[2026] SLR (SC) 61Supreme Court - Ghana2026 SC - GHANA

NANA SERWAA BRUWAA II vs. NANA OBENG KO-ASARE(SUBST. BY NANA AMARKYE KAI II)

8 July 2026 · ASIEDU JSC · ≈ 19 min read

Cite as[2026] SLR (SC) 61

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OSCOLANANA SERWAA BRUWAA II v NANA OBENG KO-ASARE(SUBST. BY NANA AMARKYE KAI II) [2026] SLR (SC) 61

APANANA SERWAA BRUWAA II v NANA OBENG KO-ASARE(SUBST. BY NANA AMARKYE KAI II), [2026] SLR (SC) 61 (Ghana).

BluebookNANA SERWAA BRUWAA II v NANA OBENG KO-ASARE(SUBST. BY NANA AMARKYE KAI II), [2026] SLR (SC) 61 (Ghana Sup. Ct. 2026).

Linkhttps://superlawgh.com/slr/2026/sc/61/

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE SUPREME COURT

ACCRA – A.D. 2026

CORAM: AMADU JSC (PRESIDING)

ASIEDU JSC

GAEWU JSC

DARKO ASARE JSC

BARTELS-KODWO JSC

CIVIL APPEAL

NO. J4/70/2024

8TH JULY, 2026

NANA SERWAA BRUWAA II ………… PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT/

(AKROKERRIHEMAA) APPELLANT

SUING AS THE QUEENMOTHER

OF THE AKROKERRI STOOL

VRS

NANA OBENG KO-ASARE (SUBSTITUTED ……… DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/

BY NANA AMARKYE KAI II (SUED AS RESPONDENT

THE REGENT OF BOBRIASE STOOL)

JUDGMENT

ASIEDU, JSC:

[1.0]. INTRODUCTION

My lords, this is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated the 15th February 2024, in which the Court of Appeal set aside the judgment of the trial High Court which had been delivered in favour of the Plaintiff/Respondent/Appellant (hereinafter referred to as the Appellant).

[2.0]. FACTS

By a writ of summons and an accompanying statement of claim, the Appellant claimed against the Defendant/Appellant/Respondent (Respondent herein) as follows:

Declaration of title to all that parcel of land lying and situate within the Greenbelt Forest Reserve at Ahansoyewodea-Adansi, Ashanti sharing boundaries in the East with Ayaase; West with Odumasi railway line; South with Akrofuom and in the North with Obuasi which was released to the Plaintiff [Appellant] Stool by the Forestry Department of the Forest Service Division, Accra for farming and residential purposes.

Recovery of possession.

Damages for trespass

Perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant, his successors in title, assigns, agents, privies and all persons claiming title through him from trespassing onto the Plaintiff’s aforesaid parcel of land.

Any other reliefs deemed fit by the Honourable Court.

[2.1]. The Appellant described herself as the Queen mother (Obaahemaa) of Akrokerri in the Adansi area of the Ashanti Region of Ghana, and in that capacity instituted the action which culminated in the instant appeal. That as the custodian of all Akrokerri Stool lands, a portion of which lands was taken over by the Government of Ghana and converted into a forest reserve (referred to as the Greenbelt Forest Reserve), the Appellant wrote to the Chief Conservator of Forest, Forestry Department, who managed the said reserve (parcel of land) on behalf of the Government, and requested a portion of the Greenbelt Forest Reserve to be released to the Appellant and the Akrokerri Community for farming and residential purposes, at a place commonly known as Ahansonyewodea.

That by a letter dated 21st January, 1999, the Forestry Department, through the Chief Conservator of Forest, released a parcel of the land, the subject matter of this suit, within the Greenbelt Forest Reserve, to the Appellant. The Appellant, in turn, put the said parcel of land in the care of the Odikro of Ahansonyewodea.

The Appellant averred that after the release of the parcel of land to the Appellant, the Appellant exercised control and management of the land until in or about 2008 when Appellant noticed development works springing up on the parcel of land. That the Appellant’s enquiries disclosed that the Respondent, the Bobriase Stool, then occupied by one Nana Amakye Kai of Brahabebome, had allocated portions of the said parcel of land to developers without the consent and concurrence of the Appellant. That the Respondent had no authorization from the Forest Service Division to allocate or deal with the parcel of lands in any manner whatsoever, and all attempts by the Appellant to get the Respondent to stop dealing with the disputed parcel of land, have proved futile.

The Appellant, therefore, prayed the Court for the reliefs stated above.

[2.2]. In their amended statement of defence, the Respondent denied the Appellant’s material averments, and stated that the entire Greenbelt Forest area covers the Respondent’s Stool lands, as well as the Appellant’s Stool lands. That even though Ahansonyewodea was released to the Akrokerri Stool (Appellant’s Stool), some portions of the Greenbelt area belonged to the Bobriase Stool (Respondent’s Stool). That the Bobriase Stool entered a portion of the land with the approval of the Obuasi Municipal Assembly. The Respondent averred further that it is the Ahansonyewodea portion of the Greenbelt Forest Reserve that was released to the Appellant, and not the entire Greenbelt Forest Reserve which included or covered lands belonging to the Respondent. That the Respondent Stool does not need the consent and concurrence of the Appellant to allocate or deal with the Respondent’s own lands, and that the Bobriase Stool lands, including the Kwame Duokrom lands, forming part of the Greenbelt Forest Reserve, have been in the possession of the Respondent Stool for over 200 years without any hinderance whatsoever.

[2.3]. The Respondent, accordingly, counterclaimed against the Appellant as follows:

Declaration of allodial title to all that parcel of land measuring 320.50 acres lying in Kwame Duokrom sharing boundaries on the North with Boete on Akrokerri stool land, on the South with Odumasi stool lands, on the West with Ahansonyewodea and on the East with Ayaase stool land specifically Gyimisu Kakaraba with boundary marks being Kwabenafo River and Nkaasu Stream.

Recovery of possession.

Perpetual injunction restraining the plaintiff her agents, assigns and any person claiming through them from challenging the defendant’s allodial title to the said parcel of land and from having anything to do with the said land.

Any other reliefs as the Honourable court may consider just.

[2.4]. The Respondent averred also that the Appellant’s action was statute barred.

[3.0]. JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT

The trial High Court delivered judgment on the 29th July, 2020, and granted the reliefs claimed by the Appellant against the Respondent.

The learned trial Court reasoned that the evidence led at the trial preponderated in favour of the Appellant’s case, in that, no land(s) belonging to the Respondent formed part of the lands acquired by the Government for purposes of the Greenbelt Forest Reserve. It was, therefore, difficult to conceive, in the absence of cogent evidence to the contrary, how the Respondent came to assert ownership of land within the area of Greenbelt Forest Reserve. More particularly, the Court found the testimony of the district officer from the Bekwai District of the Forestry Commission which oversees the reserve, as more credible and deserving of the Court’s belief.

The learned trial Court Judge observed (at page 139 of volume 2 of the ROA) as follows:

“The evidence of PW1 a public officer together with the documents tendered by him as well as the contents of the Executive Instrument corroborated the evidence of the Plaintiff [Appellant herein] that the stools whose land were taken to constitute the Greenbelt Forest Reserve were Akrokerri, Ayaase and Akrofuom. No mention was made of Bobriase stool that its land form part of the Greenbelt Forest Reserve. The said Executive Instrument (E.I. 29) Forest (Greenbelt Forest Reserve) Order, 1969 was signed by J. Ofori Torto; the Commissioner Responsible for Forestry. That was during the National Liberation Council Regime. The second schedule of the E.I. 29 stated that only the subjects of Akrofuom, Ayaase and Akrokerri were to have unrestricted access to the reserve. Where then was Bobriase stool when the E.I. was passed and only the subjects of Akrokerri, Ayaase and Akrofuom were the only people who could enter the reserve for other purposes.

The evidence on record in its totality established that no land belonging to the Bobriase Stool was ever made part of the Reserve by the Government in 1969. The evidence showed that the land released to the Akrokerri Stool by the Forestry Commission included Kwame Duakrom. See exhibit A which clearly demarcated the area as part of the Reserve and released to the Plaintiff which included Kwame Duakrom.”

The Court concluded at page 140 that:

“In sum the evidence on record is that Kwame Duakrom [claimed by the Respondent] falls within the Greenbelt Reserve which is part of the Ahansoyewodea area released to the Plaintiff. There is an Odikro of Ahansoyewodea who oversees the land in the area including Kwame Duakrom for the Plaintiff Stool i.e. Akrokerri Stool.

The Defendant has not applied to the State Institution in charge of the Forest Reserve for the release of any land. All that the Defendant did is to hide behind AngloGold Ashanti Limited and the District Assembly to claim the land in dispute. These are not the institutions in charge of Forest Reserves in Ghana.

Without any authorization from the Plaintiff [Appellant] Stool which holds the allodial title to the carved-out portions of the Reserve for them whatever conduct exhibited by the Defendant [Respondent] in demarcating lands in the area is an act of criminal trespass. This is because once there is a trespass into a forest reserve without authorization, same constitutes a criminal offence under the laws of Ghana….

As already stated, the Defendant has not applied to any State Institution in charge of Forest Reserve for the release of any land and even if the Defendant applied, he would not be successful as the Government never constituted any part of Bobriase Stool land into a forest reserve.”

The Respondent’s counterclaim was, accordingly, dismissed.

Dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial High Court, the Respondent lodged an appeal to the Court of Appeal, and prayed the Court of Appeal to set aside the judgment of the High Court.

[4.0]. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL

By a judgment delivered on the 15th February 2024, the Court of Appeal accepted the Respondent’s case, challenging the legality of the release by the Chief Conservator of Forest, of the disputed land to the Appellant, and set aside the judgment of the trial High Court.

The Court of Appeal observed (at page 425 of vol. 3 of the ROA) as follows:

“The area was released to be developed into a township. The tone and nature of the release letter indicates a total removal of the released land from the Greenbelt Forest Reserve. The central issue for our enquiry is as to whether the Chief Conservator of Forests, or for that matter the Forestry Commission itself or the Minister of Lands, had the authority to permanently remove a portion of a forest reserve created by law, that is an Executive Instrument?

To begin with, it is only the President who has been given authority under sections 3 and 16 of the Forests Act, 1927 (CAP 157), to create a forest reserve. The President does this by gazetting of an Executive Instrument. The power to declare a piece of land as no more a reserve is also reserved in the President”

The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal noted that even though the Chief Conservator of Forest has a wide discretion in the management of a forest reserve under CAP 157, it is only the President who under an executive instrument, has the authority to “uncreate a forest reserve or a portion thereof as in the instant case.” The Court, therefore, reasoned that the letter by the Chief Conservator of Forests, purporting to carve out 10 acres of the Greenbelt Forest Reserve for the Appellant’s Stool, was an act in illegality. That the said authorization was made ultra vires, having usurped the power of the President under section 19 of CAP 157.

The Court also rejected the argument by the Appellant that the Chief Conservator of Forests be presumed to have regularly performed his official duty in the demise of the disputed parcel of land to the Appellant’s Stool.

[4.1]. Having found that the Chief Conservator of Forests could not properly release the land to the Appellant, the Court proceeded to find that the said release conferred no legal interest whatsoever on the Appellant in respect of the said land, with the effect that the Appellant “had no capacity to institute the action” against the Respondent.

On a similar footing, the Court dismissed the Respondent’s counterclaim. The Court reasoned that the Respondent, having argued that only the President could declassify a portion of a forest reserve as no more a reserve, and having not received any Presidential Executive Instrument themselves declaring the Kwame Duakrom portion [claimed by the Respondent] as no more part of the Greenbelt Forest reserve, the Respondent “equally lacked capacity to institute the counterclaim” against the Appellant.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal concluded, inter alia, (at page 429 volume 3 of the ROA) as follows:

“We hereby uphold the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court dated 29 July 2020, with all its consequential orders, including the award of damages and costs. In an unusual fashion, we dismiss the suit of the Respondent instituted by a writ of summons on 14 November 2017, numbered Suit No: CI/12/17. We equally dismiss the counterclaim of the Appellant filed in response to the suit.”

[5.0]. GROUNDS OF APPEAL

Aggrieved by the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the Appellant lodged the instant appeal on the grounds that:

The judgment of the Honourable Court of Appeal is against the weight of evidence before it.

The Court of Appeal erred when on the face of the evidence failed to pronounce on the allodial interest ownership of the disputed land between the parties herein.

The Court of Appeal erred when it proceeded to determine the issue of the legality or otherwise of the letter of the Chief Conservator of Forests which was urged for the first time on appeal by the Defendant/Appellant/Respondent herein.

The Honourable Court of Appeal erred when it held that the Plaintiff/Respondent/Appellant did not have capacity to institute the action.

The Honourable Court of Appeal erred when it held that the presumption of regularity under section 37 of the Evidence Act, 1975 [NRCD 323] was inapplicable to the instant suit.

Further grounds of appeal to be filed upon receipt of the Record of Appeal.

[6.0]. APPELLANT’S ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT

In their statement of case filed on the 21st August 2024, and reply to Respondent’s statement of case which reply was filed on the 2nd October 2024, Counsel for the Appellant, arguing grounds (a), (b), (c) and (d) together, submitted that contrary to the Respondent’s assertion, there is no evidence on record to establish that land[s] belonging to the Bobriase Stool was ever made part of the forest reserve by the Government in 1969. That based on these concrete findings by the trial Court, the Court of Appeal should have, “at the very least pronounced on the allodial title holder of the said lands.” That the failure to do so has led to an unfortunate state of affairs where the trespassers or developers continue to develop the land without resort to any authority. That the failure by the Court of Appeal to make a determination as to the allodial ownership of the disputed parcel of land, has led to a perpetuation of unlawful encroachment of the released land, notwithstanding that the Appellant holds the allodial title to the lands.

Counsel has argued further that the act of the Chief Conservator of Forest in releasing a part of the Greenbelt Forest reserve land to the Akrokerri Stool, constituted an act towards the management of the Greenbelt Forest reserve and not an act un-creating a forest reserve. That even if the act of the Chief Conservator of Forests is described as un-creating a forest reserve, there was not enough evidence on record for the Court of Appeal to have considered this issue for the first time on appeal and to have a definitive pronouncement that the said act was illegal. That the Respondent herein cannot call in aid the Forests Act, 1927 [CAP 157] to save their unlawful sale of the forest lands released to the Appellant as equity will not allow a statute to be used as an instrument of fraud.

Counsel has argued that by the terms of the release, the teak poles and economic trees in the forest reserve were to be maintained. That what this implies is that the Forestry Commission, through the Chief Conservator of Forests, sought to send the signal that the control and management of the forest reserve was still within the domain of the Forestry Commission. To uncreate a forest reserve would mean that the Government no longer has control over the forest reserve and could not impose conditions as it did in this case. That neither was the issue of whether or not the land released to the Appellant by the Chief Conservator of Forests was lawful raised before the trial High Court nor did the Respondent adduce any evidence at the trial to establish that the said release or alienation was not lawful. Counsel, therefore, submits that the Honourable Court of Appeal erred when they held that the presumption of regularity under section 37 of the Evidence Act, 1975 [NRCD 323] was inapplicable to the instant suit.

[7.0]. ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENT

In the statement of case filed on the 13th September 2024, Counsel for the Respondent has submitted that, in the light of the fact that the Greenbelt Forest Reserve is covered by an existing law (i.e. E.I. 29 of 1969), the Appellant could not have obtained a release of the said land from the Chief Conservator of the Forestry Commission. According to Counsel, the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal were justified when they concluded that the Chief Conservator of Forest of the Forestry Commission had no power, statutory or otherwise, to release the land in dispute to the Appellant. That since the Appellant’s Stool trace their root of title to the release by the Chief Conservator of Forests of the Forestry Commission, the Appellant thereby acquired no valid title to the disputed parcel of land.

Counsel has submitted that the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal rightly held that the Appellant lacked “capacity” to maintain the instant suit against the Respondent. According to Counsel, the issue for determination before this Honourable Court is not about the allodial ownership of the land in dispute, but rather whether the Chief Conservator of Forests had the mandate or power to alienate a portion of the Greenbelt forest Reserve area to the Appellant herein. That in the absence of any such authority on the part of the Chief Conservator, it remains the sole preserve of the President of Ghana, under section 19 of the Forests Act (CAP 157), to declare a forest reserve as no longer a forest reserve. Consequently, Counsel has urged upon the Honourable Court to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

[8.0]. DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL/CONCLUSION

My lords, the judgment of the Court of Appeal was founded on Section 19 of the Forests Act, 1927 (CAP 157), which provides as follows:

“19. Power to declare forest no longer reserved

The President may, if satisfied that a particular land should not be a forest reserve, by executive instrument published in the Gazette, direct that from a date specified in the order the land or a portion of that land reserved under this Act shall cease to be a forest reserve.”

From the tenor of the provision, it is quite clear that the President is the proper person to direct that a reserved land or a portion thereof shall cease to be a forest reserve.

Counsel for the Appellant has argued that because the question of the validity of the Chief Conservator’s release of the land to the Appellant Stool was not raised by the pleadings, the Appellant was not afforded an opportunity to lead evidence as to the authority of the Chief Conservator of Forests in the circumstances, to release the disputed land to the Appellant. Counsel for the Respondent, on the other hand, has argued that the parties herein were both claiming the land illegally, and therefore, the conclusion reached by the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal ought to be affirmed by this Honourable Court.

At page 34 of their statement of case, Counsel for the Respondent submitted:

“My Lords, the truth of the matter was that both the Respondent and the Appellant were illegally and unlawfully claiming title to that portion of the Greenbelt Forest Reserve. That land undoubtedly was vested in the Government of Ghana in terms of E.I. 29. Both the claim of the Appellant and the Counterclaim of the Respondent at the High Court were founded on pure illegalities and therefore the Court of Appeal was right when it struck out the counterclaim of the Respondent and also dismissed the Appellant’s claim to the land in controversy.” This followed the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal, as indicated above, that:

[8.1]. My lords, the publication by the President of Executive Instrument No.29 of 1969 by which the lands in question were declared Forest Reserve is in the nature of compulsory acquisition of the lands in question the effect of which is clearly spelt out in the case of Memuna Moudy and Others vs. Antwi [2003-2004] SCGLR 967, this Court pointed out that:

“Land compulsorily acquired by government under the Public Lands Ordinance, Cap 134 (1951 Rev), vests automatically in the government upon a publication in the gazette; and further that by virtue of section 11 of the Ordinance, the acquisition operates to bar and destroy “all other estates, rights, titles, remainders, reversions, limitations, trusts and interests whatsoever of and in the lands” acquired. And under section 12(2), a certificate of title issued by the court in respect of the acquired land confers upon the holder “an absolute title and indefeasible right to the lands free from all adverse or competing rights, titles, interests, trusts, claims and demands whatsoever.” The rights, estates, limitations, etc are those existing in the land at the date of the acquisition, i.e. at the date of the publication of the gazette. Those are the interests which are forever barred or destroyed. Since the statute does not expressly bar the acquisition of any interest whatsoever in the land by the previous owner or persons claiming through him, in the future, the previous owner, who nevertheless continues to remain on the land after the land has been vested in the State, can maintain an action or defence based on his adverse possession. The previous owner can also pray in aid of his claim or defence, the statute of limitation under section 30(1) of the Limitation Decree, 1972 (NRCD 54). The Court of Appeal erred in holding otherwise”.

The fact that the Appellant saw the need to apply for a release of a portion of the land acquired for the purpose of a Forest Reserve in 1969 is itself an acknowledgement that the control of the land was no more in the hands of the Appellant or whoever had authority over the said land before its acquisition by the Government in 1969 by EI. 29. So issues of allodial title over the land does not arise for consideration by the Court. From the evidence on record, the main issue is whether or not the land in dispute has been properly released to any of the parties before this Court. The Appellant claims that she applied to the Chief Conservator of Forests of the Forestry Commission who authorised the said release. The question that follows is therefore whether the Chief Conservator of Forests of the Forestry Commission was vested with power to so authorize the release of the land in question. This is a question of law and not of facts and it can therefore be raised at any time as long as no viva voce evidence will be required in order to resolve the said question. The answer to the question, my lords, is found in section 19 of the Forests Act, 1927 (CAP 157) which, at the risk of sounding repetitive, is reproduced once more. That:

“19. Power to declare forest no longer reserved

[8.2]. My lords, I think the language of the above provision is clear that it is only the President who is given the power and the discretion to direct that from a date specified in an order the land or a portion of that land reserved under this Act shall cease to be a forest reserve, if the “President is satisfied that a particular land should not be a forest reserve”. Even then, my lords, the said order shall be made in an Executive Instrument which shall also be published in the gazette. Clearly, therefore, not only is the Chief Conservator of Forests of the Forestry Commission bereft of power to release any part of the Forest Reserve to any person whatsoever let alone do same by a letter. The Court of Appeal was therefore right in holding that both the Appellant and the Respondent herein lack capacity and the locus standi to sue for a declaration of title to the land in question, as well as the consequential reliefs which they sought. I will therefore vote to affirm the judgment delivered by the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal on the 15th February 2024 with the consequence that the instant appeal is dismissed. As a consequential order, we hereby restrain the parties and any person claiming under or through them from interfering with or dealing with the land in dispute in any manner inconsistent with the interest of the State unless released in accordance with the regulating statute. We make no order as to costs.

(SGD.) S. K. A. ASIEDU