In his summing-up to the assessors, and in his judgment, the learned Judge completely overlooked a most important fact which stares one in the face - the fact that the appellant was not seeing the things that every one else saw, and that he firmly believed (in spite of what every one else said) that what he was saying was the truth. The learned Judge, therefore, failed to direct himself and the assessors on the question of the state of mind of the appellant at the time when he committed the act, in order to determine whether or not he was a fit subject for punishment in respect of the act. It appears to us that the learned Judge was led into this error by reason of the fact that a defence of insanity or of insane delusion was not put up. “Guilty but insane” is not a plea open to an accused person. It is a “special verdict” based upon facts which a jury or Judge can find upon the whole of the evidence, whether that evidence was led by the prosecution, or by the defence, or by both.
It follows from this that the Jury received what we feel was an inadequate direction upon insanity and insane delusion, and upon the effects of these on the kind of verdict which is appropriate in such cases. We feel that, had they received a fuller direction upon these matters, the Jury would almost inevitably (in the light of the evidence) have entered a special verdict of “Guilty but Insane.”
Epilepsy relied on as unconsciousness due to disease of the mind
Now the allegation of the appellant that he is subject to epileptic fits, and the inference he wished the trial court to draw, namely, that he killed his wife while he was a subject of such a fit is a plea that the crime was committed by reason of unconsciousness due to a disease of the mind. It therefore is a plea of insanity.
In the case of R. v. Grumah (2 W.A.L.R. 255), the West African Court of Appeal held that for the purposes of section 52 (2) of the Criminal Code an insane delusion is a state of mind (induced by mental disease) in which a false belief is held that cannot be shaken by facts. That decision was followed by this Court in the case of R. v. Ayaaba Kusasi. In the judgment delivered in that case on the 28th March, 1958, their Lordships not only cited the case of R. v. Grumah, but also indicated their approval of the rationes decidendi drawn therefrom by the learned Editor of that judgment, namely, that section 52 (2) of the Criminal Code is concerned principally with whether or not the insanity is of such a nature as to render punishment pointless; it is not concerned with the form the delusion takes. We are of opinion that that is a proper interpretation of section 52 (2), and we so declare it.
M’Naghten Rules distinguished from the Criminal Code
The learned Judge summed up to the Jury on the issue of insanity, and called attention to the contents of page 15 of the 34th Edition of Archbold. The passage which he seems to have read is concerned with the answers of the English Judges which have become known as the M’Naghten Rules. The passage in question is not related to the provisions of Section 52 (2) of our Code.
It appears to this Court upon a critical examination of the evidence that, although the appellant is guilty of the act charged against him, he was insane at the time the act was done so as not to be responsible according to law for his actions. Acting, therefore, in accordance with section 11 (4) of the Court of Appeal Ordinance, we quash the sentence passed at the trial, and we order that the appellant be kept in custody as a criminal lunatic at the Mental Hospital, Accra, and that he do receive the necessary treatment, until the Governor-General’s pleasure be known.
We are of opinion that the reason given for the rejection of the plea of insanity is not well founded, and that the learned trial-Judge failed to take a proper view of the facts. It is commonplace that a mentally deranged or an insane person can be “calm.”
