for the defendant, Lord Atkin at 480 said:

“The Courts, however, have laid down for themselves rules to guide them in the normal exercise of their discretion. One is that where the judgment was obtained regularly there must be an affidavit of merits, meaning that the applicant must produce to the Court evidence that he has a prima facie defence.”

One such affidavit did accompany the defendant’s application. But unfortunately the learned judge held it did not show “any good cause

[p.434] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 430

why the judgment regularly obtained should be set aside.” The learned judge did not elaborate on “any good cause.” But I take it that he meant any good defence. If my interpretation is right, then I am afraid the learned High Court judge, with due respect, did not properly examine the contents of the said affidavit. I will refer to some of the paragraphs in that affidavit which read as follows:

“(4) That the subject matter of this suit was a piece of land which the High Court constituted by Osei-Hwere J. adjudged as my family property in suit No. L/1118/82 headed Naa Ofoe Quaye and Other v. Kabu Wekpor.

(5) That judgment has not been set aside and is therefore valid and subsisting … (23) That the Quarmyne family have been exercising acts of ownership over this land after the death of Numo Ametor Quarmyne …

(32) That in the circumstances, it is unjust that I should be precluded from entering late appearance and resisting the plaintiffs’ claim.”

The above paragraphs clearly indicated that the defendant’s family had been exercising acts of ownership over the land for years.

Surely, this is a case where the defendant’s affidavit could be described as “affidavit of merits.” It disclosed facts showing defence on the merits and the learned trial judge ought not have shut out the defendant. The learned judge should have rather adopted a more liberal approach in the circumstances of this case, and acceded to the defendant’s request so as to allow the case to be fought on its merits. In Evans v. Bartlam (supra), Lord Atkin said at 480:

“The principle obviously is that unless and until the court has pronounced a judgment upon the merits or by consent, it is to have the power to revoke the expression of its coercive power where that has only been obtained by a failure to follow any of the rules of procedure.”

It is interesting to note that the plaintiffs filed their ex parte application to enter default judgment on the last day the defendant was expected to enter appearance. In other words, at the time the application to enter default judgment was filed the eight days within which the defendant was to enter appearance had not completely expired. According to the plaintiffs, the writ was issued on 20 June 1984 and the defendant was served on the same day. Thus the defendant could only be out of time with his appearance after 28 June 1984, and not before. It is not clear why the plaintiffs were showing that undue haste.

[p.435] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 430

The default judgment was entered on 3 July 1984 and six days later, that is 9 July 1984, the defendant filed his application to set aside the judgment. The defendant’s affidavit gave good explanation for his failure to enter appearance. It seems to me that since reasonable explanation was given by the defendant, and the defendant made his application to set aside promptly, the High Court judge should have had regard also to these matters in exercising his discretion. But he did not appear to have adverted his mind to this aspect of the matter at all, as it is evident from the ruling. I do appreciate that lapse of time may not be disregarded when considering applications to set aside default judgment under Order 13, r.11. But I should think that in appropriate cases, such as the present case, the promptness with which an applicant invokes the court’s power to set aside a default judgment must also be taken into consideration. The learned High Court judge, with due respect, failed to do this; and to my mind the defendant’s application was not given the consideration it deserved.

Learned counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that since the default judgment was entered on 3 July 1984, the plaintiffs had altered their position by selling the land and so the appeal should be dismissed. Learned counsel based his contention on paragraph 21 of the plaintiffs’ affidavit filed in opposition to the defendant’s application to set aside the default judgment. The said paragraph reads as follows:

“(21) That in further answer to paragraphs 27-28 of the defendant’s affidavit, I am reliably informed and verily believe the same to be true that after the ex parte judgment we the plaintiffs herein have disposed of the land the subject matter in dispute in order to pay and to meet the expenses entailed in pursuit of our series of cases and our travelling expenses to and from Accra, hence the interest of a third party will be involved if the application is granted.”

The plaintiffs did not give any details or particulars of the sale. There was no indication as to whether the said sale took place between 3 July 1984 (the date of the default judgment) and 9 July 1984 (the date on which the application to set aside was filed). If it was after 9 July 1984 then the plaintiffs must have taken a calculated risk since the outcome of the application to set aside the judgment had not been known. The name of the supposed purchaser or assignee of the said land was not mentioned in the plaintiff’s said affidavit, the conveyance covering the alleged sale transaction, its registration number and so on, were not stated. It was not enough for the plaintiffs to make the averment’s as contained in that paragraph 21 without making the slightest effort to substantiate them.

[p.436] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 430

The learned High Court judge could not be hoodwinked by this sort of dubious transaction. Obviously, he did not believe that there was any sale, genuine or otherwise, to any third person, and that was the more reason why he did not even attempt to use the so-called sale as one of the grounds for refusing to set aside the default judgment. He seemed to have treated these averments with contempt. The subject matter of the suit, to my mind, has not been disposed of or assigned to any person, let alone to a bona fide purchaser.

For the above reasons, I hold that the learned High Court judge erred in not exercising his discretion in favour of the defendant. The ruling of the learned judge would definitely cause injustice to the defendant if it is allowed to stand. The appellate court would normally not interfere with the exercise of the judge’s discretion except on grounds of law. But where it finds that on other grounds the decision would result in injustice being done, the appellate court has both the power and the duty to remedy it.

Consequently, I am of the opinion that the appeal should be allowed and the ruling appealed from be set aside. In substitution therefor, I would make an order setting aside the default judgment entered against the defendant on 3 July 1984, and order that the defendant should enter appearance within eight days from the date of this judgment, that is on or before 20 June 1986. Thereafter, the case should take its normal course under L.N. 140A.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.A.

I also agree.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

Default judgment set aside.

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