SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1986] SLR (HC) 14High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

REPUBLIC vs. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE GRADE II, OSU; EX PARTE YAHAYA [1984-86] 2 GLR 361

1 November 1986 · BROBBEY J · ≈ 6 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (HC) 14
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAREPUBLIC v DISTRICT MAGISTRATE GRADE II, OSU; ex parte YAHAYA [1984-86] 2 GLR 361 [1986] SLR (HC) 14
APAREPUBLIC v DISTRICT MAGISTRATE GRADE II, OSU; ex parte YAHAYA [1984-86] 2 GLR 361, [1986] SLR (HC) 14 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v DISTRICT MAGISTRATE GRADE II, OSU; ex parte YAHAYA [1984-86] 2 GLR 361, [1986] SLR (HC) 14 (Ghana High Ct. 1986).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Ewudzi v. Dadson (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 82.

(2) State v. Sowah and Essel [1961] G.L.R. (Pt II) 743, S.C.

(3) Mahamadu Lagos v. Commissioner of Police [1961] G.L.R. 181, S.C.

(4) Abbey v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 546.

(5) Armah v. The State [1961] G.L.R. 136, S.C.

(6) Atinga Frafra v. The Republic [1968] G.L.R. 85.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for an order of certiorari to quash the conviction and sentence of the accused for stealing. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Ayikoi Otoo for the applicant.

No appearance by or for the Republic.

[p.363] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 361

JUDGMENT OF BROBBEY J.

The applicant, Issaka Yahaya, was arraigned before the Osu District Court, Grade II on a charge of stealing from a kiosk belonging to his former employer. He was alleged to have broken into the kiosk in the night and taken the items therein but was caught red-handed by neighbours while leaving the kiosk with those items. When the case was called before the magistrate and the charge read and explained, the applicant pleaded “not guilty.” According to the record of proceedings, the applicant explained thereafter that although he entered the kiosk, it was the complainant, his former employer, who asked him to do that and take away the goods.

Upon hearing this explanation from the applicant, the magistrate suo motu changed his plea to guilty because she did not believe his explanation. She then convicted and sentenced him to twelve months’ imprisonment.

It is against the conviction and sentence that this application for an order of certiorari has been brought to be quashed on the grounds that:

(1) there was error on the face of the record;

(2) evidence should have been taken before convicting the applicant; and

(3) the proceedings offend against the principles of natural justice.

It is obvious that the procedure adopted by the magistrate is not sanctioned by any statutory or case law in this country. The Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30) sets out in section 172 the procedure to be followed where an accused pleads not guilty to a criminal charge. The section mandatorily requires evidence to be heard so long as a plea of not guilty is entered. Section 172 of Act 30 turns out to be in the same words as section 168 of our former Criminal Procedure Code, Cap 10 (1951 Rev). In Ewudzi v. Dadson (1957) 3 WALR 82 section 168 was explained and the same emphasis was laid on the necessity to record evidence whenever an accused person pleads not guilty to a criminal charge. It cannot properly be said that the magistrate did not hear the applicant. She certainly did hear him and recorded his explanation to the charge. However, that explanation was no valid basis on which to believe or disbelieve the applicant. The learned magistrate arrived at her conclusion to a large extent from the facts given by the prosecution, It has, however, been held in a number of cases that it is wrong to presume the guilt of an accused person merely from facts proved by the prosecution. In a case in which the judgment of the High Court mentioned the following expression concerning the guilt of the accused, “I was so satisfied before the accused gave evidence”, the Supreme Court held that that expression gave the impression that the trial judge had prejudged the guilt of the two

[p.364] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 361

accused persons before hearing them. That was The State v. Sowah and Essel [1961] GLR (Pt II) 743, S.C.

One of the cardinal Principles of criminal law in this country is that when an accused person pleads not guilty, his conviction must be based on evidence Proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the same case of State v. Sowah and Essel (supra), it was held further at 747 that,… evidence for the prosecution merely displaces the presumption of innocence but a the guilt of the accused is not put beyond reasonable doubt until the accused himself has given evidence.” The appellants in Sowah and Essel (supra) were acquitted and discharged on appeal. The instant case which was before the Osu magistrate was even worse because in the Sowah and Essel case (supra) the prosecution led evidence while the trial before the Osu Magistrate involved only statements supplied by the state prosecutor.

Even if the magistrate had taken evidence from the prosecution and the defence, she would still not have been entitled to convict the applicant merely because she did not believe his defence. Short of believing the applicant, the court would have had the duty to consider whether the defence would be reasonably true or reasonably probable: see Mahamadu Lagos v. Commissioner of Police [1961] GLR 181, SC and Abbey v. The State [1964] GLR 546. It is obvious that by not recording evidence from the defence, the magistrate disabled herself from considering the reasonable probability of whatever defence the applicant was minded to put f orward on his behalf

The procedure adopted by the magistrate was so flagrantly in violation of well established principles and statutory laws, particularly Act 30, s 172, that the conviction and sentence cannot be allowed to stand. They are consequently quashed.

What is not so certain is whether or not the applicant may be ordered to be retried without necessarily infringing the rule that no person should be tried or punished twice for the same offence, especially since the applicant spent a few days in prison in consequence of the magistrate’s conviction and sentence. The authorities, however, seem to indicate that in a case like the instant one an order for retrial will be appropriate: In Armah v. The State [1961] GLR 136, SC where the trial of the accused person by the High Court was ruled to have been in complete disregard of the provisions of the then Criminal Procedure Code, Cap 10 (1951 Rev), ss 274, 277 and 285, the Supreme Court ordered a retrial before a differently constituted court. There was also a case quite similar to the instant one in which no evidence was recorded but the accused was convicted on his own plea of guilty and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. When his appeal was allowed despite his plea of guilty, a retrial was ordered: That was Atinga Frafra v. The Republic [1968] GLR 85.

[p.365] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 361

The applicant in the instant case was not tried fully. In addition, he was admitted to bail in this court on his first appearance here. The number of days he spent in prison may be taken into account if he is convicted again. The applicant is consequently ordered to be retried before another district magistrate grade II apart from the one whose conviction and sentence have been quashed herein. As stated already, should he be convicted after the retrial, it is hoped that those days he served in prison following the erroneous conviction and sentence will be taken into account when passing final sentence on him

DECISION

Application granted Retrial ordered

M.C.N.-N.

Scroll to Top