OSEI vs. SIRIBOUR II [1984-86] 1 GLR 588
24 March 1986 · ADADE JSC · ≈ 17 min read
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[p.590] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 588
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Republic v. Kumasi Traditional Council; Ex parte Nana Kofi Dei [1973] 2 G.L.R. 73; C.A. (2) Bushell v. Hammond [1904] 2 K.B. 563; 73 L.J.K.B. 1005, C.A.
(3) Cohen, A Bankrupt; In re [1961] 1 Ch. 246; [1961] 2 W.L.R. 237; [1961] 1 All E.R. 646, C.A. (4) Ampong v. Amankwa [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. 11) 736.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against a decision of the National House of Chiefs dismissing an appeal from the judgment of the Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs wherein the appellant’s action against the defendant for a declaration that he was a royal of the Juaben paramount stool was dismissed. The facts are fully set out in the judgment of the court.
COUNSEL
Totoe for the appellant.
A. Mmieh for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF ADADE J.S.C.
Adade J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the court. In 1982 the appellant, J. T. Osei (hereafter referred to as the plaintiff) sued the respondent, Nana Otuo Siribour II, Omanhene of the Juaben Traditional Area (hereafter referred to as the defendant) in the Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs for reliefs which are better quoted than paraphrased, viz:
“Wherefore the petitioner [plaintiff] claims that [the judicial committee of the Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs] may:
(a) declare that the petitioner is a royal of the Juaben paramount stool of Ashanti;
(b) direct the respondent to recognise and to treat the petitioner as such.”
The plaintiff alleges that there are three main branches of the Juaben royal family. These are the Nana Dwuwaa branch; the Nana Akua Mensah branch; and the Nana Abrafi Mensah branch. He claims that he descends from the Nana Dwuwaa branch through one Nana Abena Serwaa an elder sister of Nana Dwuwaa. Many many years ago, this Nana Abena Serwaa migrated from Juaben, sojourned in several places, and eventually settled at Mfensi where apparently the plaintiff was born. Later, on hearing of his true roots he, the plaintiff, came to Juaben, explained his circumstances to the defendant in the presence of elders, and was acknowledged a member of the Juaben royal family as a true descendant of Nana Dwuwaa. He performed the relevant custom to seal this acknowledgment. Subsequently, however, the defendant has conducted himself in such a way as to deny the plaintiff his royal status. Accordingly, he brought this action before the Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs to have it declared that he is a royal of the Juaben
[p.591] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 588 stool, and, so to speak, to seek an injunction against the defendant from denying that he is such a royal. The regional house dismissed the action in limine on the main ground that in Ashanti customary claims to royalty are made to the queenmother or else the abusuapanin (head of family) of the royal stool, who alone are in a position to know who their royals are. The defendant, who is himself only one of the royals, but neither the abusuapanin nor the queenmother, is not a proper defendant to such an action, even though he occupies the Omanhene stool. On this ground the suit was dismissed.
The regional house, however, resisted a challenge to its jurisdiction and held, contrary to objections by the defendant, that the matter itself is a “cause or matter affecting chieftaincy” within the meaning of that phrase in section 66 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370) and therefore it had jurisdiction to entertain it. The plaintiff appealed from the decision of the regional house to the National House of Chiefs. The appeal was dismissed on precisely the same grounds as those used by the regional house. Undaunted, he has appealed to this court. On 29 July 1985 we dismissed the appeal, but reserved our reasons.
As has been stated above the substance of the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant is that he is a royal and that he should be recognised and declared as such. The National House of Chiefs held that a suit for a declaration that one is a royal is a “cause or matter affecting chieftaincy” and can be maintained at any time, whether the stool is vacant or not, relying on Republic v. Kumasi Traditional Council; Ex parte Nana Kofi Dei [1973] 2 G.L.R. 73, C.A. On whether the action was maintainable against the defendant, the National House of Chiefs decided:
“We have come to the conclusion that this is a purely customary matter and that at any stage when one’s status to royalty is challenged the persons to decide on it are the queenmother and/or the head of family according to custom. It is when the queenmother and/or the head of family denied one’s status as a member of the royal family that an action is maintainable since denial by any person, chief or no chief, has no effect in custom.”
(The emphasis is ours.)
If a “denial [of royalty] by any person [other than the queenmother and head of family] has no effect in custom”, then one wonders how such a denial can ground an action in a customary tribunal, and worse still pass for a “cause or matter affecting chieftaincy” and be recognised as such by the traditional tribunal. The pronouncement establishes that such a denial raises no cause of action whatsoever at customary law. Therefore there will be nothing before the regional
[p.592] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 588 house of chiefs or the National House of Chiefs over which either of them can exercise jurisdiction.
It would seem from this that the denial simply puts in issue one’s membership of a family, be it a royal family, and the remedy for it being at best a suit to establish one’s status as a member of the family, is cognisable not by chieftaincy courts but by the ordinary courts of the land. This will have nothing to do with chieftaincy: the plaintiff will be seeking merely to establish his membership of the family, the purpose for which he is doing this being completely irrelevant to a determination of the suit.
The pronouncement clearly negates the finding by the regional house of chiefs as well as the National House of Chiefs that the subject matter of the present suit is a chieftaincy matter within the meaning of section 66 of Act 370. Section 66 of Act 370 defines “a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy” as:
“any cause, matter, question or dispute relating to any of the following: — (a) the nomination, election, appointment or installation of any person as a Chief or the claim of any person to be nominated, elected, appointed or installed as a Chief;
(b) the destoolment or abdication of any Chief;
(c) the right of any person to take part in the nomination, election, appointment or installation of any person as a chief or in the destoolment of any Chief;
(d) the recovery or delivery of stool property in connection with any such nomination, election, appointment, installation, destoolment or abdication;
(e) the constitutional relations under customary law between Chiefs.”
For the purposes of this case it is clear that sub-definitions (b), (d) and (e) are irrelevant and can be dismissed as inapplicable. But (a) and (c) call for some comment.
In the regional house of chiefs, jurisdiction was challenged on the ground that the plaintiff’s claim is not “a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy.” Against this the petitioner riposted that a claim to be a member of a royal family has in it the seeds of a future claim, however distant in time this may be, “to be nominated, elected, appointed or installed as a chief” under (sub-definition (a) above) or else “to take part in the nomination, election, appointment or installation of any person as chief or in the destoolment of any chief “under (sub-definition (c) above). Whilst we do not deny that in some circumstances a claim framed generally for a declaration of membership of a royal family may, in substance, be a claim to be “nominated, etc. as a chief,” we do
[p.593] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 588 not share the view that every claim to membership of a royal family is a chieftaincy matter, simply because it is potentially so. Such a proposition will be too wide, and cannot be supported. Every case must be dealt with and considered on its peculiar facts and by a close study of the plaint.
Analogies may be cited from other areas. For instance, every member of any family has the potential to become head of that family. But it cannot be concluded from this that a claim for membership of a particular family is necessarily a claim to the headship of the family, or that it is a cause or matter affecting the headship of that family. Similarly every normal citizen of Ghana has the potential to become the President of Ghana. We have seen this in past presidential elections in this country. But no one will dare to suggest that a suit for a declaration of citizenship is necessarily a cause or matter affecting the presidency.
In this case, the plaintiff has put his claim in great detail in a petition of some eighteen paragraphs, which we reproduce hereunder:
“PARTICULARS RELIED ON BY Whereas the petitioner has reason to believe and can prove that the following facts and particulars are true:Whereas the petitioner has reason to believe and can prove that the following facts and particulars are true:
(a) That the petitioner is a member of Nana Dwuwaa branch of the royal family of Juaben, Ashanti, which together with Nana Akua Mensah and Nana Abrafi Mensah branches of the family constitute the main royal family of Juaben, Ashanti.
(b) That an ancestress of the petitioner—Nana Abena Serwaa was an elder sister of Nana Dwuwaa. She left Juaben many years ago and settled at Kumasi, Wawasi and later at Mfensi.
(c) That she married at Mfensi and had children and grandchildren including the petitioner herein.
(d) That when the petitioner learnt of this family history the petitioner accompanied by some of the descendants of the said Abena Serwaa went to Juaben where he contacted one Osei Yaw, the chief linguist of the Juaben paramount stool.
(e) That after the petitioner had told his history to the said Osei Yaw the latter took him to one Kwaku Abebresse. He was then head of Dwuwaa branch of the Juaben royal family and has since died.
(f) That after a series of meetings at which the petitioner’s history was checked and cross-checked the late Kwaku Abebresse accepted the petitioner’s family history as
[p.594] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 588 correct and pronounced him a member of the Dwuwaa branch of the Juaben royal family.
(g) That the late Kwaku Abebresse subsequently arranged a meeting with the respondent and his elders at which the petitioner was formally introduced to them as a member of the Dwuwaa branch of the Juaben royal family.
(h) That at the said meeting the respondent and his elders after a careful and critical analysis of the petitioner’s history also came to the conclusion that the petitioner’s family history was true and correct. The respondent therefore accepted the petitioner as a member of the Juaben royal family.
(i) That as is usual on such occasions the petitioner was asked to provide customary aseda to serve as evidence of the historic occasion and the petitioner provided the following: case of schnapps and two (2) sheep in money. These were received and customarily applied.
(j) The petitioner says after the events pleaded (supra) the petitioner became and was formally acknowledged a member of the Juaben royal family.
(k) That abusuapanyin Kwaku Abebresse later died. Precisely he died in 1977 and was succeeded as head of family by Opanin Kwame Antohene.
(l) That while Kwame Antohene was the family head, Barima Akrasi of the respondent’s branch of the family caused a publication to be made in The Pioneer of 15 February 1977. In the said publication Barima Akrasi purported to say that the petitioner was not a member of the Juaben royal family. The publication was challenged by Kwame Antohene in a subsequent issue of the paper and Barima Akrasi did not pursue the matter.
(m) Some time after that, however, the respondent embarked on a campaign directed at denying the petitioner his status as a member of the Dwuwaa branch and of the Juaben royal family in general—a status the respondent had openly, traditionally and customarily conceded to the petitioner.
(n) That as part of this campaign the respondent asked the branch not to recognise the petitioner as a member of the branch and warned that he would not participate in funeral celebrations organised by the branch for their dead unless and until the branch disowned the petitioner.
[p.595] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 588
(o) That in pursuance of this warning the respondent refused to perform rites which tradition and custom impose on him as the occupant of the paramount stool of Juaben, at the funeral of abusuapanyin
Kwame Antohene. He has refused to perform the rites at subsequent funerals of the branch.
(p) That as if this is not enough, the respondent has requested the petitioner to appear before him and his elders for another look at the petitioner’s family history.
(q) That the petitioner has challenged the respondent’s conduct by swearing the great oath of Ashanti against him to the effect that the petitioner is a royal of the Juaben paramount stool but the respondent has failed to respond to the oath. In spite of this failure the respondent has still persisted in his campaign against the petitioner.
(r) The petitioner says the respondent and his elders having formally and customarily accepted and proclaimed the petitioner as member of the Juaben royal family, the respondent cannot change the petitioner’s status as such and the petitioner says the respondent’s conduct in seeking to deny the petitioner that status is uncustomary, untraditional and unconstitutional.
(s) Wherefore the petitioner claims that this committee may:
(a) declare that the petitioner is a royal of the Juaben paramount stool of Ashanti;
(b) direct the respondent to recognise and to treat the petitioner as such.
Dated at Kwabre Chambers, Kumasi, This 3 August 1982.
(Sgd.) Joseph Tufour Osei Petitioner”
Nowhere in this petition is there the slightest suggestion that the plaintiff has his eyes on the stool, or that he intends to raise, or join in raising, any matter affecting the stool. He is peeved that the defendant is not recognising him as a royal, and rather seems to question his origins. The response to the petition is in the same vein, as follows:
“1. The respondent denies categorically the averments in paragraph 7 (a).
2. The respondent denies again paragraph 7 (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f).
3. Save that Kwaku Abebresse on one occasion came to greet the respondent with the petitioner who had known the respondent previously in an informal manner, paragraph 7 (g) is denied.
[p.596] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 588
4. The respondent says further that the said meeting was not in the presence of the respondent’s elders and could not have been so.
5. Paragraph 7 (h), (i), j), are vehemently denied. The petitioner will be put to the strictest proof of the averments contained in the said paragraphs.
6. The respondent is aware of the death of Opanin Kwaku Abebresse and admits the said paragraph.
7. Save that the publication was challenged by Kwame Antohene the respondent admits the said paragraph. The respondent in further answer to the said paragraphs says that Barima Akrasi is the head of the family of the respondent.
8. Paragraph 7 (m) is denied categorically.
9. In further answer to the said paragraph the respondent says that the petitioner was on two occasions invited to appear before the respondent’s head of family to narrate his historical origins which occasions petitioner did appear but failed or refused to give such history. The respondent says further with the situation the respondent’s head of family then ruled that his branch will not perform any funerals in common with the petitioner until the petitioner has proved his case as a royal by giving his historical origins to the head of the respondent’s family.
10. Paragraph 7 (o) is denied. The petitioner was fully represented at the funeral.
11. Paragraph 7 (p) is denied. The respondent says further that the invitation was at the instance of the respondent’s head of family Barima Akrasi to afford the petitioner opportunity to prove his claim before the only competent body for a new entrant under customary law.
12. Paragraph 7 (q) and (r) are denied.
Save as hereinbefore expressly admitted the respondent denies each and every allegation contained in the petition as if the same were set out in detail and specifically traversed seriatim.”
The substance of this reply is that the defendant wants the plaintiff to establish his ancestry to his, the defendant’s, satisfaction. In such a situation we are satisfied that there is nothing affecting chieftaincy for which the regional house of chiefs could assume jurisdiction. We are aware that some pronouncements were made in Ex parte Nana Kofi Dei (supra) which would seem to support the stand taken by the plaintiff in this case.
[p.597] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 588
A careful study of the jurisdiction conferred on traditional councils and regional houses of chiefs indicates that a case will not pass for chieftaincy matter unless there is a chieftaincy dispute pending, i.e. either actually pending in the legal sense, or else pending in the popular sense, having regard to the general climate within the traditional area, depending on the factual situation. In the latter case, the facts relied on by the plaintiff-petitioner must have some close proximity to a chieftaincy dispute properly so-called, i.e. a dispute relating to or affecting the processes for getting someone to occupy a stool, or to destool an occupant of a stool. A mere claim to belong to the royal family, divorced completely from a chieftaincy dispute, would be too remote a factor to qualify an action as “a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy.” Indeed, section 15 (1) of Act 370 conferring jurisdiction on traditional councils has its marginal note reading: “Jurisdiction in Chieftaincy disputes.” (The emphasis is ours.) We are aware that marginal notes do not form part of statutes, but they have been looked at, from time to time, for help in construing statutes: see, eg. Bushell v. Hammond [1904] 2 K.B. 563 at 567, C.A. where Collins M.R. sought aid from the side note to interpret section 11 (4) of the Licensing Act, 1902; and see also In re Cohen [1961] 1 All E.R. 646 at 656, C.A. where Upjohn C.J. referred to the marginal note to section 51 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1914. Section 15 of Act 370 which gives exclusive jurisdiction to traditional councils in “any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy” contemplates that the cause or matter must have some reference to the existence of a chieftaincy dispute.
Thus under section 66 (a), the cause will be a chieftaincy matter if it relates to the “nomination, etc. of any person as a chief “, which this case is not; or to the “claim of [the plaintiff] to be elected or installed as a chief. “ Surely the plaintiff here is not claiming to be elected as chief of Juaben. To be able to bring such a claim, circumstances must exist which invite elections or nominations to the stool, viz the stool must be vacant. Where no such vacancy exists and therefore nominations and elections are not in the offing a person cannot claim that he must be nominated or elected to the stool. Similarly under section 66 (d), i.e. “the right of any person to take part in the nomination, election, etc. of any person as a chief or in the deposition of any chief’, a person cannot claim to be entitled to take part in such nomination, etc. unless nominations, etc. are afoot, or in the case of a deposition, unless a chief is being deposed, and the plaintiff’s locus standi in relation to the deposition is being challenged. Outside these circumstances we can also see a situation where a person’s entitlement to contest for the stool at a future date is challenged and put in issue, e.g. in an exchange of oaths. In that event, in order to protect and preserve his and his descendants’ interests in the stool, the person may bring an action directly claiming that he has such a right to the stool. He will be
[p.598] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 588 doing this so that he and his lineage are not forever barred from the stool. The challenge to him and his line will have raised a chieftaincy dispute entitling him to sue before the traditional council. In the absence of factual situations such as are described above, we do not see how a claim in the abstract to belong to a royal family can qualify as “a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy.” In this regard, we endorse the ruling of Charles J. in Ampong v. Amankwa [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. II) 736 to the effect that a claim to be royal is not necessarily a chieftaincy claim. We will not go as far as he did at 740 of the report that “a claim to be a royal by implication includes a claim to be elected or installed as chief on some future occasion.” (The emphasis is ours.) The claim may include, but does not do so by necessary implication. The person claiming royalty may not be thinking of the stool at all, and it is not for the court to ask him to do so, or to impute it to him. He may be satisfied if the status gives him the right to ask for the Omanhene’s presence at the funerals of his immediate relations: see, eg. paragraphs (n) and (o) of the petition (supra).
In Ex parte Nana Kofi Dei (supra) the claim of the plaintiff-petitioner was not completely divorced from a chieftaincy dispute. Indeed, it was a claim by him that he was eligible to occupy the Ntonso stool. The claim arose in the following circumstances: D., the occupant of the Ntonso stool swore at Ntonso the great oath of Ashanti to the effect that neither A. nor any member of his, A.’s, family was a royal of Ntonso and therefore eligible to occupy the Ntonso stool on any future occasion. A. predecessor of A. had occupied the stool for some period during the First Republic, but had been destooled, after the coup of 1966, by virtue of the Chieftaincy (Amendment) Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 112), and replaced by D. The oaths were exchanged during the mass jubilation following the restoration of D. In these circumstances the chieftaincy climate was such that entitlement to occupy the stool, be it in future, became a live issue between the rival factions, and gave rise to a chieftaincy dispute.
As has been stated earlier, some pronouncements in Ex parte Nana Kofi Dei (supra) particularly by Anin J.A. (as he then was) at 78-79 of the report seeming to support the plaintiff’s contention, are understandable only within the context of the facts of that case, and we hope that those pronouncements will not be extended beyond that case.
We hold that the claim in the instant case is not a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy. The regional house of chiefs had no jurisdiction to entertain it.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
J. A. A.
