OBOSU AND ANOTHER vs. MUSA AND ANOTHER [1992] 1 GLR 333
13 April 1987 · KPEGAH J · ≈ 22 min read
[1987] SLR (HC) 6Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Cohen v Rothfield [1919] 1 KB 410; 88 L.J.K.B. 468; 120 L.T. 434, C.A.
(2) McHenry v. Lewis (1883) 22 Ch.D 397; 52 L.J.Ch 325; 47 L.T. 549, C.A.
(3) Shekoni v. Ojoko (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 504.
(4) Kumah v. Ankoma [1972] 2 G.L.R. 134.
(5) Awume v. Donya [1962] 1 G.L.R. 357.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION by the defendants for stay of proceedings in an action brought by the plaintiffs in the High Court pending the determination by the Court of Appeal of an appeal filed by the defendants against the judgment of the High Court dismissing an earlier action brought by the defendants against the plaintiffs. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
Ewusie-Wilson for the plaintiffs. de-Graft Aidoo for the defendants.
[p.335] of [1992] 1 GLR 333
JUDGMENT OF KPEGAH J.
I will preface this my ruling with a statement of Eve J. in the case of Cohen v. Rothfield [1919] 1 K.B. 410 at 416, C.A. as follows:
“To restrain a man from proceeding with an action which prima facie he has a right to bring and prosecute is, as was pointed out by Fletcher Moulton L.J. in In re Connolly Brothers ([1911]1 Ch. 731 at 746), a very serious thing, but it is not disputed that there is jurisdiction to make the order, the basis of the jurisdiction being that it is a jurisdiction in personam and has nothing to do with any conflict between the tribunals.”
I will supplement the above statement of the law with another one, this time, from Jessel MR. in the case of McHenry v. Lewis (1883) 22 Ch.D. 397 at 400, C.A. The Master of the Rolls was dilating on the jurisdiction to put a plaintiff to his election where he has instituted two suits within the same jurisdiction against the same defendant for the same remedies. He said:
“In this country, where the two actions are by the same man in Courts governed by the same procedure, and where the judgments are followed by the same remedies, it is prima facie vexatious to bring two actions where one will do. And, indeed, this has been recognised, I believe, for ages by the practice of the old Court of Chancery, which always put a Plaintiff to his election by an order of course if he was suing for the same cause of action both at Law and in Equity. The same principle applies it appears to me, wherever the judgment can be enforced. . . Therefore, it appears to me that in all those cases there is prima facie vexation.”
It will be seen that in both cases, their lordships were considering a situation where the same plaintiff instituted a concurrent action against the same defendant for the same remedies within the same jurisdiction.
The brief facts of the instant case are as follows: The plaintiffs issued a writ of summons against the defendants claiming a declaration of title to a piece or parcel of land known and called “Tweikukrom” situate at Ajumako Assin in the Ajumako Traditional Area. They also claimed the ancillary reliefs of recovery of possession and an order of perpetual injunction. In their statement of claim, the plaintiffs pleaded estoppel per rem judicatam, relying on a judgment in a previous suit affecting the same land entitled Jonah Abraham Annobil v. Nana Obosu. In that suit, the first plaintiff in the instant case was the first defendant
[p.336] of [1992] 1 GLR 333 and the second defendant in the present suit was substituted for the first plaintiff in the previous suit after the latter’s death. The second plaintiff and the first defendant were not parties to the previous suit. I take it, however, that they are privies since this was not controverted by the defendants. The plaintiffs also pleaded certain arbitrations in addition to the judgment. The present plaintiffs did not counterclaim in the old suit. The claim of the defendants in that suit for declaration of title, recovery of possession, perpetual injunction, etc. was dismissed. Despite this, the defendants continued to work on the land on the ground that the plaintiffs never counterclaimed in the previous suit in the High Court and therefore had no title to the land either. The plaintiffs brought the instant suit against the defendants for declaration of title, recovery of possession and an order of perpetual injunction as a way of remedying their failure to counterclaim in the previous suit.
When judgment went against the defendants in that suit, they appealed to the Court of Appeal against the dismissal of their claim. The plaintiffs did not cross-appeal. There is an admission by the plaintiffs in paragraph (5) of their statement of claim that the judgment they are pleading as res judicata was delivered on 11 May 1985. The current action was commenced on 23 October 1985. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that the appeal was filed, considering the time allowed for appeals under the rules, before the present writ was sealed on 23 October 1985.
The defendants denied the claim of the plaintiffs related to the same land and said they were not claiming “the land in dispute” in this suit. One of the essential elements for a plea of res judicata is therefore lacking or is being denied. The defendants then averred that the judgment cannot be so pleaded against them. Pleadings had closed and issues settled since 1985. The case appeared on my cause list on 24 March 1987 and I had wanted to fix it for definite hearing when learned counsel for the defendants, Mr. de-Graft Aidoo, submitted that proceedings in this case be stayed pending the determination of the appeal filed by the defendants in the previous suit. The reasons advanced by counsel were: (a) that the record of proceedings was ready for transmission to the Court of Appeal; (b) that the record of proceedings was prepared at their expense and in good time; (c) that the appeal, if heard, the result would dispose of the instant case one way or the other; and (d) that they are prepared to do everything possible to have the appeal listed early for hearing by the Court of Appeal. This court was not told how they could jump the queue at the Court of Appeal.
[p.337] of [1992] 1 GLR 333
Perhaps the most important point raised in support of the application for stay of proceedings in this case is that the result of the appeal will have a direct effect on the case before me and will necessarily dispose of it and render this suit superfluous. It is therefore necessary for me to stay the proceedings and adjourn the case sine die, urges counsel. Mr. de-Graft Aidoo did not leave me in doubt that the result of the appeal will dispose of the instant case even if the defendants, who are appellants, lose; whichever way the appeal is decided, therefore, the result of this case will be in no doubt. Taken to its logical conclusion, learned counsel is discreetly prompting this court to be prudent and await the decision of the superior court seised with this appeal and not embarrass itself by possibly having its final decision in direct conflict with a Court of Appeal decision. May I state, in passing, that I was never told what that very important and all-embracing legal issue in the appeal is which is capable of disposing of this case or how relevant the appeal itself is to this case, if at all. I was also not told what benefits, in terms of remedies, the appeal will confer on the plaintiffs to enable me decide if there will be vexation or oppression resulting from identity of remedies or that the action is frivolous. When the application for stay of proceedings was made by counsel for the defendants, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, Mr. Ewusie-Wilson, only made a perfunctory objection.
I did not give my ruling immediately, not because I was in any doubt as to what the decision of the court should be but to give some consideration to the plea of lis alibi pendens which I considered relevant and to determine its scope and the principles for its application since such applications are not uncommon in our courts. Generally put, the question is, under what circumstances and upon what principles will a court stay proceedings in a case before it or abdicate its legitimate jurisdiction in favour of another court because there is a concurrent suit in that other court within the same jurisdiction between the same parties for the same reliefs or remedies? Tailoring the question specifically for this case, under what circumstances and upon what principles will a court stay proceedings in a case before it because there is pending in a superior court between the same parties an appeal by one of them in a previous suit between the same parties on grounds that the result of the appeal is capable of disposing of issues in the pending suit even if the appellant loses the appeal?
The first point I would like to deal with is the veiled submission and caution by learned counsel for the defendants to the effect that this court should be wary of putting itself in conflict with a Court of Appeal
[p.338] of [1992] 1 GLR 333 decision; I must therefore, out of deference for the Court of Appeal, stay the proceedings and await the outcome of the appeal. As was pointed out by Eve J. in the Cohen case (supra), the jurisdiction of a court to put a plaintiff who has concurrent suits in two courts within the same jurisdiction for the same remedies to his election to choose which case to pursue, is “a jurisdiction in personam and has nothing to do with any conflict between the tribunals.” My understanding of this statement is that to get a court to exercise this jurisdiction to stay one of the proceedings, the consideration is not the avoidance of conflict between an inferior court and a superior court or to avoid conflict between courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction; or that of a lower court paying obeisance to the jurisdiction of a higher court by abdicating its own lawful jurisdiction in favour of the higher court. What the factors are which influence a court to exercise the jurisdiction to interfere are different and will soon be considered.
The situation I face is peculiar and different from the decided cases I have laid hands on. It is not simply a case of the same plaintiff sealing two writs for the same reliefs against the same defendants; it is also not a case in which a defendant in one case has taken out a writ in another court against the plaintiff for the same reliefs; neither is it a case of the same plaintiff sealing writs in two different jurisdictions for the same reliefs against the same party; nor is it the case of the defendant taking out a writ in a foreign jurisdiction against the plaintiff for identical reliefs or remedies. This is a case in which the defendants had issued a writ against the plaintiffs and lost. The plaintiffs then brought an action upon the said judgment and previous arbitrations to remedy a technical lapse on their part not to have counterclaimed while the defendants had appealed in the first case. Maybe it will not be wrong to say that the nearest analogy available is to liken the appeal to fresh proceedings by the defendants in a different court against the plaintiffs. I say so because the same consideration may be applicable in both cases. I must confess that I have not, due to limited facilities, been able to find any authority which is on all fours with the instant case. The case of Shekoni v. Ojoko (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 504 is not particularly helpful. Most of the authorities I have located cover the situations I have earlier stated; but they do offer useful guides. Whatever way one looks at it, the issue raised in this application involves the consideration of the plea of lis alibi pendens: When an appeal is pending in a case between the same parties and the respondents institute a fresh action in a lower court seeking reliefs he could have counterclaimed for but which he failed to do, should the fresh
[p.339] of [1992] 1 GLR 333 action be stayed to await the outcome of the appeal when the defendants deny the disputed land is the same as in the previous suit?
In the case of Kumah v. Ankoma [1972] 2 G.L.R. 134 Baidoo J. had occasion to consider the plea of lis alibi pendens. This was a case in which the defendant sued the plaintiff in the district court as a customary successor of a deceased in an attempt to prevent the plaintiff from interfering with the estate of the deceased. About the same time, the plaintiff also applied to the High Court for a declaration that he was the customary successor and for the grant of letters of administration. She then wrote to the district court asking that the case before it be stayed pending the determination of the suit in the High Court. The application was ignored and judgment obtained in her absence. She failed in her bid to have the judgment vacated by the district court. In the High Court proceedings, it was contended that the case before the High Court ousted the jurisdiction of the district court. Baidoo J. after reviewing some authorities, stated the position as follows at 142:
“The cardinal rule is that a plea of lis alibi pendens will not succeed unless the applicant proves as a matter of fact that the action instituted by the plaintiff is vexatious in the sense that he the applicant is doubly and unnecessarily vexed by reason of another action for the same course of action which has been instituted in another court between the same parties. Where for instance the same litigant brings two actions about the same matter in two different courts in this country, his conduct is in all cases deemed to be vexatious and the defendant may demand that he shall elect between the two proceedings.”
Baidoo J. was faced with a situation where one of the parties sued in the High Court as plaintiff and the other in the district court as plaintiff. He dismissed the plaintiff’s contention that her suit in the High Court had ousted the jurisdiction of the district court. His view was that the plaintiff should have formally applied to the High Court for the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction to determine whether in the circumstances of the case either of the two cases pending before the two different courts be stayed or struck out. This would have offered the High Court the chance to consider the circumstances under which the plea of lis libi pendens can be invoked and whether it was applicable to the case. His lordship said at 144: “the magistrate was perfectly right in law to ignore the application of plaintiffs counsel urging him to strike out the suit filed by the defendant there.”
[p.340] of [1992] 1 GLR 333
The Kumah case (supra,) can be authority for the proposition that where concurrent suits between the same parties are pending, one in a lower court and the other in a superior court, the lower court is not necessarily obliged on the sole ground of deference or obeisance to abdicate its jurisdiction in a case properly before it. This may appear an outrageous view to hold but I do not think it is ill-founded. As Baidoo J. said at 144:
“In the absence of any order from the High Court to suspend or strike out the action regularly filed and pending before it, the magistrate was perfectly right in law to ignore the application of the plaintiff’s counsel urging him to strike out the suit filed by the defendant there.”
The case of Kumah v. Ankoma (supra) has some similarity to the instant case. It was not a case of the plaintiff suing in two different courts; but one of the defendants also taking action in a different court. Here, the plaintiffs are not the appellants in the Court of Appeal case but are the respondents. The appellants are the defendants. I think in such a situation the case against interference to stay proceedings in the court below pending the determination of the appeal becomes stronger because the plaintiff did not initiate both proceedings. One has been forced upon him and he may have no control over its prosecution, especially when the appeal is not shown to be relevant to the fresh suit.
In Cohen .v Rothfield (supra) Scrutton L.J. said at 414:
“Where the plaintiff in the foreign action is not plaintiff, but defendant, in the English action, the case against interference is even stronger, for the person to be stayed has not himself initiated two proceedings. He has initiated one, and has been compelled to appear in another over which he has, as defendant, no control.”
I have quoted this passage not because it is exactly apposite to this case in view of the obvious reference to two different jurisdictions, but because of its reference to the fact that the plaintiff to be stayed had no control over the fortunes of the second proceedings. This should also be the case when the two suits are within the same jurisdiction and the plaintiff is the defendant in one. I am here equating the appeal to a fresh suit in another court. One obvious respect in which the plaintiffs lack control is that the defendants can decide at anytime to abandon their appeal. Lastly, what happens when the defendants lose the appeal and yet decide to press further? The plaintiffs must keep on waiting. I must
[p.341] of [1992] 1 GLR 333 say, however, that when the appeal is shown by the applicant to be particularly relevant, the case against interference may not be all that weak. Also the matter would have been different and I would have had no hesitation in, saying so if the plaintiffs were the appellants, and yet brought a fresh action when their needs could be adequately satisfied by the result of the appeal that the fresh action is prima facie vexatious.
This brings me to the consideration of the principles which the courts act upon when there is a plea of lis alibi pendens by one of the parties. Eve J in the Cohen case (supra) after accepting the court’s jurisdiction to interfere and stay one action in favour of the other, said at 417:
“The question then arises in what circumstances and upon what principle does the Court act in exercising this jurisdiction in cases where, as in this case, it is invoked on the ground that another action between the same parties and for substantially the same relief is already instituted. Broadly speaking, I think the answer is that the Court will exercise the jurisdiction where the circumstances are such as to satisfy it that continued prosecution of both actions would be oppressive or vexatious. In each case therefore it becomes necessary to examine the particular circumstances with a view to ascertaining whether the answer to the question I have stated should be in the affirmative or negative, always bearing this in mind, that it is incumbent on the party who invokes the jurisdiction to satisfy the Court of the existence of a state of things justifying its exercise.”
In the same case, Scrutton L.J. agreed at 414 that the party asking for the invocation of the court’s jurisdiction to interfere and stay one of the actions must “prove a substantial case of vexation resulting from the identity of proceedings, remedies, and benefits, or from the existence of some motive other than a bona fide desire to determine disputes.” I will add that where the other proceedings is an appeal, the applicant must in addition prove the relevancy of the appeal to the new suit.
The case of McHenry v. Lewis (supra) also supports these statements of the law by Scrutton L.J. In both the Cohen (supra) and McHenry (supra) cases, their lordships considered another type of concurrent action—one within the jurisdiction and one in a foreign jurisdiction. The unanimous view in both cases is that when one is instituted within the local jurisdiction and the second in a foreign jurisdiction, there is no prima facie case of vexation or oppression since the local courts may not
[p.342] of [1992] 1 GLR 333 be necessarily aware of the advantages or special benefits of the foreign procedure. Jessel MR stated it thus at 397:
“But if one of the actions is in a foreign country where there are different forms of procedure and different remedies, there is no presumption that the multiplicity of actions is vexatious, and a special case must be made out to induce the Court to interfere. The Court has, however, power to interfere in such a case under its general jurisdiction to restrain vexatious and oppressive legislation, and will interfere in a proper case even before decree.” We are not considering such a situation here but I find some guidelines in the views expressed. From the various authorities I have considered, certain principles can be distilled to cover the following situations:
(a) where the same plaintiff brings a concurrent action within the same jurisdiction against the same party for the same purpose or reliefs then the multiplicity of actions is prima facie vexatious;
(b) where the plaintiff is the defendant in the other concurrent action, the ground for interference on grounds of vexation is weaker since the plaintiff has no control over the second action;
(c) where the plaintiff brings the second action in a foreign jurisdiction, this is not prima facie vexatious since the local courts may not be aware of the advantages of the foreign procedure; and
(d) the case for interference is also weaker where the plaintiff is the defendant in the foreign action.
Generally speaking, therefore, the plea of lis alibi pendens is not available to a party who cannot satisfy the court that he will be unnecessarily vexed by the acceptance of both actions for trial when the plaintiff has no particular advantages to gain by instituting the two actions. When, however, the plaintiff is the defendant in the other concurrent action, then as was stated by Scrutton L.J. in Cohen v. Rothfield (supra) at 415:
“… unless the applicant satisfies the Court that no advantage can be gained by the defendant proceeding with the action in which he is plaintiff in another part of the King’s dominions, the Court
[p.343] of [1992] 1 GLR 333 should not stop him from proceeding with the only proceedings which he, as plaintiff, can control.”
For “defendant” substitute “appellant” and there is a perfect statement of the law to suit this case.
The principle is very relevant here because the plaintiff is not the appellant and, as already stated, he has no control over the appeal. No special reason has been urged upon me to induce me to abdicate the exercise of a lawful jurisdiction and put the plaintiff to an election, stay proceedings, or strike out the case. There are however very strong and cogent reasons for saying that the plaintiffs’ action has been brought bona fide with a decided and determined intention to vindicate a right which they feel they have and which is being infringed, so as to obtain a remedy they believe themselves to be entitled to.
The case of Shekoni v. Ojoko (supra) appears to support the application of learned counsel for the defendants for stay of proceedings pending the determination of their appeal. The headnote reads: “Where, owing to a relevant appeal, the hearing of a case would work injustice to a party, it should be adjourned pending the determination of the appeal.” (The emphasis is mine.) The judgment of the West African Court of Appeal was delivered by Foster Sutton P. who said at 504:
“In our opinion there is substance in the point raised by counsel for the appellants. In view of the fact that there was an appeal pending in a suit involving ownership of the land which is the subject of the present suit the proper course for the learned trial Judge to have adopted would have been to adjourn the case pending determination of the appeal, with liberty to either side to apply for the hearing to be continued. To do otherwise would work an injustice to the appellants in the event of their appeal in Ekiti Divisional Native Court Suit No.2 of 1949 being successful, as they could not then renew their claim in the present suit.”
The facts of the case are not stated in the report. The judgment itself is rather sketchy and contains no reference to the facts. Also there is no intimation of the point raised on appeal which found favour with the court and was described in the judgment as being of “substance.” The only part of the judgment not quoted above is the portion concerned with the consequential orders made by the court. The only fact which is discernible from the judgment is that the subject matter and parties are the same.
[p.344] of [1992] 1 GLR 333
I conceive of an appeal being relevant to a pending suit only if, admittedly, it is one which an appellant or respondent (who is the defendant in the suit) can successfully plead as res judicata in the pending suit if his appeal should be successful. It will then be unjust to deny him the chance to plead it by proceeding with the case while the appeal is pending. Where, however, the appellant denies that the subject matter in the two suits are the same or identical, as in this case, the appeal, to me, becomes irrelevant to the pending suit and the appellant cannot be heard to say the fresh suit be adjourned pending the determination of the appeal. The defendants in the instant case deny that the disputed land is identical to the one involved in the appeal. Coupled with this is the inability of learned counsel for the defendants to positively specify what the points are that make the appeal relevant to this case. Facts must be made available for the court to objectively evaluate his assertions before deciding to stay proceedings in favour of the appeal. As was said by Eve J. in Cohen v. Rothfield (supra) at 417, it is incumbent on the party asking for the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction to stay proceedings “to satisfy the Court of the existence of a state of things justifying its exercise.” A mere assertion in court by counsel will not be a discharge of this burden. Moreover, I do not see my way clear by the assertion that if the defendants lost the appeal the plaintiffs could get the remedies they are seeking in this suit when they did not counterclaim in the previous suit.
My view on the Shekoni case (supra) is that it is good law so far as the appeal is shown to be relevant; but it is distinguishable from this case. I must not be taken to hold the view that even if an appeal is pending against a judgment, the said judgment can be pleaded as estoppel. Far from it. A judgment which is bad in law cannot operate as res judicata: see Awume v. Donya [1962] 1 G.L.R. 357. Therefore, a judgment which has the potential of being so declared because there is a serious appeal against it, suffers from a temporary incapacity. For a judgment to operate as res judicata, therefore, it must be a final judgment, that is it must be accepted by the parties as the final one disposing of the matters between them either because no appeal has been filed or because the appellate system has been exhausted. It must, of course, also be devoid of any of the defects which will render it bad in law. The party seeking the court’s intervention to stay one of the proceedings must show that the appeal is not frivolous.
Before I conclude, I would like to state that the principles which regulate the plea of lis alibi pendens are applicable even in a situation
[p.345] of [1992] 1 GLR 333 where one of the lis is a pending appeal. The added consideration is that the appeal must, on the admitted facts, be a relevant one in terms of the fresh suit. Where this is not admitted, it is the burden of the applicant asking for stay of the proceedings in the fresh action to prove that the appeal is relevant and if the suit is not stayed it will amount to injustice to him because he would not be able to raise it in the new suit. This presupposes that the appeal must not be frivolous. My views about the instant application are well known.
I will therefore dismiss the application asking for stay and order that the case be adjourned sine die pending the determination of the appeal before the Court of Appeal and it is hereby dismissed.
DECISION
Application dismissed.
M.C.N.-N.
