REPUBLIC vs. HIGH COURT, ACCRA, EX PARTE ADJEI [1984-86] 2 GLR 511
23 June 1986 · SOWAH CJ · ≈ 93 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v. Green and Lloyd Pty Ltd. [1966] 114 C.L.R.
437.
(2) Bilson v. Apaloo [1981] G.L.R. 24, S.C.
(3) Chandler v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] A.C. 763: [1962] 3 W.L.R. 694; [1962] 3 All E.R. 142, H.L.
(4) Director of Public Prosecutions v. Schildkamp [1971] A.C. 1; [1970] 2 W.L.R. 279; [1969] 3 All E.R. 1640, H.L.
(5) Stephens v. Cuckfield Rural District Council [1960] 2 Q.B. 373; [1960] 3 W.L.R. 248; [1960] 2 All E.R. 716, CA.
(6) Ex parte Partington (1844) 6 Q.B. 649.
(7) Brocklebank, In re; Ex parte Dunn (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 461, C.A.
(8) Thompson v. Dibdin [1912] A.C. 533, H.L.
(9) R v. Dibdin [1910] P. 57, C.A.
(10) Leah v. Two Worlds Publishing Co. Ltd. [1951] Ch. 353.
(11) Local Government Board v. South Stoneham Union [1909] A.C. 57, H.L.
(12) Rhondda Urban District Council v. Taff Vale Railway Co. [1909] A.C. 253, H.L. (13) Duncan v. Dixon (1890) 44 Ch.D. 211.
(14) Coxhead v. Mullis (1878) 3 C.P.D. 439.
(15) Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197.
(16) Darke IX v. Darke IV [1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 481, S.C.
(17) Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.
(18) United States of America v. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586; 77 Sup. Ct. 872 (1957). (19) Federal Trade Commission v. Flotill Products Inc., 389 U.S. 179; 88 Sup. Ct. 401 (1967). (20) United States of America v. Aluminium Company of America, 322 U.S. 716; 64 Sup. Ct. 1281 (1944).
[p.515] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 (21) Prichard v. United States, 339 U.S. 974; 70 S. Ct. 1029 (1950).
(22) Sloan v. Nixon, 419 U.S. 958; 95 Sup. Ct. 218 (1974).
(23) McCardle; Ex parte, 74 U.S. 264; S.C. 7 Wall 506.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as constituted in an action for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the High Court, Accra, for want of jurisdiction. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgments of Sowah C.J. and Francois J.S.C.
COUNSEL
Nana Otoamfom Bekoe (Peter Adjetey) for the applicant.
No appearance by or for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF SOWAH C.J.
When the instant application for an order of certiorari to quash the judgment of the High Court, Accra (in a suit entitled Johnson Complex Ghana Ltd. v. Adjei, High Court, Accra, 29 May 1985, unreported, per Adadevoh J.) was called, counsel for the respondent and his client were absent. Counsel for the applicant in moving his motion raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the court to sit. It must be observed that the objection was raised without notice to the respondent or the court. In ordinary circumstances the court would not have entertained the objection but it thought it was so fundamental that it should be heard. In the result the objection was overruled and reasons were reserved. The court now proceeds to give its reasons.
The burden of the objection was that though the Supreme Court exists it is not functional by reason of an infirmity in its membership. Counsel cited an analogous situation in which the Judicial Council exists but because its membership has been abolished the council is not operational. The court thinks that the analogy is rather far-fetched as there are in being, apart from the Chief Justice who is a member of the Supreme Court, three justices of the Supreme Court. Its membership has not been abolished.
It appears to this court that there is confusion of thought somewhere along the line. It is accordingly necessary to state briefly the history of this court. The Superior Court of Judicature was established by article 114 of the Constitution, 1979. And the said article 114 (1) and (5) provides:
“114. (1) The judicial power of Ghana shall be vested in the Judiciary of which the Chief Justice shall be the Head; and accordingly no organ or agency of the executive or the legislature shall be given any final judicial power …
(5) The Judiciary shall consist of the Supreme Court of Ghana, the Court of Appeal and the High Court of Justice which shall be the superior courts of record and which shall constitute
[p.516] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 one Superior Court of Judicature, and such other inferior Courts and traditional Courts as Parliament may by law establish.”
The membership of the Supreme Court or the manner in which the Supreme Court is to be organised for work has nothing to do with the question whether the Supreme Court exists or not. Article 115 (1) of the Constitution, 1979, provides:
“115. (1) The Supreme Court shall consist of
(a) the Chief Justice, who shall be the president thereof; and
(b) not less than six other justices of the Supreme Court.”
This provision is not dealing with how the Supreme Court should be organised for the hearing of a case or cases. It is dealing with the number of judges which should be made available for use over the entire life of the Constitution. That language is addressed to the appointing authority. It is telling that authority what it considers the minimum requirement for which provision should be made for the efficient running of the Supreme Court over its life. However, article 115 (2) provides:
“(2) The Supreme Court shall, except otherwise provided in article 120 of this Constitution, be duly constituted for the despatch of its business by not less than five justices thereof “
This is the provision dealing with the organisation of the Supreme Court for work in the exercise of its day to day business. This is a language addressed to the judicial administrator responsible for organising the Supreme Court for work.
The failure of the appointing authority to discharge its duty does not necessarily release the judicial administrator from his obligation to discharge his duties. They are independent obligations and so long as it is possible for the judicial administrator to discharge it, it is his duty to do so. Of course, under a well organised scheme, provision is made for spare capacity to take care of exigencies. This is precisely what the Constitution lays down though it may not have been adequate. It provided in article 115 (1) for a minimum strength of seven and indicated in article 115 (2) that five would be enough at any one time for work to be done. A judge may become ill, for one reason or the other he cannot sit, or as in the present situation where the appointing authority has kept the membership of the Supreme Court at its minimum strength and neglected its duty to make appointments when the number has fallen below the minimum.
[p.517] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511
So long as there are a total of five members of the Supreme Court the judicial administrator ought to perform his duty by constituting the Supreme Court. If the membership falls below five the judicial administrator will be rendered incapable of performing his duties.
In the Constitution, 1979 there was no power vested in any authority to invite judges outside those specifically appointed to the Supreme Court to sit in the Supreme Court. This is quite understandable; for under article 127 (1) a justice of the Supreme Court can only be appointed “with the approval of Parliament.” Such a power of invitation would render nugatory that provision.
The thrust of Mr. Adjetey’s argument is that when the appointed number falls below the minimum required by article 115 (1) the court will have no jurisdiction to transact business. There can be faintly discerned in the argument two postulates: the first can be dismissed off hand, namely that in the event of the fall in the minimum number of justices requisite for a Supreme Court the court ceases to exist. Article 127 (6) of the Constitution, 1979 provides: “The office of a justice of the Superior Court of Judicature shall not be abolished while there is a substantive holder thereof.” There are three justices of the Supreme Court at post today. The second postulate is that even though the Supreme Court can discharge its duties with a quorum of five it cannot work because its total membership has fallen below the requisite minimum.
The provisions in article 115 (1) regarding membership are not meant to provide for the despatch of any particular business but are to provide for the totality of judges (which number may oscillate from time to time) which will be available for the Supreme Court to discharge its business at all times. They are not provisions dealing with the exercise of jurisdiction. Those provisions are contained in article 115 (2).
On 31 December 1981 the Constitution was overthrown by the Provisional National Defence Council but in the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1981 provision was made for the continuance of all the courts in existence before the overthrow. The bulk and substance of the Constitution, 1979 relating to the judiciary was left almost intact. Of course it, too, was subject to any subsequent legislation which the P.N.D.C. may decree. In the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation (Supplementary and Consequential Provisions) Law, 1982 (P.N.D.C.L. 42), the council sought to make an amendment but did not create the Supreme Court; it merely took note that the Supreme Court as continued in existence by the Proclamation, 1981, was to be
[p.518] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 reconstituted in its membership. Section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 not merely provided for the membership of the court; it went further by providing that:
“19. The Supreme Court as continued in existence by the Proclamation is hereby re-constituted with a membership of— (a) the Chief Justice who shall be the president thereof; and (b) not less than four other justices of the Supreme Court; but for the determination of a particular cause or matter, the Chief justice may request such other justices of the Court of Appeal as he may deem fit to sit in the Supreme Court for such period as the Chief Justice may specify or until the request is withdrawn.”
It can be seen that under the law now in force the jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court may lawfully be exercised by any five justices of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal or both for its day to day business.
We may now with profit go back to article 115 (1) (b) where the words “shall consist of … not less than . . .”also appear in article 121 (1) (b) dealing with the composition of the Court of Appeal and article 124 (1) (b) dealing with the composition of the High Court. On the suggested interpretation by counsel of article 115 (1) as modified by section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42, whenever the office of the Chief Justice becomes vacant or the number of justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal or the High Court falls below four, five or twelve respectively as the case may be, those courts cease to exist or to use counsel’s words, they exist only on paper even though under the law setting up the courts or continuing them in existence there are at post enough judges to constitute the courts for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction conferred on them. The High Court bench as presently constituted with the Chief Justice and ten other justices has a membership short by two. The logic of the argument proffered if carried to its conclusion is that all the High Court Divisions in Ghana must stop sitting until its membership is brought to full strength, i.e. twelve High Court justices. Such an interpretation does not in the court’s view accord with reason or the object of the Constitution, 1979. As already observed there is the confusion between the membership of the courts and the quorum for conducting its business.
Finally the court will observe that the narrow rules of construction applicable in the cases of contracts, wills, statutes and ordinary legislation may or may not be adequate when it comes to the
[p.519] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 interpretation of a Constitution or law intended to govern the body politic. In the instant case, the court is interpreting provisions relating to an organ of State, namely the judiciary. Our interpretation should therefore match the hopes and aspirations of our society and our predominant consideration is to make the administration of justice work. We are sure it is not the intent of Mr. Adjetey that the administration of justice be paralysed. Perhaps it is more to call the attention of the appointing authority to appoint more judges. If I may borrow the language of Barwick C.J. in the Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v. G.J. Green and Lloyd Pty Ltd. [1966] 114 C.L.R. 437 at 444 out of its context, mutatis mutandis “that in this field one should not be seeking subtleties but rather applying broad and practical conceptions” The court hopes that more judges will be appointed to the Supreme Court to allay all doubts in this sphere.
JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.A.
I agree.
JUDGMENT OF ADADE J.S.C.
I have had the privilege of reading in advance the reasons given by his lordship the Chief Justice in this matter. I only wish to add a small footnote of my own.
It seems to me that with the coming into force of P.N.D.C.L. 42 arguments about the due constitution of the Supreme Court, such as we are now engaged in, have become largely academic.
Limiting myself for the time being to the constitutional provisions, article 114 (5) of the Constitution, 1979 established all the superior courts of record “which shall constitute one Superior Court of Judicature.” The membership, working quorum and jurisdiction were provided for in separate other articles. Article 115 (1) gives the membership of the Supreme Court as, “(a) The Chief Justice, who shall be the president thereof; and (b) not less than six other Justices of the Supreme Court”; that is, a minimum of seven. By using “‘other” in (b) above, the Constitution is saying that the Chief Justice is a justice of the Supreme Court.
By articles 115 (2), “The Supreme Court shall . . . be duly constituted for the despatch of its business by not less than five Justices thereof.” The word “thereof” at the end of the clause can only mean “of the Supreme Court.” Under the Constitution, justices could not be brought up from the Court of Appeal to sit in the Supreme Court. There was no provision for this.
Counsel for the applicant, Mr. Adjetey’s objection, looked at in the context of the Constitution, is to the effect that until the seven members of the Supreme Court have been appointed, the Supreme Court cannot
[p.520] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 lawfully sit. Thus if there are say, the Chief Justice and five other justices of the Supreme Court (a total of six for the time being) the Chief Justice cannot constitutionally select five out of the six to sit; it will be unlawful, and that court will not have jurisdiction to transact business. The minimum number of seven justices must first be appointed, before five can be drawn therefrom to sit.
This argument has only a superficial attraction; but it is, respectfully, fallacious. It is easily disproved by reference to section (1) of the transitional provisions, which provides that:
“3. (1) The required number of Justices for a duly constituted Supreme Court … shall be appointed within twelve months after the coming into force of this Constitution, and until the appointments [of the required number] are made, the Court of Appeal . . shall perform the functions of the Supreme Court. . .”
(The emphasis is mine.)
This section requires no interpretation. It is telling the Court of Appeal “As soon as the Supreme Court has enough persons to be able to work, stop working for them. The Supreme Court will then have jurisdiction to assume its proper functions.” We know from article 115 (2) that the minimum number to enable the Supreme Court to be duly constituted is five. This number may easily be attained, long before the seven to constitute the minimum membership have been appointed.
Therefore by section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions, if we have a Chief Justice and four justices of the Supreme Court, “the required number . . . for a duly constituted Supreme Court” shall have been appointed, and with these appointments the Court of Appeal shall cease to have jurisdiction; and the Supreme Court shall commence work.
It is a fallacy to argue that the Supreme Court must have the minimum membership of seven appointed before it can lawfully do business. With the greatest respect, the Constitution does not say so. It is this same notion, distinguishing between sitting quorum and membership, that has been carried into P.N.D.C.L. 42.
In Bilson v. Apaloo, [1981] G.L.R. 24 at 99, S.C. my brother Taylor J.S.C. expressed the same view with characteristic forcefulness when he said:
“The problem as I see it is this: At the date when the so-called full bench of the Court of Appeal was empanelled to adjudicate on the Tuffour case, the members of the Supreme Court who had been appointed following approval by Parliament were four, namely, Mr. Justice Sowah, Mr. Justice Archer, Mr. Justice Anin and Mr. Justice Charles Crabbe. If on that date Mr. Justice Apaloo is accepted as a Justice of the Supreme Court then the
[p.521] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 number of justices appointed, he, by the Constitution, and the others, by the President, will be five. In that state of affairs section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, completely deprives the Court of Appeal of jurisdiction to deal with any matter arising under articles 51, 117 and 118 of the Constitution. Their jurisdiction to adjudicate is constitutionally founded on the number of justices of the Supreme Court being less than five when they proceed to deal with the case. The existence at any point of time of five or more justices of the Supreme Court pre-empts their jurisdiction. Therefore if on the date they assume jurisdiction the defendant is a member of the Supreme Court, then since there will be five Supreme Court judges, they [i.e. the Court of Appeal] will not have jurisdiction.”
I accept the passage in its entirety, as it conforms with the true interpretation of section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions. In case it is quipped, “But these were the transitional provisions, and are no longer applicable”, let me hasten to observe that the Court of Appeal would under section 3 (1) be sitting in a “transitional” capacity pending the appointment of the five justices of the Supreme Court. As soon as the appointments were made the five might sit in perpetuity even if the remaining two to make up the minimum membership of seven were never appointed.
In 1982, P.N.D.C.L. 42 was promulgated. By its section 19, amendment article 115 (1) of the Constitution, the minimum membership of the Supreme Court was reduced from seven to five viz, “(a) The Chief Justice . . . and (b) not less than four other justices of the Supreme Court.” (The emphasis is mine.) Thus at this stage, P.N.D.C.L. 42 did no more than substitute “four” for “six” appearing in article 115 (1) (b) But it did not stop there. It added:
“but for the determination of a particular cause or matter, the Chief Justice may request such other Justices of the Court of Appeal as he may deem fit to sit in the Supreme Court for such period as the Chief Justice may specify or until the request is withdrawn.”
In this provision there is no limit to the number of justices of the Court of Appeal who may be invited to sit in the Supreme Court; the period too may be indefinite [“… until the request is withdrawn”], and, as by interpretation, the singular includes the plural, “particular cause or matters” includes “particular causes or matter.” Therefore it is quite conceivable for justices of the Court of Appeal sitting in the Supreme Court to take whole lists for weeks on end.
[p.522] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 Mr. Adjetey says, in his objection, that the minimum five members of the Supreme Court required by section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 must be appointed before the Chief Justice can press the justices of the Court Appeal into service. With respect I do not see where section 19 says this. It only gives the membership of the Supreme Court, and immediately proceeds to say that the Chief Justice may use Justices of the Court of Appeal. This is all it says.
As has been shown, the Constitution itself did not require the appointment of the minimum membership of seven as a precondition to the assumption of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court. All it required was that there must be enough persons at post to start work. This notion has not changed in P.N.D.C.L. 42, save and except that in looking for the persons the Chief Justice is now by the proviso to section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42, empowered to cast his net wider: to fish, not only from the Supreme Court but also from the Court of Appeal. It is a misconception and a gross misinterpretation of the law to say that section 19 requires the minimum membership to be appointed before justices of the Court of Appeal can be used. Section 19 does not say this anywhere. To bring home the point: supposing the proviso to section 19 had been part of the Constitution, as originally drafted, could it have been properly argued that the mandatory minimum of seven should be appointed before the justices of Appeal could be used? Certainly not.
Thus by P.N.D.C.L. 42 the justices of the Supreme Court together with the justices of the Court of Appeal (always with the Chief Justice himself) constitute one pool, from which “the required number of justices for a duly constituted Supreme Court …” may be drawn for the despatch of the business of the Supreme Court.
By widening the field of selection to include justices of the Court of Appeal, article 115 (1) as amended by P.N.D.C.L. 42, s. 19 has rendered the word “thereof” at the end of article 115 (2) otiose, useless. As originally drafted, “thereof” meant “of the Supreme Court.” Now that the selection may be made from the justices of the Court of Appeal also, “not less than five justices “thereof” can only sensibly mean “not less than five justices of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal.” The selection can no longer be limited to justices of the Supreme Court alone. This is the interpretation that can make section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 effectual. Any other interpretation will make section 19 inoperable. But we must interpret ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
A statute must be interpreted to give effect to all its parts, unless such an interpretation will lead to an absurdity. Here, to give effect to section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 it will be absurd to give “thereof” in article 115 (2) of the Constitution, 1979 its original meaning, for it will be ludicrous to say that although section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 allows the use of justices of the Court of Appeal, the selection must, by article 115
[p.523] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511
(2), be limited to justices of the Supreme Court only. It is patent, looking at the regime of P.N.D.C.L. 42 that “thereof” was left in place through the carelessness of the draftsman. It is the duty of a draftsman, when given policy changes to put into legislative form, to ensure that the required amendments, when effected, will run and be compatible with the remaining sections of the law he is amending. If there should be any incongruities, it is his duty to effect consequential amendments. These are matters of detail for the draftsman. It is not for the instructing legislative body to do this. In order efficiently to discharge his duties the draftsman must read the whole of the statute he is called upon to amend, or at least all relevant sections thereof, and at times, even read related legislation on the subject. Carelessness of the draftsman can result in irreparable loss to litigants (governments included), and place unnecessary but avoidable difficulties in the way of the courts in their efforts to dispense justice. In this case, if the draftsman had read the whole of article 115 which he was called upon to amend, he would immediately have seen that something had to be done to article 115 (2) in order to remove apparent conflicts with the new amendment, and to make that amendment sensible and effectual. I dare say that on this occasion the draftsman was remiss in his duties.
But there is a redeeming feature. Here legal interpretation can correct the error. P.N.D.C.L. 42 made under the Proclamation, 1981, takes precedence over article 115 (2) which must be interpreted to give effect to P.N.D.C.L. 42, by not limiting the selection to justices of the Supreme Court only, but to enable the Chief Justice to select from justices of the Court of Appeal also, as required by section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42. The interpretation that will achieve this result which is the true intendment of P.N.D.C.L. 42 is that “thereof” at the end of 115 (2) can only mean “of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal.”
The implication is clear, namely that the membership of the Supreme Court notwithstanding, so long as, together with the Court of Appeal, it is possible to raise a working team of five (including the Chief Justice) the Supreme Court can lawfully sit.
It may be observed, in parenthesis, that the fact that justices of the Court of Appeal can sit only “by request” is of no more than academic interest, for after all the justices of the Supreme Court also sit “by request” even though this is not expressly stated. For supposing there are ten justices of the Supreme Court, they all cannot troop into court on a Monday morning and begin to sit. The Chief Justice will have to select and request the appropriate number to sit.
Thus, if at a certain point in time there are only the Chief Justice and one other justice of the Supreme Court, but, say, six justices of the Court of Appeal, a lawful Supreme Court may be duly constituted in all manner of permutations and combinations:
[p.524] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511
(a) C.J. plus four justices of the Court of Appeal; or
(b) C.J. and the justice of the Supreme Court plus three justices of the Court of Appeal; or
(c) Justice of the Supreme Court plus four justices of the Court of Appeal; or
(d) Five justices of the Court of Appeal.
Any of these combinations will, under the new law, P.N.D.C.L. 42, give us “a duly constituted Supreme Court” even though one or two of the combinations may, for other reasons, be inadvisable. Similarly, in a situation where we have only a Chief Justice, no other justice of the Supreme Court, but, say, six justices of the Court of Appeal, it will be perfectly lawful to have “a duly constituted Supreme Court” (see combinations (a) and (d) above).
That logic of the situation is this, that even if we have fifteen justices of the Supreme Court, and say five justices of the Court of Appeal, the Chief Justice will not be acting unlawfully if he should decide, using the powers under the new law, to duly constitute a Supreme Court with: (a) Chief Justice plus four justices of the Court of Appeal; or (b) five justices of the Court of Appeal; in each case ignoring all the fifteen justices of the Supreme Court. Preposterous, unthinkable, one may retort. Yes! But not unlawful, I may add.
The problems we are called upon to ponder over seem real only because at present the number of justices of the Supreme Court is so small and we unwittingly appear to submit to the tyranny of this small figure. As soon as we begin to reason and calculate in “macro” terms, relatively speaking, we soon realise how empty and insignificant the alleged problems are.
Let me repeat that it is possible, in present circumstances, to duly constitute the Supreme Court with five justices of the Court of Appeal. Perhaps expediency and discretion may frown upon such a course of action, but the important point is that the court will be “a duly constituted Supreme Court.” It will be a perfectly lawful court fully clothed with jurisdiction to exercise all the normal powers of the Supreme Court.
We may not expect that this will happen, but if it does, where will be the constitutional challenge to it, given section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42? One thing we can legitimately expect is that in all this, good sense and considerations of the requirements of justice will prevail.
It is for the above reasons that I am also of the opinion that that objection raised by Mr. Adjetey, is misconceived.
JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.S.C.
On 20 May 1986, we ordered certiorari to issue to quash the decision of the High Court, Accra in the above matter and
[p.525] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 reserved our reasons for a later date. I now proceed to state my reasons.
After judgment had been given on a liquidated demand, the judgment debtor obtained an order to pay his debt by instalments. A later application by the aggrieved creditor compelled the learned judge to revise his order which provoked the application for certiorari.
Two issues arose for determination. The first, on the merits, challenged the learned judge’s powers to revise his previous order for instalment payments and substitute therefor other terms when the period limited for a legitimate review had lapsed. It is a simple matter of mathematical computation. The original order for instalment payments was made on 29 April 1985. The application for review of this order was filed on 17 May 1985. The rules applicable in the determination of this matter are contained in Order 39 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). The rules prescribe a time limit of two weeks for a review from the date of the order. Since more than fourteen days elapsed from the date of the order, the judge acted in excess of his powers when he revised his previous order. We were compelled consequently to set his revised order aside.
The second issue of fundamental importance relates to jurisdiction. It was formulated in counsel’s argument as follows:
“For a duty constituted Supreme Court, there should be a Chief Justice and not less than four other justices of the Supreme Court. When this criterion is met, a Supreme Court would be duly constituted to which justices of the Court of Appeal could be invited to sit.”
It was urged by counsel that this was the only logical interpretation of section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42, and since the complement of justices of the Supreme Court had fallen below the prescribed number, the Supreme Court had ceased to exist. Consequently any addition to its membership from the Court of Appeal could not cure the defect.
I disagree. But it is necessary first to go back to the Constitution, 1979 to get a clearer picture of the issues involved and put the matter in its proper perspective. The establishment of a judiciary is dealt with in chapter twelve of the Constitution, 1979. The relevant provisions are contained in articles 114 to 137. These articles deal with the hierarchy of the courts, their composition and the powers conferred on the various units thereof. Article 115 sets out the composition of the Supreme Court as follows:
“115. (1) The Supreme court shall consist of
(a) the Chief Justice, who shall be the president thereof; and
[p.526] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 (b) not less than six other justices of the Supreme Court.
(2) The Supreme Court shall, except as otherwise provided in article 120 of this Constitution, be duly constituted for the despatch of its business by not less than five justices thereof.”
The hierarchy of the courts is set out in article 114 (5) which reads:
“114. (5) The Judiciary shall consist of the Supreme Court of Ghana, the Court of Appeal and the High Court of Justice which shall be the superior courts of record and which shall constitute one Superior Court of Judicature, and such other inferior Courts and traditional Courts as Parliament may by law establish.”
Before the Constitution came into force, the transitional provisions were passed to deal with lacunae and areas that could create doubt and uncertainty in the law. The transitional provisions dealt with the judiciary in Part III of the First Schedule. Section 3 (1) thereof is as follows:
“3. (1) The required number of Justices for a duly constituted Supreme Court as established under clause (5) of article 114 of this Constitution shall be appointed within twelve months after the coming into force of this Constitution, and until the appointments are made, the Court of Appeal as established under that clause shall perform the functions of the Supreme Court contained in articles 51, 117 and 118 only of this Constitution.
The conjoint effect of articles 114 (5) and 115, and section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions, is that a judicial structure with the Supreme Court at the apex was created. The personnel to give the life-blood to that structure were the Chief Justice and no less than six other justices of the Supreme Court of whom five would constitute a working bench with the Chief Justice as president and in his absence the next senior justice of the Supreme Court occupying his place. The Supreme Court with its complement of justices, was to be established within twelve months of the Constitution coming into force. So that by any computation, before the end of 1980, if the constitutional requirement was met, there should be in existence an operational Supreme Court. The annals of our history acknowledge due obedience to this statutory injunction.
The importance of section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions appears to be two-fold: First, it set a deadline for the establishment of a functioning Supreme Court. Neither logic nor the force of congruence would permit a too easy disestablishment of an institution the law
[p.527] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 makers were at pains to see effectively established within a reasonable time. Even less acceptable is the argument that such an institution could be scuttled on the trumpery ground that its complement of justices had fallen below a minimum.
Of equal importance is the clear will the legislators demonstrated in section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions to create no vacuum in the functions of the Supreme Court. Thus the Court of Appeal was expressly empowered to perform the regular and important functions of the Supreme Court contained in articles 51, 117 and 118, when the substantive body had not been created. It seems to me inconsistent with this overwhelming desire of the law makers to perpetuate the effective functioning of the highest court of the land by creating no hiatus, that they would have fallen victim to an elementary casus omissus in making no provision for the Court of Appeal or another body to perform the functions of the Supreme Court any time it lacked jurisdictional competence arising from a Jack-in-the box syndrome of a lack of heads to pop up for the count.
The jurisdictional challenge is indeed one of construction. It has been urged that the true import of the clause in article 115, that “the Supreme Court shall consist of the Chief Justice and not less than six other Justices of the Supreme Court” is that the Supreme Court, qua court, can only derive a legal existence if there is a Chief Justice and six other Supreme Court Justices. This is clearly an unwarranted gloss on the word “consist.” If the argument is pressed that the reduction in numbers beyond a permissible level immediately dissolves the Supreme Court, then that argument also applies pro tanto to the existence of a Chief Justice to yield the same absurd result, namely that whenever the office of Chief Justice became vacant, the Supreme Court automatically ceased to exist, since “consist” also embraces the Chief Justice. The provision that the most senior justice of the Supreme Court should preside in the absence of the Chief Justice, in my view is not purely a functional arrangement, but was purposely designed to continue the effectiveness of the Supreme Court even when the office of Chief Justice was vacant. Any other interpretation would give the word “absence” in article 115 (3) a narrow and restrictive connotation and import into it temporariness which has no justification from the whole tenor and scheme of the legislation. It is my conclusion then, that provided a working bench in terms of the number of justices available to sit, meets the constitutional and legal requirements, neither the absence of a Chief Justice whether temporary or permanent nor the fall in the full complement of Supreme Court justices, should make the slightest dent in the jurisdictional competence of the bench. Any arguments on the effectiveness of the Supreme Court arising from a fall in its numbers would lead to such ridiculous results that one can safely
[p.528] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 say the makers of the fundamental law intended no such consequences. If they did, they would have expressed themselves clearly and without ambiguity. In this context, I respectfully adopt the general law thus expressed in Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 36 at p. 413, para. 628: “Unless they do so by express words or necessary implication, statutes should not be construed so as to take away the jurisdiction of superior courts.”
I turn now to consider the amendment contained in section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 which provides:
“19. The Supreme Court as continued in existence by the Proclamation is hereby re-constituted with a membership of— (a) the Chief Justice who shall be the president thereof; and (b) not less than four other Justices of the Supreme Court; but for the determination of a particular cause or matter, the Chief Justice may request such other Justices of the Court of Appeal as he may deem fit to sit in the Supreme Court for such period as the Chief Justice may specify or until the request is withdrawn.”
The historical rubric in which this section is set must not be lost sight of. The dearth of justices of the Supreme Court following a dark episode in our legal history (see “The Case of the Judicial Martyrs” (1981-82) 13 & 14 R.G.L. 1 et. seq.) which led to massive resignations and brought the number of justices of the Supreme Court below the Plimsoll line. New appointments to the Supreme Court bench was of the utmost priority. But filling vacancies in the highest court of the land has never been undertaken lightly. The search for suitable justices and all it entails has always been a time-consuming exercise. It is easier and more satisfactory to invite members of the Court of Appeal to sit in the Supreme Court to make up the required working quorum on an ad hoc basis while the search for a sound bench continued apace. That seems to be the policy rationale deducible from a concatenation of two events: (i) the enactment of section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42; and (ii) the slow pace of substantive appointments to the Supreme Court bench. There is nothing new in this. The constitutional pattern of 1979 was being followed. For instance, article 127 of the Constitution, 1979 spelt out the procedure for appointing judges to the Supreme Court. The first role was played by the judicial council in an exercise of selection and giving advice to the President; the stage was then set for the President acting on the advice proffered to appoint by warrant. Finally the approval of Parliament had to be obtained.
This is a time-consuming process, and when one considers that this is only the machinery for appointment and much more time would be
[p.529] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 spent in selecting men of calibre, the question of time is exposed in its most wasteful aspect. If then the argument proffered against jurisdiction is entertained, it would mean that every time the number of justices fell below the stated minimum, the cumbersome process would be initiated to fill the vacuum and the Supreme Court would cease to exist until the vacant places were filled by the employment of the machinery in article 127, whether it took three months or one year. As we have observed before, the viability of that argument should be founded upon the existence of provisions for the continued exercise of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction by a designated body in the interim.
One should not be too ready to impute crass ignorance to a sovereign legislative entity in its attempts to ensure the effective running of a court, by condemning its efforts as futile because the body it is sustaining is in one’s opinion itself denuded of legitimacy. But that in effect is the force of this challenge to jurisdiction.
Section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 itself recognises the Supreme Court as existing. It was not an empty shell that was “continued in existence” but what the Proclamation had sought to perpetuate. Membership was reduced from six to four. But the section did not say that a fall in numbers would compromise the legal existence of the Supreme Court. That section could not say that, because that would be in conflict and be inconsistent with the avowed aim of the P.N.D.C. of continuing that institution’s existence from the time the P.N.D.C. took office, with its Proclamation.
If the argument against jurisdiction is well-founded, another risible but unfortunate result would be the immediate uncertainty of the legal viability of the other courts in the superior hierarchy like the Court of Appeal and the High Court whose numbers are prone to fall continually below the stated minimum by the circumstances of promotion, resignation and even mass dismissals. A suitor with an intractable case might well rely on a last ditch stand of checking whether the complement of judges of his court had fallen below a stated minimum at the time of his suit, to acquire renewed optimism of success. Such a lottery has no place in a constitutional judiciary. It seems to me that an argument that founds the legal existence or juridical competency of each of the superior courts on a head count that vacillates or oscillates with each day’s uncertain events, is a poor basis upon which jurisdiction should be determined. Only chaos can prosper if we lent ear to the arguments raised in this behalf.
I am firmly of the view that the reference to a reconstituted membership of the Supreme Court with the Chief Justice as president and not less than four other justices in section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 is no more and no less than an indication that the least number of justices
[p.530] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 who should be appointed to the Supreme Court by an appointing body is the number indicated.
It is for the above reasons that the Supreme Court was adequately clothed with the jurisdiction conferred on it by the Constitution, 1979 and section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42, to continue functioning with its present numbers.
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C.
This is in substance a motion brought under the provisions of article 119 of the Constitution, 1979 for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of Adadevoh J. presiding over the High Court in a suit entitled Johnson Complex Ghana Ltd. v. Adjei, High Court, Accra 29 May 1985, unreported. At our sitting on 19 May 1986 to deal with the motion counsel for the applicant raised a preliminary objection to the competence of this court to adjudicate on the motion. The objection was by a majority decision overruled and the case took its normal course. I disagreed and still disagree with the majority decision overruling the objection and I wish therefore to set down the reasons for my own views that we lack jurisdiction.
This court has been empanelled by the Chief Justice in purported exercise of a supposed power in an alleged enabling provision said to be contained in section 19 of the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation (Supplementary and Consequential Provisions) Law, 1982 (P.N.D.C.L. 42); and the gravamen of counsel’s objection is that by virtue of the mandatory provisions of the said section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42, the court so empanelled is a court unknown to our law for failure to satisfy the provisions of the said P.N.D.C.L. 42. I think the objection is well taken. Section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 provides:
“19. The Supreme Court as continued in existence by the Proclamation is hereby re-constituted with a membership of— (a) the Chief Justice who shall be the president thereof; and (b) not less than four other Justices of the Supreme Court; but for the determination of a particular cause or matter, the Chief Justice may request such other Justices of the Court of Appeal as he may deem fit to sit in the Supreme Court for such period as the Chief Justice may specify or until the request is withdrawn.”
(The emphasis is mine.) It seems to me that this provision is quite unambiguous, and consequently amenable to one and only one interpretation, i.e. “The Supreme Court … is … reconstituted with a membership . . . of the Chief Justice … and … not less than four other justices of the Supreme Court.” The fact, however, that an
[p.531] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 opposing view may be entertained as to its true purport as is demonstrated in the majority opinion of this court, makes it desirable to examine the provisions of the law which regulate and have regulated the composition and constitution of the Supreme Court from its initial establishment by the Constitution, 1979, on 24 September 1979, to the date of the instant motion.
The starting point obviously is articles 114 (5), 115 (1) and (2) and 116 (1) of the Constitution, 1979. The relevant provision of article 114 (5) is as follows:
“(5) The Judiciary shall consist of the Supreme Court of Ghana, the Court of Appeal and the High Court of Justice which shall be the superior courts of record and which shall constitute one Superior Court of Judicature, and such other inferior Courts and traditional Courts as Parliament may by law establish.”
Article 115 (1) and (2) is as follows:
“115. (1) The Supreme Court shall consist of
(a) the Chief Justice, who shall be the president thereof; and
(b) not less than six other justices of the Supreme Court.
(2) The Supreme Court shall, except as otherwise provided in article 120 of this Constitution, be duly constituted for the despatch of its business by not less than five justices thereof.”
Article 120 provides:
“120. A single Justice of the Supreme Court may exercise a power vested in the Supreme Court not involving the decision of the cause or matter before the Supreme Court except that,
(a) in criminal matters, where that Justice refuses or grants an application in the exercise of any such power, a person affected thereby shall be entitled to have the application determined by the Supreme Court constituted by three Justices thereof and (b) in civil matters, any order, direction or decision made or given in pursuance of the powers conferred by this article may be varied, discharged or reversed by the Supreme Court constituted by three Justices thereof.”
And article 116 (1) is as follows:
“116. (1) The Supreme Court shall be the final court of appeal in and for Ghana and shall have such appellate and other
[p.532] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 jurisdiction as may be conferred up on it by this Constitution or any other law.”
This was the state of the law when following the well known revolutionary events of 31 December 1981 the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1981, was promulgated and in section 3 (1) thereof, the Constitution, 1979 was suspended. Section 9 (1) of the Proclamation, 1981, however, provides:
“9. (1) Notwithstanding the suspension of the 1979 Constitution and until provision is otherwise made by law— (a) all courts in existence immediately before the 31st day of December, 1981, shall continue in existence with the same powers, duties and functions under the existing law subject to this Proclamation and Laws issued thereunder.”
This state of affairs continued until 30 December 1982 when P.N.D.C.L. 42 was passed, and although the said P.N.D.C.L. 42 was given retrospective effect, inter alia, “except where the context otherwise provides”, an examination of the provisions of section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 shows clearly that within the context the operative date of the said section 19 is 30 December 1982. Since this date, I have not been aware of any other statutory provision regulating or touching the composition and constitution of the Supreme Court although I have perused all P.N.D.C. laws in existence, altogether 147, as at the date of drafting this opinion. Some of the provisions of the Constitution, 1979 dealing with the Court of Appeal and the High Court can, however, throw some light on the composition and constitution of the Supreme Court, in view of the fact that words like “composition”, “duly constituted”, “established” and “consist” are found in the body of the Constitution, 1979; the Proclamation, 1981; and P.N.D.C.L 42.
As I indicated at the commencement of this opinion section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 is very clear and unambiguous. The membership of the Supreme Court for the determination and hearing of cases to a finality, is the Chief Justice and not less than four other justices of the Supreme Court. Prima facie therefore for this purpose, when one disregards the provisions of article 120 which is in any event inapplicable since we are not dealing with an interlocutory application, then:
(a) if there is only the Chief Justice and no other justice of the Supreme Court, then the Supreme Court as established cannot be a duly constituted court;
(b) if there is only the Chief Justice and only one, or two justices of the Supreme Court the court will also not be a properly constituted one;
[p.533] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511
(c) if there is the Chief Justice and only three justices of the Supreme Court, then the court will again not be a properly constituted Supreme Court.
In all the three contingencies delineated above; although the Supreme Court established by article 114 (5) is existence it has as a matter of constitutional law not the requisite constituted membership provided for in the main clause of section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 to enable it to function for the purpose of exercising its original, appellate and other jurisdictions in respect of the final disposal of causes or matters put before it.
It is only when it is constituted of the Chief Justice and at least four other justices of the Supreme Court that it has jurisdiction to hear causes and matters and it is only after this condition precedent is satisfied that the Chief Justice is then given discretionary power under section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 to request other justices of the Court of Appeal to also sit in the Supreme Court so constituted apparently as ad hoc members of the court but not as Supreme Court justices for the determination of any particular cause or matter for such period as he may specify or until he withdraws his request. An argument, however, which I have heard put forward to resist this clearly unambiguous meaning is that once the court at one stage of its life has had a membership of a Chief Justice and at least four other justices of the Supreme Court, then if the number were to drop to one as I have listed in (a) then the Chief Justice can invite four justices of the Court of Appeal to sit with him, and the Supreme Court will then be constituted of the Chief Justice and four justices of the Court of Appeal. I do not know what canons of statutory interpretation justify this construction, but in my opinion this contention is a clear contradiction of the first clause of section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 and in any case it does break down and become untenable when considered alongside the provisions of article 120 of the Constitution, 1979, for it completely impedes the smooth functioning of the Supreme Court and renders otiose the full application of article 120. Let us examine it in the light of article 120.
Under situation (a), where the Chief Justice functions with no other justices of the Supreme Court but himself, I wonder how the provisions of article 120 can operate. Obviously it will be the Chief justice who can thus solely exercise the power that the article gives to a single justice of the Supreme Court and the constitutional right given by the article to a person affected by his decision to have the matter determined by the Supreme Court constituted by three of its justices will be meaningless. Under (b) the Chief Justice or any of the other two Supreme Court justices can exercise the power of a single justice of the
[p.534] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511
Supreme Court, but it appears to me that the jurisdiction to have the matter so dealt with to be considered or reconsidered by other three justices of the Supreme Court cannot also as in (a) be exercised as it seems there will not be other three Supreme Court justices available to exercise it. It is only in contingency (c) that article 120 can operate and in such a situation only interlocutory matters can be dealt with but no substantive and final decisions disposing of causes and matters can be made. It seems to me that this is a strong argument against the claim apparently contained in the majority opinion that the Supreme Court can function with only the Chief Justice or a diminished quorum when some of the Supreme Court Justices who would have constituted the quorum have lost their membership of the court. Indeed, the claim carried to its utmost logical limit means that in an appropriate case, the Chief Justice on disqualifying himself, can request five Court of Appeal justices to not only sit in, but to constitute the Supreme Court! This is a veritable reductio ad absurdum and demonstrates that the claim is with respect not well founded.
Another argument which it seems to me prays in aid the provisions of articles 115, 121 and 124 of the Constitution, 1979 is to the effect that in those articles the maximum possible membership composition of the Supreme Court, admittedly at large under the said Constitution. 1979 before section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 reconstituted the Supreme Court, and the total membership compositions also of the Court of Appeal and the High Court were specified by the said Constitution, 1979, nevertheless although the said membership fell below the constitutional number these courts did sit and adjudicate on causes and matters put before them. I think this argument misreads the provisions.
In my opinion this argument necessitates an examination of these provisions to discover the reasons why the courts sat. Article 115 (1) gives the composition of the Supreme Court as the Chief Justice and not less than six other justices and article 115 (2) indicates clearly that apart from the jurisdiction of a single justice of the Supreme Court as I have already discussed in this opinion, the Supreme Court shall be duly constituted for the despatch of its business by not less than five justices thereof. I would have thought that even if the membership fell to the Chief Justice and four others—a court of five—the court can be considered a duly constituted court if the Chief Justice and the four justices sit. And the constitutional authority for so sitting will be article 115 (2). Perhaps a close look at section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions will clarify the position. Section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions reads:
“3. (1) The required number of Justices for a duly constitute Supreme Court as established under clause (5) of article 114 of
[p.535] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 this Constitution shall be appointed within twelve months after the coming into force of this Constitution, and until the appointments are made, the Court of Appeal as established under that clause shall perform the functions of the Supreme Court contained in articles 51, 117 and 118 only of this Constitution.”
(The emphasis is mine.) Now a duly constituted Supreme Court under the Constitution is at least a court of five Supreme Court justices, so that although the membership under article 115 (1) is at least seven justices, by this provision it is implied that in the absence of two appointees the court can function. It is nowhere indicated or stated in the Constitution, 1979 that if the number of justices fell to the Chief Justice and four or five then the court cannot be duly constituted; on the other hand section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions implies the contrary. Clearly if it falls to three justices then the court cannot be duly constituted. It seems to me that article 115 (2) clearly established a quorum and it is normal in all cases where a body has a constituted membership and a quorum that as long as there is a quorum a fall in the constituted membership does not vitiate the deliberation of the body. An ideal illustration of this principle is offered by Parliament under the Constitution, 1979. Under article 75 (1) it was provided that Parliament, “. . . shall consist of not less than one hundred and forty elected members.” For deliberation, it seems the quorum provided in article 84 was, besides the person presiding, not “less than one-third of all the members of Parliament”, but for decision-making, the quorum provided in article 86 (1) was “not less than one-half of all the members” and decisions are made “by the majority of the votes of the members so present and voting.”
It is common knowledge that as long as the requisite quorum is available Parliament can function and the loss of or drop in membership by death, resignation or otherwise does not matter. I would have thought the Supreme Court under the Constitution, 1979 was designed to operate in a similar manner. I shall later on give further consideration to this aspect of the matter in the light of some relevant American authorities.
Under article 121 of the Constitution, 1979 it is provided as follows:
“121. (1) The Court of Appeal shall consist of— (a) the Chief Justice;
(b) not less than five justices of the Court of Appeal; and (c) such other justices of the Superior Court of Judicature as the Chief Justice may, for the determination of a particular cause or matter by writing
[p.536] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 under his hand, request to sit in the Court of Appeal for such period as the Chief Justice may specify or until the request is withdrawn.
(2) The Court of Appeal shall be duly constituted by any three Justices thereof and when so constituted the most senior of the Justices shall preside.”
Clearly the total membership composition of the Court of Appeal is indicated in article 121 (1) of the Constitution, 1979. The membership that can comprise a duly constituted Court of Appeal that is competent to exercise the jurisdiction of the court is provided for in article 121 (2). In order to perform its functions as a Court of Appeal it is not the total membership that sits. This inevitably means that if the total membership drops to a number below three the court cannot be duly constituted to function but if it drops to a number above two, it can be duly empanelled to function. My brother Adade J.S.C. adverted to this matter in the well known case of Bilson v. Apaloo, [1981] G.L.R. 24, S.C. where in his dissenting opinion he rightly pointed out at 68:
“Article 121 (1) gives the total membership of the court generally; article 121 (2) gives the membership of the same court at work. Naturally, the general membership is larger than the working group. Although each of the members is qualified to sit, all of them cannot sit at the same time, and pretend to be the court contemplated under article 121 (2).”
I agree entirely with that view but I would add further that a drop in the “total membership” is irrelevant so long as a “working group” is available to sit.
With regard to the High Court the total membership composition is provided for in article 124 (1) of the Constitution, 1979, as follows:
“124. (1) The High Court of Justice shall consist of— (a) the Chief Justice;
(b) not less than twelve justices of the High Court of Justice; and
(c) such other justices of the Superior Court of Judicature as the Chief Justice may, for the determination of a particular cause or matter by writing under his hand, request to sit in the High Court of Justice for such period as the Chief Justice may specify or until the request is withdrawn.”
And the membership of the court “at work” is given in article 124 (2) as follows:
[p.537] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511
(2) The High Court of Justice shall be duly constituted, as the case may be,
(a) by any one Justice thereof; or (b) by any one Justice thereof and a jury,
(i) for the trial of an offence on indictment; or
(ii) in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (a) of clause (2) of article 26 of this Constitution, for the trial of an offence, other than treason, the punishment for which is death or imprisonment for life; or
(c) by three Justices thereof, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (h) of clause (2) of article 26 of this Constitution, for the trial of a person for the offence of treason.”
Once again article 124 (1) deals only with the total membership composition of the High Court and article 124 (2) deals with the duly constituted membership for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction granted to it under the Constitution or any other law. It is clearly therefore not the entire membership that sits to exercise its jurisdiction as Adade J.S.C. so rightly pointed out in Bilson v. Apaloo (supra) and so if the membership provided for under article 124 (1) drops and the membership for a duly constituted court under article 124 (2) is available the court can sit to perform its functions.
I think it is worth keeping in mind that section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 did not mention or repeal article 115 of the Constitution, 1979, and the article and the section do not contradict each other when read together. It seems before the promulgation of P.N.D.C.L. 42, s. 19, the statutory number of Supreme Court justices competent to sit was at least seven and in the absence of two, one or two Court of Appeal justices may be invited to sit in the court to make up the number, but a number of Supreme Court justices below five cannot form a lawful court to exercise the final judicial power of the Supreme Court. Moreover nowhere in all of the provisions of the Constitution dealing with the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Court is there any provision that even if the respective court can be duly constituted under the relevant enabling provision to function, a drop in number in the respective actual total membership vitiates their jurisdiction. In fact in the case of the Supreme Court, under the provisions, of article 115 of the Constitution, 1979, as, indeed under section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42, a quorum is fixed so that although in theory the court may very well have a composition of say thirteen members, nevertheless although all the thirteen members are entitled to sit, if five are assembled for the
[p.538] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 despatch of its business, it will be a properly constituted court. In such a situation I think a drop by death or otherwise in the actual membership from thirteen to the said five will not invalidate its exercise of jurisdiction if the five members were to sit without their colleagues to deal with causes or matters on the analogy of the practice in the Parliament of the Constitution, 1979, already discussed in this opinion.
The crucial point which makes the provisions of section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 unique but not peculiar is that by the said section 19 the quorum has been statutorily fixed, but by the same section the total membership of the court is to some extent as in the case of the total membership of Parliament, at large and so unlike articles 115, 121 and 124 which have side notes; “Composition of the Supreme Court”, “Composition of the Court of Appeal” and “Composition of the High Court”, respectively for the relevant courts, section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 merely has “Supreme Court” as its marginal or side note. This in my opinion is quite significant, since article 115 had already dealt with the composition and section 19 was merely making further provisions additional to, but not repugnant to article 115.
I am aware of the traditional view sponsored for many years by the English courts that side notes or marginal notes are apparently not useful as an aid to resolve doubts revealed in the content of an enactment. Lord Reid once expressed this view tersely and probably too widely in Chandler v. Director of Public Prosecution [1964] A.C. 763 at 789, H.L. when he said rather bluntly, “In my view side notes cannot be used as an aid to construction.” In spite of the authoritative source of this view it seems to me with the utmost respect that a much more realistic view and one certainly recognised by the law lord himself in a subsequent dictum is that marginal notes or side notes need not be disregarded by a judge when he is examining the provisions of an enactment. Thus as against the view of Lord Reid in the Chandler case (supra), Adade J.S.C. in Bilson v. Apaloo (supra), in the course of his illuminating dissenting opinion, rightly accepted this realistic approach when he said: “I concede that the marginal note is not part of the enactment, but in appropriate situations it can be an aid to interpretation.” (The emphasis is mine.) Of course the side notes or marginal notes are part of the enactment and what probably my learned brother wanted to highlight is that a side note is not the enacting part of an Act. Thus understood, his main dictum is unexceptionable for it is surely unrealistic to consider what the legislature has seen fit to insert in an enactment as not being part of the enactment. I think in his dictum in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Schildkamp [1971] A.C. 1, H.L., to be referred to presently, Lord Reid refuted the view that side notes are of the enactment. In my opinion so long as they are not utilised to contradict or control the unambiguous language of the enactment, [p.539] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 side notes can be considered at least for the purpose of finding out whether they reveal any doubt as to the meaning of an enactment. This Lord Reid in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Schildkamp (supra) at 10, H.L. in apparent modification of his 1964 view in the Chandler case (supra) said:
“…it may be more realistic to accept the Act as printed as being the product of the whole legislative process, and to give due weight to every thing found in the printed Act … In such a case it is not very meaningful to say that the words of the Act represent the intention of Parliament but the punctuation, cross-headings and side-notes do not.”
(The emphasis is mine.) This realistic approach was demonstrated by Upjohn L.J. in Stephens v. Cuckfield Rural District Council [1960] 2 Q.B. 373 at 383, C.A. when he said:
“While the marginal note to a section cannot control the language used in the section, it is at least permissible to approach a consideration of its general purpose and the mischief at which it is aimed with the note in mind.”
(The emphasis is mine.) A close reading of the side notes in the Constitution, 1979 dealing with the composition of the various courts as I have already pointed out, when contrasted with the side note in section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 demonstrates that the total membership of the relevant court is indicated and the composition for the despatch of business is also indicated. It is the mandatory composition for the despatch of business which must not fall below the requisite number if the jurisdiction of the court is to be validly invoked. The fall in number of the total membership composition is irrelevant as far as jurisdiction is concerned so long as a duly constituted court as provided in the relevant article can be empanelled by the use of the available membership.
With regard to the present reconstituted Supreme Court which emerged on the promulgation of section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42, only one provision deals at one and the same time with the quorum as well as the total membership of the court in a manner that suggests unambiguously that it is only one Supreme Court that was constituted whatever the total membership or the working membership may be and so “composition of the Supreme Court”, the side note originally used in article 115, was apparently deliberately discarded, and “Supreme Court” simpliciter substituted as a new side note responsive to the reality of the status of the court. In my opinion it must be unrealistic to consider the provision of section 19 as dealing accurately and precisely with the composition of the Supreme Court as such when the total membership
[p.540] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 omposition has been left at large; and it is therefore in this light that the side note must be viewed. The total membership can be the Chief Justice and more than four other justices of the Supreme Court — the exact number is indefinite; but the quorum is the Chief Justice and not less than four other justices of the Supreme Court and accordingly in the absence of this quorum the court cannot be duly constituted for the despatch of its business.
The function of the word “but” in section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 needs now to be firmly grasped if the section is to be properly understood. It is a matter of grammar performing a dual function of both a preposition and a conjunction. As a preposition it ensures that the sentence that follows it is totally dependent and is only meaningful when considered with due regard to the meaning of the sentence which preceded it. It is in fact it, nor can it exist without it, although the preceding sentence can exist without the sentence following the preposition. As a conjunction, it joins the preceding sentence with the subsequent sentence in a function that is designed to give full meaning to both sentences without eroding the meaning of one at the expense of the other. Without any unnecessary indulgence in semantics I think a close study of the word “but” as it appears within the context of section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 shows that it is there used as meaning: “yet”; “except that”; “besides that”; “nevertheless”; or “provided that.” These are not exhaustive but they indicate within the context words or phrases which can be substituted as synonyms so to speak without losing the meaning of the provision. “But” is therefore used as it sort of proviso and the examination of its meaning within the context demonstrates that the sentence that followed it if allowed to stand with it independently of the preceding provision would be meaningless for as I have said it can only derive its meaning from the preceding provision. As is stated in Odgers on The Construction of Deeds and Statutes (4th ed.) at p. 224 quoting as authority Ex parte Partington (1844) 6 Q.B. 649:
“Unless of necessity, a proviso is never construed as enlarging the scope of the enacting words. It must be construed with reference to the preceding parts of the clause to which it is appended, and as subordinate to the main clauses of the Act.”
The “but” clause of section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 is as I have pointed out akin to what in legal parlance is known as a proviso and it is always predicated on an enacting clause which in this case is the preceding provision. Two English cases: In re Brocklebank (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 461, C.A. and Thompson v. Dibdin [1912] A.C. 533 at 536, H.L. illustrate vividly the proper ambit of a proviso in an enactment. In re Brocklebank (supra) involves a proviso in section 2 of the Bankruptcy
[p.541] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511
(Discharge and Closure) Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Vict, c. 66.) The relevant section provides:
“2. (1) A debtor who has been adjudged bankrupt, … and who has not obtained his discharge, may apply to the Court for an order of discharge. . .
(3) that on the hearing of the application the Court … may either grant or refuse the order of discharge, or suspend the operation of the order for a specified time, or grant the order of discharge subject to any conditions with respect to any earnings or income which may afterwards become due to the debtor, or with respect to his after-acquired property: Provided, that the Court shall refuse the discharge in all cases where the Court is satisfied by evidence that the debtor has committed any misdemeanour under Part 2 of the Debtors Act, 1869 or any amendment thereof.”
(The emphasis is mine.) Observe that “but” can replace “provided that” in section 2 (3) and the meaning of the subsection will remain the same. The relevant portion of section 13 of the Debtors Act, 1869, which is in part 2 of that Act provides that:
“any person shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanour … if in incurring any debt or liability he has obtained credit under false pretences, or by means of any other fraud.”
In the Brocklebank case (supra) the adjudication of bankruptcy under the Act of 1869 was made in 1878 and in February 1889 the bankrupt applied under section 2 of the Act of 1887 for his discharge. This was opposed by some of his creditors on the ground that he had been convicted in June 1882 for the misdemeanour of having in 1880 obtained goods on credit by false pretences and had been sentenced to six years’ servitude and consequently by virtue of the proviso in the said section 2 the court had no power to grant his discharge. The court below decided that it could not take cognisance of such an offence committed after the bankruptcy, which had no connection with the bankrupt’s property distributable among his creditors. The creditors aggrieved by this decision appealed to the Court of Appeal and Lord Esher M.R. delivering the leading judgment said of the proviso at 462-463:
“In this proviso the legislature have used language of the widest kind—’in all cases’ so wide that, if it’s full grammatical meaning be given to it, the proviso will produce injustice so enormous that the mind of any reasonable man must revolt from it … Some limit must, therefore be put upon the words of the proviso, and [p.542] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 they must be limited with reference to the subject-matter which is treated of.”
Lord Lindley at 464 expressed similar views and pointed out the extraordinary consequences of accepting the literal meaning of the proviso without considering its preceding clauses. As he put it:
“If we were to adopt the view of the appellants, the Court would have to inquire into the conduct of the bankrupt from the time when he attained years of discretion down to the time when he makes the application for his discharge. I cannot think that the legislature intended this. Their language will, no doubt, admit of that construction but the consequences will be so startling, that I shrink from so interpreting it. The legislature is dealing with the case of an undischarged bankrupt, and is giving directions to the Bankruptcy Court what it is to take into consideration in deciding whether it can grant a discharge to the bankrupt. That Court is concerned with the property of the bankrupt and the persons who are his creditors, and has nothing to do with anything else. That is the leading idea which limits the object of the legislature.”
The second case Thompson v. Dibdin (supra) is the locus classicus and a leading authority on the operative force of a proviso. It dealt with a proviso in the then section 1 of the Deceased Wife’s Sister’s Marriage Act, 1907. After the section had enacted that no marriage between a man and his deceased wife’s sister should be or be deemed to have been void or voidable as a civil contract by reason of such affinity, it then continued as follows:
“Provided always that no clergyman in holy orders of the Church of England shall be liable to any suit, penalty or censure, whether civil or ecclesiastical, for anything done or omitted to be done by him in the performance of the duties of his office to which suit, penalty, or censure he would not have been liable if this Act had not been passed.”
It is worthy of note that “but” can be substituted for “provided always that” without losing the meaning. Clearly this proviso prima facie gave immunity to a clergyman from an act or omission in the performance of the duties of his office and the questions which the courts were called upon to decide was whether this immunity extended to the general duties of his office as to enable him to refuse holy communion to a man and his deceased wife’s sister whom the man had married; this was a refusal that would have been perfectly in order before the Act of 1907 was passed. Of course before the Act of 1907
[p.543] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 was passed, he could not refuse holy communion to a properly married couple.
If the proviso were read and considered in isolation without any reference to the main provision in section 1 of the 1907 Act, it would seem the clergyman is entitled to refuse holy communion in the circumstance and this view was strongly pressed on the Court of Appeal. The House of Lords, however, affirmed the decision of the English Court of Appeal that having regard to the fact that the main provision of section 1 of the 1907 Act was solely concerned with the contract of marriage, a clergyman was not entitled in the circumstance to refuse holy communion to the couple. The following pronouncement of Lord Ashbourne at 544 typified the view of the House:
“. . . a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso—that is, the marriage contract. It is not a separate or independent enactment. The words are dependent on the principal enacting words to which they are tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as divorced from their context.”
Commenting on the argument that the proviso is unequivocal and therefore can be interpreted literally without any necessity to consider the preceding main clause Fletcher Moulton L.J. at the Court of Appeal in R v. Dibdin [1910] P. 57 at 125, C.A. objected very strongly:
“The fallacy of the proposed method of interpretation is not far to seek. It sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. The Courts . . . have frequently pointed out this fallacy, and have refused to be led astray by arguments such as those which have been addressed to us, which depend solely on taking words absolutely in their strict literal sense, disregarding the fundamental consideration that they appear in a proviso.”
The words of section 19 as enacted commencing from the first mention of the Supreme Court to the second mention of the Supreme Court before the word “but”, is the first clause. It is the main or principal clause or provision of the section. I have already indicated the true function of “but”, it introduced as a preposition and a conjunction a second clause or provision which is in the nature of a proviso to the said principal clause. Since the second clause is a proviso, the unquestionable principle of construction as I have pointed out in this opinion is the rule rightly adverted to by Vaisey J. in Leah v. Two Worlds Publishing Co. Ltd. [1951] Ch. 393 at 398 when he said:
[p.544] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511
“…it cannot be disputed, that a proviso must be construed and treated as if it were, not a parallel positive enactment, but a limitation on a proposition which is direct and objective.”
In my view in the light of the authorities, in construing section 19 it must be appreciated that the principal matter which its main clause dealt with is the composition and quorum of the Supreme Court. The “proviso”, i.e. the second clause, must therefore as Lord Ashbourne pointed out in the Dibdin case (supra) “prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso”, namely the composition and quorum of the court. If this is done our lack of jurisdiction will be founded on the fact that under the main clause a properly and thus legally constituted Supreme Court competent to dispose finally of all cases and appeals must be a court made up of the Chief Justice and not less than four other justices of the Supreme Court, but in this case the court is rather constituted by the Chief Justice and three justices of the Supreme Court and a justice of the Court of Appeal. Clearly this is contrary to the plain provisions of the main clause; to get round the difficulty the majority opinion resorts to the proviso and construes it without paying any proper regard at all to the main clause. When the English Court of Appeal attempted to construe a proviso in a similar manner in Local Government Board v. South Stoneham Union [1909] A.C. 57 at 62, H.L., Lord Macnaghten in the House of Lords censured the court when he said of such attempted construction, “. . . the Court attempts to construe it without regard to its surroundings as if it had dropped from the clouds.”
Now let us examine closely the provisions of the proviso in section 19. For the purpose of convenience and clarity of exposition I regret to set down once again the terms of the proviso. It stipulates:
“but for the determination of a particular cause or matter, the Chief Justice may request such other Justices of the Court of Appeal as he may deem fit to sit in the Supreme Court for such period as the Chief Justice may specify or until the request is withdrawn.”
(The emphasis is mine.) It seems to me that having in unambiguous language in the main clause reconstituted the court with a membership of the Chief Justice and not less than four other justices of the Supreme Court, the proviso is an enabling provision giving power to the Chief Justice in his discretion to invite justices of the Court of Appeal to sit in the Supreme Court so constituted. The proviso does not in any way enable the Chief Justice to ignore the main provision and oust justices of the Supreme Court by substituting justices of the Court of Appeal, nor does it enable the Chief Justice to reconstitute the court in any way
[p.545] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 whatsoever. That is a power that only the legislature has and which it can only exercise by a recourse to the legislative process. To constitute this court as it has now been constituted is to construe the proviso as “a parallel positive enactment independently of the main clause and to permit it to control and modify the said clause, thus ignoring the caveat of Lord Macnaghten in the South Stoneham Union case (supra) when the English Court of Appeal attempted to do so. But even assuming the proviso is so worded that it can be independently construed, it seems to me that the power so given to the Chief Justice is to invite justices of the Court of Appeal “to sit in the Supreme Court” as constituted. He was not given power to invite the said Court of Appeal justices in order rather to “constitute the Supreme Court” and to oust the Supreme Court justices. So whatever way one looks at the problem the court as constituted for the hearing and determination of the instant case is an illegal court and the objection to our jurisdiction is clearly unanswerable.
I agree of course that in exceptional cases a provision framed as a proviso may in substance on a careful reading be clearly an independent enactment in no way qualifying the preceding provision but is rather an additional provision to it: see Rhondda Urban District Council v. Taff Vale Railway Co. [1909] A.C. 253 at 258, H.L. Thus in the case of section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42, if the “but” clause had specifically given power to the Chief justice to constitute the Supreme Court in the circumstance with justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, the jurisdictional question posed here would not have arisen. For example, the empanelling in the instant case would have been unexceptionable if the proviso had read:
“but for the determination of a particular cause or matter the Chief Justice may empanel a Supreme Court constituted of no less than five justices drawn from either the justices of the Supreme Court or the justices of the Court of Appeal or from both.”
With such a proviso the lack of a quorum under the main clause would not inhibit the work of the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice can arrange the work of the Supreme Court in panels and he will have power to permit a Supreme Court justice to sit or not to sit in the Supreme Court. The composition of the Supreme Court for the determination of a particular cause or matter will be in his absolute discretion. In the absence of such a provision I fear the instant empanelling is unlawful.
In my respectful opinion, an explicitly obvious statutory limitation upon the jurisdictional composition of this Supreme Court cannot be circumvented by recourse to a statutory provision in a proviso which is
[p.546] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 clearly not designed or intended to affect the limitation so unquestionably and unambiguously specified. Thus the explicit provision in the main clause of section 19 of a quorum that can legitimately conduct the substantive business of the Supreme Court cannot with respect be defeated and the requisite quorum undermined by purporting to conduct the said business of the court without the presence of the legally stipulated quorum. In such a case the members of the court so acting would not be acting as a lawful court. They would be pretenders to, not wielders of, the judicial power reposed in the Supreme Court under article 114 of the Constitution, 1979.
With respect, I am really very unhappy about both the selection of the so-called panel to decide this case and the answer which the majority have given to the jurisdictional question raised in this case. I find the matter really very disturbing because I have read and re-read the provision of section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 and I find the language so plain and unambiguous that I am unable to understand let alone accept the startling construction put on it by the majority. The Supreme Court as the final judicial body in this country has ultimately a peculiar judicial responsibility, at least in civil matters, which is apparently not shared by any other judicial organ. It is a responsibility to declare the law finally in all cases that come before it. In the circumstances, it seems to me, with the utmost respect and I regret to have to say it, that it is a dereliction of its responsibility and a degradation of the judicial process when it abandons the plain and unequivocal meaning of the legislation in order to claim a jurisdiction clearly denied it. The matter becomes really serious and inexcusable when the claim is predicated on a tacit approval of what clearly appears to me with the utmost respect as an unnecessary usurpation of the powers of the legislature by the president of the Supreme Court. This, in both a civilian or military regime cannot augur well for constitutional legality and may very well embroil us in political controversy with a possible resultant confrontation that cannot but ultimately erode the lawful powers of this Supreme Court.
I have heard an argument advanced to justify this abandonment of what to me is a plain legislative language on the ground that in the absence of the interpretation adopted by the majority the business of the courts will grind to a halt and the interests of litigants and the populace will be jeopardised. For this reason it is said that public policy demands continuity of the adjudicatory process in the Supreme Court; and consequently an interpretation that will advance this is to be preferred to one that will exacerbate it. Put in other words, the argument recognises the lack of quorum, namely the requisite minimum number to constitute a lawful court. It gets around it by an argument that the lack of quorum ipso facto gives rise to an emergency which will
[p.547] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 undermine the functions of the Supreme Court and this therefore must on public policy grounds be abated by a construction that allows the court lacking the requisite legal quorum to nevertheless function. To fail to acquiesce in this, the argument proceeds, is to undermine the Supreme Court. This argument it seems to me is plainly illogical and a veritable invitation to usurp the legislative function and ignore plain legislation on grounds of emergency and public policy. I think Kekewich J. in Duncan v. Dixon (1890) 44 Ch.D. 211 at 217 gave a fitting answer to this contention when he quoted with approval the following observation of Lord Coleridge in Coxhead v. Mullis (1878) 3 C.P.D. 439 at 442:
“it is better to suppose that Parliament meant what Parliament has clearly said, and not to limit plain words in an Act of Parliament by consideration of policy, if it be policy, as to which minds may differ, and as to which decisions may vary.”
These apparent siamese twins “public policy” and “public emergency” alias “public exigency” which would seem to have interfered with the construction of section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 are not entitled in my respectful opinion to be given any part to play in the interpretation process in the circumstances of this case. A judicial disregard of what the legislature has enacted in unambiguous language, may on superficial examination be justified in view, perhaps, of a supposed public policy consideration or an apparent public emergency or exigency of the moment which gave rise to the case in deciding which the clear legislative intent is disregarded and virtually subverted. In my view however such a disregard will in the long run have a disastrously dangerous and more far-reaching ill effect than the temporary solution of an alleged emergency problem. The cause of orderly government and constitutional propriety is ill served by clearly misapplying the law as it is written in order to satisfy an emergency situation especially when the misapplication tantamounts to a plainly blatant usurpation of the legislative power of another State organ. I would have thought that the nature of the judicial and legislative functions is such that in an emergency situation, it is no part of the judicial process to emasculate the law, in such a situation it is the responsibility of the repository of the legislative power of the State to respond to the emergency and act accordingly. Unless the distinction in function is maintained, incalculable harm will be done to the orderly development of the law.
When I examine this case very carefully I have the firm conviction and I feel strongly, speaking for myself, that I am not free to acquiesce in a decision in this case or to decide this case or any other case in any way I like other dm in accordance with what my conscience tells me to [p.548] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 do what the law commands. In this respect, I must say that I entertain, quite frankly, no doubt at all about the meaning of section 19 as I have canvassed it in this opinion and because I recognise that this is a really great and undoubtedly important case in the legal history of our final appellate court, I have desisted from approaching its consideration in a perfunctory manner. I have had to give considerable thought to it and to look up English and American authorities for persuasive guidance. The result has been that this opinion is regretfully long.
When in the course of considering this case I embarked on a sustained reflection of its significance I was reminded of an observation in the dissenting opinion of that great American judge and jurist Holmes J. in Northern Securities Co. v. United States 193 U.S. 197 at 400-401 where he said:
“Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of Law will bend.”
(The emphasis is mine.) I am inclined to think that it is one thing to look at the policy of a piece of legislation and indeed public policy and probably a prevailing emergency situation and to draw on the relevant traditional canons of interpretation to construe the doubtful language of an enactment when the language is open to opposing or a number of diverse and probably conflicting plausible meanings. This approach may throw light on which of a number of meanings expresses truly the intention of the legislature. It is, however, another matter to do the same thing with the language of an enactment that admits of only one meaning and is simple, unequivocal and the application of which gives rise to no difficulty whatsoever. To control the plain meaning of such enacted words by any such devise in an attempt to avoid the legislative intent is invidious and an illegitimate exercise of the judicial function because it evinces a tendency to convert the judicial process into a weapon for misapplying statutes in accordance with the shifting and capricious views of judges as to which Lord Coleridge reminds us in Coxhead v. Mullis (supra) “minds may differ and as to which decisions may vary.”
I am afraid I do not with respect subscribe to the apparent proposition inherent in the majority decision, that the language of a statutory provision enacted in such a way that appended to its main provision is a subsidiary provision designed to merely qualify the main
[p.549] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 provision in a particular manner, can be construed so as not merely to achieve the qualification but to also control and in effect emasculate the main provision and thus render the said main provision otiose. In my view this is to be specially deprecated when it does not merely contradict the plain and unmistakable meaning of the entire provision but it in effect purports to repose in some person or authority a power which by the language of the whole enactment and the constitutional law of the country is exercisable by the repository of the legislative power of the State.
Observe closely what has given rise to the jurisdictional question in this case. Since 9 January 1986 by the retirement of the then Chief Justice, Hon. Mr. Justice F. K. Apaloo, the composition of the Supreme Court has fallen from its lawful membership of the Chief Justice and at least four others to an obviously detective number of the Chief Justice and three others. On 7 May 1986 a cause list was affixed to the Supreme Court premises and copies were served on the members of the Supreme Court. The list ostensibly prepared on the instructions of the Chief Justice specified that for the week commencing 19 May 1986 the Supreme Court would sit in panels constituted in every case below the statutory minimum of the Chief Justice and four Supreme Court justices as is provided for in section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 and the list indicated further that in every such panel the defect in numbers of the requisite minimum number of justices of the Supreme Court would be made up by the addition of justices of the Court of Appeal to deal with fifteen civil motions. Some of the said motions were substantive applications for writs of certiorari and prohibition under the provisions of section 119 of the Constitution, 1979, and others were interlocutory applications.
The application in the case before us is in substance for a writ of certiorari. It is civil motion No. 3/85 and I have listed it hereunder as No. 6 in the said cause list of civil motions which are as follows:
“PANELS FOR THE WEEK COMMENCING 19 MAY 1986 Case Panel 1 C.M. 5/84 Republic v. National Chieftaincy Adade J.S.C. Tribunal; Ex parte Nana Yaw Kodua Taylor J.S.C.
2 C.M. 6/84 Nana Yaw Kodua v. Nana Atta-Francois J.S.C. Atakora Amaniampong II Osei-Hwere J.A.
Amua-Sekyi J.A.
3 C.M. 8/85 Mahamadu Abudulai v. Na Adade J.S.C. Yakubu II
[p.550] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 Case Panel 4 C.M. 9/85 Mahamadu Abudulai v. Na Taylor J.S.C. Yakubu II Francois J.S.C. Osei-Hwere J.A.
Ampiah J.A.
5 C.M. 1/85 Kwabena Tuffuor v. J. K. Anokye and Others 6 C.M. 3/85 Republic v. High Court, Accra; Ex parte Alex Adjei 7 C.M. 4/85 Republic v. High Court, Accra Chief Justice and Others; Ex parte Odonkorteye and Adade J.S.C. Another Taylor J.S.C.
8 C.M. 7/85 Phillips Tetteh Nartey v. Mechanical Francois J.S.C. Lloyd Assembly Plant Ltd.
Amua-Sekyi J.A.
9 C.M. 2/86 Ebusuapanyin K. Ampredu v. Nana Benyadzi alias Kofi Badu and Another 10 C.M. 11/85 J.R. Gampson v. D. Holdbrook Chief Justice and Others Adade J.S.C.
11 C.M. 6/85 Paulina Dali v. Natteh Kubi Taylor J.S.C.
12 C.M. 10/85 Samuel Asante Fosuhene v. Francois J.S.C. Bafuor Akoto II and Others Osei-Hwere J.A.
13 C.M. 5/85 Victoria Sackey Mensah v. Chief Justice S. Y. T. Ayekpa Adade J.S.C.
14 C.M. 12/85 C. K. Vodu v. Fred Khoury Taylor J.S.C.
15 C.M. 1/86 In the Matter of the Republic v. Osei-Hwere J.A. Justice Kaleo Bio; Ex parte Kofi Anoma Ampiah J.A.”
It seems to me with respect that this ostensible administrative method of arranging the work of the Supreme Court in so-called panels is legally questionable and cannot be supported under any provision of our law. Under article 116 (1) of the Constitution, 1979 it is the Supreme Court and only the entire indivisible Supreme Court that has the final appellate and other specified jurisdiction to decide cases. In point of law therefore the Supreme Court does not sit in panels. As it is, the power claimed by the Chief Justice will enable him to arrange the work of the Supreme Court in panels. The Chief Justice with one Supreme Court judge and three Court of Appeal justices will form one panel and on the same day in another court room three Supreme Court judges with two Court of Appeal justices will also sit, thus enabling the Supreme Court to sit in two panels on the same day and conduct the business of the Supreme Court. I think this is ridiculous and it is an
[p.551] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 illegitimate use of the power of interpretation of statutes to construe section 19 to achieve this result.
In the fifteen cases listed for the week commencing 19 May 1986, the empanelling was apparently done as I have indicated already by the Chief Justice. The legal authority for so empanelling the Supreme Court is not found in any statutory or constitutional provision that I am aware of. Under the said article 116 (1) of the Constitution, 1979, as is continued in force by the Proclamation, 1981 and already referred to herein, but set out hereunder for ease of reference, it is provided as follows:
“116. (1) The Supreme Court shall be the final court of appeal in and for Ghana and shall have such appellate and other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by this Constitution or any other law.”
Clearly under this provision as I have already pointed out, it is the entire Supreme Court and not a panel or panels of it that is given the jurisdiction spelled out in the article. Now under article 215 (c) of the Constitution, 1979, it is provided:
“(c) where a power is given to any person or authority to do or enforce the doing of an act or a thing, all such powers shall be deemed to be also given as are necessary to enable that person or authority to do or enforce the doing of the act or thing.”
And section 10 (2) of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4), also provides:
“(2) Where an enactment confers power to do any act or thing all such powers shall be deemed to be also given as are reasonably necessary to enable that act or thing to be done or are incidental to the doing thereof.”
It appears to me that incidental to the appellate and other specified jurisdiction given to the Supreme Court by article 116 (1) of the Constitution, 1979, is also the clearly necessary power exclusively given to the Supreme Court by virtue of the combined provisions of article 215 (c) and section 10 (2) of C.A. 4 to fix the hearing dates of appeals, cases and other matters within its jurisdiction. In the circumstances I should think apart from the Supreme Court itself there is no other authority or person with any legal power whatsoever to undertake the fixing of dates for the hearing of cases before the Supreme Court.
The fixing of dates for the hearing of Supreme Court cases without the authority of the Supreme Court as it has been exercised in the past and as was done by the list for the week commencing 19 May 1986 is
[p.552] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 in my respectful view nothing but a plainly unlawful arrogation to himself of the constitutional function and power of the Supreme Court by the president of the Supreme Court. I know of no constitutional or statutory provision sanctioning it and with respect, the majority decision indicated none to assuage my unhappy feeling that the Supreme Court is by its majority decision poised on acquiescing in unlawful acts. Abandoning the choice of the dates for the hearing of cases in the Supreme Court to the arbitrary discretion of the Chief Justice is with respect very disturbing and clearly unsatisfactory. Without meaning any disrespect and without saying he will do so, it seems to me that if the Chief Justice chooses for the sake of argument to ignore a case, that case will surely never be heard so long as he is in office. This is obviously invidious and intolerable and cannot but subvert the proper administration of justice.
In any case the unambiguous provisions of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13) indicate in as clear a statutory language as can be devised that the power to fix dates of appeal cases and cases within the original jurisdiction rests unequivocally in the Supreme Court and these rules can be applied mutatis mutandis to all other cases as well as to cases within its supervisory jurisdiction.
Rules 23 (1) and 53 (1) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (C.I. 13), settle beyond controversy the question of the proper authority to fix these dates in the cases to which they apply. As regards the fixing of dates for the hearing of appeals, rule 23 (1) provides:
“23. (1) The Court may, after considering the statement of the case of each of the parties to the appeal and any other papers or arguments filed by the parties decide to determine the appeal and give judgment in Court on a fixed date without further argument or may appoint a date on which the parties shall appear before the Court for the hearing of further argument.”
(The emphasis is mine.) With regard to the fixing of dates for cases invoking the original as opposed to the appellate jurisdiction of the court rule 53 (1) provides:
“53 (1) The Court may, after considering the statement of the plaintiff’s case, and of the defendant’s case, the memorandum of agreed issues and any arguments of law, decide to determine the action and give judgment in Court on a fixed date without argument or may appoint a time at which the parties shall appear before the Court for further hearing of the action.”
(The emphasis is mine.) These provisions cumulatively show by their terms that it is the Supreme Court itself and only the Supreme Court that has the power of fixing the dates for the hearing of appeals and
[p.553] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 other cases within its original jurisdiction. These provisions in the rules with regard to dates would seem to have been really enacted out of abundance of caution since the provision of section 10 (2) of C.A. 4 was substantially repeated in article 215 (c) of the Constitution, 1979. I concede of course that no specific provision was made in C.I. 13 for the fixing of hearing dates for cases like the present which are within the supervisory jurisdiction under article 119 of the Constitution, 1979; but quite apart from the guidelines that rules 23 (1) and 53 (1) of C.I. 13 give, article 215 (c) and section 10 (2) of C.A. 4 are authorities as I have already indicated which enable the Supreme Court to exercise the incidental jurisdiction of fixing dates for the hearing of all cases within its jurisdiction. After all C.I. 13 is a subsidiary legislation, it cannot undermine a constitutional provision.
These provisions all show incidentally that the Supreme Court does not sit in panels in which some incumbent members of the court are ousted and Court of Appeal justices substituted. I recall that in Darke IX v. Darke IV [1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 481, S.C. I drew attention to an out of court pronouncement by Mr. Justice Brennan of the American Supreme Court in an article: “State Court decisions and the Supreme Court” (1960) 31 Penn Bar Assn Q. 393 with regard to the practice of the American Supreme Court where he said (as quoted in the American Supreme Court Practice (5th ed. 1978) at 342):
“Our Constitution vests the judicial power in only one Supreme Court. This does not permit Supreme Court action by committees, panels or sections.”
(The emphasis is mine.) I think in Ghana the final judicial power of the State is also vested in one Supreme Court and it is vested in such a manner that like the U.S. Supreme Court this does not permit the exercise of this final judicial power by panels of the Supreme Court. Assuming, however, without conceding it, that sittings in panels can be tolerated, a close study of the five panels listed for the week commencing 19 May 1986 shows clearly as I have already noted that every panel lacked the mandatory membership of the Chief Justice and at least four Supreme Court justices. In such a situation I dare say for lack of jurisdiction the court is powerless to adjudicate on the merits of cases and give a decision that can be considered a precedent for future courts to follow. I think all the panels were unlawfully constituted and with respect all their decisions are consequently null and void and I so hold.
Perhaps an argument can be put forward that jurisdiction was not raised in the other cases and this court and the panels fit those other cases are functus officio. Akufo-Addo C.J. in Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1
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G.L.R. 337 at 342, S.C. gave the right answer to this argument which is becoming a recurring contention in our courts. He said:
“The law, as I have always understood it, is that where a court or a judge gives a judgment or makes an order which it has no jurisdiction to give or make or which is irregular because it is not warranted by any enactment or rule of procedure, such a judgment or an order is void, and the court has an inherent jurisdiction, either suo motu or on the application of the party affected, to set aside the judgment or the order.”
I was a panel member in all the cases listed for 19 May 1986 and speaking for myself, with the exception of cases struck out or dismissed as withdrawn and cases adjourned, I would set aside all decisions in the cases which were not interlocutory and which purported to dispose finally of the cases on their merits.
Perhaps a brief study of the history of the composition of the United States Supreme Court from the date it was established to modern times may help us to understand the evolutionary direction of our own Supreme Court. The total membership composition of the United States Supreme Court has changed five times since the establishment of the court. By the provisions of the Judiciary Act, 1789, I Stat 73, the number of justices was first fixed at six. This was changed to seven in 1807, and 36 years later in 1837 it was increased to nine. In 1863 it was increased further to ten and in 1866 it was reduced to seven. I think the power to constitute the court in the U.S. or any other jurisdiction is so important and has such tremendous political significance that it can only be exercised if the wielder of the power is statutorily mandated in clear legislative language to so exercise it. This, with its political implication, is highlighted by the fact that the purpose of the reduction by Congress to seven in 1866 was to prevent Mr. Andrew Johnson, the U.S. President, from packing the court with his appointees who would reflect his known views that the then reconstruction legislation of Congress was unconstitutional. After his term of office had expired the number was increased by Congress to nine where it has remained ever since.
Is it to be assumed that after the struggles of the military and civilian regimes to control the personnel of the membership of the Supreme Court, the P.N.D.C. regime is willing to leave substantially the choice of the selection of members to sit in the highest court to the arbitrary discretion of one man not by unambiguous statutory provision but by a provision said to achieve this result by a dubious statutory interpretation? It is amazing that in this case the majority decision is in effect acquiescing in a power in the Chief Justice to completely ignore
[p.555] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 the constitutional composition of the Supreme Court in the enacting clause of section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42. The power claimed here is in theory a power to bypass all the Supreme Court justices and to invite say five Court of Appeal justices to sit and constitute the Supreme Court. It is indeed a power within the discretion of the Chief Justice, having regard to his admitted power under article 124 (c) of the Constitution, 1979 to assign a justice of the Supreme Court permanently to the High Court and to refuse to permit him to participate in the work of the Supreme Court by persistently empanelling the Supreme Court without him. I deny that any such power can be deduced by any legitimate interpretation of the proviso to section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42. Keeping the wording of section 19 in view, let us consider the composition and jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court.
The composition of the United States Supreme Court as now codified is contained in section 1 of 28 United States Code, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure which provides under “Number of Justices; quorum” as follows:
“The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate justices, six of whom shall constitute a quorum.”
It is clear from this statutory provision that the total membership composition of the United States Supreme Court is nine but the number that can legally sit to decide cases is either nine or at least six. Under section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42, the total membership composition of our Supreme Court is any number above five but the number that can sit to decide cases is either more than five or at least five. If the number in the United States and Ghana falls below the statutory quorum then in my view the court cannot sit to dispose of cases, for as I pointed out in my dissenting opinion in Bilson v. Apaloo (supra) at 90:
“A quorum as any standard English dictionary will show is: ‘a minimum number of persons necessary for transaction of business in any body’: see Chambers’s Twentieth Century Dictionary (1964 ed.).”
I shall examine one or two cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to buttress the proposition that the United States Supreme Court does not sit to decide cases with a membership below six. It must however be appreciated and kept constantly in mind that the wording of section 19 of P.N.D.C.L. 42 established a quorum of five Supreme Court justices in Ghana as the minimum number to make final decisions disposing of cases; and it is for this reason that we may profit by an examination of the American experience.
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In United States v. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the majority judgment of the court made up of himself, the Chief Justice and Justices Black and Douglas with Justices Burton and Frankfurter dissenting. It was therefore a decision by a majority of four to two in which Justices Clark, Harlan and Whittaker did not participate though they were incumbent members of the court. 28 U.S.C. made no provision as to how many of the quorum can legitimately act for the court, nor did it stipulate that the decision of the court be by an absolute majority of the members sitting, nonetheless the Du Pont case (supra) is illustrative of many cases establishing the principle that a majority of the quorum, namely not less than four justices, can act for the court. This is the common law principle which Justice Brennan expressing the unanimous view of the United States Supreme Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Flotill Products Inc., 389 U.S. 179 (1967) in a decision in which Justice Marshall did not participate, stated as regards the adjudicating membership of a court having a quorum at 183-184:
“The almost universally accepted common-law rule is … that …in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, a majority of a quorum constituted of a simple majority of a collective body is empowered to act for the body. Where the enabling statute is silent on the question, the body is justified in adhering to that common-law rule.”
On the basis of this common law rule it is my opinion that any decision of the Supreme Court which is not supported by at least three Supreme Court justices cannot be considered a Supreme Court decision. Of course if a quorum of five is not present, the members of the Supreme Court sitting will constitute a court that can hand down a ruling not involving the decision on the merits of the cause or matter before the Supreme Court: see article 120 of the Constitution, 1979. As an illustration, suppose a panel of the Supreme Court is constituted of two Supreme Court justices and three Court of Appeal justices, the court will be incapable of giving a decision that can be considered as a judgment of the Supreme court. I know that the panel that was to handle the cases listed as (3) and (4) (supra) has been reconstituted following an adjournment which was granted when the cases were first called. The reconstituted panel is made up of two Supreme Court justices and three Court of Appeal justices. This is a panel that can in theory hand down a decision allowing the appeal by a majority of three Court of Appeal justices as against two Supreme Court justices and so the decision of Court of Appeal justices in the Court of Appeal
[p.557] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 will be reversed by three Court of Appeal justices only because they have been requested to sit in the Supreme Court. I think this is clearly invidious and vividly shows that the mandatory quorum of five Supreme Court justices cannot be dispensed with in Ghana without compromising the integrity of Supreme Court decisions. It is only a majority of the quorum that can at least act for the court when all members making up the quorum actually sit and this principle is of universal application in the absence of a statutory provision regulating the matter.
Let us consider the extraordinary result which will follow if the power claimed here is to prevail. Suppose a decision of the High Court presided over by a Supreme Court judge, unanimously upheld by a Court of Appeal made up of two Supreme Court judges and a Court of Appeal judge, is set aside on appeal by a majority of a Supreme Court panel of three Court of Appeal justices against two Supreme Court justices. We will have the situation in which the view of the law held by three Court of Appeal justices will be a Supreme Court decision overriding the view of the law held by six superior court justices made up of five Supreme Court justices and one Court of Appeal justice. Surely it is infinitely better when in all cases the final law of the land as declared finds support in the view of at least three Supreme Court justices in accordance with the common law principle enunciated by Justice Brennan in the Flotill Products case (supra). Again suppose the Chief Justice is unhappy about the views of all his four colleagues in the Supreme Court. If the present interpretation adopted in the majority view is correct he can assign each of the Supreme Court justices to work at the High Court and always empanel the Supreme Court with himself and the Court of Appeal judges he likes. Surely the constitutional provision ought not to be interpreted to give effect to such extraordinary results. These results show that the majority decision is with respect wrong.
I think inherent in this principle is a negative consequential principle also of universal application that in the absence of a quorum and an enabling statutory provision, a court is completely incompetent to adjudicate on the merits of any case at all within its jurisdiction. This consequential principle is statutorily recognised in rule 4 (3) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States adopted on 15 June 1970 which provides:
“In the absence of a quorum, on any day appointed for holding a session of the court, the justices attending (or, if no justice is present, the clerk or deputy clerk) may adjourn the court until there is a quorum.”
Clearly this incompetence to decide is a rule of commonsense and rule 4 (3) would have been surplusage but for the provision enabling
[p.558] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 511 the clerk or his deputy to participate in the adjournment process. Our Rules of Court Committee will do well to study this provision and consider its relevance to the practice in this Supreme Court.
In United States of America v. Aluminium Co. of America, 322 U.S. 716 (1944), the court was unable to obtain a quorum to hear the case and the impasse thus created was resolved in 1946 by Congress passing into law 58 Stat 272, 15 U.S.C., s. 29 now contained in the 1948 codification of the United States Code: 28 U.S.C., s. 2109. Thus for the first time in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court, provision was made for the disposal of cases in which the mandatory quorum of six is lacking. The provision reads:
“If a case brought to the Supreme Court by direct appeal from a district court cannot be heard and determined because of the absence of a quorum of qualified justices, the Chief Justice of the United States may order it remitted to the court of appeals for the circuit including the district in which the case arose, to be heard and determined by that court either sitting an banc or specially constituted and composed of the three circuit judges senior in commission who are able to sit, as such order may direct. The decision of such court shall be final and conclusive . . . In any other case brought to the Supreme Court for review, which cannot be heard and determined because of the absence of a quorum of qualified justices, if a majority of the qualified justices, shall be of opinion that the case cannot be heard and determined at the next ensuing term, the court shall enter its order affirming the judgment of the court from which the case was brought for review with the same effect as upon affirmance by an equally divided court.”
I think the Law Reform Commission will certainly profit from studying the rational foundation of this provision and examine how it can expediently be modified to suit our law. We may however consider how the U.S. Supreme Court has operated the provision.
On 5 July 1950 in Prichard v. United States, 339 U.S. 974 (1950), on petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeal for the sixth circuit, the Chief Justice, and Justices Reed, Frankfurter and Clark disqualified themselves in the case. The ensuing absence of a quorum caused the provisions of section 2109 of 28 U.S.C. to be applied in the case and as the majority of the qualified justices were of the opinion that the case could not be heard and determined at the next term, the judgment of the Court of Appeal was affirmed. The Supreme Court did the same thing in 1974 in Sloan v. Nixon, 419 U.S. 958 (1974).
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In the American cases so far discussed herein, of the total composition of the court, the absent members disqualified themselves. What will the position be if the total membership of the court as distinct from the quorum had decreased by death, resignation or retirement and no new appointment had been made? Will it affect the legal composition of the court? An analogy was once posed by our law under our Constitution, 1979, before P.N.D.C.L 42 was passed. It was this: would a fall in membership under article 115 (1) from the Chief Justice and not less than six other justices to the Chief Justice and four others affect the legal position of the court at work, since under article 115 (2) the working quorum was any five Supreme Court justices? I think as long as a quorum is available a fill in number is irrelevant and the provisions of section 3 (1) of the transitional provisions support this view. However, the experience of the U.S. Supreme Court is worth studying.
During the 1971 term of the United States Supreme Court which commenced on the first Monday in October, the court dealt with a number of cases that threw some light on the problem: on 17 September 1971 Justice Hugo Black resigned as a US Supreme Court judge and on 23 September 1971 almost one week later Justice John Herlan also resigned. The court therefore commenced its 1971 session with only seven justices: Warren Burger, the Chief Justice, and Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, White and Blackmun and it heard and determined quite a number of cases before Justices Rehnquist and Powell joined the court in December. For a reference to some of the cases which the seven justices disposed of in the 1971 term: see “The Brethren” by Woodward and Armstrong at 153-178.
I think this survey of American practice does highlight aspects of the similarity in our court system with the American Supreme Court. Like our court the American Supreme Court has a total membership and a working membership, namely a quorum. And we will do well to learn from their experience. Although the total membership of our Supreme Court is specifically at large its working membership or quorum is not. Speaking of our superior courts in his dissenting opinion in Bilson v. Apaloo (supra) at 69 my learned brother Adade J.S.C. noted:
“It cannot be too much emphasised that these courts are all creatures of statutes. Statute prescribes their name, their total membership, their working strength, their powers and even their places of sitting. Any departure from any statutory requirement renders a court incapable of exercising the jurisdiction given to it.”
(The emphasis is mine.) We have seen how the impasse created in the American Supreme Court by the lack of quorum in United States v.
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Aluminium Co. (supra) was resolved by legislation. In this case the attempt to resolve the impasse created by the absence of a legal quorum by recourse to a non-existent power in the Chief Justice to pack the court with Court of Appeal justices must with respect be regrettable indeed. I think the proper thing is to invite the appropriate State organ to deal with the matter, by appointing a new justice of the Supreme Court.
For the reasons I have canvassed in this opinion I am firmly of the view that the objection taken by counsel that has court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine cases when its membership consists of the Chief Justice and less than four justices of the Supreme Court, is well founded and unanswerable, and the objection cannot be met by a contention that justices of the Court of Appeal can participate to provide the quorum. I am afraid the properly constituted court as is mandatorily specified in P.N.D.C.L. 42 is at least the Chief Justice and not less than four Supreme Court justices and no attempt to avoid the clear terms of this legislation should be entertained. The Chief Justice, three justices of the Supreme Court and a justice of the Court of Appeal empanelled as a court to hear and determine the instant motion will be a court unknown to the constitutional law of the country and the decision of such a court will be void for want of jurisdiction. In Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 264 at 265 the Supreme Court of the U.S. dismissing a habeas corpus application for want of jurisdiction declared:
Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”
In the result, I think the proper course for this court to take is to adjourn the certiorari motion sine die until a quorum emerges after the P.N.D.C. has appointed at least one justice of the Supreme Court to provide the necessary quorum, so that a properly constituted Supreme Court can hear and determine the motion. In the alternative it is my opinion and I do hold that this court has no option but to declare in consonance with the principle enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ex parte McCardle (supra) that it has no jurisdiction and to dismiss the motion before it on the ground that it is incompetent as a court to adjudicate on it. I would dismiss the motion on that ground but with liberty for the applicant to have the motion heard by a properly constituted court when one becomes available.
Finally, I think the Provisional National Defence Council ought to give consideration to passing an enabling enactment validating all
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Supreme Court decisions given between 9 January 1986 and the date when a justice of the Supreme Court is appointed to make up the mandatory legal quorum.
DECISION
Objection overruled.
M. C. N. N.
