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[1986] SLR (SC) 5Supreme Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

REPUBLIC vs. HIGH COURT REGISTRAR, KUMASI AND ANOTHER; EX PARTE YIADOM I [1984-86] 2 GLR 606

24 March 1986 · ADADE JSC · ≈ 21 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (SC) 5
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v HIGH COURT REGISTRAR, KUMASI AND ANOTHER; ex parte YIADOM I [1984-86] 2 GLR 606 [1986] SLR (SC) 5
APAREPUBLIC v HIGH COURT REGISTRAR, KUMASI AND ANOTHER; ex parte YIADOM I [1984-86] 2 GLR 606, [1986] SLR (SC) 5 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v HIGH COURT REGISTRAR, KUMASI AND ANOTHER; ex parte YIADOM I [1984-86] 2 GLR 606, [1986] SLR (SC) 5 (Ghana Sup. Ct. 1986).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Darley v. R. (1845) 8 E.R. 1513.

(2) Moosi v. Boateng [1975] 2 G.L.R. 396.

(3) Republic v. Boateng; Ex parte Adu Gyamfi II [1972] 1 G.L.R. 317.

(4) Republic v. Sagoe II; Ex parte Baffo V. [1979] G.L.R. 378.

(5) Republic v. Akwapim Traditional Council; Ex parte Nyarko III [1975] 2 G.L.R. 362.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for, inter alia, an order of certiorari to quash the High Court ruling refusing to grant an application in the nature of quo

[p.608] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 606 warranto in a chieftaincy suit. The are sufficiently set out in ruling of the court delivered by Adade J.S.C.

COUNSEL

Tsatsu Tsikata for the applicant.

Mills-Robertson (for Pobee) for the second respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ADADE J.S.C.

Adade J.S.C. delivered the ruling of the court. As we understand the case for the applicant, there are two parts to this application, plus a possible third.

The first part is a convoluted, indirect and concealed application for certiorari under article 119 of the Constitution, 1979 asking this court “for an order quashing the ruling of Quashie-Sam J. of 18 October 1979, upon an application in the nature of quo warranto brought by the applicant herein against the second respondent herein.”

The second part of the application, also purporting to be made under the same article 119 of the Constitution, 1979, shored up by article 118 of the same Constitution, asks the court to give directions to the High Court with respect to the High Court’s jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters. We have put “chieftaincy matters” ‘in italics because out of this term arises the possible third request. For if this court should accede to the second application and proceed to give the required directions, and if the court should pronounce that the High Court has jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters, then, following out of counsel’s submissions, there is a third request to this court to say “how the jurisdiction, if it exists, is to be exercised.” (See paragraph (3) of the applicant’s affidavit dated 25 February 1983.) In argument, this was reduced to asking the court to explain: (a) what are “chieftaincy matters”? and (b) which, if not all, chieftaincy matters the High Court can lawfully handle?

We shall now proceed to deal with these various pleas. First the application for certiorari. We have described this application as indirect. The motion filed on 25 February 1983 does not ask for certiorari. In fact, that word does not appear anywhere, either in the motion, or in the accompanying affidavit and statement of counsel. The motion is entitled:

“Motion for directions in the supervisory jurisdiction of the court, under articles 118 and 119 of the Constitution, 1979, and section 9 of the P.N.D.C. (Establishment) Proclamation, 1982.”

And it says:

“Please take notice that this honourable court will be moved for and on behalf of the applicant herein for directions in the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this court over the inferior courts to enable the enforcement of her rights as queenmother

[p.609] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 606 against an unlawful usurpation of the position of chief, and for an interpretation of the provisions of the said Constitution as retained in force by the P.N.D.C. (Establishment) Proclamation, 1982, regarding the High Court’s jurisdiction in so far as it touches chieftaincy matters.”

So this is the application: (a) for directions so that the applicant can enforce her rights, and (b) for an interpretation, to the end whether the High Court has, or has not got, jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters. There is no question of certiorari at all. But then the motion proceeds, in the conventional terminal paragraph, to ask for:

“…such further or other orders as to this honourable court may seem meet including an order quashing the ruling of Quashie-Sam J. of 18 October 1979 upon an application in the nature of quo warranto brought by the applicant herein against the second respondent herein.”

(The emphasis is ours.)

It is from the use of the magic word “quashing” that one suspects that the applicant may be thinking of certiorari. Even so, in her affidavit filed with the application, the applicant gives the impression that the said ruling of 18 October 1979 is exhibited merely as one of the many conflicting decisions on the jurisdiction of the High Court in chieftaincy matters, which conflicting decisions this court is being called upon to reconcile. Paragraphs (2) and (3) of the said affidavit read:

“(2) The application herein seeks, inter alia, to obtain an authoritative interpretation and consequent directions from this honourable court regarding the exercise of the High Court’s jurisdiction in connection with chieftaincy matters as indicated in the statement of my solicitor which I hereby verify.

(3) I attach hereto, marked N.A.K.Y. 1 a copy of the ruling dated 18 October 1979 of his Lordship Mr Justice Quashie-Sam refusing the application for injunction in the nature of quo warranto…”

In his statement, counsel describes the nature of his application as:

“The application herein is for directions to enable applicant enforce her rights as queenmother which have been unlawfully usurped, and for an interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions.”

[p.610] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 606

Nowhere is there any talk of certiorari. But in his argument in this court, one of the reliefs counsel asks for is an order quashing the ruling of Quashie-Sam J. of 18 October 1979 on the ground that the ruling is erroneous on the face of the record. Although an unsatisfactory way of applying for certiorari, it is on the basis of our understanding of what counsel seeks and of the substance of his argument, as replied to by counsel for the respondent, that we treat his request in terms of certiorari. We do hope that in future, applicants will ask for reliefs more explicitly, and not leave them to be inferred from argument. It is not a state of affairs which ought to be encouraged at this level.

On 19 February 1979, pursuant to leave granted by the High Court, Kumasi, the applicant herein, as Nana Abena Konadu I and others, filed an application under Order 59 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), asking the court “for an order of injunction to issue to restrain:

(a) the first respondent hereto [i.e. D. O. Amankwa] from usurping the office, functions and powers of the Effiduasehene;

(b) the first respondent from occupying the palace of the Effiduase stool;

(c) the first respondent from interfering with the rights of the applicants hereto to elect and install a new Effiduasehene; and

(d) the second-eighth respondents from aiding and abetting the first respondent to commit the wrongful and unlawful acts mentioned in paragraphs (a)-(c) above and for this honourable court to make any further order or orders as to this honourable court shall seem fit on the ground set out in the accompanying statement and affidavit.”

The application was entitled:

“In the matter of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370) and In the matter of Order 74 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A) and In the matter of an application for an order of injunction to issue at the instance of Nana Abena Konadu I and majority of the elders of the Effiduase stool whose names are listed in the schedule hereto v.

David Osei Amankwa who styles himself as Nana Osei Worae II … [and seven others, all of whom were named].”

[p.611] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 606

To properly appreciate the case of the applicant it is necessary to set out in full the ruling of Quashie-Sam J. on 18 October 1979. It is a short one-page ruling. After reciting the claim, the learned judge continued:

“Learned counsel for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection in the matter. He approached his objection from two angles: first, assuming that this court has jurisdiction in the matter before the court, the question he posed is whether it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of injunction as sought, and his answer to that question is that this type of relief of injunction is not available in Ghana. Secondly, he contended that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain this matter, it being a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy.

After hearing very lengthy submissions by both counsel on the preliminary objection in March, May and June 1979, I fixed 26 July 1979 for my ruling. On that date I was unable to deliver the ruling owing to non-availability of some of the authorities cited by counsel which I needed to consider in a serious ruling. I indicated the situation to counsel who promised to make the authorities available to me to be able to work on them during the legal vacation which was to commence soon on 1 August 1979. I therefore adjourned the ruling to 18 October 1979 in anticipation that I would work on it during the vacation period, but within a week of the commencement of the vacation, I received a letter dated 7 August 1979 from someone who describes himself as Alhaji Adams writing on behalf of the applicants making very improper, uninformed and unfounded allegations against me as a judge. I took what I considered to be appropriate action on that letter and brought the matter to the attention of His Lordship the Chief Justice.

Coming back to the ruling, however, the authorities I desired to see are still not available to me. I have however considered all the submissions by both counsel which I endeavoured to record almost verbatim at the hearing and have come to the conclusion that while this court has concurrent jurisdiction with a traditional council or house of chiefs in chieftaincy matters, it has no jurisdiction to grant the type of relief of injunction sought in this application. It follows then that this application must be refused and is dismissed. Counsel for the respondents asks for ¢4,000 costs, I award costs at ¢800.”

(The emphasis is ours.)

The grounds for counsel’s attack on Quashie-Sam J’s ruling are given by him in paragraph (4) of his statement, filed with the application on 25 February 1983 viz:

[p.612] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 606

“4. This ruling [of 18 October 1979] constituted a manifest error of law on the face of the record by a court which had duly granted leave for the application, but subsequently erred gravely in failing to appreciate the nature of the application and consequently acted ultra vires in dismissing it as improper when grounds had been established for the grant of the remedy.”

We must confess we do not quite understand the use of the term ultra vires in the above context. However, doing the best we can, and in order that our response may be appreciated, we interpret counsel’s argument as meaning that the learned judge erred in law when he said he had “no jurisdiction to grant the type of relief of injunction sought in [the] application . . .” and that this error is apparent on the face of the record. On this basis, we proceed to examine the submission of counsel in support of the application for certiorari.

Counsel says that the application to the High Court was in the nature of quo warranto and that under it the judge should have granted the application since, in his view, the second respondent was a “usurper” of the office of Effiduasehene. The remedy of quo warranto, he says, is available here in Ghana by virtue of the English enactment recited at the head of the application, viz “the Administration of Justice Act, 1938 of England.”

Wharton’s Law Lexicon (14th ed) at p. 834 defines quo warran as:

“a writ issuable out of the King’s Bench Division of the High Court of Justice, in the nature of a writ of right for the Crown against him who claims or usurps any office, franchise, or liberty to inquire ‘by what authority’ he supports his claim, in order to determine the right … [to the office or franchise.]”

Short and Meller’s Crown Practice (2nd ed) at p. 172 says that:

“This information will only lie against persons who claim to usurp any office, franchise, or liberty or privilege belonging to the Crown, and not of a mere private nature unconnected with the public government, or against a mere servant of a corporation, one who exercise no franchise or authority of any kind under the Crown—the test always being whether the office is of a public nature and not merely a ministerial one, held at the will and pleasure of others.”

The learned authors then cite Darley v. R. (1845) 8 E.R. 1513 where Tindal C.J. delivering the considered judgment of the judges in the House of Lords said at 152:

[p.613] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 606

“. . . this that proceeding by information in the nature of quo warranto will lie for usurping any office, whether created by charter alone or by the Crown with the consent of Parliament, provided the office be of a public nature and a substantive office . .”

(The emphasis is ours.)

The order drawn up after the application has been granted leaves no doubt that the remedy is intended to apply to public offices only: see, e.g. Form No. 32 at p. 515 of Short and Mellor (supra) wherein it is recited, inter alia, that the applicant:

“. . . gives the Court here to understand and be informed … that the place and office of … is a public office and place of great trust and pre-eminence within the said … touching the rule and government of the said . . . which said offices, privileges and duties he, the said [respondent] for and during all the time last above-mentioned, upon our said Lord the King without any legal warrant, authority or right whatsoever has usurped and still does usurp, …in contempt of our said Lord the King to the great damage and prejudice of his royal prerogative and against his Crown and dignity . . . And that due course of law may be awarded against him, the said [respondent] . . . to make him answer to our said Lord the King and show by what authority he claims to have, use and enjoy, and perform the office, liberties, privileges and duties aforesaid.”

From which extract it is more than adequately established that the office in question in a quo warranto proceeding must be a public office and one, as it were, in the gift of the Crown (or Crown and Parliament). Translated into the Ghanaian context, this means that the office must be one held of the government or the State, directly or indirectly, mediately or immediately.

The office in question in these proceeding is the office of the chief of Effiduase. Is this such an office as can be reached by an application (and therefore an order) in the nature of quo warranto? Is it a public office? We think not. The non-public character of the chief’s office is evidenced by the fact that eligibility to stools or skins is not open to the public or even to all the adult males of a particular locality. In every case, it is limited to a small group called the stool family from which alone a candidate can be selected to occupy the stool. Even so, the selection is done, not by the Oman as a whole, but by yet another small group of privileged persons called the kingmakers. In the instant proceedings, we are told that in the whole of Effiduase town, the kingmakers number only twelve (see paragraph (6) of exhibit N.A.K.Y.

[p.614] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 6

1B—statement of Obaapanin Abena Konadu I [the applicant herein] attached to her motion before the High Court, Kumasi). And by article 177 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, even Parliament has no power to enact any legislation:

“(a) which confers on any person or authority the right to accord or withdraw recognition to or from a chief, or (b) which in any way detracts or derogates from the honour and dignity of the institution of chieftaincy.”

The implication from article 177 (2) of the Constitution, 1979 is that the Republic or the government has nothing to do with appointing or dismissing a chief. And no agency of the State or government or Parliament has any such powers in relation to a chief. From which we conclude that the office of a chief is not that kind of public office which can be subject to attack by way of information in the nature of quo warranto. It is granted that the office of a chief is guaranteed by the Constitution, 1979, art 177 (1). But the guarantee does not, and indeed cannot, turn what is a non-public office into a public one.

Quashie-Sam J. in giving the ruling of 18 October 1979 did say that the High Court “has concurrent jurisdiction with a traditional council or house of chiefs in chieftaincy matters, [but] it has no jurisdiction to grant the type of relief of injunction sought in [the] application.” It would seem that it is this latter part of the holding that is causing offence.

But why should it? As we read it, that pronouncement was in direct response to counsel’s (Mr. Kofi Sackey’s) argument on 19 February 1979 that:

“It is a public office to be an occupant of a stool. To style one’s self as a chief and try to exercise such functions of a chief when not properly nominated and enstooled amounts to usurping that position. At common law quo warranto proceedings lie in the High Court by way of information. This is abolished and replaced by the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1938 (1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 63), s. 9.

Contends that Order 74 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), and Administration of Justice Act, 1938, ss. 9 and 10 apply. This is confirmed in the judgment in the Adu Gyamfi II case . . . “

These submissions were made during the ex parte application “for leave for an order of injunction to issue . . .” The proceedings in court, after service of the motion, are not exhibited. But guided by the statement of case of the second respondent in these proceedings, filed in this court on 28 March 1983, one gets a good idea of the arguments of counsel which led to Quashie-Sam J.’s conclusion that:

[p.615] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 6

“Quo warranto was available only where the office was one created by the Crown, either by charter or by statute. Though chieftaincy is guaranteed by the suspended Constitution the office of a chief is not one held under the Crown; nor was it created by the Crown. It is submitted accordingly that the common law remedy of quo warranto is not available in Ghana in respect of the office of a chief…”

(The emphasis is ours.) The emphasised words in respect of the office of a chief are missing from the summary of counsel’s arguments appearing in the first paragraph of Quashie-Sam’s ruling quoted above, but it is understood to be implied in the ruling that “[the High Court] has no jurisdiction to grant the type of relief of injunction sought in this application.” We clearly understand Quashie-Sam J. to say that having regard to the applicability of quo warranto, he has no power, no jurisdiction, to extend its application to the office of a chief, that office, agreeing with counsel, not being one created by the Crown. This, fortunately, is the understanding of the applicant too. For, arguing the application before this court on 20 April 1983, Mr. Tsikata for the applicant says “the judge refused us because we came by quo warranto. He would have come to a different decision if we had come by straight injunction.”

Let it be noted that Quashie-Sam J. had no doubt in his mind about the general jurisdiction of the High Court in chieftaincy matters; he said the High Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the traditional councils or the regional house of chiefs. This holding is consistent with his earlier ruling in Moosi v. Boateng [1975] 2 G.L.R. 396. Whether we agree with him in this is neither here nor there. The important point, however, is that it shows that when he used jurisdiction the second time in relation to the application before him in the instant case, he was obviously not referring to jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters generally, but specifically to the remedy of quo warranto as sought to be applied to chieftaincy, and to the office of a chief. We have no doubt in our minds that in this the learned judge was perfectly right, and we see nothing exceptionable in the conclusion he came to. As far as this aspect of the motion is concerned we agree with counsel for the respondent that Republic v. Boateng; Ex parte Adu Gyamfi II [1972] 1 G.L.R. 317 and Republic v. Sagoe II; Ex parte Baffo V. [1979] G.L.R. 378 were wrongly decided. On that basis we shall dismiss the application for certiorari.

Assuming we are wrong in the assessment we have made, the application will nonetheless fail. Certiorari lies, apart from jurisdictional situations, to correct errors of law apparent on the face of [p.616] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 6 the record. From what has been said so far, it is incontrovertible that the error of Quashie-Sam J. (if an error it be) cannot be said to be apparent on the face of the record, having regard to what Mr. Tsikata calls the confusion that surrounds the jurisdiction of the High Court in chieftaincy matters. In other words, he says the issue has not yet been settled; that no one knows for certain what that law is, whether the High Court has or has no jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters. So how can we fault Quashie-Sam J. for deciding one way rather than the other? If anything, the error is one that requires the lifting of a veil before it is reached. In the apt words of Jones-Mensah J. in Republic v. Akwapim Traditional Council; Ex parte Nyarko III [1975] 2 G.L.R. 362 at 368 it is a “latent error”, not a patent error; a hidden error, not an exposed one, and cannot, on the authorities, be a proper foundation for certiorari. They properly belong to appeals. And this is not an appeal. The application fails on this ground too.

Now to the second limb of the application. Counsel says that there are conflicting decisions in the courts below on the question of whether the High Court has jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters. This state of affairs has not been helpful generally, so we must give directions in this matter so that his client, Nana Abena Konadu I, queenmother of Effiduase, can “[enforce] her rights as queenmother against an unlawful usurpation of the position of chief [by the respondent].”

This request purports to be made under the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court conferred by article 119 of the Constitution, 1979. Counsel in his written statement dated 25 February 1983 says that:

“20 The state of confusion spawned by conflicting decisions, viewpoints and pronouncements in the lower courts, does no credit to the administration of justice since the impression is created that results depend on which particular judge hears an application, rather than the actual merits or principle of the case.

21 It is surely meet that the Supreme Court exercises its supervisory jurisdiction over the lower courts including the circuit court, High Court and the Court of Appeal, by giving authoritative guidance and consequent directions to these courts especially in the cases herein recited concerning the jurisdiction over, and relating to, chieftaincy matters.”

And article 119 provides:

“119. The Supreme Court shall have supervisory jurisdiction over all other Courts in Ghana and over any adjudicating authority, and in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction shall

[p.617] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 6 have power to issue such directions, orders or writs including writs or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory powers.”

The article is clearly in two parts: the first part, ending at the semi-colon, confers supervisory powers generally; the second part adds, in case we maybe tempted to forget same, that these general supervisory powers extend to and include the prerogative writs. As far as the prerogative writs are concerned we do not think that there is any difficulty about the scope of the court’s jurisdiction. Countless precedents and pronouncements can be resorted to, to guide the court, if need be, on the grounds upon which applications for habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus may be considered.

The same cannot be said of the general supervisory powers of the Supreme Court. No general principles seem to be readily available for guidance, nor do we think that such general principles are desirable. As far as we are concerned, each case ought to be considered on its merits, all relevant circumstances being taken into consideration.

In this application the applicant says that as a result of conflicting decisions, she (and by extension, the public) does not know whether the High Court has or has no jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters. This court must therefore tell the world what the position is, “to enable [her] enforce her rights as queenmother . . . “

To appreciate her case, some background facts relevant to the application will be helpful. By motion No. 62/79 the applicant, the queenmother of Effiduase, applied to the High Court, Kumasi in February 1979 by way of quo warranto to restrain David Osei Amankwah, the second respondent in these proceedings, from posing as and exercising the functions of the Effiduasehene on the ground that the said David Osei Amankwah had not been properly enstooled as such chief. The ruling on this application, refusing to make the order, was given by Quashie-Sam J. on 18 October 1979. This ruling is the subject-matter of the application for certiorari earlier dealt with in this opinion.

On 21 November 1980 the queenmother took out a writ of summons (No. 478/80) asking the court to strike out from the national register of chiefs the name of Osei Worae II, the stool name of David Osei Amankwah, on a number of grounds. Pending the hearing of the suit, the queenmother applied for an order of interim injunction to restrain the said Nana Worae II from entering the ahenfie and or performing the functions of a chief of Effiduase. The application was heard by Ampiah J. and granted on 16 October 1981. Twelve days later

[p.618] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 6 on 28 October 1981, Nana Osei Worae II appealed against the ruling of Ampiah J. to the Court of Appeal, on the ground that it was ultra vires the High Court: that the High Court had no jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters.

Because of the appeal, and no doubt uncertain as to the outcome, having regard to the state of the authorities, the queenmother has brought this application asking this court to pronounce, in advance, on the substance of the appeal, whether the High Court has or has no jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters. In the course of arguing this case, counsel for the applicant was candid enough to confess to the court that if the appeal had not been filed, his client would not have brought this application. It strikes us in the circumstances that this application could not have come in the best of faith. By the ruling of Ampiah J. on 16 October 1981 the queenmother had succeeded in negativing the effect of Quashie-Sam J.’s ruling of 18 October 1979, and she would have been contented with that, but for the appeal which the chief, Nana Osei, lodged against it. She now invites us to take a step which obviously will have the effect of prejudging the fate of the appeal, and rendering it valueless. We do not think that this court should allow itself to be used in this manner to frustrate the work of the courts below.

Besides, by the tone of her application, the applicant seeks advice from us, “to enable her enforce her rights as queenmother.” This advice is, to our minds, the sort of advice which ought properly to be sought from, and given by, a solicitor. This court does not exist to render advice to prospective litigants, and we ought to resist any attempt by anyone to use us as glorified solicitors’ chambers.

Having declined for good cause, to pronounce on the High Court’s jurisdiction in chieftaincy matters, it is unnecessary to proceed to consider the applicant’s third request, i.e “how the jurisdiction, if it exists, is to be exercised.”

For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the application is wholly misconceived and ought to be rejected.

DECISION

Application dismissed.

M.C.N.-N.

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