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[1986] SLR (HC) 17High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA vs. MENSAH [1984-86] 2 GLR 622

28 July 1986 · AMMAH J · ≈ 9 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (HC) 17
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OSCOLAUNIVERSITY OF GHANA v MENSAH [1984-86] 2 GLR 622 [1986] SLR (HC) 17
APAUNIVERSITY OF GHANA v MENSAH [1984-86] 2 GLR 622, [1986] SLR (HC) 17 (Ghana).
BluebookUNIVERSITY OF GHANA v MENSAH [1984-86] 2 GLR 622, [1986] SLR (HC) 17 (Ghana High Ct. 1986).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Republic v. Central Disciplinary Board; Ex parte Tsawodzi [1973] 2 G.L.R. 299.

(2) Bank of Ghana v. Nyarko [1973] 2 G.L.R. 265, C.A.

(3) Hemans v. Ghana National Trading Corporation [1978] G.L.R. 4, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decision of the District Court Grade I, Tema wherein the court held that the plaintiff-respondent was wrongfully dismissed by the defendants-appellants. The facts are fully stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Wontumi for the appellants.

Yankson for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF AMMAH J.

This is an appeal by the defendants – appellants (hereinafter referred to as the defendants) from the judgment of the District Court Grade I, Tema. The plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) took an action against the defendants for damages for wrongful termination of his appointment.

The relevant and brief facts show that before the termination of the plaintiff’s appointment on or about 12 August 1982 he had worked for some time with the defendants. At the material time he was a principal administrative officer, a senior officer. His duties included allocation of the defendants’ houses and worked under the executive engineer. It would seem a rented house belonging to the defendants became vacant. Such rented houses were meant for the occupation of the employees of the defendants and this would be with the consent and approval of the executive engineer. Shorn of irrelevant facts the plaintiff gave this vacant rented house to one Madam Afua Abrefi who was not an employee of the defendants, according to him, to avoid any theft there. He did this when the executive engineer was away and without his consent and approval. It was alleged he collected rents from this lady and did not pay same to the defendants.

[p.624] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 622

The plaintiff admitted in evidence that he did not have any authority from the housing allocation committee to put Madam Abrefi in the said house. Mr. Ludwig Osei, second witness for the plaintiff, said in cross-examination that it was improper for the plaintiff to give the house to the lady as he did.

As a result of the plaintiff’s behaviour and following a report from the executive engineer to the registrar, a disciplinary committee of inquiry was appointed to go into the matter. The plaintiff was represented by counsel. The disciplinary committee of inquiry after their investigation made their report, tendered as exhibit 2. In this report their recommendation with regard to the plaintiff states among other things, that:

“In view of the foregoing the committee recommends that Mr. Mensah be suspended for fourteen days without pay. The committee further recommends his transfer from not only the housing section but also from the estate organisation after serving his suspension.”

As a result of the report the plaintiff’s appointment was terminated by letter No. P. 9473/135 of 12 August 1982. The letter among other things, stated that, “Such acts, (i.e. of the plaintiff) would amount to misconduct and the university views them with grave concern.” In that letter the plaintiff was offered “three months’ salary in lieu of notice as well as all benefits from his past service.”

The plaintiff appealed to the vice-chancellor of the defendants against the termination of his appointment but it was turned down by the latter’s letter No. P. 9473 of 8 November 1982. In this letter the vice-chancellor made the point that “the committee was a fact finding one which did not possess the right to decide on sanctions.”

It was then that the plaintiff took this action. After a reasoned judgment the trial district magistrate, grade I, gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff. He awarded him ¢50,000 damages with ¢15,000 costs. It is against this judgment and costs that the defendants have brought this appeal.

The defendants have appealed on a number of grounds as set out in the grounds of appeal. Counsel first argued grounds (1)-(5) of the appeal together. These grounds in a nutshell were that: (i) the judgment was against the weight of evidence; (ii) the finding of the trial court that the disciplinary committee did not establish any misconduct against the plaintiff, ie that he did let the defendants’ rented premises to a stranger without authority and did collect rent from such a stranger and thereby defrauding the defendants’ was wrong; (iii) that the trial court was wrong in law in justifying the wrongful act in letting the defendants’

[p.625] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 622

said premises to a stranger on the ground that such wrongful act was actuated by “purely humanitarian” consideration; (iv) that the trial court was wrong in not treating the disciplinary committee’s findings as final but allowed evidence to contradict the same; and (v) that the findings of the trial court that the plaintiff acted in good faith and did not collect any rent from the person to whom he unlawfully let the said premises were against the weight of evidence.

Counsel for the defendants argued that the defendants terminated the appointment of the plaintiff with full benefits but he was not dismissed. Counsel for the plaintiff argued to the contrary. It may be correct having regard to exhibit 1, that there may be a difference in the terms termination of appointment and dismissal but it is not necessary to burden this judgment with an academic discussion on it. There was sufficient evidence, whatever the term used, that the plaintiff was asked to stop work with the defendants with the usual benefits to be paid him. There might be termination of appointment as per exhibit 1 — the Unified Conditions of Service for Senior Staff of the University of Ghana (January 1976).

After hearing counsel on both sides I think if the learned trial magistrate’s holding was that there was no evidence of misconduct found by the disciplinary committee and that the plaintiff acted `in good faith and on humanitarian grounds, then that would be wrong because in my view, from the record, evidence was given to show and the disciplinary committee held that the plaintiff’s behaviour constituted misconduct within section 2 (g) of the Revised Unified Conditions of Service for Senior Staff of the University of Ghana (January 1976). Secondly, it could not be correct in such circumstances that the plaintiff acted in good faith and on humanitarian grounds.

Ground (6) of the appeal reads as follows:

“that the trial court was wrong in law in holding that the defendant – appellant’s vice-chancellor had no power in terminating the appointment of the plaintiff – respondent and in dismissing the plaintiff – respondent’s subsequent appeal and the appeals made on his behalf in the circumstances in which the vice-chancellor did.”

Ground (7) of the appeal also reads: “The trial court was wrong in holding that the plaintiff – respondent was wrongfully dismissed by the defendant – appellant from its employment.” In support of his argument counsel referred to section 6 (1) of the University of Ghana Act, 1961 (Act 79), and Statute No 24 (a) made by virtue of section 15 (1) of Act 79. Section 6 (1) of Act 79 reads; “The Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed by the University Council and, under the Council, shall be

[p.626] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 622

the academic and administrative head and chief disciplinary officer of the University.” Statute 24 (a) referred to above also provides, “The Vice-Chancellor shall appoint all employees of the University other than senior members.”

Counsel for the defendants argued that if the vice-chancellor had power to appoint, then by implication he could terminate their appointments. He further submitted that the disciplinary committee was a fact finding committee which could make recommendations to the vice-chancellor who would then decide the appropriate penalty. Counsel for the defendants concluded that the vice-chancellor’s final decision to terminate the plaintiff’s appointment was right.

Counsel for the plaintiff also referred to the evidence in general, Statute No. 24 (a) and chapter 10 on discipline in the Unified Conditions of Service for Senior Staff of the University of Ghana (Revised) and submitted that what the vice-chancellor did `in terminating the appointment of the plaintiff was wrongful.

The argument for the defendants with regard to Statute 24 (a) appears to me to be fallacious for the simple reason that it governs junior officers and not senior officers as the plaintiff was at the time. Section 44 of exhibit 1 provides:

“The application of disciplinary sanctions to senior staff for misconduct shall be the responsibility of the Disciplinary Committee constituted by the Vice-Chancellor. The Registrar or his representative shall serve as the Secretary of the Committee.”

(The emphasis is mine.) Section 49 of exhibit 1 sets out the penalties; clause (c) of that section provides for “suspension from duty without pay for a period not exceeding fourteen days.”

Having heard counsel’s arguments on this aspect of the case and having read the relevant portions of exhibits 1-2 and 3 (the vice-chancellor’s letter No. P. 9473 of 8 November 1982), I have come to the conclusion that the vice-chancellor should have acted at least on the recommendation of the disciplinary committee of inquiry which section 44 of exhibit 1 allows him to constitute. His decision `in going beyond the disciplinary committee’s recommendation was ultra vires the terms and conditions of service and therefore wrong: see Republic v. Central Disciplinary Board; Ex parte Tsawodzi [1973] 2 G.L.R. 299. I am therefore of the view that the district court was right in its holding that the plaintiff’s appointment was wrongfully terminated. This is sufficient to dismiss the substantive case.

But the defendants complain in their grounds of appeal (8) and (9) that even if the plaintiff was “wrongfully dismissed” the damages of [p.627] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 622

¢50,000 and costs of ¢15,000 awarded were excessive and wrong in law. The action in this case is that of master and servant. In this case where the relationship of the parties is governed by the Unified Conditions of Service for the Senior Staff of the University of Ghana, exhibit 1, effect should be given to it.

There has been a long line of decided cases with regard to the quantum of damages to be awarded with regard to this aspect of the law. A few may be mentioned here: Bank of Ghana v. Nyarko [1973] 2 G.L.R. 265 at 275, C.A. and Hemans v. Ghana National Trading Corporation [1978] G.L.R. 4 at 5, C.A. In the latter case where the employee who was wrongfully dismissed was entitled to a month’s pay in lieu of notice the court awarded him four months’ salary as compensation and stated that if he had already been paid the month’s salary in lieu of such notice it should be deducted from the compensation. In this case by section 58 (iv) of exhibit 1 the plaintiff was at the time entitled to three calendar months pay in lieu of notice. It would seem he was offered this amount but he rejected it. I think the measure of damages would be three months’ salary in lieu of notice but I would add that he should be given a further three months’ salary as compensation as was done in the Hemans case since this would constitute a reasonable period during which he could find another job.

Counsel for the defendants sent me a letter copied to counsel for the plaintiff that on 12 August 1982 the salary of the plaintiff was ¢1,115 per month. I accept this as correct because it is confirmed by the address made on behalf of the plaintiff during the proceedings. It means that the plaintiff must be entitled to ¢6,690 as damages, “as well as all benefits from past services” as specifically stated in exhibit C. I think the trial court took into consideration the award of ¢50,000 in awarding ¢15,000 costs. In my view costs of ¢3,000 would seem reasonable.

I would award the plaintiff ¢4,000 costs in this court, In all therefore the plaintiff is entitled to ¢7,000 costs in this court and the trial court. Subject to this variation `in the damages and costs awarded, the appeal is dismissed.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

Award of damages and costs varied.

J. A. A.

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