HUNGAROTEX FOREIGN TRADING CO. vs. BOATENG [1984-86] 1 GLR 611
13 November 1986 · AMUA-SEKYI JA · ≈ 43 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Di Ferdinando v. Simon, Smits & Co. Ltd. [1920] 3 K.B. 409; [1920] All E.R. 347, C.A.
(2) S.S. Celia v. S.S. Volturno [1921] 2 A.C. 544; [1921] All E.R. 10, H.L.
(3) Societe Des Hotels le Touquet Paris-Plage v. Cummings [1922] 1 K.B. 451, C.A. (4) Re United Railways of Havana and Regla Warehouses Ltd. [1961] A.C.1007; [1960] 2 W.L.R.
969; [1960] 2 All E.R. 332, H.L.
(5) Schorsch Meier GmbH v. Hennin [1975] Q.B. 416; [1974] 3 W.L.R. 823, [1975] 1 All E.R. 152, C.A.
(6) Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd. [1976] A.C. 443; [1977] Q.B. 489, H.L. (7) Barclays Bank International Ltd. v. Levin Brothers (Bradford) Ltd. [1977] Q.B. 270; [1976] 3 W.L.R. 852; [1976] 3 All E.R. 900.
(8) Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Tradax Export (S.A.) [1977] Q.B. 324; [1977] 3 W.L.R. 126; [1977] 2 All E.R. 849, H.L.
(9) Societe General de Compensation v. Ackerman [1972] 1 G.L.R. 413, C.A.
(10) Re St. Nazaire Co. (1879) 12 Ch.D. 88, C.A.
(11) Re Suffield and Watts; Ex parte (Brown) (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 693.
(12) Holt v. Jesse (1876) 3 Ch.D. 177.
(13) Neale v. Gordon-Lennox [1902] A.C. 465, H.L.
(14) Marsden v. Marsden (1876) 2 Ch.D. 786; 34 L.T. 700; 24 W.R. 714, C.A.
(15) In re Arthur; In re Abakah v. Attah-Hagan [1972] 1 G.L.R. 435, C.A.
(16) Manners v. Pearson & Son [1898] 1 Ch. 581; [1895-99] All E.R. Rep. 415.
(17) The Despina R. and the Folias [1979] A.C. 685; [1978] 3 W.L.R. 804; [1979] 1 All E.R. 421, H.L.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL by the plaintiffs to set aside the order of the trial judge upholding the contention of the defendant that the conversion rate of the [p.614] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611 dollar to the cedi should be at the rate prevailing at the time of the breach of contract and not at the time of payment. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Amua-Sekyi J.A.
COUNSEL
Adueni for the appellants.
Opoku-Adjei for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.A.
Some time in 1979 the defendant, a Ghanaian national, entered into a contract in Hungary with the plaintiffs, a state corporation of the government of Hungary, for the supply of textile fabrics valued at US $110,000 under 180 days’ credit terms. The textile fabrics were duly supplied to the defendant who accepted same. He made a part-payment of US $23,750 and issued three cheques for the balance of $86,250. The cheques having been dishonoured by the foreign bankers of the defendant, the plaintiffs fell on his English guarantors, Messrs Bharwaneys Ltd., who turned out to be worth nothing. They then approached the defendant in Ghana for their money. He asked for accommodation. The plaintiffs agreed, and on 9 August 1982 entered into an agreement with him for the payment of the balance by monthly instalments over a period of eleven months. Needless to say, the defendant did not pay a single cent. Solicitors were instructed to demand the payment of the debt. When this was done, his solicitors, by a letter dated 22 May 1984, offered to pay $5,000 by the month ending June 1984 and thereafter $1,000 each month. The letter ended with these words: “I trust that Dr. Djamson [the plaintiffs’ attorney] will sympathetically give my client this last chance to test his bona fides.” A second letter dated 11 June 1984 offered to raise the monthly instalments to $2,000 and to pay not less than $20,000 by 31 December 1984. Unimpressed, the plaintiffs issued their writ.
The writ of summons and the statement of claim were filed together on 6 July 1984. Appearance was entered for the defendant on 8 August 1984. Two days later, the plaintiffs took out a summons for judgment. On the return date, that is 28 August 1984, counsel for the parties asked the court to adjourn the hearing to 12 September 1984. On 7 September 1984 the defendant filed a so-called defence in paragraph 8 of which he averred as follows:
“8. The defendant in answer to the whole of the claim admits liability for the balance due and owing, but contends that even though the money of account is US dollars the mode of payment should be Ghana cedis at the current rate of exchange.”
He backed this up with an affidavit in “opposition” to the summons for judgment in paragraph 9 of which he said he was submitting to
[p.615] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611 judgment for $86,250 with interest at five and a half per cent. He asked that he be permitted to pay the debt by an immediate payment of $5,000 and monthly payments of $1,000, both in cedis at the current rate of exchange. My understanding of this offer is that it was contingent upon the rate of exchange remain in hungarotex v. Boateng the same during the period that the instalments were to be paid. If, therefore, the rate was altered by the Bank of Ghana, whether upward or downward, the cedi equivalent of $1,000 would be calculated as at the time each instalment was paid.
It is clear that the legal advisers of the defendant knew that an affidavit in opposition to a summons for judgment was hardly the place to make an offer of payment of the amount claimed by instalments. They therefore, filed at the same time and before judgment, a motion asking the court to order that the amount claimed be paid by instalments. Surprisingly this unorthodox procedure was countenanced by the court, which allowed the motion to stand down while the summons for judgment was heard. The defendant submitted to judgment for the amount due with interest at the rate of five per cent per annum for one year only. By consent it was agreed that the debt be paid in cedis at “the prevailing bank rate.” Costs in the action were also agreed at ¢150,000.
In my view, the use of the word “prevailing” in place of the word “current”, made no difference. If the defendant had on the date of judgment paid into court the cedi equivalent of the judgment debt and interest as at that date his liability under the judgment would have been discharged. At that time the rate of exchange was ¢38.50 to one US dollar. That he did not do so is admitted. The question is whether he could take advantage of his default to pay the plaintiffs less than the cedi equivalent of the sum due as at the date he did pay them. I am satisfied that both on grounds of principle and in law he could not do so.
The application to pay the sum due by instalments was opposed by the plaintiffs. Paragraph 2 of an affidavit filed by the defendant on 29 October 1984 shows that they made their position clear to both the defendant and the court when judgment was entered and insisted that they be paid the judgment debt of $90,562.50 in full. When the motion came up for hearing on 31 October 1984 the plaintiffs again opposed the application. In spite of this, the trial judge, Ansah-Twum J., acceded to the request of the defendant and ordered him to pay ¢500,000 within seven days and the balance in nine months.
The defendant took full and, if I may say so, undue advantage of the breathing space afforded him. To begin with, he procured the filing, on 6 November 1984, of a notice that he had paid the sum of ¢500,000
[p.616] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611 as ordered by the court when in truth and in fact he had not. Indeed, he was not to do so until 19 December 1984. Next, he waited for the nine months’ grace to elapse and then filed a motion for stay of execution and extension of time within which to pay the balance. By then, the rate of exchange had altered for the worse, and the defendant acknowledged that he was bound to pay more under the judgment. This is apparent from paragraphs 2-4 of the affidavit he deposed to on 12 August 1985 which read as follows:
“2 That I was sued by the plaintiffs in the sum of $90,562.50 including $4,312.50 interest at the rate of five per cent per annum from 1 July 1983 to 30 June 1984.
3 That I submitted to judgment on 12 September 1984 and was given up to 8 August 1985 within which I was to pay the whole judgment debt and costs at the prevailing rate of exchange of the cedi to the US dollar.
4 That I there and then paid the costs of ¢150,000 to the plaintiffs and later paid ¢500,000 on account, leaving a balance of ¢4,028,125 outstanding.”
The figures given by him show that he calculated his liability under the judgment at the rate of ¢50 to one US dollar. This, however, did not satisfy the plaintiffs who contended that at the prevailing rate of ¢57 to one US dollar the judgment debt of $90,562.50 now stood at ¢5,162,062.50 and that having paid ¢500,000 into court the defendant owed ¢4,662,062.50. The important thing, however, is that both parties recognised that the depreciation in the value of the cedi since the date of the judgment did not, and could not, enure to the benefit of the defendant.
Before long, the defendant had had a change of mind. On 26 August 1985 he filed a further affidavit in which he asserted that the rate of exchange ought to be as at the date of judgment which he said was ¢38.50 to one US dollar and worked out the total judgment debt as ¢3,441,394.76. The motion came up for hearing, this time, before Ammah J. The parties agreed to a consent order being made in the following terms:
“By Court: By consent of counsel on both sides the defendant-judgment debtor applicant is given up to 10 September 1985 to pay the balance now outstanding, i.e. ¢4,662,062.50 to the plaintiff-judgment creditor.
The defendant-judgment debtor is further ordered to pay ¢5,000 costs today to the plaintiff-judgment creditor. Failure to abide by these conditions execution to proceed.”
Thus, in return for being given a further two weeks’ grace the defendant had agreed to accept the contention of the plaintiffs that the
[p.617] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611 balance due from him was ¢4,662,062.50. That was on 27 August 1985. On 6 September 1985 the defendant paid into court the sum of ¢3 million, describing it as “part-payment of judgment debt and costs.” Since the costs of ¢150,000 had already been paid to the plaintiffs, this latter payment was an admission that the plaintiffs were entitled to more than the cedi equivalent of the judgment debt as at 12 September 1984. True to form, however, the defendant filed yet another motion for stay of execution and extension of time. He blandly told the court that the balance now due was ¢1,028,125.00 when he well knew that by the consent order it was ¢1,662,062.50. Ammah J. dismissed the application with costs. On the same day, the defendant paid into court the sum of ¢1,662,062.50 describing it as “final payment in the above-mentioned case.”
One would have thought that that would be the end of this long saga. But no, the defendant had a few more cards up his sleeve. Three days later he filed a notice of appeal against the order of Ammah J. Searches filed by the plaintiffs to ascertain whether the outstanding balance had been paid into court were left on the court’s docket unanswered. Then, a month later the defendant filed a motion for stay of execution pending appeal. The return date was 28 October 1985. On 25 October 1985 he filed a notice discontinuing the appeal lodged in this court and filed a fresh motion in the High Court for stay of execution and amendment of the judgment dated 12 September 1984.
Even though his attention was called to the consent order made by Ammah J. on 27 August 1985, Ansah-Twum J. who heard this motion permitted the defendant to resile from the agreement entered into by him and held that under the judgment he was bound to pay only the cedi equivalent of the debt as at the date of judgment. Relying on Di Ferdinando v. Simon, Smits & Co., Ltd. [1920] 3 K.B. 409, C.A. he expressed the view that as a matter of law the defendant was bound to pay only the cedi equivalent as at the date of breach of the contract and he severely criticised Mr. Ofosu-Asante, former counsel for the defendant, for agreeing to pay more than this. He ordered that any sums paid into court in excess of the cedi equivalent of the debt as at the date of judgment should be refunded to the defendant forthwith and awarded ¢25,000 costs against the plaintiffs.
On the terms imposed by Ansah-Twum J. the cedi equivalent of the total debt at the rate of ¢38.50 to one US dollar was by my calculation, ¢3,486,656.20. That meant that the defendant had overpaid the debt by ¢1,675,406.30. We were told that the defendant had availed himself of the order and collected the last instalment of ¢1,662,062.50 from the court.
The plaintiffs have appealed to this court and are asking that the decision of Ansah-Twum J. be set aside together with the order as to
[p.618] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611 costs. The defendant, for his part, has taken a cue from the learned judge and is now asking that the order be varied to the cedi equivalent as at the date of the breach which he sets at 30 June 1983, so that he may retrieve more of the money now in court! He asks us to forget that in paragraph 4 of his defence he set the date of breach at April 1984.
On the strength of his cross-appeal, the defendant applied once again to the High Court for a stay of execution. Ansah-Twum J. said he was impressed by the chances of success of the cross-appeal, and he ordered that no part of the amount still in court be paid out to the plaintiffs. Since then the cedi has been devalued still further and is now ¢149 to one US dollar. The plaintiffs must be wondering whether it was wise to sue the defendant in our courts.
Di Ferdinando v. Simon, Smits & Co., Ltd. (supra) was an action for damages for breach of contract, and the question which arose was whether the damages which had been assessed in Italian lire were to be converted into sterling at the rate of exchange prevailing at the date of the breach or at some later date. The court held that by the practice of the courts of England the conversion should be as at the date of the breach. Where sterling was the stronger of the two currencies, as in S.S. Celia v. S.S. Volturno [1921] 2 A.C. 544, H.L. the rule worked to the disadvantage of the defendant who found himself paying more in sterling than would have been the case if a later date, such as the date of judgment or the date of payment had been applied. He could, however avoid the ill-effects of the rule by paying the plaintiff in the foreign currency: see Société des Hotels Le Touquet Paris-Plange v. Cummings [1922] 1 K.B. 451, C.A.. On the other hand, if sterling was the weaker of the two currencies, as in Re United Railways of Havana and Regla Warehouses Ltd. [1961] A.C. 1007, H.L., the rule worked to his advantage as he could insist that the plaintiff accept payment in sterling.
The need for a change was gradually felt, and came with the decision in Schorsch Meier GmbH v. Hennin [1975] Q.B. 416, C.A. This was an action in which the plaintiffs, a company incorporated in the Federal Republic of Germany, sought to recover from the defendant in England a sum of money expressed in Deutsch marks. The Court of Appeal unanimously held that under the European Community Act, 1972 which made the Treaty of Rome part of the law of England, the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment for a sum expressed in the currency of the contract, in this case Deutsch marks, and by majority, that apart from the Act they were so entitled because the courts of England now had power to give judgment in foreign currency. Two reasons were given in support of the majority view: first, the courts could now order specific performance of a contract to pay money; secondly, judgment for a sum in foreign currency could be given in the form that the
[p.619] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611 defendant do pay to the plaintiff so much in foreign currency or its equivalent in sterling at of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611-634 the time of payment. For purposes of execution, time of payment means the time leave is granted to enforce payment of that sum.
There was no appeal to the House of Lords, but shortly thereafter a question arose as to whether the decision was to be confined to plaintiffs from the Common Market States. In Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles), Ltd. [1976] A.C. 433, H.L. the plaintiff, a Swiss national, sold goods to the defendants, an English company, at a price expressed to be payable in Swiss francs to a Swiss bank within 30 days. Two bills of exchange drawn in Switzerland and accepted by the defendants having been dishonoured on presentation the plaintiff sued for the sum in Swiss francs. Following the majority decision in Schorsch Meier GmbH v. Hennin (supra) the Court of Appeal gave judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal to the House of Lords, the decision of the Court of Appeal was affirmed.
In Schorsch Meier GmbH v. Hennin (supra), Lord Denning M.R. compared the former stability of sterling with its present state at 424 and said; “Things are different now. Sterling floats in the wind. It changes like a weathercock with every gust that blows.” And Lawton L.J. remarked that all the reasons which have been given for a chauvinistic approach to foreign currency, with the exception of those based on the difficulty of execution by writs and garnishee orders, had become meaningless and that the result of adhering to the practice of giving judgment in sterling had been to do injustice to foreign traders and to allow defaulting British traders to get a benefit which brought discredit on the administration of justice in Britain. If I may say so without hurting national pride, our currency, the cedi, is even less stable than sterling now is. It is best described as a falling star ever plunging downward into the abyss. If we adhere to obsolete English practices we risk bringing the administration of justice in this country into disrepute.
It would be observed that in Schorsch Meier GmbH v. Hennin (supra) the majority were of the view that judgment could be given in foreign currency in all cases where that currency was the currency of the contract, that is the money of account and of payment. In Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd. (supra) Lord Wilberforce added another condition which was that the proper law of the contract should be that of a foreign country. However, this further restriction was not supported in the opinions of the other members of the House of Lords. In Barclays Bank International Ltd. v. Lovin Brothers (Bradford) Ltd. [1977] Q.B. 270 and Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Tradax Export (S.A.) [1977] Q.B. 324, H.L. where the proper law of the contract was English, judgment was given in the foreign currency
[p.620] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611 which was the currency of the contract. Here, the defendant contracted to pay the plaintiffs in dollars. It would have been a complete defence to this action that he had paid the sum due in dollars. But since he did not and the plaintiffs had to take their money in cedis, was it unreasonable or unfair that they should ask to be paid not in depreciated cedis but so many cedis as would purchase the full value of dollars adjudged in their favour? The plaintiffs said they wanted $90,562.50, no more, no less. Were they under our law entitled to have that sum? I should have said that they were.
The case of Di Ferdinardo v. Simon, Smits & Co. Ltd. (supra) on which Ansah-Twum J. based his criticism of counsel for the defendant was applied by this court in Société General de Compensation v. Ackerman [1972] 1 G.L.R. 413, C.A. In doing so, however, this court drew attention to the fact that our rules of procedure were silent on the matter and that they were in those circumstances enjoined by Order 74 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A) to have recourse to the procedure, practice and forms in force for the time being in the High Court of Justice in England. I think we ought to do the same and apply the practice now in force in England, that is that which is set out in the majority decision in Schorsch Meier GmbH v. Hennin. From that standpoint, it is clear that the consent order made by Ammah J. on 27 August 1985 was in accordance with current practice. I would therefore set aside the decision of Ansah-Twum J. dated 19 November 1985 together with the order as to costs. I would affirm the order of Ammah J. and make an order that the defendant pay back into court forthwith the amount withdrawn by him. The cross-appeal is without merit and ought to be dismissed.
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.
I have had the opportunity of reading in advance the judgment read by my brother Amua-Sekyi J.A. and I entirely agree with the reasons and the conclusion that the appeal should be allowed and the cross-appeal be dismissed.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.A.
The plaintiffs are a foreign trading corporation founded and registered in Hungary and carrying on business in Budapest. The defendant is a Ghana resident who trades under the name and style of City Home Stores, Accra. In 1980 the parties entered into an agreement in Hungary for the sale of textile fabrics by the plaintiffs to the defendant. Following this agreement the plaintiffs sold and delivered to the defendant in Ghana the said fabrics to the value of $110,000. The defendant made part-payment of $23,750 leaving a balance of $86,250. Whereupon the defendant entered into a covenant with the plaintiffs (through their lawful attorney) to pay the balance
[p.621] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611 within a period of eleven months commencing from 31 August 1982 at monthly instalments of $4,000 at the least. The covenant was secured by the mortgage of the defendant’s house to the plaintiffs.
The outstanding balance remained as it was by the end of the extended period. A series of correspondence followed between solicitors for the parties in which the defendant outlined his plans to settle his indebtedness. First he proposed to pay $5,000 by the end of June 1984 and the same amount within July and August 1984, whilst he would maintain the regular payment of $1,000 every month. Next, he stepped up his proposal to pay a total sum of $20,000 by 31 December 1984 and then continue with the monthly instalments of $2,000. The above proposals were contained in two letters written on behalf of the defendant and dated 22 May 1984 and 11 June 1984. It is not difficult to see that the defendant was smarting under the mortgage deed when he made these proposals. They do not seem to have been accepted because the plaintiffs slapped their writ on the defendant on 6 July 1984.
The plaintiffs’ writ sued for:
“(a) $86,250 the balance of the price of goods sold and delivered to the defendant;
(b) interest on the said amount at the rate of eighteen and a half per cent per annum from 1 July 1983 to 30 June 1984; and (c) interest on the amount at the rate aforesaid from 1 July 1984 until payment or judgment.”
The plaintiffs then filed their summons for judgment which came before the court on 28 August 1984 and was adjourned to 12 September 1984 for hearing. In the interim the defendant filed three documents on 7 September 1984 namely: his defence, his affidavit in opposition to the summons for judgment and his motion to be permitted to pay the amount claimed by instalments. In the affidavit supporting his motion he proposed to pay a lump sum of $5,000 and monthly instalments of $ 1,000. In paragraph 8 of the defence it was pleaded as follows:
“8 The defendant in answer to the whole of the claim admits liability for the balance due and owing, but contends that even though the money of account is US dollars the money of payment should be Ghana cedis at the current rate of exchange.”
When the summons for judgment came once more before the trial court on 12 September 1984 counsel for the defendant announced to the court the terms upon which the defendant would submit to
[p.622] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611 judgment. Apparently counsel for the plaintiffs raised no objection to those terms. The court recorded a consent judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with the terms announced:
“(1) in the sum of US $86,250 payable in cedis at the prevailing bank rate carrying interest at the rate of five per cent per annum for one year only;
(2) agreed costs of ¢150,000 and (3) the entire judgment debt to be paid into court, but the agreed costs to be paid to the plaintiffs or their representative.”
The court’s attention was then drawn to the defendant’s motion for a stay of execution and payment by instalments. The motion was adjourned to 18 October 1984 for hearing.
As one would expect, the plaintiffs opposed the motion, and very hotly too. They particularly challenged the court’s jurisdiction to order the payment of the judgment debt by instalments. Their opposition was disfavoured and the trial judge, Ansah-Twum J., feeling secure that he could do so under his equitable jurisdiction and discretion stayed execution and ordered the defendant to pay into court within seven days the sum of ¢500,000 and thereafter pay the entire balance of the judgment debt within nine months beginning from 8 November 1984. That was not all. He made a default order. The recorded order in the record of proceedings shows a typing error. I have no doubt that the order gave the plaintiff liberty to go into execution without further recourse to the court for leave if the defendant defaulted.
I pause here to remark that the learned trial judge had the jurisdiction to order payment of the judgment debt by instalments at any time before the entry of the judgment. Order 63, r. 6 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), supplies the convenient and far-reaching adjunct to the trial judge in the administration of justice. It provides as follows:
“6. Subject to particular rules, the Court may in all causes and matters make any order which it considers necessary for doing justice, Whether such order has been expressly asked for by the person entitled to the order or not.”
It has also been decided that it is within the powers of a judge to alter his judgment at any time before it is entered and perfected: see Re St. Nazaire Co. (1879) 12 Ch.D. 88, C.A. and Re Suffield and Watts; Ex parte Brown (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 693.
In ordering the defendant to make a down-payment of ¢500,000 the trial judge expressly held his bona fides in fee. The deadline to fulfil that order was 7 November 1984. On 9 November 1984 and also on 14 November 1984 the solicitor for the plaintiffs conducted a search and
[p.623] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611 he was informed on both occasions that the defendant had lodged no deposit in court. The plaintiffs were, accordingly, fully aware of the defendant’s default. Indeed a spurious notice of the lodgment of the ¢500,000 into court had been filed by the defendant on 6 November 1984. This notice could not have influenced the plaintiffs because of the true position revealed by the searches conducted subsequently on their behalf. The plaintiffs were yet to know by their search of a much later date 9 August 1985 that the ¢500,000 was in fact lodged in court on 19 December 1984. The point being made here is that although the plaintiffs were as at 9 November 1984 entitled to fall on the defendant’s default and levy execution “without further recourse to the court for leave” they chose to stay their hands and thus foreclosed the immediate redemption of the judgment debt. The defendant can hardly be called upon to answer for any supposed disadvantage or lose they incurred by their own inaction.
The plaintiffs’ failure to go into immediate execution, however, enabled the defendant to carry the case through certain twists and turns. He failed to pay the entire judgment debt as ordered by the end of the nine months’ grace. In truth he made no other payment apart from the lump sum of ¢500,000 he deposited in court on 19 December 1984. He filed another motion on 12 August 1985 praying for a stay of execution and extension of time to pay the balance of the judgment debt within two months. Meanwhile, in the money market, the exchange rate of the cedi to the dollar was plunging. For instance, on 30 June 1983 it stood at ¢2.75 to $1 but it plummeted to ¢38.50 to $1 as at 12 September 1984, the date of the consent judgment. It had sunk further to ¢57.00 to $1 as at 12 August 1985 when the defendant filed his action for another extension of time to pay the entire judgment debt. It subsequently plunged deeper and deeper.
In his affidavit opposing the motion, the plaintiffs’ attorney insisted that the judgment debt of $90,562.50 was to be converted at the then prevailing exchange rate of ¢57 and, when converted into cedis, the debt stood at ¢5,162,062.50 less the ¢500,000 already lodged in court. This demand excited the defendant to file a supplementary affidavit in which he in short, challenged the claim that the conversion should be at the rate of ¢57 to $1. He maintained that on a true and proper interpretation of the judgment of 12 September 1984 and the ruling of 31 October 1984, the exchange to be used in the conversion was that which prevailed at the date of the judgment on 12 September 1984. He thought that the rate was ¢38 to the dollar and, upon that, the judgment debt stood at ¢3,441,394,76. He further reasoned that by their interpretation the plaintiffs sought to amend the consent judgment.
The motion this time came before Ammah J. on 27 August 1985. The defendant was not present in court. His counsel, Mr. Aryee, was
[p.624] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611 also not in court but Mr. Kumado held his brief for the defendant. The plaintiffs’ counsel was of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611-634 in court. And so was the attorney (as it appears from his subsequent affidavit). Both counsel agreed that the defendant-applicant be given two weeks to pay the balance of ¢4,662,062.50 and the costs of ¢5,000 to be paid that same day to the plaintiffs. The court made the consent order and gave the defendant up to 10 September 1985 to pay the said debt. The defendant paid ¢3,000,000 out of the said amount into court on 6 September 1985 and on 10 September 1985 he filed yet another motion to stay execution and for another extension of time to pay the balance which, according to his calculation, stood at ¢1,028,125. His supporting affidavit reiterated the old question as to the true interpretation of the consent judgment of 12 August 1984 and the order of 31 October 1984. The affidavit of the plaintiffs, on the other hand, stuck to the ¢57 to the dollar exchange rate and claimed ¢1,662,062.50 as the balance outstanding. Ammah J. dismissed the application on 20 August 1985.
One would have thought that the defendant had by now exhausted his legal armoury from which, for one year short of eight days since the consent judgment, he had drawn out one weapon or other to ward off the execution of the judgment. Immediately after his application for stay of execution had been refused he lodged the ¢1,662,062.50 in court and then embarked on a new strategy by filing an interlocutory appeal against the ruling of Ammah J. and then moving the court for stay of execution pending appeal. On 15 October 1985 he filed two documents, one to give notice of discontinuance of the appeal and the other a motion on notice. The motion prayed for an order to amend the judgment of 12 September 1985 “to enable the proper meaning of the said judgment to be ascertained and for stay of execution.”
The parties were, admittedly, poles apart in their interpretation of the consent judgment of 12 September 1984 as to the connotation of the words “at the prevailing bank rate.” The plaintiffs understood this to mean the bank rate prevailing at the date of payment whilst the defendant favoured the bank rate prevailing at the date of the judgment. The clarification of the judgment was necessary to inform the defendant of his indebtedness and the plaintiffs of what amount they could go into execution for. After hearing counsel for the parties Ansah-Twum J. ruled that the consent judgment which stated: “$86,250 payable in cedis at the prevailing bank rate carrying interest at the rate of five per cent per annum for one year only” meant that it was payable at the rate of exchange prevailing or current at the time the said consent judgment was entered, and not at the time of payment. He ordered that the defendant was at liberty to withdraw any money he had paid into court in excess of the judgment debt calculated in cedis at the rate of
[p.625] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611 exchange prevailing at the date of the consent judgment on 12 September 1984. He awarded ¢25,000 costs to the defendant, partly to off-set what he considered the inordinately high costs of ¢150,000 awarded to the plaintiffs by consent.
The plaintiffs appealed against the ruling upon the main grounds that he erred in his interpretation of the judgment and also that he failed to consider the effect of the consent order on 22 August 1985 on the defendant’s application for amendment of the judgment. The plaintiffs also appealed against the costs as being excessive. The defendant cross-appealed against the same ruling and urged the ground that the trial judge erred in misconstruing the legal effect of the consent judgment. According to his counsel the prevailing rate of exchange as at the breach date of the contract should have been used to convert the US dollars in question. The breach date was stated to be 30 June 1983. At that time the exchange rate was ¢2.75 to 1 US dollar.
The effect of the ruling under appeal was truly to set at naught the consent order of Ammah J. According to counsel for the plaintiffs he and Mr. Kumado (who held Mr. Aryee’s brief for the defendant) agreed in court on the law applicable which was that the conversion of the currency of account into cedis should be governed by the prevailing rate of exchange at the date of payment. Whereupon both of them consented on the terms which the learned judge embodied in his order which patently varied the consent judgment of Ansah-Twum J.
The affidavit of the attorney for the plaintiffs illuminates certain dark aspects of the events before Ammah J. and here I quote the relevant paragraphs:
“17 Yet another application for stay of execution was brought on 27 August 1985. When, at the hearing, the defendant realised the hopelessness of his position the case was stood down at the request of his counsel.
18 During the interim counsel for the defendant approached me and my counsel with a request for an extension of time for two weeks within which to pay the whole of the balance then outstanding whereupon I reluctantly agreed to the following terms:
(i) that the defendant would be granted until 10 September 1985 to pay the whole balance;
(ii) that the rate of exchange would remain as agreed at the time of judgment, i.e. at the rate prevailing at the date of final payment;
(iii) that at the rate of ¢57 to one US dollar (effective 9 August 1985) the balance then outstanding was ¢4,662,062.50;
[p.626] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611
(iv) that the defendant would pay ¢5,000 costs to the plaintiffs forthwith.
19 These terms which were agreed upon in spite of the defendant’s allegation in his supplementary affidavit that the plaintiffs were claiming more than was due to them under the judgment were announced to the court and they became the order of the court. A copy of the ruling of 27 August 1985 is annexed hereto and marked exhibit Hl.”
In retrospect (because of the ruling of Ansah-Twum J. which denounced the contention of the plaintiffs that they had agreed with the defendant and his counsel, as part of the consent judgment before him, that “in view of the fluctuation in the value of the cedi the cedi equivalent of the judgment debt would depend on the rate prevailing at the time of final payment”) it becomes clear that the plaintiffs’ attorney and his counsel completely misinformed Mr. Kumado that there was a prior agreement to apply the rate prevailing at the time of final payment. Indeed, Ansah-Twum J. went into great lengths to support his condemnation of the gloss the plaintiffs, in collaboration with the defendant’s erstwhile solicitor, would feign put on his consent judgment.
It was fully admitted that the defendant was not in court when Ammah J. made the consent order. He therefore, had no voice in reaching the agreement. It is true that in his affidavit supporting the motion before Ammah J. the defendant had deposed in his paragraph 4 that the balance left of the judgment debt was ¢4,028,125. This may give the impression, although deceptive, that the defendant himself had acknowledged this figure as the outstanding amount. That figure was not his calculation. It merely stated the figure the plaintiffs were claiming as the judgment debt on their execution document (see paragraph 6 of the defendant’s affidavit filed on 25 October 1985 accompanying the motion to “amend”). At any rate the supplementary affidavit filed by the defendant on 26 August 1985 took a firm stand in opposing the ¢4,662,062.50 the plaintiffs were claiming in their affidavit in answer and he deposed that the balance stood at ¢3,441,394.76. It was never the contention of the plaintiffs themselves (see their paragraph 19 quoted above) that the defendant admitted the balance to be ¢4,028,125.00. The only instructions to his counsel, of which the plaintiffs and their counsel had full knowledge, were limited to the defendant’s supplementary affidavit which fully articulated his attitude. To their obvious knowledge Mr. Kumado had no authority to enter into any agreement with the plaintiffs, even if they did not mislead him. In my opinion it will entirely be wrong to recall the legal fiction of [p.627] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611 a client’s implied or ostensible authority to his counsel so as to bind the defendant to a compromise against his will.
The law reports abound with a wealth of authorities that in deserving cases a party can be relieved from the binding effect of a consent given by his counsel. I may here cite a few. In Holt v. Jesse (1876) 3 Ch.D. 177 it was held that a consent given by counsel in the presence and with the sanction of his client may be withdrawn before the order is drawn, if given through inadvertence, but not so where the matter was fully understood at the time and the client shortly afterwards changes his mind. At 182 to 183 of the report Malins V.C. said:
“. . . I beg to express my opinion, which I believe is in conformity with all the cases that have been cited, that if it shall turn out that by the inadvertence of counsel, by the careless consent of the Plaintiff or Defendant himself, not fully knowing or considering what he is about, an order given by consent has prejudiced him in a manner which neither he nor his advisers could have anticipated at the time, such as in the case of Swinfen v. Swinfen [2 De G. & J. 381], where counsel was instructed to do one thing and consented to a totally different thing; that is, for instance, being instructed to make a claim to an estate in fee simple, he consented that the claimant should have a life estate only, or a tenancy for life; that is entirely beyond his authority, and nothing could be more reasonable than that his client should not be bound by such a consent inadvertently given.”
The analogy of counsel having instructions to claim for more but consenting to claim for less will also apply in the converse to bring the consent beyond his authority where the instructions are to submit to judgment for a lesser amount but counsel consents to submit to judgment for a bigger amount.
The case of Neale v. Gordon Lennox [1902] A.C. 465, H.L. also concerned a consent order to refer an action. The principles enunciated in that decision will apply to all situations of consent given by counsel on behalf of his client. The headnote reads:
“A counsel has no authority to refer an action against the wishes of his client or upon terms different from those which his client has authorised. If he does so refer it the reference may be set aside although the limit put by the client on his counsel’s authority is not made known to the other side when the reference is agreed upon. The Court before whom the question of setting aside the reference comes is not bound to sanction an arrangement made by counsel which is not in the opinion of the Court a proper one.”
[p.628] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611
This court considered and applied these two decisions together with other decisions including those of this court in In re Arthur (Decd.); Abakah v. Attah-Hagan [1972] 1 G.L.R. 435. Whilst the court conceded to counsel the power to bind his client by his consent to an order of the court if the consent so given flows from the authority of his client and with full knowledge of the facts, yet it went on to hold that such consent order could be set aside if the client discovered that (a) it was made without his consent at all; or (b) counsel had exceeded his instructions; and also on the ground of fraud, mutual mistake, or on some other ground upon which a court could set aside an agreement.
The authorities are clear on the point that in no case will the court interfere to set aside a consent judgment save at a time before the order of the court has been perfected by entry of the consent judgment; and in the case of an ordinary consent order before it is drawn up: see Marsden v. Marsden (1872) Fam. 280. Accordingly, it is settled law that the court will not interfere at a time after perfection of the consent judgment or order. The remedy, in that situation, is by a fresh action to set it aside. Unlike the consent judgment of Ansah-Twum J. which was entered counsel for the plaintiffs openly confessed before us that he had not entered the consent order of Ammah J. so as to perfect it and to render it executable. I, for my part, would set aside the consent order of 27 August 1985 on the grounds that the order was made without the defendant’s consent at all and also that the counsel was misled by the plaintiffs and their attorney to consent to the agreement.
But, when all is said and done, the tiny consent order proclaimed by the plaintiffs does not only become irrelevant but it is also dealt a mortal blow by Order 41, r. 11, a beneficent provision of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A) intended, no doubt, to protect absentee litigants from unsavoury and spurious agreements entered into on their behalf by counsel in court without their authority. That rule stipulates that where the defendant has not appeared, or has appeared in person, no order for entering judgment shall be made unless the defendant attends before a judge and gives his consent in person, or unless his written consent is attested by a solicitor acting on his behalf. Both the trial judge and counsel for the parties overlooked these important provisions which had patently been violated when the consent order was pronounced by Ammah J. The result was that that order was completely null and void and it must be deemed to have never been pronounced by the court and nothing could have flowed from it. Consequently the said consent order together with the order for costs of ¢5,000 ought to be set aside. Similarly, the further costs of ¢1,500 awarded against the defendant by Ammah J. on 20 September 1985 ought also to be set aside.
[p.629] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611
It was said that when Ansah-Twum J. gave his ruling on 19 November 1985 the rate of exchange stood at ¢60 to the US dollar and when the appeal came before us for hearing on 15 July 1986 the rate had sunk to ¢90 to the dollar. In the said ruling Ansah-Twum J. commented purely as an obiter dictum as follows:
“In fact, the law as I understand it is that, if there had not been that agreement as embodied in the judgment, the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover the judgment debt in cedis only at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time the amount adjudged became due, and not even at the date of judgment, let alone the date of payment. For the general principle of law is that the rate of exchange is always calculated at the date when the default occurs, and in the present case it would be the date on which payment became due and not even on the date of judgment: see: Di Ferdinando v. Simon, Smits & Co. Ltd. [1920] 3 K.B. 409, C.A.”
The Di Ferdinando’s case, of course, echoed the law of England which had prevailed for some 300 years and had been given its modern affirmation in cases starting from Manners v. Pearson & Son [1898] Ch. 581, C.A. and had been re-echoed in many other decisions thereafter, even as late as in the House of Lords decision of In re United Railways of Havana and Regla Warehouses Ltd. [1961] A.C. 1007, H.L. (as regards foreign money debts) That law was that an English court had no jurisdiction to give judgment for the payment of an amount in foreign currency and that for the purpose of litigation in England a debt expressed in a foreign currency must be converted into sterling with reference to the rate of exchange prevailing on the day when the debt was payable. Our own Court of Appeal followed the “sterling breach-date” rule enunciated by these English decisions and held, in Société Général de Compensation v. Ackerman [1972] 1 G.L.R. 413, C.A. that it was procedurally wrong for a Ghanaian court to award damages in foreign currency in that the court’s order could not be enforced by the ordinary writs of execution. For that reason it ordered that the damages awarded in that instant case must be converted into local currency at the rate of exchange prevailing when the contract was breached. This decision has not been overturned.
It is, of course, no longer the law of England that the courts cannot give judgment in foreign currency and that when, for the purpose of litigation, a debt expressed in foreign currency must be converted into sterling the rate of exchange must be that prevailing when the debt was due to be paid. The law as it stands today, in short, is that it is possible now to sue before an English court for debt in foreign currency or its sterling equivalent of which conversion should be at the date when the [p.630] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611 court authorised enforcement of the judgment in terms of sterling. The change in the law was said to be the result of the storm of change which was blowing over Britain and to which the Court of Appeal gave avant-garde, although cautious, expression in Schorsch Meier GmbH v. Hennin [1974] 3 W.L.R. 823, C.A.
That case is similar to the case on appeal before us. There, the plaintiffs, a company incorporated in the Federal Republic of Germany, supplied and delivered goods to the defendant in England. He paid for some of the goods in German currency (Deutche mark). He failed to pay the balance owed after the plaintiff had sent him the statement of account in February 1972. The debt was then DM 3,756, the sterling equivalent being £452. In July 1973 when owing to the fall in the value of sterling, the sterling equivalent of the sum due had risen to £641 the plaintiff claimed the debt in Deutsch marks in the West London County Court and they asked the judge to refer to the European Court of Justice under article 177 (a) of the Treaty of Rome the question whether the rule of English law that an English court could give judgment only in sterling was compatible with article 106 of the said Treaty. The judge refused to make the reference and dismissed the claim on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to give judgment in any currency other than sterling. On appeal by the plaintiffs, it was held (in the headnote) at 824 that:
“(1) that article 106 required the English court, as the national court of a member state, to give judgment for a creditor residing in another member state in his own currency where it was the currency of the contract; it would be contrary to the spirit and intent of the treaty to preserve and apply the English rule by making a creditor in a member state accept judgment against a defaulting English debtor in depreciated sterling; accordingly, the rule that an English court could give judgment only in sterling no longer applied.
(2) That in any event the reasons for the rule, founded on outdated procedure and the stability of sterling, had been eroded by, in particular, changes in the form of money judgments and the availability of an order for specific performance of a contract to pay money and as the reasons had ceased to exist the rule should be discarded. . .”
The main reason for the change in the law adumbrated by this decision was characteristically brought to the forefront in the opening judgment of Denning M.R. when he stated at 826, “Here we see the impact of the Common Market upon our law. No one would have thought of it before.”
[p.631] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611
The former rule of law, with its breach date conversion was brought to its quietus, however, by the House of Lords in Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd. [1976] A.C. 443. That case, if I may say so, originated capriciously. A Swiss seller sued in England two English buyers upon written contracts for goods supplied and prices fixed in Swiss francs. He claimed the sums due in Swiss francs converted to sterling at the breach date. On 22 November 1974 the buyers intimated that they would submit to judgment. On 26 November 1974, the Court of Appeal gave the judgment in Schorsch Meier GmbH v. Hennin (supra) which discarded the rule on which the plaintiff had stated his action. The seller, thereupon, amended his pleadings to ask for judgment in Swiss francs as an alternative to claiming judgment in sterling. Bristow J. gave judgment in sterling, holding that the rule that English courts could express judgment only in sterling had not been altered either by Parliament or by any decision of the House of Lords. The Court of Appeal reversed his decision and following Schorsch Meier GmbH v. Hennin gave judgment for the seller ordering the buyers to pay the sum due in Swiss francs, the currency of the contract, or the equivalent in sterling at the time of payment. On appeal to the House of Lords it was held (Lord Simon dissenting) as stated in the headnote at 444 thus:
“(1) that it was legitimate for the House of Lords to depart from the ‘breach date conversion’ rule and recognise that an English court was entitled to give judgment for a sum of money expressed in a foreign currency in the case of obligations of a money character to pay foreign currency under a contract, the proper law of which was that of a foreign country, and when the money of account was that of that country, or possibly some country other than the United Kingdom.
(2) That the claim had to be specifically for foreign currency or its sterling equivalent and conversion should be at the date when the court authorised enforcement of the judgment in terms of sterling.
(3) That the instability which had overtaken the pound sterling and other major currencies since the decision of the House of Lords in In re United Railways of Havana and Regla Warehouses Ltd.
[1961] A.C. 1007, as well as the procedures evolved in consequence by the English courts and by arbitrators in the City of London to secure payment of foreign currency debts in foreign currency justified departure from that decision in terms of Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent)
[1966] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611
1 W.L.R.1234 since a new and more
[p.632] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611 satisfactory rule could be stated to enable the courts to keep step with commercial needs and would not, involve undue practical and procedural difficulties . . .”
It will be noted that the House of Lords embarked on its reform exercise by grappling with its own decision in the Havana Railways case and demolishing it under its declaration of 1966. Under the declaration the House affirmed its power to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so. The House did not, as in the case of Schorsch, rely on the Treaty of Rome and membership of E.E.C. (because Switzerland was not a member) but it relied on the instability which had overtaken the sterling since the Havana Railways case and the change in procedure to justify a departure from the old rule of law. The decision in Miliangos case (supra) was, of course, confined to the case of debt. How far the new rule would apply to damages in tort and also to damages for breach of contract were questions expressly left open for a later decision. With the decision of the House of Lords in the twin cases of The Despina R. and The Folias [1979] 1 All E.R. 421, H.L. the jurisdiction of the English courts to give judgment in foreign currency, as it were, reached its apotheosis. The Despina extended jurisdiction to tort and The Folias to contract.
It would seem that counsel for the plaintiffs hit upon the decisions in Schorsch and Miliangos cases by some flash of recent revelation because he never cited them before Ansah-Twum J. Not that they would have influenced his decision to a different conclusion but they might have rendered him less harsh in his criticism of the conduct of the case by the first solicitor for the defendant. These decisions have fanned his enthusiasm in inviting the court to open its doors and windows to admit the wind of change and thereby topple this court’s decision in Société Generale de Compensation v. Ackerman. It was further argued that the procedural difficulties which beset our courts from giving judgments in foreign currency had now been overcome in England by giving judgment in the form approved by Lord Denning M.R. in the Schorsch case and also that it was now possible for the court to order specific performance for debt. The form approved by Denning M.R. as stated in [1975] Q.B. 416 at 425 of that case is: “It is this day adjudged that the defendant do pay to the plaintiff so much in foreign currency (being the currency of the contract) or the sterling equivalent at the time of payment.”
It is all well and good that we are asked to permit a transplant of English decisions to change our law. The storm that blew over England to transform their law did not blow out of nowhere: Membership of the European Economic Community, the willingness and capability of the [p.633] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611
House of Lords to respond to the call, the change of procedure to enforce such judgments, etc. played their combined role. But have we the capacity to review or overturn our own judgment; or can our courts, in the harsh realities of today and in the face of the provisions of the Exchange Control Act, 1961 (Act 71), particularly sections 5 and 6 as amended by the Exchange Control (Amendment) Law, 1986 (P.N.D.C.L. 149), enforce a judgment in foreign currency? Although P.N.D.C.L. 42, s. 66 (1) abrogated the Constitution, 1979, subsection (2) preserves such provisions as were continued in force by the Proclamation, 1981 and P.N.D.C.L. 42 itself. Consequently we look to article 121 of the said Constitution, 1979 for our powers.
Article 121 (3) provides that subject to the provisions of clause (3) of article 116 the Court of Appeal shall be bound by its own previous decisions and that all courts inferior to the Court of Appeal shall be bound to follow the decisions of the Court of Appeal on questions of law. It would be presumptuous for any judge of the High Court (or for any one presiding over an inferior court) to refuse to be bound by a decision of this court which has not been overruled by the Supreme Court or altered by the P.N.D.C. Here then is a strong reason why Ansah-Twum J. properly refused to permit any flirtation with the “date of payment conversion” rule advocated by the plaintiffs but rather favoured the “breach date conversion” as well as the incapacity to sue for foreign currency rule laid down in the case of Di Ferdinando and followed in the Ackerman’s case. Simply put, we have no power to overrule the Ackerman’s case. This is the more so because the rule followed in the Ackerman case is a positive rule of law although the reason for the rule may be procedural. Thus Lord Denning M.R., when discussing the “breach date conversion rule” in the Havana Railways case (supra) at 1069 said: “This is, I think, a rule of positive law established by decisions of this House and of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.” That being so this court is bound by its previous decision in Ackerman’s case and we cannot embark on a law reform in this appeal.
The parties consented to the judgment pronounced by Ansah-Twum J. He did not by his ruling amend the consent judgment but supplied the omission which alone can make the judgment certain. There can be no valid reason for disturbing that consent judgment and his ruling on the judgment except as to costs awarded in his ruling which the defendant’s counsel agrees was exorbitant. The plaintiffs’ appeal, in my view, ought to be dismissed except as to the costs of the ¢25,000 awarded which ought to be reduced.
The consent judgment by Ansah-Twum J. was perfected by the plaintiffs before the defendant cross-appealed. It has not been set aside
[p.634] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 611 by any substantive suit. It is, therefore, binding on him. The defendant’s cross-appeal ought to be dismissed for the above reasons.
DECISION
Appeal allowed and cross-appeal dismissed.
L.K.A.
