The offence of the abetment of a crime, as defined in section 20 (1) of Act 29, may only be committed if the act or omission of another party which is purposely aided, facilitated, encouraged or promoted itself constitutes a crime. Therefore, if it is shown that the act or omission complained of in that other person does not amount to a crime known to our law, any act of whatever nature which aids, facilitates, encourages or promotes the commission of that other act, is not punishable as a crime.
Absence of the necessary intent in the principal offender
The essential ingredient of the crime of forging a will, contra sec. 314 (1) of the Criminal Code, is that the forgery must be made with one or other of the following intents, namely, “intent to defraud, intent to defeat, obstruct or pervert the course of justice.” In the absence of such intent, the “forgery” is no offence against sec. 314 (1), and the existence of the intent in an abettor of the “forgery” could not supply the lack of intent in the “forger,” so as to make the “forgery” an offence against the section. And, indeed, each of the charges as laid in the information against Mensah for abetting, alleges that Tabi and Anyimadu had such an intent to defraud.
For unlike a conspirator, an abettor stands alone. It is only in conspiracy charges that one person cannot be found guilty or innocent and the other found innocent or guilty as the case may be. Thus a person who is charged with abetment of a crime can be found not guilty even though the crime itself is found to have been committed by the person who he is alleged to have been abetted.
