Where the determination of a case depends upon facts and the court forms the opinion that a prima facie case has been made, the court should proceed to examine the case for the defence in three stages: (1). Firstly it should consider whether the explanation of the defence is acceptable, if it is, that provides complete answer, and the court should acquit the defendant; (2). If the court should find itself unable to accept, or if it should consider the explanation to be not true, it should then proceed to consider whether the explanation is nevertheless reasonably probable, if it should find it to be, the court should acquit the defendant; and (3). Finally quite apart from the defendant’s explanation or the defence taken by itself, the court should consider the defence such as it is together with the whole case, i.e., prosecution and defence together, and be satisfied of the guilt of the defendant beyond reasonable doubt before it should convict, if not, it should acquit.
Burden of proving guilty knowledge where possession is proved
With very great respect to the learned trial judge this court was of the opinion that the foregoing passages contained very serious misdirections on the burden of proof which go to the very root of the whole case. Even though once possession was proved the onus was upon the accused to prove lawful authority or excuse the onus still remained on the prosecution to give conclusive evidence that possession was accompanied with guilty knowledge.
Circumstantial evidence that raises only suspicion
In a case where the evidence is purely circumstantial and establishes nothing more than suspicion, the judge must draw attention to the necessity of some piece of evidence that is more than mere suspicion and which would lead to one conclusion and one conclusion only, that is, to the guilt of the prisoner. One cannot put a multiple of suspicions together and make proof of it. For circumstantial evidence to support a conviction it must be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, and must lead to the irresistible conclusion not only that the crime charged has been committed, but that it was in fact committed by the person or persons charged and by no other person; in other words the evidence on the whole must exclude the probability that the alleged crime could have been committed by some person or persons other than the person or persons before the court.
Comparing the case for the prosecution with the case for the defence
Be that as it may, a trial court, if it concludes a case by saying it believes the prosecution as against the defence, or to use the expression here that the prosecution’s case is more worthy of belief, will not be deciding the case on a balance of probability. It will only be drawing a conclusion as regards the truthfulness or otherwise of the case put forward by both sides which it is entitled to do. And the law is that even if it does not believe the accused’s story it should consider whether or not it is reasonably probable in which case it must acquit. But if it accepts the prosecution’s story as more truthful and goes on to consider it as establishing the case beyond reasonable doubt it is entitled to convict. A mere comparison of the evidence of the two sides is not tantamount to deciding a case on a balance of probability. The trial court is bound to weigh the two stories and decide which one to accept and for what reasons always bearing in mind that the accused assumes no burden to prove his innocence.
There is no magic formula for a trial court in directing itself as to the burden and standard of proof required in criminal cases; it is sufficient if it directs its attention to the fact that the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt rests with the prosecution.
The principle is that an accused person has a choice to either testify or to remain dumb. No matter which way he chooses, it is still incumbent on the prosecution to prove any charge leveled against him beyond reasonable doubt. That assessment could only be made by considering both the factual and legal substance of the case led by the prosecution without necessarily looking at what the defence or accused had said or intends to say. In my view therefore, the requirement that the prosecution has to establish a prima facie case against an accused before the accused could be called upon to open his defence is another way of saying that such evidence or case led must be such that it should leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable person that it was the accused who committed the offence so that where the accused failed to give any explanation to rebut the guilt staring in his face, he would by all means be convicted.
What this implies is that whether the accused person testifies or not, it is still the duty of the prosecution to establish or prove the charges preferred against him and the standard of proof required by law is; ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’. A person is not pronounced guilty just because he refused to testify. He is pronounced guilty only when the evidence led by the prosecution in respect of the charge(s) satisfied the standard of proof required by law and that is; ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’. If at the close of the prosecution’s case the prosecution was able to prove all the essential ingredients or prerequisites of the crime alleged and the prisoner or accused refuses to say anything in explanation or in defence, it would mean that the prosecution had proved the charge(s) against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. That is because the prisoner or accused could not offer any explanation to rebut the allegations established which prima facie, constituted proof.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt not proof beyond every possible doubt
The prosecution bears the burden of proving every element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt, but this does not require proof beyond every possible doubt. The evidence must be assessed as a whole.
Proof of a link between bloodstains on the accused and the deceased
The burden of proof in trial on an indictment for murder is a very high one and the prosecution is not relieved of this burden merely by proving that blood was found in the clothes of the appellant. In this case where the prosecution seeks to rely on the allegation that human blood was found in the clothes of the appellant it was incumbent on them to prove also that the blood was that the deceased or at least of the same group as that of the deceased, otherwise they would have failed completely in establishing a nexus between the appellant and the killing.
