SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1986] SLR (SC) 4Supreme Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

REPUBLIC vs. CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, TAMALE; EX PARTE VOLTA, SENIOR GAME WARDEN [1984-86] 1 GLR 372

23 June 1986 · ADADE JSC · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (SC) 4
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAREPUBLIC v CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, TAMALE; ex parte VOLTA, SENIOR GAME WARDEN [1984-86] 1 GLR 372 [1986] SLR (SC) 4
APAREPUBLIC v CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, TAMALE; ex parte VOLTA, SENIOR GAME WARDEN [1984-86] 1 GLR 372, [1986] SLR (SC) 4 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, TAMALE; ex parte VOLTA, SENIOR GAME WARDEN [1984-86] 1 GLR 372, [1986] SLR (SC) 4 (Ghana Sup. Ct. 1986).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Oppan v. Frans & Co. Ltd. [1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 281, C.A.

(2) Practice Direction (Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court) [1981] G.L.R. 1, S.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for enlargement of time within which to appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal after an earlier refusal by the Court of Appeal. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling of the court.

COUNSEL

T. Amassah (Miss) for the applicant.

Kwaku Baah for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ADADE J.S.C.

Adade J.S.C. delivered the ruling of the court. This is an application for enlargement of time within which to appeal against a judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 4 November 1985.

[p.375] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 372

The applicant, B. K. Volta, the Senior Game Warden, Mole National Park, Damango, says that the appeal was heard without notice to him as required by rule 15 (2) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218). By the time he got to know of the judgment, the statutory period within which he could properly appeal had lapsed, so he applied to the Court of Appeal for extension of time to enable him appeal. This statement cannot be correct as on his own showing he knew by 25 November 1985 that the appeal had been heard: see paragraph 15 of his affidavit. He says, however, that the application for extension, although filed within the proper time, was nonetheless refused on 12 May 1986. Accordingly, he has filed the instant fresh application to this court asking for an enlargement. The application purports to be made under rule 8 (6) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13).

In argument, Miss Amassah, counsel for the applicant, referred also to the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218), r. 10 (6) as amended by the Court of Appeal (Amendment) Rules, 1969 (L.I. 618), and also to article 116 (1) of the Constitution, 1979. We do not hesitate to dismiss article 116 (1) of the Constitution as inapplicable to these proceedings and irrelevant.

Rule 8 (6) of C.I. 13 reads as follows:

“(6) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (4) of this rule where a person has applied to the Court below for an extension of time within which to lodge a civil appeal and a period of not less than one month has expired since the time when the said application was made without the Court below having granted or refused the application, the applicant shall be entitled to move the Court to have the application determined by the Court.”

(The emphasis is ours.) And rule 10 (6) of L.I. 218 as amended by L.I. 618 is in the following terms:

“(6) For the purpose of sub-rule (4) of this rule and of the said rule 28, where a person has applied to the Court below for enlargement of time in which to appeal and a period of not less than one month has passed since the time when the said application was made without the Court below having granted or refused the application the Court below shall be deemed to have refused to grant the application and the applicant shall thereupon, subject to sub-rule (5) of this rule, be entitled to have the application determined by the Court.”

(The emphasis is ours.)

As would be observed, both the above rules envisage a situation where after a certain period of time the court below has failed to take a

[p.376] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 372

decision, one way or the other, in an application pending before it. In that event, in order that the fortunes of the applicant shall not be prejudiced by the indolence of that court, the applicant is given the liberty to ignore the court and to file his application direct to the appellate court. In this case, the Court of Appeal took a decision on the application before it, and refused it. We do not therefore think that rule 8 (6) of C.I. 13 is applicable.

L.I. 218 is the Court of Appeal Rules applicable in the Court of Appeal, but not in the Supreme Court. In rule 10 (6) of L.I. 218 referred to, “the Court below” means the High Court or the court from which the appeal has been brought; and “the Court” means the Court of Appeal.

By rule 28 of L.I. 218 (dealing with stay of execution pending appeal) a person whose application has been refused by the court below “is entitled to have the application determined by the Court.” A refusal by the court below is a prerequisite for repeating the application in the Court of Appeal: see Oppan v.

Frans & Co. Ltd. [1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 281, C.A. In order to satisfy this condition, rule 10 (6) imputes a refusal to the court below, if that court does nothing over “a period of not less than one month”, so that the applicant can take advantage of rule 28.

Unfortunately this imputation contained in rule 10 (6) of L.I. 218 is missing from rule 8 (6) of C.I. 13, which are the rules by which the Supreme Court works. Counsel for the applicant, Miss Amassah, says that the omission is inadvertent, and that the statutory intention in rule 8 (6) of C.I. 13 is the same as that in rule 10 (6) of L.I. 218. If there indeed is an omission in C.I. 13, then there must be more than one omission: First, rule 28 of L.I. 218 which permits an applicant to repeat his application in the Court of Appeal if it is refused by a court below, has no counterpart in C.I. 13. And perhaps because of this, which we can only say is a deliberate omission, a refusal by the Court of Appeal is not a condition for an application to this court under rule 8 (1) (b) of C.I. 13. It would be noticed that the phrase “the Court below” is not mentioned at all in rule 8 (1) (b) of C.I. 13 (compare this rule with rule 10 (1) of L.I. 218), creating the false impression that under C.I. 13 “the Court below” has no power to extend time. This may be the second omission for there is a necessary implication in rule 8 (6) that “the Court below” may entertain and deal with an application for extension of time.

On 15 June 1981 the Chief Justice issued a Practice Direction (Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court) reported in [1981] G.L.R. 1, SC principally in respect of the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In paragraph 6, the Direction stated:

[p.377] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 372

“6. It is also to be noted that where a cause or matter can be determined by a superior court, other than the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the lower court shall first be invoked. The Supreme Court may dismiss any such cause or matter, with punitive costs to be paid personally by counsel or by the party

responsible for bringing such cause or matter to the Supreme Court in the first instance.”

This Direction applies not to applications only, but to causes and matters generally. Since causes and matters commenced in the lower courts do not get repeated in, but are rather appealed to, the Supreme Court, it seems that if by this Direction an application is filed in the first instance in the Court of Appeal and it is dealt with (as in his case), then, as contended by Mr Kwaku Baah, counsel for the respondent, the only remedy left to a dissatisfied applicant is to appeal. If the intention is to adopt the practice in rule 28 of L.I. 218 then some further directives are called for.

Be that as it may, rule 8 (4) of C.I. 13 completely extinguishes a person’s right to apply for extension of time, after a grace period of three months. L.I. 218 contains a similar ban under its rule 10 (5), implying that notwithstanding the wording of rule 10 (6) of L.I. 218, no application can lawfully be entertained after six months, in the case of a final decision.

The judgment sought to be appealed against was given on 4 November 1985. The six months’ deadline expired on 3 May 1986. The instant motion was filed on 20 May 1986, seventeen days outside the permissible period.

With the exercise of a small amount of diligence, this situation could have been avoided: see paragraphs 15-19 of the applicant’s affidavit. So that even if it is conceded for purposes of argument that the words “. . . the Court below shall be deemed to have refused to grant the application . . .” appearing in rule 10 (6) of L.I. 218 were inadvertently omitted from rule 8 (6) of C.I. 13, the position of the applicant here is not improved one whit, he having applied outside the six months’ period. This court therefore will seem to have no jurisdiction to entertain the application.

The application is accordingly dismissed. We make no order as to costs.

DECISION Application dismissed J. A. A.

Scroll to Top