REPUBLIC vs. NATIONAL HOUSE OF CHIEFS, KUMASI AND ANOTHER; EX PARTE KUSI-APEA [1984-86] 2 GLR 90
10 April 1986 · TAYLOR JSC · ≈ 26 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Mekkaoui v. Minister of Internal Affairs [1981] G.L.R. 664, S.C.
(2) R. v. Kynaston (1927) 19 Cr. App. R. 180.
(3) R. v. Quaidoo (1890) Red 196.
(4) Republic v. Controller and Accountant-General; Ex parte Dizengoff (W.A.) Ltd. [1974] 1 G.L.R.
337.
(5) In re Nathan (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 461, C.A.
(6) Ukejianya v. Uchendu (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 45.
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the decision of the High Court, Kumasi refusing to grant an order of mandamus compelling the National House of Chiefs to have the appellant’s name recorded in the national register of chiefs. The facts are sufficiently state in the judgment of Taylor J.S.C.
COUNSEL
Hayfron-Benjamin for the appellant.
No appearance by or for the first respondent.
James Ahenkorah for the second respondent.
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C.
The circumstances that have led to the appeal and cross-appeals before this court from a decision of the High Court, Kumasi need to be stated clearly in order to put in their proper perspective the legal issues that call for a decision in this chieftaincy case. There were a number of controversial claims put forward in the affidavits of the parties in this case in which Nana Kusi Apea, the appellant, as an applicant in the High Court, prayed for a writ of mandamus to compel the National House of Chiefs, the first respondents herein, to enter his name in the national register of chiefs as the Omanhene and paramount chief of the Wenchi Traditional Area. The main facts, however, which are relevant in these proceedings were unchallenged and are really simple.
The appellant was apparently removed in 1958 as Omanhene of the Wenchi Traditional Area and the second respondent, Nana Abrefa Bediatuo VI, was installed as Omanhene in his place. It is not necessary in these proceedings to make any pronouncements as to whether his removal and the installation of the second respondent were in accordance with the customary law governing the destoolment and enstoolment of the incumbent of the Wenchi paramountcy.
In 1966, however, following the revolutionary events which overthrew the Government of the First Republic, the appellant was reinstated by statute, i.e. the Chieftaincy (Amendment) Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 112).
It is of some importance to note exactly the state of the law on 5 December 1966 when N.L.C.D. 112 became law as well as the precise significance of the statutory chief so created. Section 1 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1961 (Act 81) defines in very clear terms who is a chief under the law as it existed in 1966 as follows:
“1. (1) A Chief is an individual who— (a) has been nominated, elected and installed as a Chief in accordance with customary law, and (b) is recognised as a Chief by the Minister responsible for Local Government (in this Act referred to as the “Minister”).
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(2) The Minister may by executive instrument at any time withdraw recognition from a Chief if— (a) the Chief has been destooled and his appeal against the destoolment has been dismissed or the period allowed for appealing has elapsed without an appeal having been brought, or (b) the Minister considers it to be in the public interest to to withdraw recognition.”
The provision of N.L.C.D. 112 under which the appellant regained his position as the paramount chief is section 4 and it provides as follows:
“4. Any person who was chief in any place specified in column 2 of the Second Schedule to this Decree immediately before any such person as is referred to in Column 1 of that Schedule was recognised as chief for that place, shall, if he is alive at the commencement of this Decree, be deemed, with effect from commencement of this Decree, to be restored to the stool of the person specified in the said Column 1 of the said Schedule and to have been recognized as chief by the Member of the National Liberation Council responsible for chieftaincy matters for the purposes of section 1 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1961 (Act 81).”
Wenchi is the fifteenth in the list of the places in Brong-Ahafo in column 2 of the Second Schedule and the name of the second respondent, Nana Abrefa Mbore Bediatuo, is the fifteenth name spelled out in column 1 of the said Second Schedule also under Brong-Ahafo. And to clinch the status so dispensed to the appellant, the executive instrument which originally withdrew recognition from him, namely Kwame Kusi otherwise Kusi Apea I Order, 1959 (L.N. 105 of 1959), was revoked by section 7 of N.L.C.D. 112. It is worth remarking in the circumstances that government recognition is a condition precedent to the chiefly status under Act 81.
The state of affairs thus established in Wenchi by N.L.C.D. 112 in 1966 continued for almost seven years, when on 5 November 1976 the Supreme Military Council, then exercising plenary legislative powers, passed into law the Wenchi Paramount Stool Affairs Decree, 1976 (S.M.C.D. 64). That Decree repealed in effect N.L.C.D. 112 and by its provisions removed the appellant and reinstated the second respondent.
Before the Supreme Military Council (hereinafter referred to as S.M.C.) promulgated S.M.C.D. 64, its Commissioner responsible for Chieftaincy Matters on 10 December 1975 requested the National House of Chiefs to inquire into and advise him on the constitutional matters relating to the Wenchi paramount stool. The National House of
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Chiefs in the circumstance appointed a committee which submitted a report to it. That report was favourable to the second respondent, but subsequently the house itself apparently scrutinised the said report of its committee and submitted an advisory opinion entitled, “The Wenchi Stool Affairs Advisory Opinion by the National House of Chiefs 1976.” This report, however, was favourable to the appellant. The S.M.C. accepted the report of the committee of the house and gave effect to it by reinstating the second respondent and removing the appellant.
The sections of S.M.C.D. 64 achieving these objectives are as follows:
“1. The purported enstoolment of Nana Kusi Apea I as Omanhene and Paramount Chief of Wenchi is contrary to custom and is hereby declared to be null and void.
2. (1) The nomination, election and enstoolment of Nana Mbore Bediatuo VI was in accordance with the custom of Wenchi and accordingly the purported removal of Nana Mbore Bediatuo VI as Omanhene and Paramount Chief of Wenchi by the Chieftaincy (Amendment) Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 112) was void and of no effect.
(2) The said Nana Mbore Bediatuo VI is therefore hereby restored as Omanhene and Paramount Chief of Wenchi with immediate effect.
3. (1) Nana Kusi Apea I shall not — (a) purport to be Omanhene or Paramount Chief of Wenchi whether under customary law or otherwise;
(b) in any manner assert any claim to be Omanhene or Paramount Chief of Wenchi;
(c) do any act tending to incite disaffection against Nana Mbore Bediatuo VI, Omanhene of Wenchi.
(2) If the said Nana Kusi Apea I contravenes any provisions of subsection (1) of this section he is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years . . .
6. (1) No person shall— (a) recognise Nana Kusi Apea I as Omanhene and Paramount Chief of Wenchi whether under customary law or otherwise;
(b) in any manner support, encourage or canvass any claim of Nana Kusi Apea I to be Omanhene or Paramount Chief of Wenchi;
(c) do any act tending to incite disaffection against Nana Mbore Bediatuo VI, Omanhene and Paramount Chief of Wenchi.
[p.97] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 90
(2) Any person who contravenes any provision of subsection 1 of this section is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding ¢1000.00 or to imprisonment not exceeding two years or to both.
7. The provisions of this Decree shall apply notwithstanding any enactment, customary law or any other law to the contrary.”
Clearly on 5 November 1976, by the imperative provisions of S.M.C.D. 64, a Decree of the Supreme Military Council, the second respondent regained the Wenchi paramount stool which he had been deprived of since 5 December 1966 by N.L.C.D. 112. On 4 June 1979, however, the Supreme Military Council was itself ousted from power and a new military regime, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (hereinafter referred to as the A.F.R.C.D) took over the reins of government and until it relinquished power on 24 September 1979 it also, like the regime it toppled, exercised plenary sovereignty of the Westminster variety.
I have stressed the nature of the power which the military regimes which took over the reigns of government in this unfortunate Republic exercised, in order to highlight the position as a matter of constitutional law that strictly speaking our courts have no power as they have under a constitutional government to declare laws passed in accordance with the yardsticks propounded by these military regimes as invalid. Under constitutional rule, the legislative acts of the government are subject to the supreme edicts of the Constitution and therefore even in the absence of an enabling specific constitutional provision, our courts must of necessity superintend the legislative functions of a constitutional government in order to promote constitutional democracy and ensure the supremacy of the Constitution. The only power which the courts have ever had and still have to declare the laws of a military regime invalid or null and void is in cases where the law itself does not conform to the criteria for validity mandatorily provided for by the military regime itself. In Mekkaoui v. Minister of Internal Affairs [1981] G.L.R. 664, S.C. to be discussed presently in this judgment, it is obvious that the yardstick for determining the validity of a particular Decree was itself provided by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council which promulgated that Decree.
In the instant proceedings for mandamus, Mr William Adumua-Bossman led evidence, the relevant part of which was described by the learned High Court judge as “incontrovertible”, that on the eve of leaving office, i.e. on 23 September 1979, Flt-Lt. J. J. Rawlings, the Chairman of the A.F.R.C., signed a Decree entitled: Delayed Report
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(Publication and Implementation) Decree, 1979, A.F.R.C.D. (hereinafter referred to as the Delayed Report Decree). According to Mr Bossman’s evidence which was not challenged, he handed over six type-written copies of the Decree to the Chairman of the A.F.R.C., who signed them and handed the lot to him. He took them to the Attorney-General’s Office and handed them over to the clerk of the Chief Parliamentary Draftsman but when he went back to the office a week later, he learnt that the Decree so signed had been misplaced and as he had a souvenir copy he left it with the Attorney-General’s Office and he had photocopies made. One of the photocopies was received in evidence as (exhibit A). The Decree so signed was never printed and has not been published and the originals are also nowhere available.
It is not necessary to refer to many provisions of this peculiar Decree. In section 5 it provides:
“(5) So far as may be relevant to any report mentioned in the Schedule hereto, The Wenchi Paramount Stool Affairs Decree, 1976 (S.M.C.D. 64) and the Wenchi Queenmother’s Stool Property (Restoration Decree), 1977 (S.M.C.D. 102) are hereby repealed.”
In the Schedule to this Decree are seven reports and the third report is: The Wenchi Stool Affairs Advisory Opinion by the National House of Chiefs (1976). The Decree has no commencement date and as I have already pointed out it has neither been printed nor published.
The Attorney-General and P.N.D.C. Secretary for Justice, who is the “Principal Legal Adviser to the Government”, has stated in unequivocal terms as follows:
“As far as I am aware the Armed Forces Revolution Council never deliberated upon the Wenchi stool affairs, neither did they promulgate any law touching on any stool matter captioned ‘Delayed Report (Publication and Implementation) Decree, 1979 A.F.R.C.D’. S.M.C.D. 64 (Wenchi Paramount Stool Affairs) Decree, 1976) and S.M.C.D. 102 (Wenchi Queenmother’s Stool Property (Restoration) Decree, 1977) have not been repealed…”
If there is one person who should have a list or knowledge of the enactments which the legislature has passed from 1979 to 1980, it ought to be the present Attorney-General and Secretary for Justice and I should think that the fact that the alleged Decree was admittedly signed by the present Chairman of the P.N.D.C., makes it highly improbable that the Attorney-General would proffer this information and opinion without consulting the government or making the necessary enquiries which any responsible officer would have made in the circumstances. I do not propose to lose sight of that fact.
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The short issue that calls for a decision in the circumstances therefore is whether this Decree has operative force and has indeed repealed S.M.C.D. 64. To answer this question it seems to me that some seven salient characteristics of this alleged Decree said to be undoubtedly signed by Flt-Lt. J. J. Rawlings, the then Chairman of the A.F.R.C., must be noted. These are:
(1) The Decree has not been printed.
(2) The original Decree signed were six in number, but not one is available, only photocopies are extant.
(3) The Decree has not been published.
(4) No state institution or authority has any copy of the Decree in its custody.
(5) The beneficiary of the Decree is the client of a legal practitioner from whose custody the Decree emerged.
(6) From 23 September 1979 until 30 June 1983 the beneficiary of the Decree made no move to assert the rights alleged to have been dispensed to him under this Decree.
(7) There is no provision in the Decree as to the date it is to come into force.
With regard to 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 above, leaving for the moment item 7, it is important to note that under the Acts of Parliament Act, 1960 (C.A. 7) as amended, the Government Printer has the responsibility of printing Acts or Decrees of the Republic. Section 10 provides: “A copy of any Act, other than an original copy, purporting to have been printed or published by the, Government Printer shall be prima facie evidence of the terms of the Act, . . .” Furthermore, under section 8 (2) of C.A. 7, the Chairman of the A.F.R.C. retains a copy of the Decree and copies are sent to the Chief Justice and the Archivist. These are therefore the officials who should have custody of the Decree, but in this case a private legal practitioner whose client, the appellant herein, was the beneficiary of the enabling provisions was the sole custodian. In the light of this it is necessary to examine very closely the submission of counsel for the appellant at the High Court.
The contention was that by virtue of the said Decree said to have been signed on 23 September 1979, the appellant reverted to the position he held before S.M.C.D. 64 was passed and he was now the statutory paramount chief of Wenchi and he was accordingly entitled to have his name inserted in the national register of chiefs.
Two interrelated matters not too germane but quite significant in considering the proper course of action of the appellant need to be disposed of at once. The first is who in law under our present dispensation is a chief? And secondly, what does the entering of the chief ‘s name in the national register of chiefs imply? The answer to the
[p.100] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 90 question posed by the first matter will resolve the second question relating to the national register. With regard to the said first matter it must be noted that before the Constitution, 1979 came into force the question, “who is a chief?” was statutorily answered by section 48 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), as follows:
“48. (1) A chief is an individual who has, in accordance with customary law, been nominated, elected and installed as a Chief or as the case may be appointed and installed as such and whose name for the time being appears as a Chief on the National Register of Chiefs:
Provided that no person shall be deemed to be a Chief for the purposes of the exercise by him of any function under this Act or under any other enactment, unless he has been recognised as such by the Minister by notice published in the Local Government Bulletin.
(2) Subject to the foregoing subsection (1) the name of any person who has been installed as a Chief shall be entered by the National House of Chiefs in the National Register of Chiefs not later than one month from the date of the receipt of the notification of such installation.”
It would seem therefore that under the law as it existed immediately before the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979 the entry of the name of a chief in the national register of chiefs is a condition precedent to qualification under the law in order to be considered a chief.
Additionally, under section 48 (1) recognition by the Minister responsible for Chieftaincy Affairs is essential if a chief is to exercise any functions under Act 370 or any other enactment. With the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979 and the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1981, as amended by the P.N.D.C. (Establishment) Proclamation (Supplementary and Consequential Provisions) Law, 1982 (P.N.D.C.L. 42), the question who is a chief is now quite simply answered by the combined effect of the provisions of article 181 of the Constitution, 1979 and section 53 (2) of P.N.D.C.L. 42. Article 181 of the said Constitution defines a chief as follows:
“…the expression ‘chief’ means a person who, hailing from the appropriate family and lineage, has been validly nominated, elected, and enstooled, enskinned or installed as a chief or queenmother in accordance with the requisite applicable customary law and usage.”
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Although Act 370 was continued in force by section 4 (2) of the P.N.D.C. Proclamation, 1981, it is clear that its definition of a chief as is contained in section 48 (1) and (2) of Act 370 and the definition of a chief as is contained in section 53 (2) of P.N.D.C.L 42 are to some extent in conflict and section 4 (3) of the P.N.D.C.
Proclamation, 1981 in mandatory terms provides that in such a situation the provisions of section 48 (1) and (2) of Act 370 “shall be deemed to be amended by” section 53 (2) of P.N.D.C.L. 42. This means that the definition of a chief in the combined provisions of article 181 of the Constitution, 1979, and section 53 (2) of P.N.D.C.L. 42 as I have set it out already in this judgment is now the subsisting definition of a chief. It is remarkable that the question of the entry of his name in the national register of chiefs and the recognition by the Secretary for Chieftaincy Affairs are now no more conditions precedent for the validity under law of the status of a chief. Although the parties seem to be litigating for the right to have their names entered in the register of the National House of Chiefs, it is now clear that as from 24 September 1979 when the Constitution came into force, the said registration does not in any way derogate from the status of a person as a chief. But it would seem that if a chief wants to exercise the functions of a chief provided for under any enactment, then as in the previous law, he needs recognition, i.e. by the Secretary for Chieftaincy Affairs, and the said recognition is effected by the secretary giving notice of the recognition in the Local Government Bulletin.
Under section 48 (2) of Act 370 it is, of course, clear that the National House of Chiefs has mandatory duty to enter the name of a new chief in the national register not later than one month on their receiving notification of his installation. Once again it seems failure to so register after installation does not detract from the status of the incumbent of a stool qua chief. The parties here, however, are not new chiefs and therefore the relevant provision which is applicable is Act 370, s. 50 which provides:
“50. (1) The National House of Chiefs shall maintain a register to be known as ‘the National Register of Chiefs,’ in this Part referred to as ‘the Register.’ (2) The National House of Chiefs shall cause to be recorded on the Register such particulars relating to chieftaincy as it may think fit or as may be required by this Act or any other enactment to be recorded thereon.
(3) The Minister or any person authorised by him in writing may request to be supplied with a copy of the Register or an extract thereof and upon such request the National House of
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Chiefs shall cause to be supplied accordingly a copy of the Register or an extract thereof, in each case duly certified to be true by the Registrar or a public officer authorised in writing by him… (7) Any person aggrieved by the refusal by the National House of Chiefs to register him as a Chief may within thirty days after the appeal against the decision to the Supreme court.”
The mandamus application before the High Court was brought under section 50 and subsections (1) and (2) are therefore the decisive provisions. The submission which counsel for the appellant made before the High Court was that in 1971 when Act 370 was passed, “section 50 required that all persons who were then chiefs should have their names on the national register.” The submission would seem to be, as I have already pointed out in this judgment, that in 1971 when Act 370 was passed, the appellant was a chief and that although S.M.C.D. 64 deprived him of this status in no uncertain terms, nonetheless the Delayed Report Decree repealed S.M.C.D. 64 and this therefore entitled him to an order of mandamus compelling the National House of Chiefs to enter his name in the register.
The sole question therefore as I have indicated already is whether the said Delayed Report Decree, so categorically impugned by the Principal Legal Adviser of the Government, is one of the existing enactments continued in force by section 4 (2) of the P.N.D.C. Proclamation, 1981. That section provides:
“ . . . any enactment . . . in force in Ghana immediately before the 31st day of December, 1981, shall continue in force until revoked, repealed or amended, but shall only continue in force with such modifications as are necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Proclamation.”
Under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979 which set up the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, the modalities for the commencement of its Decrees—in other words the yardsticks for their operative force, were spelt out very clearly in paragraphs 3 (6) and (7) as follows:
“3. (6) Every Decree made by the Revolutionary Council shall, as soon as practicable after it is made, be published in the Gazette.
(7) A Decree made by the Revolutionary Council shall, unless otherwise provided in that Decree, come into force on the date of publication of that Decree in the Gazette.”
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The conditions therefore under which a Decree of the A.F.R.C. can be considered genuine and given operative force can be gathered from these provisions and they are three:
(i) The Decree must be published in the Gazette unless evidence is given that it is impracticable to publish it;
(ii) if the Decree itself indicates the date on which it is to come into force, then quite apart from publication, it comes into force on that date; and
(iii) if the Decree is silent as to its commencement date, then it comes into force on the date it is published in the Gazette.
The Delayed Report Decree was not and has not been published in the Gazette and so the first condition has not been satisfied for no evidence was led as to the impracticability of so publishing it. In the body of the said Decree no date is indicated as to when it is to come into force and so the second condition has not been satisfied. As the Decree has never been published there is no Gazette date to satisfy the third condition. It is obvious therefore that like the Insolvency Act, 1962 (Act 153), the Delayed Report Decree has not come into force even if the incontrovertible evidence is accepted that the Chairman of the A.F.R.C. did sign it.
In the unlikely event that force was by some unimaginable process given to the Decree, then it would in effect repeal S.M.C.D. 64. However, under section 8 (1) (a) of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4) it is provided:
“(1) The repeal or revocation of an enactment shall not — (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time when the repeal or revocation takes effect.”
The effect of this provision is that the appellant will not revert to his status before the Decree was enacted and therefore his only remedy if he claims to be a chief is to initiate proceedings in the judicial committee of the relevant regional house of chiefs to have his status pronounced upon in the said judicial forum.
In the circumstances, a recourse to mandamus when his status is so dubious and has not been judicially settled or statutorily recognised is a clearly misconceived strategy and a good ground to refuse him the remedy of an order of mandamus, a discretionary remedy given when an applicant’s entitlement is unquestionable and the only way in the circumstance of doing justice to him.
At the High Court on 9 July 1984 Amua-Sekyi J. (as he then was), delivering his judgment refusing to grant the order of mandamus, referred to the Supreme Court case of Mekkaoui v. Minister of Internal
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Affairs [1981] G.L.R. 664, S.C. and under the influence of the reasoning in the submission of counsel for the appellant he said that, that case:
“decided that Decrees of the A.F.R.C. which have no commencement date and were not published in the Gazette before 24 September 1979, were null and void. However, the dissentient view has now gained the upperhand for section 60 (1) of the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation (Supplementary and Consequential Provisions) Law, 1982 (P.N.D.C.L. 42), has affirmed the validity of the Decree the Supreme Court declared null and void.”
It seems to me with respect that the ratio decidendi of the Mekkaoui case (supra) and the provisions of section 60 (1) of P.N.D.C.L 42 have been completely misconceived by the learned judge and counsel for the appellant. The Decree which was published as A.F.R.C.D. 42 was not the Decree which was promulgated by the A.F.R.C. A.F.R.C.D. 42 was a document partly made by an officer of the Attorney-General’s Department. The original document signed had in effect been tampered with by an official of the Attorney-General’s Office and that document had not been published. It was the tampered document which was published as a Decree. The majority decision in the circumstances repudiated in no uncertain terms the notion that apart from the A.F.R.C. or the Parliament established by the Constitution, 1979, there is any other authority in the Republic with power to legislate or take part in legislation as the Attorney-General’s Office did. The content of A.F.R.C.D 42 in the form in which it found its way into the Gazette was the joint product of the A.F.R.C and the Attorney-General’s Office.
The Attorney-General’s Office has no legislative power under the A.F.R.C. regime and under the Constitution, 1979 and its participation in the legislative process degraded the purported Decree. It was for this reason that the Supreme Court declared the Decree so published to be null and void. The judgment of the majority of the court was careful in stressing that like the Chattels Transfer Ordinance, 1952 (No. 51) and the Insolvency Act, 1962 (Act 153), the Decree signed by the Chairman was not A.F.R.C.D. 42, but the Decree with no commencement date on it so signed was a valid Decree and it was not in force merely because it had no commencement date and as signed had not been published. All that it needed to give it operative force was either it was published with no date in the precise form the chairman signed it, or legislation was passed by the accredited legislature, i.e. Parliament or the lawful body exercising legislative powers giving legal force to the document as A.F.R.C.D. 42. And section 60 (1) of P.N.D.C.L 42 gave legal force to the document which clearly had none at the time it was published and by
[p.105] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 90 this legal means, far from impugning the ratio decidendi of the majority view, it accepted it.
The attempt in Mekkaoui v. Minister of Internal Affairs (supra) to enforce an invalid Decree clearly foundered because the actual Decree signed by the Chairman of the A.F.R.C. had not been published and it had not therefore in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 (6) and (7) of the A.F.R.C. Proclamation, 1979 come into force. This is not a novel situation in countries operating the common law system. In R. v. Kynaston (1927) 19 Cr. App. R. 180 a conviction under a section of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1925 was quashed by the English Court of Criminal Appeal on the ground that the section creating the offence was not to come into force until an Order-in-Council had been made and at the time of the prosecution none had been made. Lord Hewart C.J. in that case made the poignant observation at 181 that this prosecution “resembles nothing so much as pulling a bell-handle without a bell at the other end.” It is therefore not correct to hold that the validity of A.F.R.C.D. 42 has been affirmed by P.N.D.C.L. 42, s. 60 (1). The correct legal view is that the invalid Decree has been validated by legislation. It was never a valid Decree before P.N.D.C.L. 42, s. 60 (1) made it valid.
Assuming, however, that the appellant has made a good case for mandamus, the legislature in section 50 (7) of Act 370 has given him a remedy to appeal to the Supreme Court if the National House of Chiefs refused to register him as a chief. Long ago at Cape Coast Castle on 11 December 1890, barely 14 years after the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1876 came into force, Francis Smith J. in R. v. Quaidoo (1890) Red. 196 in the Divisional Court stated the rule, “The prerogative writ of mandamus does not lie when any other remedy exists.” And in modern times Abban J. (as he then was) in Republic v. Controller and Accountant-General; Ex parte Dizengoff (W.A.) Ltd. [1974] 1 G.L.R. 337 at 344 relying on the authority of In re Nathan (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 461, C.A. reiterated this principle in very simple language:
“Mandamus, like all other prerogative writs, is a discretionary remedy. So that even where an applicant has satisfied all the primary requirements for the ‘award of the remedy,’ the court may, nevertheless, refuse it on the ground that another remedy equally effective is available.”
It seems to me that mandamus is ill-suited as a remedy for the complaint of the appellant in this case. The National House of Chiefs is a corporate entity and operates by giving instructions to its servants and officers. It can as a corporate body actually only obey the order of mandamus by vicarious action and therefore it is in effect its instructions to its scheduled subordinate officer that is the remedy
[p.106] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 90 sought by the applicant for mandamus. Abban J. (as he then was) in Republic v. Controller and Accountant-General; Ex parte Dizengoff (supra) at 344 stated the principle applicable in such a situation when he said:
“Suppose the court makes the order and the respondent obeys the order by giving the necessary authorisation to the treasury officer to pay, but that … officer refuses to make payment, what then will happen? It will be difficult, in those circumstances, to enforce the order of mandamus against the … officer, no order having been made against him to make payment. The mandamus will therefore become ineffective and useless as far as that …officer is concerned.”
In the hypothetical situation so graphically canvassed by Abban J. (as he then was), it is clear that mandamus will be ineffective against the officer if when instructed to enter the name of the applicant he neglects or refuses to do so, and the National House of Chiefs cannot also be impeached for contempt in disobeying the order because they did obey by giving the necessary instructions. It is now trite law that under such circumstances courts of law do not give orders which are potentially unenforceable: see Ukejianya v. Uchendu (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 45 at 46.
In this case both the first and second respondents have cross-appealed. In the case of the second respondent, Nana Mbore Bediatuo VI, the appeal was, inter alia, mainly on the refusal of the court to award costs when the application for mandamus was refused. The second respondent resides in the Brong-Ahafo Region and although there is a High Court in Sunyani, the action was brought in Kumasi and he had to incur expenses in successfully resisting the claim of the appellant. There would seem in the circumstances to be no reason why costs were not awarded to him against the appellant except to conjecture that contrary to the view expressed in this judgment as to the non-operative force of the Delayed Report Decree, the learned judge entertained some forlorn hope that the Delayed Report Decree because there was, as he put it, “uncontrovertible evidence” that it was signed by the erstwhile Chairman of the A.F.R.C. may stand some chance of being declared valid by a court of competent jurisdiction, by which he no doubt meant the Supreme Court. I am sure this is not a legitimate ground for refusing a successful party his costs.
In my view, unless there are very sound reasons for it, a successful party in a suit is entitled to his costs and it is not a proper exercise of discretion to refuse him his legitimate costs without assigning good reasons for the refusal. In the result, I would dismiss the appeal of the appellant and allow the cross-appeal of the respondents. The second
[p.107] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 90 respondent is entitled to his costs, both in this court and in the court below. The first respondent did not appear and in their case therefore there will be no order as to costs. The second respondent, Nana Abrefa Mbore Bediatuo VI, is awarded ¢10,000 costs in this court in this court and ¢6,000 in the court below against the appellant, Nana Kusi Apea I. His appeal is accordingly dismissed.
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.
I agree.
JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH J.A.
I also agree.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
Cross-appeal allowed.
L.K.A.
