The offence is in two forms. The first is; to agree with a common purpose for or in committing or abetting a crime while the second is; to act together with a common purpose for or in committing or abetting a crime. Under the first, the offence is committed when the said persons agreed with a common purpose for or in committing or abetting a crime though in the end, the agreement was not carried into fruition. The second entails a situation where the said persons never had any previous agreement or deliberations for or in committing or abetting a crime though they acted together in committing or abetting a crime. Both situations, when established beyond reasonable doubt, constitute the offence of conspiracy.
The effect of the new formulation of the offence of conspiracy as defined by this court is that the persons must not only agree or act, but must agree to act together for a common purpose. Having regard to this new formulation of the offence of conspiracy a person could no longer be guilty of conspiracy in the absence of any prior agreement.
In the opinion of this court, the Ghana law of conspiracy is wider in scope and in content than the English law on the subject. It consists not only in the criminal agreement between two minds, but also in the acting together in furtherance of a common criminal objective.
As the trial court rightly opined in its ruling on the submission of no case to answer and in the judgment that followed afterwards, the main ingredients that have to be proved in a conspiracy charge are: 1. There must be at least two or more parties to the agreement or action. 2. The two or more parties must agree or act together. 3. They must do so with a common purpose. 4. The common purpose in their agreeing or acting together must be to commit a crime.
It is rare in conspiracy cases for there to be direct evidence of the agreement which is the gist of the crime. This usually has to be proved by evidence of subsequent acts, done in concert and so indicating a previous agreement. In the view of this court the conduct of appellants on that Sunday in March, 1961, in the house of first appellant shows some collaboration between them which is evidence of a previous agreement to carry a criminal design into effect. There was in this case sufficient evidence directed and confined to the facts which constitute the anterior conspiracy, and therefore in the opinion of this court the inclusion of a count of conspiracy in the instant charge was perfectly justified.
