Self-defence in Ghana case law.

We do not think that a person who stands his ground and challenges his opponent to a deadly fight can reasonably be held to be a person who believes that his life was in imminent danger.

YEBOAH v. THE STATE [1967] GLR 512 [1967] SLR (CA) 36 · Court of Appeal · 1967 · AZU CRABBE JA

Section 63 (4) of Cap. 9 itself provided that a person may justify “any necessary force or harm” for the protection of himself against murder. To justify the use of force or harm under that section, therefore, it must be shown that it was reasonably necessary in all the circumstances to use it. Further, a person can justify the killing of another in self-defence, only in the “case of extreme necessity.

YEBOAH v. THE STATE [1967] GLR 512 [1967] SLR (CA) 36 · Court of Appeal · 1967 · AZU CRABBE JA

But in our opinion the learned trial judge erred in favour of the appellant, because a plea of self-defence would not avail an accused person under our law, unless he could lead some evidence to show (1) that the harm which he caused to the deceased, resulting in the latter’s death, was reasonably necessary; and (2) that he caused the harm in circumstances of extreme necessity, that is, that short of killing the deceased, there was no other means of saving his own life. It is sufficient if the accused believed on reasonable grounds, though mistaken in his belief, that his life was in danger. We think that this is in accord with the view of the Lord Justice-General, Lord Normand, when he said in Owens v. H.M. Advocate 1946 S.C. (J.) 119, cited in R. v. Chisam (1963) 47 Cr.App.R. 130 at p.134,C.C.A.: “self-defence is made out when it is established to the satisfaction of the jury that the panel believed that he was in imminent danger and that he held that belief on reasonable grounds. Grounds for such belief may exist though they are founded on a genuine mistake of fact.”

YEBOAH v. THE STATE [1967] GLR 512 [1967] SLR (CA) 36 · Court of Appeal · 1967 · AZU CRABBE JA

And granted that it was the deceased who first attacked him we think that if the assault had ceased when he retaliated, his conduct amounted to revenge and not defence. In R. v. Driscoll (1841) Car. & M.214, Coleridge J. summed up the law as follows at pp. 214-215: “If one man strikes another a blow, that other has a right to defend himself, and to strike a blow in his defence, but he has no right to revenge himself: and if, when all the danger is past, he strikes a blow not necessary for his defence, he commits an assault and a battery. It is a common error to suppose, that one person has a right to strike another who has struck him, in order to revenge himself, and it very often influences people’s minds; and I have, therefore, thought it right to state what the law upon the subject really is.”

YEBOAH v. THE STATE [1967] GLR 512 [1967] SLR (CA) 36 · Court of Appeal · 1967 · AZU CRABBE JA